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This thesis examines representations resulting from the Battle of the Atlantic. 
Representations of the Second World War have changed little since 1950; there has been 
even less in portrayals of the Atlantic Campaign. Participant's experiences were distilled into 
myths: the essence of the events and emotions. Portrayals were written mainly by 
participants. They embodied what those participants wanted to recall and communicate, and 
continuity dominated movement in both representation and interpretation. 
The readily available primary sources tell us little about postwar perceptions of the 
Atlantic. Secondary sources have been used for the first time to define, describe and 
illustrate military and civilian mythologies of the Atlantic Battle from many countries, principally 
Britain, Germany, Canada and the United States of America. How and why participants and 
others created sense and relationships with their experiences through myth is explained. The 
limited penetration of popular culture by these portrayals explain their position among other 
recollections of modern wars. 
The sources of these mythologies in maritime culture and their origin during the Great 
War are shown. Their change and development through Second World War activities and 
national needs are traced. Without those national needs, postwar limitations upon authors 
and audiences, as well as the effects of the concentration of public memory upon other 
things, led to relative ignorance and isolation. The portrayals still embodied participants' 
requirements. 
After the Second World War types of representation and commemoration were 
defined and established. New sources and new interest in the subject after 1974 are 
demonstrated. These diverted interest and activity. Recent anniversaries and writing reveal 
the broad range of types of representation among several media, increasing academic depth 
and sophistication, and the healthy prospects for further elaboration and exploration. 
Change has been brought by the desire of new, younger non-participants to rework and 
reinterpret old events and myths in order to achieve greater understanding, and promote more 
awareness and commemoration of relatively neglected people and their times. 
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C- 
Have You Seen The Old Man 
Outside The Seamen's Mission? 
Memory Fading With The Medal 
Ribbons That He Wears 
And In Our Winter City 
The Rain Cries Little Pity 
For One More Forgotten Hero 
& A World That Doesn't Care 
So How Can You Tell Me You're Lonely? 
And Say For You That The Sun Don't Shine 
Let Me Take You By The Hand 
& Lead You Through The Streets Of London 
I'll Show You Something To Make You Change Your Mind 
Ralph McTell 
For Jim 
Whom I Knew But Never Knew 
For The Men Of M.T. Inverlane, 
M.V. San Adolfo 
& S.S. Oakcrest... 
For All Who Fought 
In The Battle Of The Atlantic 
& Were Forgotten 
& Those Who Loved Them 
And For All Other Young Men & Women, 
In Peace Or War, 
Who Have Died Before Their Time. 
Author's Note 
Due to the unusually large number of books and films used as 
primary sources, 
they have not been footnoted fully in the text, 
both for reasons of space, and for convenience. 
All are fully cited in the bibliography. 
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TECHNICAL & IDIOMATIC TERMS 
N.B. Italicised terms are found elsewhere in the Glossary. 
AA: Anti-Aircraft: guns or vessels. 
a/c: Aircraft. 
Adm: Admiral; Admiralty. 
AMC: Armed Merchant Cruiser: Ocean liner armed with surplus weaponry as stop-gap patrol cruiser by 
RN. Some lost in heroic actions with KM surface raiders, others sunk by U-Boats, rest converted to 
[more effective] troopships. 
Armed Guard: (USN) equivalent of Maritime Royal Artillery Regiment, or RN DEMS personnel. 
ASDiC: Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, 1918-22, which developed a sonic pulse-
transmitter capable of detecting, under ideal conditions, a submerged object. Technologically distinct 
from SONAR, ASDIC used the piezoelectric effect on quartz to produce ultrasonic pulse. With an audible 
carrier for operator's ears: this distinctive 'ping' is one of most the recognisable VWV2 sounds, & one of 
the most recognisable, if not identifiable, sounds of 20 111 Century. 
ASV: Air-to-Surface-Vessel RADAR; UHF, 10cm X, later 3cm. 
ASW: AntiSubmarine Warfare; aircraft or ships specially converted or constructed. 
ASWORG: USN ASW Operational Research Group. See OR. 
B-Dienst: Funkbeobachtungsdienst: Wehrmacht radio-monitoring & cryptographic service. 
BdU: Befehlshaber der U-Boote: Headquarters, Submarines, KM. 
BLACK GAP: Areas of Atlantic beyond the range of shore-based ASW patrol aircraft before April 1943, 
when VAA & escort-carrier [CVE]coverages met. 
BoA: in this thesis, the Battle of the Atlantic, campaign fought 3.9.39-7.5.45, & named as such by 
Churchill 6.5.41. 
Bofors: Swedish-made 37mm or 40mm rapid-fire cannon. Licence-built with Oerlikon, became universal 
AA/anti-submarine gun for all sides. 
Bold: KM effervescent decoy: contained chemical which produced mass of bubbles ASDIC returned 
echo from. 
Bombe: Unofficial term for the Polish-designed electromechanical scanning machines constructed at BP 
for analysing Enigma codes, due to the continuous ticking they made when operating. 
BP: Bletchley Park: Buckinghamshire mansion NW of London where British GC&CS was based and 
Enigma codes were analysed and eventually broken. 
CAMShip: Catapault Aircraft Merchantman: 2ND of 4 measures to give convoys organic air cover: 
obsolete fighter mounted on catapult on bows of MV to provide 1 -shot' defence of convoy against patrol 
or anti-shipping aircraft, 1941. 
Capt: Captain. 
CC or CoCom: Coastal Command (RAF). 
Cdr: Commander. 
CinCWA: Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches Command, RN. 
CNO: (USN) Chief of Naval Operations: Admiral King, USN, 1941-45. 
CNWA: Canadian Northwest Atlantic: RCN-controlled Operational Zone after mid-1943, controlling 50% 
of BoA escorts. 
Comm: Commodore. 
Commerce-Raider: Warship designed or ship converted to attack Merchantmen, not enemy warships or 
submarines. 
COMINCH: Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet. (Fleet-Admiral King, USN, 1941-5.) 
Condor: Focke-Wulf Fw-200; modified airliner with guns, bombs, enhanced structural strength & range, 
for VLR convoy detection, guiding U-B to convoys, & shipping attack, operated by I-Staffel, KG-40, LW: 
but KM controlled. 
CVE: USN designation of Carrier-Vessel-Escort: Escort Carrier, which see. 
DC: Depth Charge[s]: explosive-filled 450-lb drums with hydrostatic detonator rolled over stern, lobbed 
from beams of ASW vessels or dropped by aircraft, to destroy submarines. Principal ASW weapon 1916- 
45; weak Amatol filling later replaced by Torpex, which raised lethality. Lethal radius still measured in 
feet, even if delivered accurately. Superseded by Acoustic Torpedo. 
DEMS: Defensively-Equipped Merchant Ships: ships so equipped or RN personnel for maintaining & 
training MN gun crews. 
Drumbeat: Translation of Paukenschlag. It actually means a 'hit', not a 'roll', on the drums. 
Enigma: German commercial encryption machine adopted by all German armed forces in 1926. Based 
on multiply-positionable combinations of 3 [later 4 & then 5 of 8 interchangeable] rotors, plus a plugboard, 
Enigma offered millions of combinations of letters, supposedly beyond contemporary capabilities of 
manual decryption. See further Ultra. 
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Escort-Carrier: last & most effective of 4 measures to give convoys organic air cover: small carriers 
converted in UK, US & Canada from MV hulls & operating small numbers of ASW patrol a/c & fighters 
under austere conditions. 
Escort-Group: ASW vessels trained [theoretically] to operate as a group in defending convoys & 
attacking U-Boats. 
FCS: Fighter-Catapult-Ship: 1 51 of 4 measures to give convoys organic air cover: converted MV in RN 
with 2 obsolete fighters mounted for 2 '1-shot' missions against enemy patrol or anti-shipping aircraft. 
Like CAMship aircraft, FCS aircraft were only fighters, not ASW, & could be used only once, the pilot 
ditching alongside, or parachuting hopefully to recovery by an escort. Once US entered war & MACships 
& CVE's gradually became available, FCSs & CAMships reverted to Merchant ships or became 
depot/transport vessels for Landing-Craft. 
FdU: FOhrer der Underseeboote: Commander, Submarine Force; Commodore, later Admiral, Donitz 
1939-43; then Admiral Friedeberg, 1943-45. 
Fireman 1 s1 Tindal: senior Asian stoker, over stokers, under a Serang. 
Foxer: Simple acoustic decoy (several bars on chains) streamed aft from escorts to seduce GNAT 
seeker heads. 
GC&CS: Government Code & Cypher School: Brit. military cryptanalytic & cryptological establishment; 
the "Golf Cheese & Chess Society". See Ultra. 
GNAT: (RN) German Naval Accoustic Torpedo, known in KM as the T5 Zaunklinig ("Wren"). Could only 
home on vessels moving at more than 7kt & less than 25kt, & also susceptible to Foxer, which 
diminished their effect. As they were designed to hit escorts, tacit acceptance of the loss of German 
supremacy in the BoA, as MV had always been, & still were, more important targets than escort vessels. 
Allied Acoustic Torpedoes were also developed, & used effectively against U-Boats, principally by ASW 
aircraft. 
GRT: Gross Registered Tons: internal volume of a vessel: allowing 1GRT =100 cubic ft. 
Guerre de Course: [French] "War on trade": war on merchant shipping as practiced historically, & 
ultimately by U-Boats. 
Hedgehog: Stop-gap ahead-throwing weapon to counter 'dead zone' between loss of contact by ASDIC 
of U-Boat [as escort passed overhead] & when DC's could reach their detonation depth from the sides or 
stern of the escort. Developed against strong opposition from official channels in Adm; fired 24 contact-
fused depth bombs in pattern ahead from bows at shallowly-submerged U-Boat. Contact-fusing meant 
bombs did not detonate without striking the U-Boat. 
Huff-Duff: HF/DF: High-Frequency Direction-Finding: locating ships Wor U-Boat's by receivers in 
multiple vessels or shore-stations taking bearings on their radio transmissions. 
Hydra: Cypher used on the Enigma machine, using 3 rotors to create complicated encryption of 
messages. 
Hydrophone: underwater microphone forming passive SONAR in all navies. During WW2 more used by 
KM than Allies, & used since by everyone, as Passive SONAR, which unlike Active SONAR, does not 
disclose your position. 
KK: KorvettenKapitan: KM Commander [as German Army stipulated their ranks must be higher]. 
KM: Kriegsmarine, "WarMarine", Germany Navy 1935-45. 
I-St, KG-40: 1 STStaffel, Kampfsgeschwader-40, Luftflotte-5: 1 sTFlight, Bomber-Squadron-40, (AirFleet-3) 
of LW, operating Fw-200Condor VLR patrol/anti-shipping a/c, from Bordeaux-Merignac, France & 
Stavanger, Norway, 1940-44. 
KpLt: Kapitan-Leutnant: Lt.Cdr. "Herr Kaleu". 
KTB: Kriegstagebuch: "Day-war-diary", KM log kept at sea by ships & U-Bbat. 
KzS: Kapitan zur See: Captain. Derived from Army system, where a military officer always had to outrank 
his Naval equivalent. 
Lascar: Brit.Emp generic term for E.African, Arabic or Indian engine or deck personnel, hired by local 
agents & subordinate to designated seniors, replicating honour, duty, caste & allegiance-system ashore. 
LL: Lend-Lease: US Govt Act of Mar.1941 granting war supplies to Allies without demand for payment 
during war. 50% went to UK, c.25% went to USSR. 
LRE: Long-Range Escort: Fleet destroyers with converted boilerrooms for fuel & DC space for 
transAtlantic escort. 
Lt: Lieutenant. 
LtCdr: Lieutenant-Commander. 
LW: Luftwaffe: German Air Force. 
MACship: Merchant-Aircraft-Carrier: 3RD of 4 measures to give convoys organic air cover: Bulk carrier or 
tanker with superstructure cut down & flightdeck added to give extremely-austere external aircraft-
operating capability [without hangar spaces] for ASW & fighter aircraft, 1942-4. 
Milch-Cow: [properly Milchkuh] Specially-built U-Boat [typ-XIV] for refuelling & rearming U-Boat at sea. 
All sunk as priority by WAC & USN. 
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MN: Merchant Navy (term already in use unofficially before adoption in UK in 1928). 
MOMP: Mid-Ocean Meeting-Point: south of Iceland, where RN & USN [later RCN] exchanged escort 
responsibility. 
MRA: Maritime Royal Artillery: Brit.Army regiments, with RN DEMS; anti-raider & AA gun-manning on 
Merchant Ships. 
MS: Merchant Seaman. 
MT: Motor-Tanker. 
MV: Merchant Vessels, ships or otherwise; Motor-Vessel. 
NM: Nautical Mile, 6,080ft [1' of longitude at equator] as against land mile of 5,280ft. 
Oer!ikon: Swiss-made 20mm rapid-fire cannon; along with Bofors became ubiquitous AA gun when 
manufactured under licence by Allies and Germany. 
OIC: Operational Intelligence Centre: which compiled intel on KM & tracked U-Boat via sightings, HF/DF 
& radio intercepts. 
OKM: OberKommandoMarine: German Navy High Command. 
OKW: OberKommando Wehrmacht: German MoD/DoD & Combined Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces, 
1933-45. 
ONI: (USN) Office of Naval Intelligence, equivalent of Admiralty Intelligence Sections, not 01C. 
OP-20G: USN Operational-Group 20G; equiv of Adm. STR & BP. 
OR: Operational Research: scientific, tabulated, statistical & other investigations of convoy & escort 
tactics & technology intended to improve efficiency of personnel & systems, & increase lethality of 
weapons, sensors, & vessels. 
Paukenschlag: "Drumbeat", codename of 1 sT U-Boat operation off US coast following German 
Declaration of war on US. Paukenschlag is a single hit of the drum, not a "roll on the drums." 
PBY: USN designation of Consolidated Aviation Catalina medium-range ASW patrol aircraft. 
RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force. 
RADAR: Radio Detection And Ranging: UHF radiowave pulse-detection system, now ubiquitous, 
developed and perfected during WW2. 
RAdm: Rear-Admiral. 
RAF: Royal Air Force. 
RAN: " Australian Navy. 
RCAF: " Canadian Air Force. 
RCN: " Canadian Navy. RCNR /Reserve RCNVR/Nolunteer Reserve. 
Reichsmarine: Germany Navy 1919-35. 
RN: Royal Navy (gentlemen AND seamen). 
RNR: Royal Naval Reserve: non-Professional [non-seamen] reserve of Navy personnel (gentlemen, not 
seamen). 
RNVR: RN Volunteer Reserve: Professional [MN] reserve of Navy personnel (neither gentlemen nor 
seamen). 
RNZN: " New Zealand Navy. 
RNZNR: " " 	" 	" Reserve. 
RNZNVR: " 	" 	" Volunteer Reserve. 
S-Boot: "Schnelboot", German fast attack motorboats used to raid coastal convoys: the British termed 
them E-[Enemy]Boats, as they have become known. 
Schlussel-M: (Marine-Funkschlusselmachinen): KM version of Enigma encryption machine for telex & 
wireless communications. 
Serang: Chief Asian or Lascar seaman, when lascars employed. 
S-Gerat: KM equiv of ASDIC, Sond-Gerat: "Sound-Apparatus": active SONAR. 
SigInt: Signals Intelligence, the collection of enemy & neutral radio communications. Part of Comlnt, 
(Communications Intelligence) & in combination with cryptography, Radlnt (RADAR Intelligence, 
collecting the specifics of their power, type & characteristics) & more recently Telint (Telemetry 
Intelligence), a vital part of finding, & understanding enemy intentions force levels & deployments, so 
that combatants can be despatched to monitor or attack enemy activities. 
SKL: Seekriegsleitung: German Naval Staff. 
SLoC: Sea Lines of Communication: "Sea Lanes", & other inadequate concepts for describing convoy 
routes. 
Snorkel: [properly Schnorchel] Dutch-invented breathing-tube allowing submarines to refill airtanks & run 
diesel engines when at periscope-depth, enabling them to proceed less observably at speed while 
submerged. KM adopted 1943 from one found in a shipyard. 
Snowflake: Illumination rocket fired by escorts to illuminate convoys during U-Boat attack, before RADAR 
widely available. 
SOE: Senior Officer, Escort: in charge of the Naval Escort-Group or Groups defending a convoy. 
SONAR: SOund Navigation And Ranging: USN-develloped underwater detection equipment: with 
poorer-shaped dome; meant less passive [listening] capability than ASD1C, used magnetostrictive effect 
upon electrified nickel instead. 
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Squid: RN codename for 3-barrel mortar throwing full-sized DC's ahead of Esc, allowing it to maintain 
contact with U-Boat while delivering attack, & turn away from underwater detonations; previously DC's 
had to be discharged over the stern (creating blind-spot 'dead zone' in ASDIC beam as escort passed 
over submerged U-Boat) of fast-moving Esc to avoid damage to escort by detonation. Developed 1942- 
3, & deployed 1944, though not in great numbers by VE day. 
SqnLdr: Squadron Leader: RAF, RAAF, RCAF. 
SS: Steam-Ship. 
STR: Submarine Tracking Room: Section of Adm. in London run by Cdr.Rodger Winn QC which tracked 
& distributed U-Boat locations from sightings, U-Boat attacks, MV sinkings, & HF/DF contacts. 
Support-Group: RN, RCN & USN ASW vessel groups operating semi-independently round convoys to 
strike at U-Boats when U-Boats found convoys. Generally moved from threat-area to threat-area, or 
between one threatened convoy & another, instead of remaining with a single convoy throughout its 
voyage. Formed when escort-vessel numbers permitted from Nov.1942; but not deployed [due to use on 
Operation Torch ASW patrol] in Atlantic until March 1943, when their presence, along with VAA & CVEs, 
proved decisive in only 5 weeks, after 46 months of war.... 
TBS: Talk Between Ships, VHF radio for co-ordinating escorts. 
Triton: ("Shark" in GC&CS), Enigma U-Boat cypher, using 4 rotors instead of 3, intro'd Feb'42, not 
broken by BP till Dec.1942. 
U-Boat: Unterseeboote, "under-sea-boat", German submarines, generally of a few mass-produced types: 
VIIA-C, of 750T, 17kts/7 submerged; IXB-D of longer range, 1,1001, 17kt/7kt; Tye-X, XIV "Milch-Cow" 
Tanker; & Type-XXI, XXIII Ocean & Coastal types of hydrodynamic design, Snorkel-fitted standard, 
expanded battery capacity, & high (17kt) submerged speed; developed but not deployed early enough to 
affect the loss of German supremacy in the Atlantic. 
Ultra: UK codename for intelligence derived from cryptology of German Wehrmacht & KM codes 
produced by Hydra & Triton cyphers on the Schlussel-M encryption machine, commercially known as 
Enigma. Investigated & broken in principle by Polish intelligence 1926-39, Britain & France inherited. 
these in July 1939 & further mechanised decryption at BP [GC&CS1, accidentally inventing digital 
computing along the way. Eventually yielded concurrent transcription of KM codes, tho' major blank 
times & complexities of Enigma made depth & breadth of penetration less than has been supposed. 
HF/DF yielded more rapid & more valuable positions of U-Boats long before expensive decryption yielded 
actual plans. 
USA: United States of America. 
USAAF: US Army Air Force (not an independent service till 1947). 
USAR: US Army. 
USCG: US Coast Guard: quasi-military coastal surveillance, weather & customs service. 
USMC: US Marine Corps, soldiers in the Navy. 
VAA: in this work, abbreviation for VLR ASW alc, which see. 
VAdm: Vice-Admiral. 
VLR: Very Long Range aircraft, on ASW patrols. 
WAC: Western Approaches Command: set up in 1940 in Plymouth under Adm.Dunbar Naismith, later 
moved to Liverpool, under Adm.Sir Percy Noble 1941-2 & Adm.Sir Max Horton 1943-45, for co-ordinating 
escort & support forces for convoy duty around UK, & into Atlantic. 
WATU: Western Approaches [Command] Tactical Unit: anti-U-Boat school at WAC HQ, Derby House 
Liverpool, where classes & simulators largely 'manned' by WRNS were run for escort officers. 
Wehrmacht: German Army. 
Western Isles, HMS: Base at Tobermory, Scotland where RN & RCN Esc crews were trained & 
retrained convoy escort duty & ASW tactics in their ships. 
WESTOMP: Western Ocean Meeting Point, where WAC & CNWA esc met & exchanged responsibility 
for convoys. 
WRNS: Women's Royal Naval Service: Units comprising transport, admin, training, operational research 
& other vital duties including working of convoy & submarine tracking 'Plots' at WAC, STR, Adm, WATU, 
etc, & naval bases. 
Z-PLAN: G.Adm.Raeder's construction plans to supplant Anglo-French Naval supremacy, intended for 
war in 1944-48. 
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The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor throughout the war. 
Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere, 
on land, at sea, or in the air, depended ultimately upon its outcome. 
Churchill 
ON the face of it the three entries in a seaman's last discharge book 
seem bald statements. 
MT Inverlane, no.159816; 5493 tons; Port of Registry: Glasgow; Engaged: 19.9.39; 
Rating: Steward; Conduct: Very Good; Description of Voyage: Foreign. 
Only the 'Discharge' heading gives any hint of a tale: 
14.12.39, Vessel Abandoned, 55°05'N, 01°07'W. 
M.V . San Adolfo, 164464; 4376 tons; 4500 hp; Port of Registry: London; Engaged 
29.2.40, Greenock; Rating: Sailor; Conduct: Very Good; Description of Voyage: Foreign; 
Discharge: 18.6.40, Plymouth. 
S.S. Oakcrest, 171313; 3277 tons; Port of Registry: London; Engaged: 20.7.40, 
Glasgow; Rating: Sailor; Conduct: Very Good; Description of Voyage: Foreign. 
It is the 'Discharge' column that says it all, sums up both the voyage and 
the adjustment the Merchant Navy had made by a year and more into the 
Battle of the Atlantic: a handwritten scrawl, not water-stained or blurred, for this 
is a replacement book, not an original, and paid for, but nonetheless hasty and 
brief: 17W, 53N, 25.11.40, at sea. 
Although there is a sense of urgency, an abruptness and approximation 
to the figures, they do not reveal what happened. Thee details are 'extracted 
from log and list'; i.e from one held ashore of the seaman's signing-on details, 
not from the discharge book itself. Family oral history holds that Oakcrest was 
little more than a coaster, built for the Mediterranean. Certainly she was 
pressed into long trans-ocean service only by generous Government insurance 
cover and the fact that the U.K was losing to enemy action over a quarter of a 
million tons of shipping a month. In peacetime Oakcrest would probably have 
been quietly rusting away in some backwater, too small and old to be venturing 
profitably anywhere, let alone the North Atlantic. Instead, with a single, 
probably pre-Great War gun on her stern to ward off surfaced German 
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submarines - the U-Boat of the second of two dreaded World Wars - no armour 
protection, and with forty crew and a single RN DEMS ["Defensively-Equipped 
Merchant-Ships"] gunner, she had plied her way across 'the pond', perhaps 
once, perhaps several times. To Halifax, Nova Scotia, and on to New York, 
through the U-Boat-infested Western Approaches to the British Isles, through 
the dreaded 'Black Gap' where there were no Royal Navy escorts or long-
distance aircraft cover. Like Inverlane and hundreds before her, she had 
perhaps survived the outward journey, and come home safely once already. 
This trip she was heading out, a member of convoy OB-244 for New York, 
torpedoed with six others, in the early morning of 23RD November 1940; one by 
U-103, five in five hours by U-123. 1 
At this time RN escorts were still few, overworked, poorly-trained, 
lacking radar and radio-interception equipment, and limited by low radius to 
escorting merchant ships in convoy a few hundred miles from the coast. A 
single overarching RN Western Approaches Command would not be set up till 
the following February. RAF Coastal Command air patrols and escort were 
also few, limited in range, and lacked radar and accurate navigation. They had 
no weapons capable of dealing with a U-Boat, surfaced or otherwise. 
Comparatively sluggish U-Boats like U-123 were safe. Their newly-adopted 
tactics were to operate in groups: rudeltactik: "wolfpacks", and to loose 
torpedoes from the surface at night, where they were all but invisible to ships 
or aircraft. 
The discharge book's bald statement does rot say Oakcrest was 
underpowered or too small to be convoying. Tonnage suggests age: ship 
designs tended to get larger, rather than smaller, as crewing numbers and 
running costs were little greater for 10,000tonners than 5,000 tonners, little 
greater for 5,000tonners than 3,000tonners. She may even have served under 
another name, or many, prewar, and in the Great War. There were plenty of 
pre-Great war vessels in the decidedly 'greying population' of the British 
Merchant Navy. Nor does the Discharge Book say, as family oral history does, 
1 Slader, J, The Red Duster At War, William Kimber, London, 1988, p.92. 
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she was carrying steel plate, torpedoed, and sank in only seven minutes. Two 
of the crew got into a lifeboat which was lowered and fell astern, and were 
never seen again. Those still alive got into the second lifeboat, one man, 
James Campbell, jumping from the side of the ship and breaking another 
man's collarbone. 
The North Atlantic in winter is still feared and respected in a way no 
other frequented route is, save Cape Horn. Under Lloyd's Register, and on the 
Plimsoll Line which shows the safe loading marks and the correct waterline, 
there are six marks: TF, F, T, S, W, WNA: Tropical Fresh, Fresh, Tropical Salt 
Water, Summer Salt Water, Winter Salt Water, and WNA...Winter North 
Atlantic. These marks show just how deeply a ship can safely be loaded in 
water of varying temperature and salinity, and thus density and displacement. 
Only the North Atlantic in Winter has a whole Plimsoll mark to itself. 
In the North Atlantic, in winter, continually taking water over her sides, 
the boat drifted North-East for between eight and eleven days. Twelve men 
died of exposure and injuries in that time, including the man with the broken 
collarbone, and were consigned to the deep. Some were in clothing needed 
by the living, some not. In a storm, the boat, still with a foot of near-freezing 
seawater washing round in her, sighted land, and the boat made the shore one 
'dark and stormy night' in December 1940. By chance, they had fetched up, 
off a narrow gully, on the island of Barra in Scotland's Outer Hebrides, but not 
before two more men, in sight of safety, let slip their hold on hope and died. 
The boat did not even safely beach in the narrow rocky gully, on a 
storm-racked coast surrounded by cliffs. "It looked fearsome on a quiet sunny day 
with a one metre swell. At night in a storm it must have been like a giant washing 
machine full of boulders.” 2 At the last moment it broached, side-on to the sea, 
capsizing, hurling the exhausted survivors into the water, and crushing two. 
The men, all frostbitten, collapsed onto the beach. After eighteen hours, from 
dark until mid-morning, two still on their feet went for help at a farm half a mile 
away. They were only a couple of miles from the main settlement, Castlebay. 
13 
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By a last, vicious, twist of fate those from the farm who came back with the 
survivors recognised one of the men who had died earlier, John McKinnon, not 
consigned to the deep because the rest were too weak and cold. Had he held 
on but a little longer, that night he could have been by the fire in his own home 
there on Barra. 3 
Some survivors died still on Barra, and were buried above the beach 
under four slim granite headstones, with the Merchant Navy (MN) crest. 
W.Whitty (from Waterford) W.Daley W.Carr M.Fenton 
Bosun AB Fireman & Trimmer 1 	Radio Operator 
SS Oakcrest SS Oakcrest SS Oakcrest SS Oakc rest 
1 December 1940 
Aged 39 
1-2 December 1940 1 December 1940 1 December 1940 
The six survivors of forty-one rested and were sent home.' James 
Campbell's replacement Discharge Book (charge 2'6d), was signed on 15 
January 1941. All the survivors had grevious exposure injuries - what had 
come to be called Immersion Foot, the result of limbs unavoidably kept in 
near-freezing water for days or weeks. James Campbell lost both legs below 
the knee to frostbite, and only preserved his hands through the ordeal by 
keeping them tucked in his armpits. He spent a year in hospital with double 
pneumonia. After amputation he received tin legs, though the doctors said he 
would never walk again without sticks, from the age of twenty-four. Jim said 
"I'll never walk with the bluidy things!" and threw them away. He was and 
remained an obstinate man. As the war ended he took a night school course 
in accountancy, with a wife and two children to supriort. In Glasgow, near 
Blackpool, and then in Kent he worked as such, until his death in 1977, seeing 
2 Alan Campbell, pers.comm; notes for the author, 1998, 1999. 
3 Barra itself got into the news some six months later when a ship, SS Politician, wrecked on nearby 
Eriskay during a whisky shortage, carrying something in the order of 20,000 cases (240,000 
bottles/200tons] of Whisky, most of which mysteriously disappeared in the following weeks...Inevitably 
fictionalised, by Compton Mackenzie, the book was called Whisky Galore as was the movie, a 
masterpiece of the contemporary Ealing Tradition, and as much a cinema classic in its time as The 
DamBusters. The sequel, both an artistic and commercial failure, was called, naturally enough, Scotch 
On The Rock& The last 14 bottles sold at auction in Glasgow for £12,012 in 1993. 
4 "I would give a lot to have the letter written to Jim's mother by the doctor on Barra in 1941.", Alan 
Campbell, op.cit. 
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his heart's desire, Sydney Heads once more from a ship, during a visit to 
Australia in the summer of 1975-6. 
By November 1940 James Campbell was already, unlike many 
merchant seamen who had joined up 'for the duration', no stranger to either 
the sea or disaster. Running away to sea from Glasgow at age 16 in 1932 like 
his elder brother John before him, he had travelled the world under the 'Red 
Duster', the ensign of the British merchant fleet. It had always had this flag, 
never seen as a navy, or an arm of the state, from within or without. Only the 
Great War had given it even the merest indication that such status or position 
could exist. At the commencement of war in September 1939, Campbell was 
in port, joining a ship a fortnight later, sailing, perhaps in convoy, to Abadan 
outside Khorramshahr in 'the Gulf', bound Invergordon on the Firth of Forth 
with 12,694 tons of fuel oil. We have already seen her fate: 14.12.39, 55 °05'N, 
01 °07'W, vessel abandoned. Somewhere off Newcastle the ship, a motor 
tanker, ironically built in Germany only three years before, was mined, 
probably by one air-dropped by the Luftwaffe. Close to shore, in autumn, they 
got to land safely, save four killed by the explosion, and the tanker broke in 
two, the aft section beached off Whitburn Steel. Later the fore half was used 
as a blockship, sunk at Longhope in May 1944. 
Campbell's next engagement was another tanker, for another company, 
signing on to the ship as all men did; not to a ministry or to a government 
department, but to a ship and a company, while the company took the 
insurance for the voyage, and the government requisitioned the ship and filled 
it with cargo by way of the Ministry of Wartime Transport, the MoVVT. MV San 
Adolfo came and went to her destination safely, though family members say 
she was bombed in port somewhere; records and oral history do not report. 
James Campbell said "the bomb fell, the captain's boot-soles disappeared between 
the deck rails and I thought 'if its good enough for him, its good enough for me." This 
type of danger-disarming tale, shrugging off the tension and shock of a loaded 
tanker being bombed while stationary alongside in port, is typical of MN and 
indeed all war stories and adventure tales related by men the world over. 
Such narrative styles kept the reality of war at bay. 
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Campbell was an ordinary seaman inside the concrete-slab wheelhouse 
(cannon-shell-proof) when the vessel was strafed. 5 Somewhere in the North 
Sea during their return from abroad, they met an already famous destroyer 
with an already famous captain: HMS Kelly, commanded by Mountbatten. 
Kelly had been torpedoed, her back almost broken. Campbell always spoke of 
being at the wheel when the ship's master used a loudhailer to enquire "if there 
was anything we could for you sir?" Mountbatten replied "No - quite all right, carry 
on."6 His ship would live - and he managed to bring her safely to port, her 
starboard rail awash, where she was repaired and continued her short, 
eventful life. 'Batty' and Kelly were immortalised in 1942 by Noel Coward's 
film In Which We Serve. San Adolfo continued on her way. 
Engaged in February, Campbell was discharged in June at Plymouth, 
the ancient port of William Bligh's birthplace two centuries ago, and long 
before, that of Drake. Four months of waiting followed. War had not yet 
caught up with trade and the needs of rapid loading and unloading of goods 
and fuel. More time, space and opportunity were lost in delay and/or 
mismanagement, as well as repairing damage, than action. Later San Adolfo 
would almost play another small part in the fame and mythology of the Battle 
of the Atlantic: she was again in convoy in May 1941, and nearly earmarked to 
refuel at sea RN warships pursuing the German battleship Bismarck, the last 
great gamble of oceanic surface commerce raiding by the Kriegsmarine. 
5 He would always later recall the roof and wall blocks clicking, back and forth, against one another, as 
the ship rolled. 
6  Ibid. 
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For Campbell, the period after San Adolfo was another wait; part rest, 
part itching to get to sea again where seamen belong, as they put it, before 
signing on to Oakcrest in July 1940, and apparently an unusual longer wait 
(July-November) before heading out in OB-244 to be sunk only a few days 
later. Men, if their ship came back, tended to leave and rejoin another, or the 
same one, with leave and rest in between, if only for a few days. Companies 
did not like men living aboard in port, no matter where. Conditions were poor, 
and companies notoriously tight with money. Seamen tended to prefer the 
change, any change, to remaining where they were.' Perhaps Campbell took 
a shore job awhile before growing tired of it, or merely wanting to be back at 
sea. Seamen were literally ten a penny and could, even in wartime, be got 
easily. Later in the war would come shortages, propaganda, encouragement, 
strikes and protests over pay and conditions, mass refusals to serve in certain 
ships or for certain companies. Later in the war also would come better pay 
and conditions, the end of the old, hated Navigation Act ruling that stopped 
men's pay when their ship was lost. There would be sufficient escorts, 
weapons and sensors, sufficient tactics, sufficient strategy. All this was in a 
future James Campbell never took part in. All of this was a future that need 
not have been necessary had such measures been taken prewar, to provide 
better ships and better accommodation, better training, better tactics and 
strategy, better escorts - any escorts. 
James Campbell received for his wartime efforts and injuries the 1939- 
45 Star, which was awarded to all combatants and people involved closely in 
the war; the 1939-45 medal, for wartime service bravery; and the Atlantic Star, 
the campaign medal which all in the Royal and Merchant Navies serving in the 
Atlantic received: a simple straightforward five-pointed star, with a blue-green-
grey ribbon, the colours of the Ocean they had fought upon. He also received 
a Mention in Dispatches, and the Oakleaf on the Atlantic Star Ribbon that 
signified this. Notification, when it came, was in suitably appropriate language, 
the like of which Drake, Nelson and Churchill had used: 
7 Hay, D, War Under the Red Ensign, Janes, London, 1982, p.169; Lane, T, The Merchant Seaman's 
War Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, p.77-8, 82-3. 
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Admiralty. Whitehall, 
19th February 1942 
Sir, 
I am commanded by My Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty to inform you that They 
have learned with great pleasure that on 
the recommendation of the First Lord the 
Prime Minister has obtained the King's 
approval for the Publication of your name 
in the London Gazette as Commended for good 
services in S .S.0 akcrest, in action with 
the enemy. A copy of this letter has been 
sent to the owners of the ship. 
I am, Sir, 
Your obedient servant, 
H.V.Markham 
Such language, to a mere able seaman! To you, from Sir Henry V. 
Markham, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Admiralty. One can almost 
imagine, as one is no doubt intended to, the collected lords and leaders of the 
Royal Navy clustered round a table, pondering the story of your sacrifice and 
singling it out for attention amongst a million others. "It is with baubles that men 
are led," said Napoleon, and though he was anything but a sailor, the idea 
holds true. Even today, half a century and more on, the language, itself of 
another era, and the tone, still "stiffens the sinews and summons up the blood!" as 
Henry V put it. The weight and worth of five centuries of maritime tradition lies 
visibly upon the typed page like a pronouncement from on high - from, indeed, 
Their Lordships Of The Admiralty. 
In common with almost all Great War and Second World War ex-
servicemen, Jim rarely spoke of his experiences, even the prewar ones, to 
family or friends. Fourteen months in the Battle poisoned eight years of varied 
maritime life. The few tales passed to his son are the only record of his times 
at sea, as he left no written record, though he may have written one in 
common with other veterans, had he lived into the Anniversary era. 8 Until 
recently almost all have been silent, save senior men who published their 
Law in Howarth, S, & Law, D, feds], The Battle of the Atlantic Greenhill Books, London, 1994, p.599. 
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memoirs in the years following the end of hostilities. For almost all Merchant 
Seamen, and most naval and air force personnel, a long silence descended 
over and around them and their life at war. Compared to the very many 
accounts of administration, operations, technology and famous events, 
mundane and ordinary experiences were neither popular nor sought after. The 
sensational and extraordinary were posed as the norm. Outside these, there 
would be silences about the bravery, fortitude, and losses of seamen as well, 
compared to wartime official and media publication and promotion of their 
lives and times. For all their limitations, such limited propagandist wartime 
works at least promoted memory. Postwar, only seamen themselves wrote of 
their experiences, in ways which nonparticipants could read but not fully 
cornprehend. 
The reader will note many things are deliberately missing from the 
Preface. There was no exposition of life in the boat: what the survivors would 
have done, eaten, said, sung, or thought. How they died, of what, and when, 
was not in the tales Jim passed down. They remained locked away from the 
world in his own memories, probably too harrowing to tell. The ethnic and 
social composition of the crew is unknown. There are no non-British names 
among the dead, save Reinwald, probably Norwegian. Nothing in this preface 
was synthesised or imagined from the mass of 'lifeboat literature' which 
festoons especially British MN accounts of the Battle. There is deliberately no 
gender, ethnic or class history in this account because it is restricted to what 
little could be found about Jim, the ship, the U-Boat, the events, and the time. 
Commanded by KorvettenKapitan Karl-Heinz Moehle, U-123 was a 
large, long-range type IX U-Boat. These were intended for ocean commerce 
raiding, in distant waters: the central and South Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. 
Prewar, like all U-Boat designs, but gradually improved by the challenge and 
response of combat, they were typical of the many versions built between the 
wars, for various roles. They were slower to dive, and less manouverable, 
than the favoured type VII, of which most U-Boat production was comprised, 
but they had greater range, as much as 11,000 nautical miles, and the space 
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for the stowage of food and extra torpedoes which made long-range missions 
possible and profitable. 9 
Moehle, born 31-7-1910, had joined the pre-Nazi German Navy, the 
Reichsmarine, in 1930, and served in surface vessels before shifting to the 
Nazi-era Kreigsmarine's illegally developed and burgeoning U-Boat arm, in 
1936. As such he was a member of a select elite, not only in pay and training, 
but also in that he shared equally the discomfort and danger and all-
enveloping life of his ordinary submariners. He had commissioned a new 
small coastal type IIB, U-20 in 1937, after serving as a Warrant Officer in two 
smaller training boats. He had had a good war by late 1940, sinking 8 ships in 
six wartime patrols, mostly in the North Sea, before the prestigious commission 
of U-123. U-123 was to be his last front-line command, and in herl° he sank 
the remainder of his 22 ships for 94,710tons, before posting to a shore 
command, of the 5Th U-Boat flotilla at Kiel, and then of the U-Boat base there. 
Arrested in June 1945 and tried for passing on to his subordinates the 
infamous "Laconia Order", he served five years, being released in November 
1949. 11 He was one of the luckier commanders of the U-Bootswaffe, 
remaining ashore later in the war, when other commanders were sent to sea, 
either to make up losses, or simply to bolster morale, and were lost in the great 
U-Boat culls of the last years, when Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare 
technologies had outstripped the U-Boat, and convoy defences were not the 
porous shields of November 1940. 12 
U-1 2 3 was also a charmed boat. Begun in April 1939, and 
commissioned in May 1940, at the height of the Dunkirk crisis, U-123 spent his 
entire war career in the 2 ND flotilla at Lorient in Occupied France. It was from 
these ideal, invulnerable bases that the legendary U-Boats motored, in myth 
and reality, to decimate Allied shipping. Passed by Moehle to Reinhard 
Hardegen, in May 1941, who took him to the Eastern coast of the USA in the 
9 ROssler, E, The U-Boat: Evolution & Technical History, A&A Press, London, 1981, pp.103-5, 150-1. 
10 Or rather him, as German and Russian parlance refers to ships and boats in the masculine. 
11 The Laconia Order stemmed from a U-Boat's rescue of survivors of a ship containing Italian PoWs, 
which was bombed by an Allied aircraft, prompting a ban on further assistance of Allied survivors, & a 
hinted policy from Hitler of deliberately killing them, against the Geneva convention. U-Boat Head 
Admiral DOnitz quietly disagreed, and was not convicted postwar for this order or its interpretation. 
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first German attacks on that coast, U-123 opened Operation Paukenschlag: 
paraphrased by western historians as "Drumbeat". U-123, under Moehle, 
Hardegen, and von Schroeter, damaged four ships of 31,000tons and sank 47 
merchant ships of 244,000tons, and a submarine. He was decommissioned at 
Lorient in the aftermath of the D-Day landings, scuttled to prevent Allied use in 
August 1944, surrendered in 1945, and raised to serve in the French Navy till 
1959. 13 
Oakcrest is far less documented. There is no company history of Crest 
Shipping nor inherited corporate records. Where or when she was built, and 
her engine and worth remain a mystery. When torpedoed, she was in an 
outbound convoy, carrying no cargo, but ballasted, hence her tonnage of 3277, 
not the maximum 5407 according to Lloyd's War Losses. She was not 
carrying steel plate, these were a precious import, not a mere ballast. Her 
ballast "was probably steelworks slag: it was an easy way to get rid of it." 14 
The story of Inverlane and San Adolfo, too, was not exactly as Jim told it. Kelly 
was torpedoed, but in the North sea on 8 May 1940, in action with her flotilla 
against German torpedo boats and destroyers. It is hardly credible a slow 
motor tanker, with 12,694 tons of invaluable fuel aboard, would stop or be 
allowed to stop, in the middle of a sea battle where torpedo-carrying fast attack 
craft had just seriously damaged a fast warship. Kelly had been mined in 
December 1939, in the North sea, right after her commissioning, going to the 
aid of a tanker which had just been mined. It is far more likely that fallible 
memory confused the two incidents. Jim remembered the mining, and 
Mounbatten's conversation with Inverlane's master, but not the date. 
Two things should be made clear, both about this story and the Battle of 
the Atlantic as a whole: the inaccuracy of shipping records, partly due to 
different tonnage definitions, and the fallibility of human memory and oral 
history. Oakcrest wasn't a coaster, merely old and outdated, wasn't carrying 
steel plate, but in ballast, and both the date and time of sinking vary: 22/11, 
12 At http://www.uboatmetilmen/moehle.htm  
13 At http://www.uboat.net/boats/u123.htm  
14 Alan Campbell, op.cit. 
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23/11 [British vs German Zone time], 25/11. Perhaps 20 died in the lifeboat: 
excluding the inevitable deaths from the torpedo hit, the pair lost astern in the 
first lifeboat, as well as the four definitely buried in lonely graves on Barra, 
visited by James' son, (the author's father) in 1993. There are 25 names from 
Oakcrest on the Tower Hill Memorial in London, for those 37,701 British 
merchant seamen, of both World Wars, who have no known grave. 15 
These facts are not meant to undermine the credibility of Jim's story, nor 
to present 'the actual historical truth'. Absolute truth does not exist in any 
objective sense. These family tales were not intended as history. They had a 
different function. They preserved and recalled the events as the participants 
remembered them, not as officialdom or analysts would later, 'working in 
tranquility after the fact'. As such they functioned mythically. These stories 
included only what the participants considered important. They were the 
essence of the experience. Moreover they were therapeutic, the collection, 
arrangement, reuse and reworking of powerful traumatic memories into oral 
narrative with a highly personal purpose. They told the tales of fear and 
surprise and humour and worry, and of poor pay, food and conditions, the way 
the participants remembered it. The addition of documented fact does not 
invalidate them, nor make the tales better or less mythical. The mindset of 
myth formed and the force of the memories drove the accounts, even among 
those participants writing after the war. They knew the facts, and knew the 
difference between myth and reality, yet these tended not to modify their 
feelings or impressions about their experiences or those they wrote about for 
the consumption of the public. 
15 See Appendix III. 
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CONTINUITY AND MYTHOLOGY: THE BATTLE DEFINED 
"Here there was no semblance of meaning...the emotions were so many and mixed up they were indecipherable... 
Nothinghad been decided, nobody had learned anything." 
James Jones The Thin Red Line  
This thesis focuses on the changing representations in different national 
and cultural traditions of the Battle of the Atlantic. During and after the Great 
War, new mythologies evolved from existing maritime ones to explain new 
experiences to naval and merchant seamen, airmen, civilians, governments 
and industries. This was expanded during and after the Second World War by 
more participants and authors. The work of Canadian Professor Michael 
Hadley serves as this thesis' departure point. Both his 1995 Count Not the 
Dead on U-Boat iconography and his 1996 chapter "The Popular Image of the 
Canadian Navy" analyse mythology in press, documentary, cinema feature, 
history and fiction.' 
Myth is integral to meaning and perspective. 2 Myth can explain how 
and why representations are created, even where authors consciously assign 
little meaning. Myth is one way authors turn experiences into representations. 
For participants of the Atlantic Campaign who became authors, myth was how 
they understood and communicated what they had done and seen. It has 
become how we have seen and comprehended these events. Myth is not 
wrong, or false. It is the processing reality is given to make experience 
vicarious, communicable, and open to all. For participants, myth tended to 
serve in place of meaning. For most of them the Battle had no 'meaning'. 
Most did not hate the enemy, nor did love of country motivate them or validate 
their actions. "Men saw the necessity of war, but objected to camouflaging this 
under a spurious cloak of patriotism: they were doing what ihey were told and would 
be shot if they did not." 3 
There have been hundreds of representations of the Battle. The mythic 
forms they took, and the limited meaning most were given, created a broad 
rather than deep stream of works. A paradox ensued, a complicated group of 
simple, related representations. Within this stream have been currents, all 
I In Hadley, M, Huebert, R, & Crickard, F, A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity McGill-
Queens University Press, Montreal, 1996, p.35-56; Hadley, M, Count Not the Dead: the Popular Image of 
the German Submarine, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995. 
2  Myth is not a deception. It cannot be removed in order to merely debunk a view of events. 
3 MacLean, A, HMS Ulysses, Collins, London, 1955, p.212. 
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heading in the same general direction but divided between myriad types and 
sub-types of representation. These different experiences and views were 
related and mixed, to produce each distinct representation in separate works. 4 
This thesis examines media representations of all the participants in the Battle, 
not merely the public record of merchant seamen. 5 A subsidiary intention is to 
explain how participants, especially merchant seamen, were relatively 
neglected, losing postwar support and recognition. "If one had to select a single 
man on whom the survival of the country depended in the darkest days of the War, 
one could do worse than Adm.Sir Max Horton RN, who as Commander-in-Chief, 
Western Approaches Command, bore the brunt of the submarine attack at its height; 
but who outside the RN [or now indeed inside] has ever heard of him?" 6 W a r 
memorials explicitly commemorate the dead, only implicitly the survivors. 
Representations must serve as memorials also for the living, for they 
outnumber war dead, and their problems endure.' 
Fussell's Great War & Modern Memory depicted a crisis of incredibility 
and incommunicability on the Western Front. 5 This can also be seen in works 
about the Atlantic campaign during and even more after the Second World 
War. There was a crisis of description. The experiences were rarely 
recounted without resort to melodrama and hyperbole. There was a crisis of 
terminology. Mostly the tools already available in military and maritime works 
were used to examine experiences. These were limited by service attitudes 
and ideas, methods and forms, or by the requirements and forms of fiction. 
The campaign itself is open to myriad definitions. Its myths took diverse forms, 
within various services and nationalities. They were divided into Allied myths 
about 'the Battle', and German myths about the U-BO -at. These were also 
broadly split into myths held by participants, and myths about them. German 
myths and some Allied ones were traditional (hero) myths, others were about 
events and conditions. All created new relationships with events. Almost all 
4 Kenneth Poolman for instance produced after 1960 a variety of novels, memoirs, popular histories, 
technical accounts and even screenplays. 
5 In this thesis, 'merchant seamen' it is shortened to 'seamen' while 'sailors' are 'naval seamen'. 
"Merchant mariners" and "merchant marines" are misleading. Many ordinary people do not know who 
this refers to: merchants [businessmen], mariners [seamen], the US Marine Corps, or sailors [not 
soldiers] therein. 'Merchant seamen' is at least unambiguous. 
6 Howard, M, The Causes of Wars, Unwin, London, London, 1983, p.209. 
7 For practical reasons Memorials exclude those survivors who died postwar from Rolls of Honour, but 
these often mutilated or emotionally injured survivors are also casualties. McKernan, M, Here Is Their 
Spirit, Uni.of Queensland Press/AVVM, 1991, p.257, 258-9. 
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participants felt the war had no meaning beyond serving the state, or defeating 
Nazism: doing their duty, in an unpleasant situation. Very few held it to be a 
sacred or special task, as Great War sacrifice had become. 
These men recorded their experiences and perspectives. The events 
largely had no 'deeper' "Meaning", but they were important. These 
experiences were powerful, transforming, traumatic or exhilarating watersheds. 
The most significant moments of their lives drove the representations. Writing 
about the events and experiences gave a purpose, a personal position in the 
greater field of national war aims. Their experiences seemed so significant 
they ought to have a deeper, more spiritual, more sacred meaning. "So 
demoralising was this repetition" of war "within a generation that no one felt it 
appropriate to understand or explain it."9 Their "Limited poetry and prose suggested 
a reluctance to indulge in patriotic, bombastic, and easily falsifiable prophecies of 
triumph, peace, and universal justice." 1° "War might be necessary...but pre-1914 
heroics about it were contemptible." 11 Already exposed to the senselessness and 
futility of the Great War, these authors knew better than to look for 'higher 
"meaning". They wrote of what they had done and seen, and were able to 
come to terms with it. They wrote not for themselves, but for an audience who 
could never comprehend these experiences without experiencing them 
themselves. Often awareness of how little the public understood or 
empathised caused bitterness. Often participants were plaintive about 
'collective amnesia': public ignorance, misunderstanding, being relatively less 
recognised for their service and sacrifice. Ultimately they could only write for 
themselves, for each other, for relatives, in the hope they might understand, 
not the public who had been moved by earlier war epics. Judging from the 
number and diversity of works, they were largely successful. A great number 
of readers gained vicarious experience of commerce warfare at sea. For the 
writers this was the most important part. For them the essence of the 
experience was expressed. 
8 Cited in Calder, A,  The Myth of the Blitz, Jonathon Cape, London, 1991, p.16. 
9 Fussell, P, Wartime Oxford University Press, London, 1989, p.133. 
1° Calder 1991 op.cit p.150. 
Il  lbid, p.151. 
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It is irrelevant that there is little artistic, literary or cinematic depth in 
many Battle representations. Each work was constructed a certain way for a 
purpose and an intended audience. Many works were commercial, while 
others were for official purposes. Control by institutions and their values and 
ideologies had some impact. All fitted within genres, both fictional and factual, 
and writers often rigidly adhered to such distinguishing features. 12 Telling a 
story well was usually significant, unlike newer types of history. "Postwar 
historiography was strangely adverse to narrative."" Again, rigid adherence to 
convention made a large number of similar, purely operational and technical 
accounts or adventure fictions, with little innovation or individuality. Atlantic 
Battle writings are indicative of the minimal change in twentieth-century 
maritime writing that Raban has described. 14 
Despite the enormous body of writing about the Battle, its content 
remains both incomplete and generally lacking in theoretical sophistication. 
Change and innovation in historical, fictional, documentary and cinematic 
works have been gradual but cumulative. This was because the 
representations usually stated what participants required, no more and no less. 
Only later did other, nonparticipants, find deficiencies in the stories and 
methods, and searched for new perspectives, new approaches and new 
answers, appropriate for themselves in new times. Many of these new authors 
were professional, and they brought fresh direction and rigour to study of the 
campaign. Academic works have been relatively few, though their influence is 
growing. 15 Raban states 
"writing about the sea in the 20 TH century needed fresh , understanding, a shift 
of knowledge or sensibility to liberate it from the 19TH century masterpieces to 
which it is in thrall...the gap between the lay reader, the lay writer, and the 
professionals of the sea widens.. .The Cruel Sea is much the richest and most 
complicated of its author's books." 16 
Many postwar writers escaped from peacetime austerity and 
mediocrity by reenacting earlier voyagers. "One could stitch together sentences 
from Smeeton and Pye, McMullen and MacGregor without a seam." 17 "Their ships 
and men are new, but their water is 19 TH century. Their books have a focus on 
storms"..."they are content to recycle the language and iconography of their 
12 See the taxonomies in Ch.1 
13 Calder, A, Revolutionary Empire, 2NDEdn, Pimlico, London, 1998, p.536. 
14 Raban, A, The Oxford Book of the Sea Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p.30-1. 
15 Academic books, articles and conference papers comprise roughly ten percent of the total historical 
output. 
16 Raban 1992 op.cit p.30. 
17  Ibid p.31. 
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predecessors." Authors "laboured under an exhaustion of descriptive metaphor." 
Recently new studies have begun to take effect. 
This thesis brings together isolated, compartmentalised national studies 
and their mythologies to define ways to advance study of the entire 
campaign. 19 Both authors and audience were rather separate from the 
mainstream public. Servicemen and civilian seamen of each country were 
divided. The problem has not been one of overall coverage or general view. 
There have been several sophisticated accounts that deal both in context and 
detail with the international, tactical and human dimensions of the Battle. 2° 
These have only appeared in the recent past, when large bodies of primary 
and secondary sources became available. The human dimension has never 
been lacking, as evidenced by the enormous number of mythic memoirs and 
personal accounts. Technical histories may have been intended merely to 
analyse equipment developments, while neglecting the human dimension. 
Memoirs emphasised personal experiences without, as Zimmerman lamented 
in 1994, exploring the relationship of technology to personnel, and thus how 
and why operational use and misuse of tectmology affected the Battle. 21 
The vicarious experiences offered by participant-dominated works could 
have been more representative: closer to the actual connection between action 
and mundaneity, between the exciting and the ordinary. All dimensions could 
have been represented better, especially by professional historians and 
academics in recent decades. More representative writings earlier might have 
made the Battle a more appealing subject for academics. 22 Until recently, 
general accounts of the war ignored seamen and peripheralised sailors - the 
'fighting' men at sea. More specific histories and fictions focussed either on 
naval actions, or on equally mythologised attacks and sinkings in convoy, 
excluding the vast majority of mundane experiences. The importance of 
18 Ibid, p.33. 
19 One contribution of academic conferences has been to bring together separate national services and 
their traditions. 
20 Costello, J, & Hughes, T, The Battle of the Atlantic, Collins, London, 1977; Tarrant, V.E, The U-Boat 
Wars 1914-45, Arms & Armour Press, London, 1989; Terraine, J, Business In Great Waters: The U-Boat 
Wars, 1916-45, Puttnam, NY, 1989. 
21 Zimmerman, D, "Technology & Tactics" in Howarth, S, & Law, D, The Battle of the Atlantic: 50 1. " 
Anniversary International Naval Conference, Greenhill Books, London, 1994, p.476. 
12 It is still uncertain why the Battle was not more appealing to academics earlier. One reason may be 
that academics simply worked in other areas (politics, social history, labour relations, ethnicity, gender] 
while writers about the Battle were not in professional or academic positions. It took a while for 
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convoy-escort, merchant navies and seamen, and their social and cultural 
aspects, to seapower throughout the past was marginalised. "Fictions seemed 
more real than the actual". 23 Postwar feature film was action-centred, 
unrepresentative, and almost entirely outside the myths. It contained 
deceptive myths of another kind: that war was about battleships, or mainly 
about conclusive battles, not steady attrition. The Battle of the Atlantic was 
anything but these. 
This thesis artificially divides representations into three eras of British 
work and two German, including changes and continuities in style, content, 
focus, and other important characteristics. US and Canadian writing are less 
periodic. Continuity and change in novels is explored; especially the 
commercial pressures on them absent from histories. The few cinema films 
set in the Battle made after 1945, and the two films made since 1960 are 
examined. Their content, intended audience and purpose, and critical and 
commercial success are compared with the mainstream war films of their eras. 
Factual documentary and reconstructive efforts in television between 1945 and 
1999, are also examined. 
Chapter One defines the Battle's mythologies, and methodology: terms, 
techniques, and types of representation. Chapter Two illustrates the 
'prehistory' of these representations in Great War, Interwar and Second World 
War works. Both Atlantic Battles (1914-18 and 1939-45) were revolutionary for 
sea warfare, yet their representations remained rooted in tradition. It 
introduces the new forms that emerged under the duress of war. Chapter 
Three deals with the first postwar phase, 1945-60, illustrating the definition of 
the Battle's themes in history, fiction, feature, documentary and 
memorialisation. It shows the detailed knowledge of few and considerable 
misunderstanding of most, without a broad middle ground. It also discusses 
the gradual change that followed. 24 Chapter Four is the most problematical 
section, describing the minimal developments but many diversifications during 
academics interested in the Battle to emerge, and to give this form of naval history credibility, once 
enough 'space' for it in 'serious' history was created. 
2'3 Raban 1992 op.cit p.11-13. 
24 Chapter Three also explains what the Department of Trade, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Government, 
and their equivalents did, according to their needs and requirements, irrespective of 'justice': adequate 
commemoration, and the other needs of dead and living merchant navy participants, compared to 
servicemen. 
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the comparative lull in activity between 1960-74. Chapter Five relates the 
marked change in focus and interpretation [with limited changes to content], 
and the impact of the release of previously secret material, especially related 
to Ultra, after 1974. Chapter Six relates the changes during and after the 
Fiftieth Anniversary era 1989-95, and some possibilities for future research. 
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"Mit der Dummheit kampfen GOtter selbst vergebens." 
"Against stupidity even the gods tight in vain." 
von Schiller 
All history is to some extent mythical. This author's concept of Atlantic 
Battle myths developed from Calder's Myth of the Blitz. Blair's Hitler's U-Boat 
War: The Hunters identified naval mythologies involving the Battle but merely 
regarded them as deceptive and did not explore them further. This provided 
a stimulus to combine the methods and perspectives of the former with 
mythical material from hundreds of works like the latter. Myth is more than 
deception. The mythologies have been embedded in representations: 
history and fiction, and cinema and television documentary. No extensive 
historiography of postwar work has been made, comparing and contrasting 
national, chronological, and media variations. 
From the very beginning, mythology was present in the language, tone, 
style, content, inclusions and exclusions. These changed slowly over time. 
Attacks and sinkings were portrayed as innumerable and continuous. They 
were described in terms of shock, horror, danger, and trauma. They were 
less frequent in reality, save in critical months. War was presented as 
intruding on peaceful lives. Histories, novels, documentaries and cinema 
features concentrated on action, not a balance between it and mundaneity. 
There was no admission the vast majority of experiences were mundane, but 
that representations concentrated on action. There were remarkably few 
variations on themes, with all books presenting most or all types of a select 
set of events and experiences. Some were always included, some 
infrequently, some in one genre but not others. 
"It is the function of the 'historian proper' to discover and record the 
complicated and disagreeable realities" of war: to explore myth.' The sources are 
rarely profound, limited by the lack of meaning assigned by participants. 
What remains profound is the force of the events they mythologise, and the 
power these mythologies hold over their creators, audience and times. Myth 
promotes reassurance, resisting reason and argument. "For many of us, the 
'myth' has become so much a part of our lives it is anguish to be deprived of it."' 
Howard, M, "the Use and Abuse of Military History", op.cit, p.189. 
2 lbid, p.190. 
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By "dipping things in myth we see them more clearly."' Calder [1991] 
showed how Blitz myths were created. Myth was a belief or conception, held 
by survivors, participants, relatives and 'the interested'. 4 Myth-making was 
"the creation of an image of the past, through careful selection and interpretation, in 
order to create or sustain certain emotions or beliefs."' This was the dictionary 
definition of myth: reducing, understanding, comprehending and managing 
events, placing oneself within them and the context of the times. It was not 
the conventional sense that "myths are lies."6 Calder defined `nonmyth' as 
neither supporting nor attacking a myth, while `countermyth' actively debunks 
and critiques mythic style, tone, and content.' Explorations such as this 
thesis have a problem using secondary sources. It means defining, 
exploring, and remaking representations - being non-mythical and counter-
mythical -simultaneously, from the same sources. Ross' seminal 1985 The 
Myth of the Digger provided a definition that the Battle or any event can be 
placed in. She described myth as "a legend built up as an ideal-type out of what 
the myth-makers themselves deem to be the most important features of the 
experience...to them the truth of the myth in any particular instance is irrelevant...VVhat 
matters is that an essence is expressed, a distillation of important truths." "To anyone 
looking back today at the First AIF, much of what has been written about it seems truly 
mythical, in the sense that it is an ideological, perhaps fanciful, elaboration of the facts 
perceived by historians and commentators."' Mythic history, then, is the essence 
of the experience. It can promote an ideology in place of meaning. Some 
representations are more mythic than others, depending on how the 
experience elaborates the facts. This does not make it less accurate or 
more wrong. 
Ideology played a smaller role in Battle myths than in the Great War, 
except in Germany. For most participants, the myths were about experiences 
and war aims, not meaning. For the British, ideology enveloped both 
3 C.S.Lewis, in Time & Tide, 14.8.1954, cited in Carpenter, H, The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien, A&U, 
London, 1981, p.445. 
4 Calder, A, The Myth of the Blitz Jonathon Cape, London, 1991, pp.xiii, 2, 5. 
5 Howard 1983 op.cit, p.188. 
6 C.S.Lewis, during the "Long Night Talk", 03:30am, Sunday, 20.5.31, cited in Carpenter, H, J.R.R. 
Tolkien A Biography, Allen & Unwin, London, 1977, p.151. 
7 Calder 1991 op.cit, p.177. 
8 Ross, J, The Myth of the Digger, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1985, p.13. 
9 Ross 1985 op.cit, p.115. The 1 sTAIF was Australia's famous Great War [Gallipoli, Pozeieres] 
ANZAC division, 
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participants and readers in an existing relationship with the sea, sea warfare, 
and British seapower. For Canadians the Battle had more to do with defining 
new relationships to the sea via existing relationships with the land, as well 
as defining a Canadian identity. Raw farmers and other landsmen from the 
provinces were sent to sea and became sailors. For Americans, the Battle 
represented war aims: supporting and then joining the forces against 
tyranny. In Germany existing ideas about masculinity, duty and service were 
recapitulated, and later criticised, through the vicarious experience of U-Boat 
warfare. 
"The Somme is a dense and impenetrable insular British mythology."' Exactly 
the same isolation and parochialism was long prevalent in Battle myth. The 
representations of almost all nations until recently [except at academic 
conferences] were myopic and insular." Allied participants could not and did 
not remember from the German perspective or vice versa, for all the vicarious 
experiences that representations provided. The British treated it as their 
battle: for survival. Canadians ignored, neglected and forgot it until the 
1980s. The Germans, as defeated practitioners of submarine warfare, were 
separate, cut off by culture, language, and their concentration on U-Boat 
iconography. The Americans either downplayed the Battle in favour of the 
Pacific, or concentrated on the convoying of their troops and separate hunter-
killer operations. Their trade convoy escort contributions during the neutrality 
period were comparatively unrecognised and unrecorded. The similarity of 
the Pacific submarine war to German U-Boat efforts had little effect on 
American interpretations of the Battle. Likewise accounts of British 
submarine warfare on Axis shipping never seemed to mix with Atlantic anti-
submarine warfare. While servicemen could recognise other services and 
other nationalities, finding comradeship among men who had fought in 
different arms, ways, and on different sides, this only slowly filtered to the 
books. Seamen as a group were not insular, but once separated back at 
10 Terraine, J, The Smoke & the Fire: Myths & Anti-Myths of War, 1861-1945,  Sidgwick & Jackson, 
London, 1980, p.108. 
11 Indeed it could be said history conferences have been attempts to bridge gaps and bring 
participants and perspectives together. We have however little idea of how the public responds to 
what it is reading. 
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home, among workers, returned soldiers, airmen, and sailors, were a 
distinct and detached minority. 
Myth can be a basis for National Identity. The Battle was only used to 
create or sustain it in wartime.' The Blitz myth and the 'People's War' 
served the British. The Merchant Navy's myths fitted neatly into these 
accounts of stoic civilian courage under fire. Yet postwar it was largely 
ignored. The Battle was scarcely used as earlier epic naval and maritime 
narratives had been." It was too complicated and dependent on secret new 
technologies, anonymously used." It lacked sufficient glamour or grandeur 
to be equated with earlier epics. There was little, by comparison, for 
American identity, compared to the Pacific, or to the Bomb, or the drive 
through Europe. Canada stood to gain greatly from the Battle, in using its 
newly expanded navy's responsibility to define itself among the Allies. 
Postwar Germany associated the Battle only with defeat and destruction; 
either forgetting and/or looking forward. This was in contrast to personal 
identity and heroicism, which U-Boat men clung to. Only Britain had 
connections to the Atlantic at war of past and present. Yet its 1939-45 Battle 
was not connected, or demonstrated well enough. 
These mythologies originated during and after the Great War among 
seamen and government and naval bodies in Britain and Germany. All 
responded to and rejected a century of unchallenged British maritime 
supremacy and late nineteenth century naval theory. Mahan's 
groundbreaking naval histories from 1890 focussed upon 'classical' 
battlefleet-confrontations, yet stated commerce-warfare was almost as 
effective if used by lesser nations to weaken the strongers' economy." The 
Royal Navy failure to execute Mahanian ideals successfully was blamed for 
the Great War's protracted stalemate between rival fleets. Submarine 
12 Although as many have pointed out, the RCN was defined by its Atlantic service. See Hadley et al 
1996 op.cit, p.53. 
13 Sir Henry Wood's "Fantasia on British Sea-Songs" during the annual Last Night of the Proms is 
today perhaps the last vestige of public British sea-power and historical Naval awareness. 
14 Such as Radar, SONAR, HF/DF, acoustic torpedoes, Ultra, Magnetic Anomaly Detection. 
15 Rodger, in Rodger [ed] Naval Power in the 20 TH Century, Macmillan, London, 1996, pp.xvii-xx. 
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warfare on commerce meanwhile made them obsolete.' 	Actual 
experiences of sea warfare were romanticised and made unrealistic." 
Germans created separate hero myths to comprehend their defeat after 
successful Mahanian trade-warfare." U-Boats were undefeated in 1918, but 
unable to sink ships in great numbers, despite their continuing 
undetectability. I9 Great War commerce raiding conditioned Second World 
War myth. Surface raiding was initially considered more serious by both 
sides and conditioned their strategies. Delay in convoying, impotent escorts, 
and technological limitations caused high shipping losses to submarines. 
Financial stringency, strategic and tactical delusions, and pacifism also 
prevented adequate rearmament, leading to a larger, longer near-repetition 
of the Great War's Battle. 
Only propaganda materials benefitting the war effort were made 
during the Second World War. Censorship prevented much negative 
material, but "even a pessimistic terrifying story was better than unmediated 
actuality."' After the war, general historical and public perspectives and 
attitudes on the war as a whole were defined. These have not evolved 
significantly.' There was little documentary material in this time. Maritime 
cinema, though containing the Battle in periphery, did not support its central 
myths. General public and service myths about sea warfare were dominant. 
Wartime propaganda and postwar military and cultural need bred ideas 
rarely subject to analysis or examination, as much technology was kept 
secret postwar, and codes and ciphers were kept secret even longer. The 
memories of the comparatively few Allied participants "were dwarfed by those 
of the majority of the population: they had been in factories, the Blitz, in the 
18 The lack of decisive victories over German warships at Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank, and 
Jutland. 
17 I.e Bone, Hashagen, von Forstner, see below. 
18 The real difference of 1943-45 over 1918 was that the U-Boat had been defeated, with new sensors 
& weapons; at least before type-XXI/XXIII Electroboote were deployed. Dipping-SONAR, helicopters, 
satellites, computerisation, etc, gave postwar escorts their response. 
18 "1941 looked like 1918", Winton, J, Convoy: the Defence of Sea Trade, Michael Joseph, London, 
1983, p.156. This was what the Great War Atlantic Battle may have become, had U-Boats not sunk 
ships while undetectable, had ASDIC been demonstrated ineffective, without radar, HF/DF, Ultra, to 
assist Allies detecting and sinking U-Boats with new weapons. Perhaps Wolfpack and higher losses 
would have resulted [like October 1940], if U-Boat commanders could see they were still largely 
invulnerable, even when attacking convoys rather than single ships. 
20 Fussell 1989 op.cit p.36. 
21 vvillmott, H, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War, Joseph, 
London, 1989, p.483-4. 
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army. German participants' memories contrastingly were not dwarfed by 
Wehrmacht recollection or civilian experience. Instead they were added to 
the existing celebrated and assured U-Boat iconography: hero myths of both 
machines and men. Not memories of the Battle per se, these changed and 
evolved separately. 
The Blitz Myth, partially intended to secure US involvement, was created 
by media and political organs and survivors, for British and American 
consumption.' Steeped in the prewar glamour of the Royal Air Force, and 
fears of city-razing enemy terror attacks, the Blitz became a symbol of 
resistance to Nazism. The British could be trusted to carry on fighting for 
freedom the way the French had not." "Myths made sense of the frightening and 
chaotic actuality of war with heroicism." 24 By contrast, Atlantic Battle myths were 
and remained largely for participants (and therefore minority) consumption, 
though during the Second World War, and after the Great War, they had been 
used more widely for promoting shipping, or seamen, against the Germans, 
and against the U-Boat. The Germans had their own myths, of cruel Allied 
blockade, of the supermen who operated the boats, 'stabbed in the back' 
myths of betrayal by leadership. 
Thus each service and nation had its own myths. They were made in 
the following manner: 
Facts known or believed to be true were set out.  There were high shipping 
losses. A greater percentage of seamen were killed than 'armed' 
servicemen. Most U-Boat personnel were killed or prisoners of war by VE-
Day. 
These facts were overlaid with inspirational values and convincing rhetoric.  
Ships and U-Boats, British seamen and equally `Iron U-Boat Men' were 
anthropomorphically steadfast and brave, while the innovation, productive 
potential, and commitment of America encouraged these nations. 
22 Calder 1991 op.cit, p.212. 
23 Lend-Lease, passed March 1941, arrived from 31.5.41, Ibid, p.38. 
24 lbid, p.14. 
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Facts which didn't fit were excluded. Actual shipping losses were not so 
high as to threaten the survival of Britain all through the war.' Captured 
enemy vessels, hired continental shipping, and shipbuilding kept ahead of 
losses, though security and victory were long uncertain. Only three percent of 
Second World War convoys lost ships, and while 574 ships were lost in 
convoy (of about 4700 lost worldwide and 2275 in the North Atlantic alone), 
75,000 were convoyed safely, in over a quarter of a million convoys." 
German leaders avoided evidence of the Allied penetration of Enigma. 
Postwar silence and secrecy further enhanced the status of the Ultra myth, 
once it emerged in 1974: a vast amount of information based on highly 
secret operations enabled the war to be won singlehandedly. "Myth forbids 
us to ask", and hence to analyse and reconsider.' 
As received by and from seamen, Allied and U-Boat servicemen, the 
audience gains a composite myth, never seen in one place or by one author. 
High shipping losses and great suffering were caused by 'invincible' U-
Boats, 'unprepared' navies and air forces, terrible weather, US 
'intransigence', 'audacious' British domination, 'incompetent' Canadians. 
The German Atlantic was usually empty, attacking a convoy a dangerous 
harrowing experience. The Allied Atlantic was a sinister waste with U-Boats 
behind every wave, always able to penetrate the escort screen." Canadian 
participants were neglected by all but their own recent books, their enormous 
contribution unrecognised. US intransigence to convoy strategy and escort 
tactics is largely a British myth. 'Audacious' British strategic campaign 
domination likewise is American myth. Blair regards the entire Battle as a 
'myth', a "classic case of threat-inflation.' This type of myth counters British 
historiographical domination - of the writing about the fighting - while 
25 Bomber Command was excluded from the Blitz myth: it didn't fit the image of heroic civilians under 
bombardment: ibid p.43; 29,890 Londoners were killed by bombing 1939-45; 30,705 killed elsewhere in 
Britain; ibid p.42. 
26 Noble in Creighton, K, Convoy Commodore, William Kimber, London, 1956, p.11; Winton 1983 op.cit 
p.320. 
47 Calder 1991 op.cit, p.13. 
28 In the same way that the Blitz myth was merely brave noble fighter pilots, and cheery cockneys 
picking over their rubble and putting up 'busnes as usual' signs. 
Blair, C, Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939-42, [V.1 of 2], Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 
1997, p.xiii. 
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emphasising US material and technological contributions. All agree on the 
terrible, largely un-mythical weather. 
By Ross' definition, the Battle Myths served very well. The legends 
stated for each of the involved minorities what their ideals were, what were 
for them 'the important truths'. Allied navies and airforces justifiably claimed 
their service was instrumental to victory. U-Waffe men could claim they were 
doing their duty, untainted by Nazism, guilt or responsibility.' Merchant 
seamen could claim without fear of contradiction they were utterly vital to 
Britain's survival and the continuance of the Allied cause. Merchant seamen 
could also use their myth to portray struggles with authority over pay, 
conditions, and perceptions, joined to existing mythology of freedom and 
oppression. Myths both explained their role in the war and disarmed 
criticism about strikes, drunkenness, or civilian status. Myths were the 
essence of the experience: for seamen long hours, bad pay, a terrible risk 
continuously run, regarded half as heroes and half as war-profiteering army-
dodgers by the mass-mobilised population from which they came. The 
escort myth was under-trained crews in badly equipped, overworked ships, a 
distinct sense of being second-best to regular, large-ship forces, a sense of 
impotence in the face of stealthy, piratical U-boat men, long watches, 
subsistence on bully-beef and cocoa. For Canadians the escort myth was 
compounded by technological lags, inexperience, a sense of being dragged 
from peace. For aircrews, myth was defined by long hours over a featureless 
ocean, the risks of attack, weather and mechanical trouble. U-boat myth was 
weeks of patrolling empty seas, the shattering hours of depthcharging after 
detection by escorts or attacking a convoy, the squalor and confinement of life 
aboard and the lionised relaxation ashore. 
It is significant how many such myths stem from the early years of the 
war, not the latter, when equipment and conditions changed. They were 
however 'elaborations and fancy', most frequently and pungently seen in 
memoirs and fiction and not, surprisingly, in postwar feature film. This was 
because the memoirs were personal, and the films commercial. The 
3° Either no-one was guilty, their leaders were, or as later many came to believe. DOnitz was. 
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memoirs were the essence of individual experience, while the films were 
largely representations of the state, or its perspective, in recreations of 
famous events. 31 
Myths of the tiny minority of German survivors (for 28,000 of 39,000 U-
Boat men died in the Battle) made their war and defeat bearable, explicable 
and manageable.' They could hold the 'Tonnage War' myth, winning by 
sinking more than the enemy could build. Many, like Donitz, their leader, 
espoused the misconceptions that "we could have won with 300 U-Boats at 
war's commencement."" A few, like the novelist Buchheim, still consider that 
Donitz betrayed his submariners, sending them out to die when the Battle 
was clearly lost. Many felt betrayed by German technological failures, or 
defeated by Allied technology (especially Ultra), not men. They could believe 
that the Navy remained comparatively non-Nazi through the war, which in a 
sense it did. Few thought that it was as thoroughly penetrated by and 
entangled with earlier, more pervasive ideas of German nationalist 
supremacy, from as far back as Bismarck, which the Nazis drew upon and 
extended. Donitz was under Hitler's spell from the beginning, but he was 
prepared by a lifetime's work for and upbringing in the ideals of the German 
state. He and his men were servants of the Reich.' 
German non-participants' views were separate. U-Boat men were 
'killers', like soldiers or bomber crews, taking part in an 'unjust war on 
civilians', or victims of politics or technology. U-Boat life, like convoy life, was 
a 'romantic' or 'unromantic' vicarious experience after 1945, as for most who 
read about the sea. Despite eventual escort supremacy, there is also a non-
German myth of 'invincible U-Boats' in some quarters. Both sides supported 
this, only challenged by technical historians. 35 The few German survivors 
31 Both the 1952 film the Cruel Sea and 1971's Murphy's War, from novels, are exceptions. 
32 Costello & Hughes 1977 op.cit, p.322. 
33  A spring 1939 memo to the Naval High Command cited in Costello & Hughes 1977 op.cit p.34; also 
in Donitz, Ten Years & Twenty Days, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1959; and during a 1973 
conversation with L.Kennedy, cited in Padfield, P, DOnitz, Gollancz, London, 1984, p.487. The fact 
that fifty Type-VII U-Boats (RM4million each) could be built for the cost of Bismarck (RM200million) 
obviously gave force to his wish that Germany have an effective, rather than balanced navy; 
Mallmann Showell,  U-boats Under the Swastika, Allen, London, 1973, p.15. 
34  Topp, E, The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander, Praeger, Westport, Conn, 1992, p.164-5. 
35  Or rather the deception that mythically heroic U-Boat men were beaten by technology [i.e. Ultra], 
not outfought. 
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needed to believe their submarines were the best, and the Royal, Canadian, 
and US Navies needed to believe they had beaten them.' 
Just as there remains a hero myth of U-Boat men, there is clearly an 
unstated seamen's hero myth. It has the same content: iron men (now in 
steel, not wooden, ships), stalwart and dedicated, dutiful and brave though 
unassuming, embodying the best traditions of their service, and carrying 
national ethos in their blood." Seamen's myths were only held by a minority, 
not as a broadly accepted national iconography. It was instead myth about 
them that was internationally known. Seamen's myths were of `us and 
them': people versus seamen, pay, conditions, losses, strikes, and reasons 
for going to sea descended from old myths about sailors. 38 Both wars were 
uncomfortable, though not the wholesale horrors that mythic popular 
histories stated. Their war was like Dover's bombardment. "If London's raids 
were a blow to the head, ours was a gnawing toothache, all of the time."' 
Shipping losses however were not continually grave. Deaths were 
closer to myth than tonnage, though whole-war totals blur the peaks and 
troughs between 1940-43. 4° Deaths presented per diem, per month, would 
not only have given a clearer sense of the ebb and flow, but also the 
relevance of men's worries, adding a factual core to their sailing and sinking 
experiences. In very few works, usually recently, have deaths been put in 
context with yearly shipping losses.' Earlier misrepresentation not only 
supported the seaman's myth of continuous terrible losses, which there 
were not, it also supported the general American Tnyth that losses were 
never too severe and that the whole Battle was exaggerated. For the size of 
the Merchant Navies involved, 24% losses over the whole war was hardly 
inflated, considering the trials and normal risks of service at sea, wartime 
36 A further, minor persistent myth is that the Luftwaffe's Fw200 Condor aircraft (used for 
reconnaissance and less frequently, attacks) was a serious threat until countered. No research 
penetrates popular misconception to debunk this; see Ch.6: "1989-2000." 
J7 See Lane, T, The Merchant Seaman's War, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990, Ch.3 
pp.33-66, & 262, for national traditions and ethos. 
616 Kelly, I, "To Go On the Account", unpublished Honours History thesis, University of Tasmania-
Launceston, 1999, pp.4-6, 45, 46. 
39 Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939-45,  Pimlico, London, 1992 edition, p.415. 
4° Deaths were concentrated in the early to middle periods, dropping sharply after. Had the mid-1943 
death-rate continued, overall totals would have been as startling and unforgettable as the Great 
War's Western Front was. 
41 I,e Slader, J, The Fourth Service, Robert Hale, London, 1994, p.324. 
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worries of torpedo, mine and bomb, with prejudice and discrimination. The 
separation between the horrific experiences of many and the mundaneity of 
many more does not produce a tension like that between defeat and service 
in U-Boat works. 
American pay rates and conditions were not universal. The pay rates 
of Canadian or British seamen were never revealed.' Some landspeople 
despised seamen and thought them shirkers or cowards, avoiding military 
service in the Merchant Navy. How landspeople in equally reserved 
occupations dealt with similar abuse remains unclear." Others recognised 
and thanked seamen; the press made individuals heroes, and through them 
seamen as a group." Seamen had been regarded as aliens and semi-
criminals for centuries, an under-recognised and openly mistrusted segment 
of the population." More recently, the Great War had shown that not only did 
the country depend on seamen for almost all its food and fuel," but also that 
the Royal Navy, the much-vaunted protector of the nation of ages past, was 
all but impotent against submarines. The public had been given the 
Mahanian ideas that navies took as policy: Wagnerian capital-ship battlefleet 
confrontations as in the Elizabethan, Baroque and Napoleonic eras. The 
new style of naval warfare did not fit, and tended to be misunderstood and 
marginalised. 
If anyone lacked traditional myths about heroes, it was the escort 
forces and Coastal Command. Western Approaches Command and the 
Royal Canadian Navy especially were presented in books and films as less 
heroic (merely 'defensively' escorting) than amphibious assault forces, 
destroyer flotillas, or battleships. The US Navy focussed on its highly 
successful 1943-5 offensive patrols centred on hunting U-Boats via Ultra 
42 Halford, R, The Unknown Navy, Vanwell Publishing, St.Catherine's, Ontario, 1995, p.71-6, 244-6. 
43  Perhaps those in reserved occupations, uncomfortable with their own noncombatant status, were 
the discriminators? 
44 Extolling the individual and mass heroism of seamen is almost universal among accounts. Lane 
devotes a chapter to the creation of these heroic myths, how press loaded seamen with herculeanic 
strengths and character. 
45 Palmer, M, Ships & Shipping, B.T.Batsford, London, 1971, pp.23-33, 47-56; Hay, D, War Under the 
Red Ensign, Janes, London, 1982, pp.11-13; Costello & Hughes 1977 op.cit p.34; Lane 1990 op.cit 
pp.103-4, 218; White, J, "Hardly Heroes: Canadian Merchant Seamen & the International Convoy 
System 1939-45", The Northern Mariner, Vol 5, N.4, October 1995, pp.19, 21-5, 27-28. 
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intercepts.'" Compared to brave, stalwart uncomplaining seamen, and iron-
jawed, crew-cut, steely-eyed Teutonic youngsters, escort crews were poor, 
pale, unremarkable servicemen. The Royal Navy was unprepared for the 
obvious U-Boat war to come. It had 'a muddle and make-do' attitude, over-
reliance on ASDIC, no preparation for convoy escort. Max Hastings was to 
write of the Falklands campaign of 1982 "mirroring a host of others that British 
forces have launched with high hopes, considerable muddle and inadequate 
resources, redeemed...by remarkable service efficiency, some outstanding weapons 
systems (which did extra duty for those that failed [my italics: depthcharges, anti-
submarine bombs, ASDIC failed; radar, Leigh-Light and Squid did not]) and the 
quality and courage of the men who fought."48 Only after the war did the Royal 
Navy acquire a fairer share of what little glory was attached to the Atlantic 
campaign, as seen in famous Battle novels," or more prominently, warships 
hunting enemy raiders, as in its films. 5° Coastal Command was denied an 
official open history due to Cold War secrecy. It suffered a silence myth, "the 
indignity of being ignored", peripheralised by Fighter and Bomber Commands. 
Coastal Command was left worse off than Western Approaches Command, 
though it continued postwar, its prewar duties modified. 5 ' 
Royal Canadian Navy myths were of vast numbers of Great Plains 
civilians, presented as cowboys, under-trained and equipped, sharing the 
muddling attitude of its British parent. 52 The experience of escorting shipping 
with very few U-Boat sinkings to its credit accompanied the troubles of vast 
expansion, leading to a sense of unrecognised effort. The tiny regular navy 
wanted to expand and be remembered, a balanced future role. The 
reservists returned to civilian life at war's end. Their experiences were 
buried. They suffered from no voice in the postwar regular navy and a long 
46 From 1928 a semi-service codification as the Merchant Navy', with HM the Prince of Wales as 
"Master of the Merchant Navy & Fishing Fleets" in Lane 1990 op.cit p.22. 
47 The US Navy could have presented its entire Battle experience, including extensive but uneventful 
convoy escort before Pearl Harbor, rather than concentrating on the effective escort-carrier patrols 
which produced better results. US Navy policy and history emphasised U-Boat sinkings over escort 
duties in contrast to the stated Royal Navy goal of "the safe and timely arrival of convoys." 
48 Hastings M & Jenkins, S, Battle for the Falklands Michael Joseph, London, 1983, p.364. 
49 Convoy-escort novels such as The Cruel Sea, Kleber's Convoy, HMS Ulysses. 
53 Such as Battle of the River Plate, Sink the Bismarck! 
51 Law "The Historiography of the Battle", in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit p.600. 
52 McLean, D, "Muddling Through", in Hadley et al 1996 op.cit., p.173-89. 
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silence about wartime shortcomings." The Canadian navy promoted other 
issues, while amalgamation of the defence forces, and Canada's increasing 
multiculturalism further eroded interest. 54 Cold War anti-submarine warfare 
was inexplicably underpromoted despite its centrality to NATO strategy. 
Given the existence of so much myth among authors and audience, 
there has been little controversy. Usually where there are differing, strongly-
held personal myths and viewpoints, they will be contentious. There has 
been little fierce argument over the relative importance of US troop convoys or 
British trade convoys. Initial US Navy responses to U-Boat attacks after Pearl 
Harbor have been condemned by almost all authors. There has been 
minimal contention within various representations about control of airpower, 
in contrast to wartime competition between the services." There are 
continuing inaccuracies and distortions over the US Navy contribution, 
especially portrayal of its role in Ultra. 56 This starkly contrasts with the 
enormous US role in escorting its own troops and supplies, aircraft and 
shipbuilding, and oil production, the last three clearly the largest winning 
elements. Other controversy - and thus myth - centres around the wholly 
British scattering of convoy PQ-17, and the losses this incident caused." 
Unlike the successful novel and film of Das Boot, which triggered broad 
discussions, controversy about PQ-17 has been mainly a participant 
controversy, not a popular or academic one. Once the participants are all 
dead this will merely be a fervent 'buff controversy, fought with decreasing 
relevance and accuracy by men in clubs and societies and in the pages of 
the press and informal journals. 
53 The 1949 Mainguy report also discussed serious attitude differences between officers and men; 
Glover in Hadley et al 1996 p.72. 
s4 Milner "the Historiography of the Canadian Navy: the State of the Art" pp. 28-9; Hadley op.cit in 
Hadley et al 1996 pp.51-2, 55. 
Between the US Navy and Army Air Force, and more forcefully between Royal Air Force Bomber 
and Coastal Command. 
The provision of calculating technology, and collection, not analysis, of Signals Intelligence. As 
Blair points out, this was larger than previously thought, especially in the role of women; Blair, C, 
Hitler's U-Boat War: the Hunted. 1942-45, [V.2 of 2], Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1998, pp.326, 
415. 
57 This Arctic convoy was scattered because the Admiralty could not be sure whether Norwegian-
based German surface ships were at sea. Without anti-submarine or anti-aircraft escort, 75% of PQ-
17's ships and cargoes were lost to U-Boat and air attack. 
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The largest problem the Battle has, in historical perspective and 
cultural meaning, except in Germany, is mass ignorance - 'collective 
amnesia' - , not mass mythologising and distortion." The vast majority of 
Europeans and North Americans are less aware of the Battle than more 
prominent campaigns, as they are of the Chinese-Japanese war, the only 
Second World War campaign which was more protracted. Participants even 
by 1968 were "a tiny minority who have lived on into an age when numbers and 
votes, pressure groups and self-seekers, sensation and scandal drown the small 
voice of those who served selflessly and faithfully.' Battle myths arose partly in 
response to that 'collective' or 'popular amnesia'. These helped make 
bearable the sense of injustice felt by Allied participants, especially 
seamen.' This resulted from the campaign, which underpinned all others in 
the West, receiving less than its postwar due of recognition and 
commemoration. Government and other lobbies had more power and 
influence than individuals, or absorbed and deactivated commands. Other 
commands and services merely promoted 'their bit': other campaigns and 
battles. It was not a case of exclusion. They had better powers of 
persuasion, and more exciting stories to tell. They were remembered better 
than the Battle and its participants.' 
There is a lag between representation and popular image. "Popular 
image is a composite pattern of public perception and media representation." 62 An 
accurate public perception would depend on knowledge of most 
representations, and awareness of their parameters and values. Analysis of 
works demonstrates how they are written, not how they are read.' Milner's 
1996 chapter "The Historiography of the Canadian Navy" continued earlier 
efforts to publicise Canadian contributions." His papers in Runyan & Copes 
[1994] and Sadkovich [1990] unintentionally expose the disconnection 
58 It is not possible to ascertain the size and scope of the vicarious German audience: even the size 
or diversity of the representations cannot indicate what is read. 
S.W.Roskill in Winton [ed] Freedom's Battle: the War at Sea, Volume One, Hutchinson, London, 
1967, p.401. 
6° Speaking or writing bitterly of their neglect and peripheralisation was simultaneous with discussion 
of service and experience, and the vital part played by merchant services and navies. 
61 Relative neglect, especially in Canada, as newspaper and other reports indicated. 	Hadley in 
Hadley et at 1996 op.cit pp.51-2, 55. 
62 introduction in ibid, p.8. 
63 Kelly 1999 op.cit, p.36-9, 44. 
64 Milner "...The State of the Art", in Hadley et al 1996 op.cit, pp.23-34. 
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between Naval activity and public awareness. Milner still had to define and 
describe RCN historiography for his audience. These were conferences of 
service personnel, historians, and academics. Such specialists as these 
were more aware of RCN heritage than the public. The proof of Canada's 
relative lack of awareness of the Battle [and also tentatively of Britain's and 
America's] is articles like Miler's. He was not presenting RCN heritage to a 
general audience." Only recently have the Battle and its ex-servicemen 
begun to get a greater share of recognition through such efforts. Memorial 
services have generally been attended only by participants, as with the 
commemorations of Canadians in the Battle held in Liverpool in May 1998." 
Each of these representations had a purpose, an intended audience. 
Each used narrative in certain ways, to promote the ideology of a certain 
group. Some had unintended consequences, such as those following the 
Ultra revelation, the controversy following Irving's PQ-17, or after Werner's Iron 
Coffins. Each was set within a tradition of maritime writing and mythology, a 
milieu of purpose. All wished to publicise their contribution among a mass 
of other military accounts, in an era of maritime and adventure stories. It was 
expected men would describe their service in such an important conflict. 
Some had other agendas. Shipping companies, Commands, and 
individuals had contributions to promote in official publications, or actions to 
defend." Feature film makers had commercial motives." This produced 
the gap between thoroughly personal memoirs, and solidly dramatic movies. 
These were almost all capital ship gunfire, not relationships, psychological 
drama, characterisation, or complicated ASW combat. \ They knew of no other 
method than myth. Lane's purpose was to explain seamen's sociocultural, 
not operational, position. Hadley's purpose was to evaluate the significance 
of U-Boat myth, and its separation from military [land] myth. 
65 See for instance the minimal mentions of the Navy amid Canadian armed forces entries in 
encyclopaedias: Introduction, Hadley et al 1996 op.cit p.3-4. General Canadian Anniversary works 
such as Harbron's Longest Battle [1993] are gradually making up this deficit. 
66  See at http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/historical/secondwar/atlantic/12-98.htm  
6' Such as Broome's autobiography/incidental history of PQ-17. 
65 While the armed services supported their efforts for publicity and recruitment drives. 
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"History does not repeat itself. Historians repeat each other." 69 Nowhere i s 
this more striking than the history of the Battle, especially its Arctic subgenre. 
The discourse of the Battle was, quite simply, stuck. Recent accounts are 
still overwhelmingly narrative, essentially operational history. This slow 
evolution is symptomatic of the entire war, with causes, origins, explanations, 
results, not restricted to the Battle." No post-structuralist and little even post-
operational style is in evidence. A few individual, usually counter-mythical, 
texts have not affected the subject. Partly what prevents evolution in memory 
and cultural representation about the Battle is the lack of revisionism in 
fiction and cinema, where most people get their 'history' from. There have 
been no Deighton's Bomber or Robinson's Piece of Cake: works giving us a 
counter-mythological Buchheim's Das Boot was equally mythical, if 
not more, than Allied fictions." Buchheim's detractors indulge in myth too, 
but theirs are based on long association with U-Boats, the Battle, and DOnitz, 
whereas Buchheim had one cruise as a journalist/propagandist. Like Das 
Boot, Piece of Cake did not remake popular Blitz myths. No revision of the 
Allied Battle or its participants occurred. 
Authors suffered from a limited ability to communicate their 
experiences, used to certain forms of writing: service reports, or not at all. 
They added to and deepened, usually without enriching, an existing genre of 
reportage, phraseology and ideas. This can explain the slow change in 
writing since 1945. Journal articles are numerous but no more academic or 
non-mythical than books. Brazilian, ' Norwegian and Portuguese 
representations in addition to much German do not exist in translation, 
further minimising their international impact. Within their countries their 
prominence is limited compared to the experience of occupation or 
neutrality. 73 
69 Howard, 1983 op.cit, p.191. 
WirnOtt, IOC.Cit. 
71 Deighton's Bomber on Allied bomber offensives, Robinson's Piece of Cake on Battle of Britain 
fighter pilots. 
" His remythologising even prompted former U-Boat men to publish lengthy refutations. Merten, K & 
Baberg, K, VVir U-Boot-Farhrer sagen: "Nein! So war das nicht!",  Reiss, Neustadt, 1986. 
73 Norwegian Battle works have been less prominent than partisan experiences, while merchant navy 
operations were not even published before 1994. Dutch and Danish works began appearing in the 
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Few authors were academics. Academic theses "by and large do not 
exist", which has meant "less potential impact and penetration of culture."' 
Historians who had been wartime servicemen wrote official histories such 
as British Intelligence in the Second World War, 1981-89.' 5 Academic history 
in 1999 was a long way from how it was written, taught, and learned in 1950, 
or 1960. 76 Academic attention was generally elsewhere. This deprived 
authors of the theoretical impetus to adopt new ideas or change views, for "a 
doctrine rejected by the majority of the academic community is not likely to remain 
tenable for very long by those school teachers and publicists who mould public 
opinion."" There were no theories to penetrate culture once academics adopt 
them." 
While some historiographic and sociological work has been done on 
wartime representations, little for postwar works exists, other than brief 
conference papers concerned with types and quality, not their purposes or 
meanings, or the motives of public-relations bodies, governments, authors 
or audience. Varying schemes can be made dividing cultural activity and 
representations, extending the historiographies of Fiftieth Anniversary 
Conference delegates Law and Gardner, and Hadley. The following Plates 
1.1-1.13 are new graphic versions of their ideas. They have until now not 
been cross-cultural or international. Separate languages, traditions and 
memories prevented such combinations. 
Plate 1.1 is a taxonomic chart of Atlantic Battle representations from 
1914 to the present. This chart illustrates the broad range of works, and their 
convergences. All representations evolved after the Great War, and 
underwent change due to wartime requirements after 1939. Government 
funding of propaganda meant cinema, documentary and news flourished 
1980s. Thowlsen, "Norwegian Merchant Navy in Allied War Transport" in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit 
p.61. 
4 Gardner in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit, p.529; Law op.cit 598; this author found six historical, not 
cultural, theses. Others may simply not be registered. 
75 Hinsley et a/, who had written a similar short of the war at sea in 1950. 
75 Imagine if Australian Aboriginal, or North-American, history was still written today as it was in 
1950... 
77 Howard 1983 op.cit p.76. 
78 Even this is not certain: the public view of Bligh is still trapped in a 1930 pre-Mackanness 
cinematic stereotyped brutal flogging captain, despite 60 years of unrelenting academic and popular 
effort to widen public horizons and update attitudes. Dening 1988 & 1992, Kennedy 1978 and 1989, 
Christian 1982, 1999, Mackaness 1936. 
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both in number and in sophistication. 	Fictions were restricted, while 
biography and official accounts benefitted as cinema did. Postwar, cinema 
converged with fiction in early memorable adaptations, such as the Cruel  
Sea, later converging with documentary to produce more limited, 
conventional, informative recreations of famous events, such as Battle of the 
River Plate, Above Us the Waves and Sink the Bismarck! Cinema has been 
intermittent since. Fictions diversified into a wide range of subgenres and 
blends. History also diversified into many types which are explained and 
examined below. These media began to converge in the mid-late 1990s 
when the Internet provided the opportunity to combine biographical, technical 
and operational material with images, contact addresses and sources, for 
commercial and memorial or remembrance purposes. 
Gardner suggested a three-phase scheme for historical works, not 
dealing with other representations or remembrance. He divided [Plate 1.2] 
Atlantic Battle history into [1] Official History 1945-to mid 1950s, [2] Secondary 
and reminiscence, 1950s-to now, and [3] the after-Ultra period from 1974. 
These phases except the last are haphazard and uncertain, there being no 
clear changes, as for cinema after 1960." 
Plate 1.2 GARDNER 1994 
Source: Gardner in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit, p.528. 
Law expanded, more specifically. Plate 1.3 shows Law's division of 
the period into types of history. He described their growth, diversification, 
and the decline of several. He saw an embryonic 'post-Ultra' era after the 
publication of the Official History of British Intelligence,  1981-8980 , and 
Kahn's excellent 1991 Seizing the Enigma; further reducing Ultra's power to 
79 Gardner in Howarth and Law, op.cit, p.528. There is no Allied or single national perspective, p.516. 
93 Which stated clearly the actual significance of Ultra to the Battle. 
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merely one element among many.' Hinsley ought to have settled the issue, 
but some later books continued the Ultra myth, if only because of its 
glamour." It will take decades to fade at the present rate. Hadley [Plate 1.8] 
divided German U-Boat myth into periods related to the World Wars and by 
the publication and subsequent furore about Buchheim's 're-mythical' novel 
Das Boot, and its subsequent cinematic and TV incarnations. 
Plate 1.3 LAW AFTER GARDNER 1994 
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Source: Law in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit p.598-600. 
A few works were innovative in presentation or use of sources." Few 
novels and films, and few more histories, have been defined classics. This 
definition depended largely on setting, penetration of culture and audience 
reaction, not content. Influence over other works and later perceptions was 
another component. Some histories are still considered valuable and 
current, though containing dated ideas or outdated information. The official 
histories are in this category, if only for their length and coverage. Some non-
official works have also had long careers." "Contemporary ephemeral" Atlantic 
novels flourished until recently." Many non-historical works were peripheral: 
81 As did recent works such as Gannon, M, Black May: the Defeat of the German Wolfpacks,  Harper-
Collins, NY, 1998. 
E2 Gardner in Howarth and Law, op.cit p.531. 
83 I.e Broome's use of real, raw, reproduced signals in Convoy Is To Scatter, 1973.   
e4 Campbell & Maclntyre's The Kola Run [Muller London 1958] is in this category: even though 
published 40 years ago its blend of view, accuracy, content, balance, and lack of hyperbole means it 
continues to positively influence thought on the Arctic convoys. More recent works are less blessed 
with its turn of phrase, which is what makes Kola Run as memorable and classic as Morison: this 
"succeeds as literature, as well as narrative and analysis" as Keegan puts it. Keegan, J, The Battle 
for History: Refighting World War Two, Hutchinson, London, 1995. 
85 "Contemporary ephemeral fiction" is from Fussell 1989, op.cit p.239. 
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they used the Battle as a setting, but were not about it. This has been a 
particular feature of naval cinema: only twice, decades apart, have there been 
films of the Battle as it was known and fought by the majority of its 
participants. 
Plate 1.4 fills the space in Battle historiography. It describes a new 
cross-cultural chronology, including all forms of media, as well as all 
national patterns. 
Plate 1.4: A Cross-Cultural Chronology 
Phase 1: Immediate Postwar Period; 1945-60. This was the era of operational history, war 
movies, and general personal accounts. Very limited TV documentary commenced, the few classic 
novels were written, and a never-slackening stream of unrealistic commercial novels (mainly written 
by former participants) began. 
Phase 2: Intermediate Period 1960-74. The world no longer intensely memorialised, while the 
flow of minority-interest material was continued." Fiction continued to romantically mangle - what the 
authors actually went through. Few participants complained about lack of commemoration, except to 
each other, and in letters to newspapers or service magazines. David Irving relit one of a few 
wartime controversies, a 1969 furore over his heretical retelling of convoy P0-17, a £30,000 libel 
victory for the commander of its escort, and fire and brimstone at sailors' social gatherings ad 
infinitum. After 1960, cinema only twice again featured the Battle, once peripherally, and histories 
both popular and academic, fictions, and documentary, continued analysing events and experiences, 
rather than exploring the surrounding myths. Technical histories were the principal new area of 
activity. 
Phase 3: Post-30-Year-Rule/Ultra Period; 1974-89. With the release of previously secret 
materials and then the revelation of vast Allied cryptological efforts, a change in direction was forced 
on the entire history of the Second World War; upon the Battle in particular. This moved from history 
to fiction, giving spy and espionage novels new foci. There was no retheorisation, evolution in 
perspective, or any exploration of myth. What also occurred, more in public opinion than products, 
was the revolution and remythologisation (not demythologisation) of the U-Boat." The German novel 
Das Boot polarised debate about portrayal of crews; exacerbated by film and TV miniseries, cultural 
activities and product. Dissenters kept silent, aware of the Irving furore. Novelists continued 
obliterating their experiences without resistance. Canadian history of the Battle appeared, of all 
types - memoir, operational, technical, incidental. Canadian work had been absent since small 
amounts in the Immediate Postwar period. 
Phase 4: 50TH Anniversary Era; 1989-95--. Another burst of work appeared, some academic, 
much by former participants finally able to write of hidden trauma. More Merchant Navy history 
appeared among the naval accounts, with integration of German sources. The fiftieth anniversary of 
the beginning of the war raised awareness, with the Cold War ending. Academic and professional 
histories grew in number and prominence. Change in existing ideas and attitudes grew. Seamen 
were now closer to service personnel than before, and closer to remembrance and commemoration as 
well. There were the beginnings of new theorisation. 
The future promises greater exposure and centralisation for the Battle, in new media, 
especially the Internet, where there is a chance for new interpretations among blends of text, images, 
graphics, and improved communications between participants and the audience." This will only 
happen if the Battle can avoid being swamped on this most unedited and unregulated of media, by 
glossier, more famous and already established topics. The most likely area of theoretic breakthrough 
remains academia, if recent works both nonmythical and countermythical, can be built upon without 
being swamped by commercial or mythical product. This will, as always, depend as much on the 
audience's taste and interest, as authorship." 
85 Hobsbawm, E, The Age of Extremes, Michael Joseph, London, 1994, p.328. 
87 Buchheim was creating a new myth, not removing or opposing existing ones. Hence 'Remyth': a 
new use of mythology to create a separate image of events and attitudes. 
88 New interpretations, and innovative blends of text, images, sounds, graphics, are however not yet 
in evidence. 
88 Audiences support certain interpretations and presentations by purchasing them, inhibiting others. 
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Histories are divided in Plate 1.5 into many subtypes of approach and 
content. There are broadly three types of approach: mythical, non-mythical, 
and counter-mythical." Most histories are mythical: they support the 
general tenets surrounding the Battle. A few are nonmythical, neither 
supporting, debunking or exploring myths, but merely relating a part of the 
Battle. Even fewer are countermythical, opposing or debunking myths. 
Technical histories for instance tend to be nonmythical simply because they 
lack discussion and narrative, focussing on analysing hardware, where 
myths of men and s experiences are infrequent. Openly countermythical 
works are often little known. 
Plate 1.6 describes the broad market of content of varying quality and 
coverage: general, official, operational, campaign, incidental, personal, 
biographical, and technical. General accounts covered the whole war with 
more or less passing reference to the Battle. In the Anniversary Era, general 
accounts often with scholarly contributors, received vital improvements. 
Significant advances in coverage and analysis were made, bringing the 
Battle and its logistics closer to combat in discussion, and linking Merchant 
Navies to armed services." Earlier general accounts usually ignored the 
Battle, or had tiny, unrepresentative entries. Even current ones are smaller 
and shorter than encyclopaedia and dictionary-type entries on battles or 
campaigns. In coming decades this transfer of the Battle from minority 
intimate to general knowledge will pay off, but not before the last participants 
are dead. Books of sea battles tended to ignore the Battle, partially due to its 
aforementioned difficulties of representation, categarisation, scale, detail, 
complexity, and a lack of existing background among the audience. 
Campaign histories specifically described the Battle. 	Incidental 
histories analysed one battle, convoy, or important event. Personal accounts 
were generally events from a single perspective, but not written as 
autobiography or biography [usually a whole life, not just a wartime service 
93 Calder 1991 op.cit p.177. 
91 Such as Dear, I.C.B & Foot, M.R.D, The Oxford Companion to World War Two, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1995 [contributors including Milner], and quality general historical accounts such as 
Overy, R, Why the Allies Won, Jonathon Cape, London, 1995. 
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MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 1: HIT, MYTH & CROSS-CULTURAL METHOD 
period]. 92 Technical accounts covered the development and/or use of a ship, 
class, aircraft, weapon, or sensor. Thematic accounts covered a type of 
operation, of warfare, or its impact or consequences, instead of straight, day-
by-day narrative and analysis of actual events, losses and gains. Operational 
History related the day-to-day and general strategic and tactical progress of a 
force, corps, detachment or other military body, within a defined theatre. 
Almost all were Participant History: written by those who were there. 
Tony Lane, a former seaman, published a sociology in 1990, The 
Merchant Seamen's War, exploring its experiences, structure, attitudes, 
image and presentation, and wartime works about it. This study was not 
continued into the postwar era. His work is a template which allows us to 
explore wartime and prewar works about the British Merchant Navy, and 
apply this to other merchant navies, and to the armed services, as well as an 
introduction to analysing postwar works. Canadian professor of Germanic: 
studies, Michael Hadley offers another template. His 1995 Count Not the 
Dead explores a century of German U-Boat works and their meanings. 
Hadley deals with the U-Boat since 1895, not the Battle of the Atlantic. He 
also deals only with the German U-Boat as a cultural icon, a rather more 
straightforward task [as it excludes other national traditions and operations 
as well as histories], but nonetheless his approach and coverage give useful 
foci in addition to opening up a vast amount of works otherwise closed to the 
English speaker. Hadley's 1996 chapter did not explore the Battle from the 
Canadian perspective, rather the Navy from its representations. 
Plate 1.7 describes 	the relative contributions 	of national 
representations. These have tensions, causes, parameters, and 
characteristics. Norway's war and history was divided in three. Until April 
1940, neutrality balanced a vast profitable merchant fleet precariously 
between Nazi and British requirements. After occupation its remaining Navy 
served, famously, within British Home Fleet and Western Approaches 
Command forces. In comparison to frequently terribly-equipped, trained 
overworked Royal Canadian Navy Escort Groups, ironically the most effective 
92 see Pearce in Ch.5. 
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Royal Navy anti-submarine warfare group, B6, comprised Royal Norwegian 
Navy corvettes with a single elderly Royal Navy destroyer carrying the senior 
officer. 93 Norway's entire Merchant Navy joined the Allied war effort, 
contributing shipping to the Battle of the Atlantic and continued to support the 
Norwegian government in exile. The occupation phase divided in two: from 
April 1940 part freedom to trade, part support of Britain; after Pearl Harbor 
under-represented Allied shipping, caught between US and British 
requirements and politics as during the Phoney War. Limited Norwegian 
naval history, rarely seen elsewhere, focussed like Royal Canadian Navy 
history on destroyers and glamour, not escorts. Shipping management 
history and experiences were still being written, in Norwegian, in the late 
1990s. 94 
The postwar Royal Canadian Navy focussed on regular actions, as it 
considered its escort performance too embarrassing and dull to deserve 
inclusion, even given its importance to NATO Atlantic strategy.' The 
Canadian Merchant Navy had an obscure, parochialised heritage, hampered 
by its shipping's seasonal nature. Suddenly created during and after the 
Great War, the deepwater fleet failed during the Depression." In the Second 
World War, a political determination for a hostilities-only disposable 
merchant fleet, ensured another postwar decline." Canadian seamen were 
recast from wartime heroes to postwar Communist-inspired Union 
troublemakers, rapidly crushed." Royal Canadian Navy and Merchant Navy 
Battle experiences and commemoration were thus both denied any voice for 
decades. Change occurred only from the late 1970s for the Royal Canadian 
Navy and late 1980s for the Canadian Merchant Navy, though some 
restitution for the few remaining participants was provided in the Anniversary 
Era. Canadian historiography no longer resembles Britain's. It had fewer, 
93 Milner in Runyan, T, & Copes J, [ed] To Die Gallantly: the Battle of the Atlantic 50 TH Anniversary 
American Historical Conference, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, footnote 32 to p.134. 
94 For details see Thowlsen in Howarth and Law op.cit.pp.60-79. 
85 Milner in Sadkovich, J, (ed) Reevaluating the Major Naval Combatants of WW-II, Greenwood 
Books, Westport, Conn, 1990, p.42. 
85 Like the Australian experience: Campbell, I, All In The Same Boat, Australian War Memorial, 
Historical Research Section, Summer Scholarship paper, February 1996. 
87 To a certain extent this could be said to be the British and US experience as well: mass shipping, 
like tank production a wartime expedient, not a long-term economic strategy. 
88 Halford, R, 1995 op.cit pp.ix-x, 237-39, 241. 
• 
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recently prominent works. Canadian writers concentrated, naturally enough, 
on 'their' war: the long hard struggle against the elements and their 
entrapment between the Royal and US Navies. Conflicting strategies 
misused Canadian forces and denied autonomy or a section of the theatre 
equal to deployment." Douglas's works on the Royal Canadian Air Force 
and Navy were almost unknown outside Canada' °° and US authors were until 
recently ignorant of the burgeoning literature. 10 ` Canada moved through the 
general, operational, personal, and technical writing Britain passed through 
1960-69, after the Ultra-domination of the 1970's (though benefitting from its 
inclusion), and Anniversary memorial works, all at once. 
American historiography has been dominated by Roosevelt's 
relationship with Churchill, early experiences of benign and then belligerent 
neutrality before December 1941, the Pacific war, and controversy between 
American and British historians.' Heavy shipping losses, technological 
impotence, and controversy over performance lessened the desire for 
publicity and commemoration. US Navy history has been served by solid 
personal, technical and incidental accounts of offensive forces in the later 
years of the Battle, not 'classical' discussions of the Battle, as well as 
Morison's official history, "which succeeds as literature, not just narrative and 
analysis", as Keegan put it.' Poor shipping management and contrastingly 
amazing construction programmes have never lacked prominence. As in 
Britain, the official histories of the US War Shipping Administration, Maritime 
Commission, and Army Transport Service described operations, not 
experiences. As in Canada, the US Merchant 'Marine' was regarded as a 
wartime expedient.'" This was in stark contrast to its prewar size, second 
only to the British Merchant Navy. Company histories are few and recent, 
compared to technical and construction histories. Oral and social histories 
are now available. All lack an overarching scheme, as more general British 
93 Fully 50% of Atlantic escort responsibility eventually lay in Royal Canadian Navy hands: Milner in 
Runyan & Copes 1994 op.cit.p.121. 
1°3 lbid p.128. 
10' lbid, footnote 18 to p.128. 
1°2 Competition between theatres, control of Army aircraft versus US Navy, the actions and opinions 
of Admiral King. 
1°3 Keegan 1995 op.cit, p.39. 
10' It could be built for wartime use and disposed of, without any commitment to employment, 
seapower, or economics. 
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works provided. None of the long tradition of merchant and marine writing in 
the US (Melville, Dana, et al) transfers to Second World War works.'" In 
Britain, heritage fed company histories and, much later, personal accounts, 
which are the only repository of wartime Merchant Navy experiences and 
operations. 
German historiography is separate once again, due partly to the 
language barrier, and partly to the different experience of the war and Cold 
War. A small amount of this material was translated and read in English, the 
dominant language of the memory of the Battle. Only some ideas and 
attitudes passed translators and editors; many were never communicated to 
the world. Atlantic Battle icons are lacking in other nations: only Germany 
turned the U-Boat into one. Elsewhere the aircraft carrier replaced the 
battleship, and then the ballistic-missile submarine replaced the aircraft 
carrier, but in morbid terms.'" German books translated for the English 
world have a strange quality. Those about the U-boat show no trace of any 
pleasure in sinking merchant shipping, or much sorrow in relating the 
losses and deaths caused by Allied escorts and aircraft. There is no 'death 
or glory, worth the sacrifice in the end' found in Allied books, nor any real 
hatred of opponents who bombed German cities and killed civilians. The 
absence of feeling is not designed to divert anger about stories of killing and 
sinking Allies. It is an unwillingness to express such feelings. It is a grief, 
more than a guilt, that is too deep to be borne openly. The winners can 
permanently parade theirs for the world and press, especially in those last 
six anniversary years.'" 
Hadley fortunately first identified in 1995 for English readers a 
historiography for the wartime and postwar eras. He also introduced 
German naval history from its mid-nineteenth century beginnings, and the 
relationship and tension between surface and submarine forces and 
writings which characterise German experience and memory. A century and 
a half of naval experience and thought are now open to us, as is a large, 
1°5 US maritime writing was closer to nature writing; Raban, 1992 op.cit p.20. 
106 Postwar, nuclear power made such national icons ambiguous and menacing, not mere glorious 
symbols. 
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overlooked and unexplored field of German writing: a century of the U-Boat's 
centrality in German naval thought and conceptualisation. Only in Germany 
does the Battle, via the U-Boat, have a prominent position. As Hadley points 
out, 
"the prevailing European mindset of continentalism has led scholars to identify 
'war' with 'land-war' and 'war-novel' with land-war novel'. Naval war and its 
attendant questions of morality and maritime prestige have been excluded from 
the formula. Yet army and U-Boat works present essentially different arguments 
about Germany's experience of war."'" 
Strong public support for naval matters starkly contrast with the 
complaints of German authors that Government and public misunderstood 
seapower, and misused the navy. He does not cover naval histories to any 
great degree, focussing on popular accounts, novels, documentary, and 
cinema as representations. Nor does he compare and contrast German 
with British or other writings.'" All popular accounts are examined, but not 
the technical histories of ROssler or the solid scholarly works of Rohwer. 
The latter exemplify the academic work on the Battle. Hadley makes the 
important point that quality is not something that can be found: aesthetic 
achievements are few and there is little to criticise, as in other textual 
research. There is the "same repetition of exhaustive descriptive metaphor found 
in British maritime novels." 0 He sees each representation merely as a piece of 
the puzzle, allowing us to view German culture and perceptions. 
German historiography moved from publicist works, to populist and 
propagandist accounts during the Great War, as well as incidental works and 
biographies. These were supplemented by feature films. The Second World 
War brought another burst of propagandist books and films, idolising the 
aces and ordinary men of the U-Boat force into heroes. Postwar, these were 
modified into accounts which mourned, described and celebrated the men 
and their sacrifice. A separate strand of anti-U-Boat works emerged in the 
107 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.138, 178-9. 
119 Naval narrative can be more romantic, about the 'clean sea', devoid of the scars and debris of 
combat. Seabattles create no carnage or shrines, sailors can be untouched by politics, and so 
forth. Yet even there, land-war terms were used: operational U-Boat were called Frontboote, "Front-
Boats", as if on a maritime Western Front. [bid, p.x. 
1°9 Hybrid works, such as Gasaway's German-source inspired Grey Wolf Grey Sea, [Arthur Barker, 
London, 1972] would benefit especially from Hadley's attention, as they are equally outside the usual 
textual and thematic run of Atlantic works, and from German genres. 
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socialist East Germany. Technical accounts followed, as well as novels and 
features, before the revolution of Buchheim's fictional retelling of his wartime 
experiences. This controversial book and later film dominated German 
representation after 1973. A debate between supporters and detractors of 
Buchheim has defined and fuelled much portrayal of U-Boats since. 
There are similarities between British and American authors: they 
concentrated on the same types of battles, defeats, victories, incidents, and 
views. Differences are, however, marked. Mines, bombing and the threat of 
invasion made ordinary life in Britain a front line experience in ideas and 
expectations, if not sober reality. The Dunkirk, Blitz, and `Sealion' myths the 
British told the US and themselves made them all feel combatants in a way 
never experienced in America. This crucial difference between American and 
British perceptions has dominated writing about the Battle. Canada's 
separate experience has been excluded, caught with the worst opinions and 
attitudes, between Britain's tactical domination and vital needs, and 
American strategic domination and logistical preferences." American 
writing condemns Britain for trying to run the Battle, while neglecting other 
areas for its peripheral rather than central strategy. Recent scholars have at 
last identified this crucial difference in warmaking. American scholars 
generally refuse British policies any credence, though they may demonstrate 
why they were used. Many US scholars and popularisers alike have 
condemned Britain for thinking the Battle vital at all, forgetting that survival 
depended on the Atlantic. American and British accounts are, from different 
perspectives, hard on Admiral King. II2 There is as much against King as 
there is for him. 
110 Raban 1992 op.cit, cited in Hadley 1995 op.cit p.xi. 
111 Canada's sense of frontline experience caused by coastal U-Boat operations was long forgotten, 
see Hadley's 1985 U-Boats Against Canada [ McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal]. 
112 Adm.King was made head of the US Atlantic fleet during 1940. Supposedly an Anglophobe, he 
resisted misuse of the US Navy by government or other services, and also considered unescorted 
convoy worse than none at all, his only real error when U-Boats began operating off the US coast 
after Pearl Harbor. The Pacific war, delay in providing escorts and a convoy system, has led to a 
myth that he 'allowed' vast numbers of ships to be sunk in order to retain control over his forces and 
avoid interservice cooperation. He didn't remove US Navy ships en masse from the Atlantic once war 
was declared, refuse to institute convoy, or approve of offensive operations already shown by the 
Royal Navy to be useless. He did escort US troop convoys instead of Allied trade convoys, and did 
think no convoy better than convoy unescorted, which was a fatal mistake - with other people's 
shipping and lives. Blair, vol I, op.cit, pp.457-460, 521-33, 594. 
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Plate .11: CINEMA, • 1940-98 
Plate 1.9: SECOND WORLD WAR MEDIA 
Representations are divided into different types and subtypes. Written histories and personal 
accounts, fiction, cinema features, and documentary [once cinematic, now totally televised or on 
videocassette] are the chief forms, and the Internet has been a recently added growing area of activity. 
Plate 1.10: POSTWAR MEDIA 
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Unlike history, cinema has been generally commercial, devoted to 
expounding rather than exploring mythology, and neglectful of the mundane 
and the personal in favour of the famous and exciting. Plate 1.11 denotes the 
various types. Only The Cruel . Sea dealt directly with convoy escort and 
defence, though it has non- and counter-mythical elements. Another three 
featured U-Boat operations from the German side, heavily mythical.'" Only 
two other than these have even had U-Boats in them: one was a peripheral 
'classic', The Enemy Below, which never dealt with attacking or defending 
shipping, the raison d'être of the U-Boat campaign; while the other was an 
even more peripheral tale, set, deliberately at war's end.'" The other half-
dozen Atlantic films, all British, recreated mythically famous peripheral 
surface and intelligence actions, not typical, unremarkable submarine-
convoy warfare. 
Fictions of the Battle are easily summed. Up to 1990 there were 
according to Michael Paris more than 2000 novels of or about the Second 
World War in English or translation, at least 86 directly involving the Battle. 115 
Plate 1.12 defines their variations. There have been many novels since 1990 
just with naval settings. There is no clear definition in any case, as many 
have substantial content elsewhere. The few classic, novels of the war at 
sea in the Immediate Postwar Era led (in the boom of cheap novels) to a 
growing number of titles and sustained interest in the following eras, added 
to by the growth of the 'reminiscence' market leading up to and during the 
fiftieth Anniversary. They are mythical: they concentrate on action and drama 
described either vividly or coldly. They are divided in two. There were six 
works by professional writers with a powerful character and relationship-
driven story about the ocean and the Battle, which penetrated popular 
awareness. 116 These were amid a hundred commercial or `pulp' populist 
novels of varying quality, coverage and connection. These have become 
more popular over the years, as representations of the Battle in most media 
113 Sharks & Little Fish, 1957; U-47: Kaleu Prien, 1958 . Das Boot, 1981. 
114 Murphy's War, 1971. 
115 39-45: 9, 45-60: 22, 60-74: 18, 74-89: 34, 89-98: 7+=90; Paris, M, The Novels of World War Two: 
An Annotated Bibliography,  Library Association, London, 1990; p.vii. 
116 The Cruel Sea and HMS Ulysses were instant commercial successes, always remembered; the 
latter still in print. 
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has grown. Fiction has changed little thematically and technically since 
1955. Since 1989 numbers have shrunk, but there are no changes in quality 
or focus from the commercial concerns of marketing and serial production. 
The forced continuation of central character and theme into new settings is 
perhaps the most distinct recent feature. The Battle has become a subgenre 
of war fiction, as ephemeral and formulaic as any other commercial genre. 117 
Novels supported Battle myths in two ways. Like cinema, they 
supported the myth of combat and action, without demonstrating mass, 
mundane, convoying and escort experience. Otherwise they supported any 
or all Battle myths, depending on who was writing. Coastal Command crew 
or base novels reflected Coastal Command myths and experiences: long 
hours, worry, fear, high losses to U-Boats and German aircraft, weather, 
rowdy nights of drinking, as well as the boredom of patrol amidst the 
supposed glamour of flight. Merchant Navy novels had a stereotypical mix of 
old salts and young boys, an alcoholic or two, often the captain; a mate 
everyone hates, a pink-cheeked young radio-operator, an Royal Navy DEMS or 
MRA man or crew, a Scots engineer. The food will be poor, hours long, living 
spaces cramped, worry continuous. Many of the crew will have been 
repeatedly sunk and rescued only to return to sea. Royal Navy novels had a 
high, distant captain, a mix of Hostilities-Only officers, old salt regulars and 
Hostilities-Only ratings, and too few escorts; U-Boats always penetrate the 
screen, but will still be sunk. 
Postwar documentaries about the Battle were infrequent and not 
illustrative of genre, era, or the Battle in 'reality' or representation. There has 
effectively been only one per era save in the Anniversary period. Nor do they 
illustrate the Battle against other naval campaigns or the war generally. 
There have been only two dozen or so documentaries about the war at sea in 
total since 1950, and only twelve with close relation to the Battle. They are 
unfortunately clustered in recent years, as cinema features were in the 
117 No Battle book since Das Boot has remained long in print or on sale, or been reprinted, unlike 
1950s titles which are periodically reprinted with new covers. Battle books remain available through 
flourishing second-hand shops and through lending libraries, read almost entirely by fans. Their post-
Great War equivalents decayed decades ago, explaining their absence, save library and occasional 
mint condition expensive titles in quality antiquarian bookshops. 
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1950s, by accident of production and audience taste. 	One principal 
difference is that even if 1950s sea movies did not become classics, as 
many war movies did, they were all successful irrespective of quality. In the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s documentaries have been, with one exception 
neither popular, nor successful in changing the myth, even when well 
made." 8 Only in Germany after 1985 was there a thin but steady run of 
documentary concentrating on the U-Boat as continuing literary memory and 
consciousness icon. This was as trapped in obsessive support for and 
condemnations of Buchheim as other media in Germany since 1973. 
Because wartime and postwar films were often `docudramatic', 'made 
for television', pure documentary illuminated little that features did not.' 
Attention was elsewhere, save in rare circumstances.' There were no 
equivalent 'peace docos' in the 1950s to 'war docos' during the war.' 
There has been slow change of focus over the half-century, increasingly 
narrowing to either people or technology, in how events are covered and how 
people are presented. Plate 1.13 shows the divisions between them. Focus 
has moved from generalised presentation of large events to (as usual with 
the modern awareness-raising documentary) the under-or-unrepresented, 
suffering, ordinary person. All show either the restrictions of serials and 
bias, or simply to maker's intentions, as is usual with documentary and TV, 
irrespective of actual issues.' 
In summary, mythology enfolds all aspects of the Battle and its 
representation. This mythology has causes, features, and content. A 
chronology has been derived, with a taxonomy of cross-cultural media. 
These show what changes have occurred, in addition to suggesting reasons 
for lack of evolution. National historiographies and their differences and 
similarities can be explored, beyond the bare bones of separate eras, 
118 The exception is the excellent 1973 Thames-TV series The World At War. 
119 Being monochrome, and having aspect ratios close to TV. 
120  Broad cataloguing of campaigns, or much later minority pieces on technology, seamen's plight, or 
Black US Navy service. 
121 Penelope Huston, Sight & Sound, Summer 1955, cited in Ramsden, J, "Refocussing 'The People's 
War': British War films of the 1950's" in Journal of Contemporary History, Vo133N °.1, pp35-63, Sage 
Publications, London, 1998, p.53. 
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idiosyncrasies, and types of representation. 	The Battle's events and 
experiences are both unproblematical in scope and well established. What 
is difficult is integrating the Battle's different genres, while exploring rigid 
national perspectives and stereotypes, and the very pervasive myths and 
legends which dominate it. It has only a few well-established points of 
contention, little forceful dispute, and little apparent complexity to attract the 
academic. Despite participant interest and representation, it has suffered 
from relative neglect, from marginalisation in memory and media activity, as 
well as official commemoration. Its overwhelming continuity of theme, 
content and genre is its most prominent and peculiar feature. The origin and 
features of those continuities and changes are the subject of the next five 
chapters. 
122 This could be avoided by describing what contemporaries thought, and comparing that to recent 
historical theory and perspective, instead of what the makers wish to use the Battle for. 
Documentary makers necessarily always have their own agenda. 
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REPRESENTATIONS AND MYTH 1914-45 
I'm sure we may rate the past tremendous year as the most splendid, as It was the most deadly year, 
in our long English and British, story. Nothing Surpasses 1940. 
But I and my faithful colleagues had no lack of care, the shadow of the U-Boat blockade cast its chill still on us. 
All our plans depended upon the defeat of this menace. The Battle of France was lost. 
The Battle of Britain was won. The Battle of the Atlantic has now to be fought. 
Churchill, July 1941. 
Continuity characterised the themes and content of representations 
after 1945. What has been less obvious is continuity from before the war, 
originating in historical and mythological responses to the Great War at sea. 
There are continuities of official employment of history and myth. There have 
been continuities of myths among seamen, blending existing myth and legend 
with new ideas. There was also continuity of representation. Official 
propaganda, personal perspective, and commercial interest were the 
purposes.' Forms created then run through all later works, up to the present, 
though there have been variations and departures. Such variations have been 
derided or ignored, but rarely explored. Change has been gradual but 
accumulative. It has not however always been obvious. The force of the 
experiences drove the representations. Continuities and resemblances in 
cultural attitudes and works today, towards a conflict that began sixty years 
ago, and using ideas and themes created for and after a conflict that began in 
1914, warrant further exploration. 
The authors - mainly ex-participants - wrote mythically because they 
were immersed in it. Seamen of all nations grew up with both tales and 
history, within a mythic and psychological framework of great past deeds. 
British maritime myth before the Elizabethans was not of English making. The 
Phoenicians, Themistocles, St.Brendan, Diaz, Magellan, Columbus, Vespucci, 
Caboto, were their heroes of old, as for the Spanish sand Portuguese, Dutch 
and Italians. Domestic heroes were added to foreign once they were created: 
Anson, Cook and Franklin, Morse, Brunel, Plimsoll, as British maritime 
supremacy became unassailable in the nineteenth century. For the 
Englishman the sea was "swollen with significance...it shaped and defined the 
nation.. .was where its wars were fought.. .its roads to market.. .the testing ground of 
"manhood. The Englishman could hardly look off a pier without thinking of" English 
naval myth begun with the Elizabethans: "Drake, Hawkins, Raleig h, Blake, Jervis 
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and Nelson" to Jellicoe and Beatty. 2 The American ocean "was freed of the 
weight of history in Britain" though it too had heroes such as Jones, Perry, 
Farragut, Dewey. 3 The French had Colbert, the Dutch Tromp, deRuyter and 
Piet Hein. This was the world of history, legends, heroes and antecedents the 
writers of Atlantic Battle myth grew up in and contributed to. 
The Battle comprised two rounds, 1914-18 and 1939-45. The former 
began a revolution in naval strategy, tactics, logistics, technology, and 
representation. The latter secured it. Civilians at sea became targets, 
combatants, intermingled with servicemen. For the first time the ocean was a 
vital, single link in the survival of Britain and its dependencies. It divided 
Britain from its colonies and greatest potential ally, the USA. Germany could 
not ignore these vulnerable sea routes, despite its continental strategy. In both 
World Wars Britain's long-developed markets and sources overseas, and its 
colonies, aided and abetted in a vastly different conflict to its experience. 
Previously, Britain had been largely self-sufficient. By 1914 a century of world 
peace, and the benefits and restrictions of leading the industrial revolution had 
taken their toll. The great nineteenth century expansion in population and 
industrialisation meant dependence on markets and suppliers overseas. Most 
of its food, industrial materials, fuel and other supplies were imported. 4 It could 
no longer stand alone without a vigorous defence and support of the Atlantic 
routes it depended upon. Britain's continental war effort and its economy were 
threatened by weapons its Navy could not combat. 5 The fact that most Atlantic 
Campaign writers allude to Great War convoys, but only a few regard and 
examine it as the first of two equal rounds, is instructive. 6 
1  Each tended to dominate a media: propaganda drove history, personal ideas drove memoirs, and 
commercial need drove cinema, though in wartime as never after propaganda was the dominant purpose 
of all media. 
2 Raban 1992, op.cit p.20. 
3 'bid, p.23. 
4 Despite the Battle, Britain imported 14.57 million tons of US steel 1940-45; Calder 1991 op.cit p.57. 
s Preston, A, The First Submarines,  Phoebus Publishing, London, 1974, p180. 
s E.g. Winton 1983 & 1990, Terraine 1989, Tarrant 1990. 
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PLATE 2.1: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, 1914-18 
The Great Wars Battle (largely outside the Atlantic) between shipping and commerce raiders 
(both ships & submarines) is less documented and its phases less defined than that of the Second World 
War. 
Phase 1: 28/8/14--18/2/15 
Early phase of unrestricted U-Boat warfare on warships, and many notable sinkings. 
Slow early phase of restricted U-Boat warfare on shipping, with gradually rising losses 
& growth of mythology of shocking effectiveness and cruelty. 
Phase 2: 18/2/15-- 5/15 
Unrestricted submarine warfare on merchant shipping begins. Liner Lusitania sunk 
7/5/15, with heavy loss of life, including neutral Americans. Political and public-
relations disaster; German Naval Command calls off unrestricted U-Boat warfare on 
shipping. 
Phase 3: 5115--2116 
Shipping losses fall. Surface raiders continue operating, while U-Boat are hamstrung 
by regulations. 
Phase 4: 2116--1117 
Despite restrictions on U-Boats, shipping losses begin to climb, slowly, in all theatres 
- Baltic, Mediterranean, North Sea, Atlantic. 
Surface raiders are all sunk, blockaded, interned or immobilised in foreign ports. 
German High Seas Fleet effectively trapped in harbour after Jutland [May 1916]. 
Phase 5: 1/17 --4/17 
Re-application of unrestricted warfare on shipping under new U-Boat Arm leader 
Admiral von Holtzendorff. Shipping losses rise exponentially. 
Phase 6: 4/17-11/11/18 
Extension of convoying to Scandinavia, & thence to Atlantic sees dramatic drop in 
shipping losses, while sinkings of U-Boats remain low. US enters war; USN begins 
patrols and support of Allied navies. Accelerated U-Boat construction meant more at 
sea, with more building & working-up, when Armistice signed. 
Convoy theory vindicated. 
Germany built 344 fighting submarines [Front-Boote] 1914-18: with 28 at war's 
commencement, with 226 under construction & 212 more ordered at the Armistice; 
more than 800 in total. 
199 were lost (53.5%), with 515 Officers & 4,849 men, and 1400 captured, of a total of 
13,000 seagoing personnel (40%). 
The value of convoy, apart from construction, weaponry, sensors, or tactics, can be 
seen from a few simple figures: 
11,135,000 tons of merchant shipping were lost to U-Boats, out of 13,000,000 tons 
lost in total, a high proportion of the remainder lost to mines, many laid by U-Boats. 
Great Britain alone lost more than 2,000 ships with 15,313 men (5.5% of the Merchant 
Service), while the RN lost 22,811, or 4%; [6,000 - 26% - at Jutland alone]. 
More than 84,000 voyages were made in convoy 1917-18, 0.4% sunk (257 ships), 
while 2,216 ships were sunk steaming independently in the same period. 
Only 18 were sunk under joint Air & Sea escort (Macintyre 1961 op.cit p.22.). 
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For the first time new technologies were used widely by major powers at 
war, not experimentally, but as conventional weapons. The submarine, the 
mine, the radio and the aircraft all literally brought new dimensions to war. All 
could have been even more revolutionary had not naval leaderships been so 
conservative. 7 Mistrust of or unwillingness to use the power of submarines, 
torpedoes, mines, and aircraft also meant that naval powers were unprepared 
politically, technically and theoretically to exploit them. Their effectiveness 
occurred in spite of naval leadership. The impact of shipping losses and of the 
relative impotence of anti-submarine weapons changed sea warfare. 8 The 
shock of new technologies was most keenly felt amongst seamen and those 
government and naval authorities charged with shipping direction and use. 
Surface raiders began taking a toll of Allied merchant ships within days of the 
beginning of the war, while Germany's few U-Boats concentrated, with 
alarming success, on warships: sinking several while both Admirals and the 
public recoiled from this ungentlemanlike new weapon. U-Boats had the 
advantage of being able to submerge when enemy warships appeared, but 
they were dogged by low submerged speed and manoeuvrability until late in 
the Second World War. 8 
Popular disgust and diplomatic pressures prevented unrestricted U-Boat 
warfare until 1916, despite incidents such as the sinking of Lusitania. Even 
then, worries about drawing America into the war, and growing international 
opposition to Germany caused two separate cessations of unrestricted warfare 
before the situation on the Western Front demanded it. 1° Shipping losses 
rose, without convoy or weaponry to protect vessels. Great War U-Boats 
almost won their campaign." The Second World 'tonnage-war' would be 
fought by men led and trained by Great War U-Boat men. 12 The actual event 
of torpedoing was traumatic enough, compared to the stopping and sinking of 
ships by surface warships in previous centuries. Taking of prisoners by 
commerce-raider was normal, but was a radically new experience in any case, 
9 Preston, A, 1974, op.cit, p.165-6. 
10 See Plate 2.1 "Chronology of the Battle of the Atlantic: 1914-18" of this thesis. 
11 In April 1917 25% of Allied merchantmen in British waters were sunk; Bennett et a/, Sea Warfare, Ure-
Smith, Sydney, 1975, p.69. 
12 	• Winning the war by sinking more shipping than your enemy could build, as well as their cargoes; 
Hadley 1995 op.cit p.68. 
7 Beesly, P, Very Special Intelligence: the Admiralty's 0.I.C. in WW2,  Hamilton, London, 1982, p.3-6. 
a Hadley, M, op.cit, p.22; Ireland, B, Warships, Hamlyn, London, 1978, p.103-4. 
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given the decades of peace preceding the Great War. U-Boats were 
described like pirates. They attacked unsuspecting unarmed civilians, and they 
left crews to fend for themselves, or killed survivors as towing survivors to land 
or waiting for neutral shipping to appear was usually impractical and 
dangerous. 
This would set the tone for representations of submarine warfare on 
shipping. 13 It would also create much of the mythology. 14 What also changed 
were the basic ideas and images navies, governments, and the public would 
have of the sea and those who work on it. Maritime mythology has always 
existed to make sense of the sea, placing humans and their experiences in 
understandable frameworks. During and after the Great War the former 
mythology of the sea, of wind, wave, seamonsters and pirates, largely 
dispelled by education and improvements in ship design and technology, were 
replaced and enhanced with new myths: of piratical, brutal submariners, 
greedy owners, ignorant and uncaring military figures and a wasteful public. 
Seamen, civilians in a near-total war, continued to be a sidelined 
misunderstood, near-subversive element of society, for all their centrality to the 
war effort. 16 
At war's end there was continuity and change. The U-Boats were 
surrendered and disposed of. Germany was forbidden to replace them. 
Merchant fleets decayed. 16 The Depression and slow recovery further 
undermined their position. Terms and titles designed to give seamen and 
service some status, position and acknowledgment for their sacrifice were 
peacetime creations. In 1928, the Prince of Wales Was made 'Master of the 
Merchant Navy and Fishing Fleets' in addition to other titles, but it was hardly 
used before 1939. 17 Both commerce-warfare and anti-submarine warfare were 
13 See Appendix I, "Cultural Chronology, 1915-2000", of this thesis. 
14 Hadley 1995 op.cit, p.164. 
15 White, J, "Hardly Heroes: Canadian Merchant Seamen & the International Convoy System 1939-45", 
The Northern Mariner, Vol 5, N.4, October 1995, pp.19, 21, 24, 27, 28. 
16 British merchant tonnage was 19 36tons in 1914 (39% of world tonnage), 1666t (325%) by 1918: 11 6 
tons lost, 746  tons replaced; 17356t (325% of world tonnage) in 1939; Adams "Control of British 
Merchant Shipping" in Howarth & Law op.cit p.166. "The British Merchant Navy was slightly bigger 1914 
than 1939, but in a much better position by 1945", Winton 1983 op.cit pp.113-5. 
17 Woodman, (1994) revealingly states "what press and propaganda were pleased to call the Merchant Navy. No 
such thing existed: it was a courtesy given a huge collection of ships owned by a variety of companies whose 
standards represented the spectrum of corporate responsibility." pp.15-6. The Arctic Convoys, 1941 -45, Murray, 
London, 1994. 
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in limbo. 	Pacifism and arms-limitation treaties were fashionable. 
"Disenchantment with the war bred distrust of all things military." 18 Conventional 
surface warships were built at the expense of auxiliary aircraft carriers, escort 
vessels, and sensors. This was only partial delusion: Germany once freed of 
Versailles prepared a balanced fleet for ocean surface commerce raiding. U-
Boats were given the low priority Britain gave to anti-submarine warfare. The 
lessons of 1914-18 about convoy, escort, weapons, and air cover were 
available, but were largely ignored. Bomber Command would be equally 
unprepared for the war ahead, but it, unlike the Merchant Navy, was not 
responsible for feeding the nation. It was unthinkable that a U-Boat campaign 
would be fought again. War itself was now largely unthinkable. Even though 
the seeds of the next were already planted, such measures as air cover and 
international agreements, combined with ASDIC, convoying, mass-production 
and tactics, were enough support for such a view. 19 
Wartime exploits generated postwar representations. During the Great 
War, newspapers and newsreels spoke of brave seamen, U-Boat pirates, 
faithful escorts like sheepdogs around the edges of herds of merchantmen. 
Postwar books such as von Spiegel's U-Boat-202, 1919, Hashagen's Log of a  
U-Boat Commander, 1931, and Bone's Merchantmen-At-Arms, 1929, 
contained much that would be perpetuated, both in tone and focus. 2° It was 
steam that caused the separation between Royal and Merchant navies, as well 
as growing state regulation of trade. 21 Significantly, Bone admitted he 
removed "much language and description from the 1919 edition." 22 What remained 
was hyperbolic, and mythic, enough. International law was shattered by mine 
and torpedo. "Merchant vessels assassinated, murder commonplace". 23 The 
alarming height of sinkings, a "burden heavy, losses great", the fatalism of 
sailors, embarrassed by attention, were reiterated. 24 
18 Terraine 1980 op.cit p.205. 
18 Preston, A, Submarines Since 1919 Phoebus, London, 1974, p.215. 
28 For details of U-Boat mythology and iconography 1895-1995, see Hadley's superb counter-mythical 
Count Not the Dead: the Popular Image of the German Submarine  Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 
Maryland, 1995. 
21 Bone, D, Merchantmen-At-Arms: The Merchant Service in the War  Chatto & VVindus, London, 1929, 
pp.8-10, p.30. 
" Author's note. 
23 Bone op.cit p.64; p.24. 
24 lbid pp.30, 50, 64, 82-3, 100. 
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Tranquil, idyllic voyages were "not typical." 25 Armed freighters fought U-
Boats, sank one, damaged another. "Abused and ridiculed as prisoners", "victims 
of German savagery" were repatriated, ragged, hungry and destitute. Given no 
consideration by the Board of Trade, seamen were without maintenance or 
manning planning until November 1915. Everything else was left to Seamen's 
Missions.26 Deep water horrors were emphasised. "Dissatisfied with 
frightfulness that murdered only half a ship's crew, boats are shelled", hospital ships 
torpedoed. 27 Air attack was one of the "constant perils of the sea."28 U-Boats 
were underestimated, countermeasures useless, before zigzag, war standard 
ship construction, convoy, and conferences, were introduced. 29 Seamen, 
gallant fishermen and minesweeper crews, steady dock workers, solid 
salvagemen and repairmen were all undeterred. "Obstinate courage and 
unconquerable sea pride forbade escorts to desert their merchantmen." 36 The 
balance of Bones' book described voyages, attacks, sinkings, and lifeboat 
experiences which were to be repeated almost indefinitely in Merchant Navy 
and Navy accounts. The mundane was only used to demonstrate the intrusion 
of violence. The force of these experiences drove men to write only of the 
memorable moments, not a balanced account. Their passion and pain were 
the model for the accounts of later wars. 
Some interwar books described seamen's war experiences, though 
never without errors of fact or lurid exposition. Servicemen's experiences in 
escorts and aircraft do not seem to have received equal publicity. 
Representation of escort experience outside staid official accounts do not 
appear to be available. Both seamen and servicemen became almost 
forgotten, especially as the Depression loomed and landspeople worried more 
about themselves. New media like cinema newsreels and features, as well as 
books, magazines, and newspapers, also contributed to such myths, 
especially of German U-Boat men. In Germany these were an honoured and 
respected elite, untouched by mutiny and betraya1. 31 Though anti-war notions 
" 'bid p.xx. 
26 Ibid p.130; p.83. 
22 lbid p.100; p.103, p.118. 
28 Ibid p.107. 
28 Ibid p.166; p.140-46. 
3° 'bid op.cit p.204; p.223. 
31 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.44-5. 
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took hold of the public for the first time, books, novels and cinema did create 
slightly broader awareness of sea warfare. It now comprised more than the 
regular forces so popular in Mahanian theory. 32 
Wartime experience was blended with official propaganda in post-war 
cinema. British Instructional Films made no less than six films about Great 
War battles in the 1920's. These features had a strong documentary flavour 
which was reiterated in Second World War films. Jutland [1921], Zebrugqe  
[1924], and The Battles of Coronel and the Falklands  [1927] had a naval 
subject, though only Zebrugge was concerned even slightly with the U-Boat 
threat. They were general overviews: campaign history, without personal 
stories or narrative, like later TV documentaries. They combined newsreel with 
selected re-enactments, models, maps and dioramas. 33 Jutland described the 
famous seabattle which did not decide the war, but did, accidentally, castrate 
the German navy. Coronel and Falklands was a potent tale of disaster 
redeemed by triumph, like the war at sea itself, and like classic British 
histories. with Second World War and later films, War Office and 
Admiralty involvement was large. In Coronel and Falklands no less than 35 
warships and 4,000 ratings took part. The level of involvement was so great 
that questions were asked in Parliament: was this expenditure morally or 
legally justifiable? Was the Admiralty getting its money's worth? 36 As Hynes 
points out, such co-operation was primarily for monument-making. 36 Making a 
profit was secondary. Like wartime and post-war films they were commercially 
successful but critically tepid. British critic Ms.Bryher commented 
"in Coronel and Falklands war is presented entirely from romantic boy- 
adventure book angle.. .those who desire [my italics] unreality are forced further 
and further from the actual meaning of battle." 37 
32 Mahan in the 1890s had polarised naval history and doctrine by demonstrating the centrality of large 
fleets in crucial battles, while also emphasising the use of war on trade to a lesser extent. Navies and 
governments absorbed his first principle but not his second, and five decades of misconception and 
misuse of his theories ensued. Rodger, 1996 op.cit, p.xvii-xix. 
33 Hynes, S, A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture,  Atheneum, NY, 1991, p.443. 
34 The destruction of old British ships by a successful German cruiser squadron, followed by outraged 
dispatch of battlecruisers in their only real role: the Wagnerian hunting and destruction of the German 
ships, in December 1914. 
as Hynes op.cit, p.444. 
36 Loc.cit. 
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This was prophetic. 	It is equally applicable to the cinema 
representations which would resemble these features, three decades later. 
The last British battlefleet movie, Sink the Bismarck! of 1960, was lambasted 
for returning almost exactly to the same ancient style. 38 
In German literature, 1916's action off Jutland was the key shift from 
surface to submarine focus. As U-Boat successes continued with the fleet 
penned in harbour, the U-Boat could dominate, in strategy and 
representation. 39 After the Great War the U-Boat's image in Germany was 
undamaged by the surface fleet's mutiny and revolts .. 1926 saw U-9, Sinking  
of UC-48, U-Boat in Danger, as well as the surface-fleet films The Scuttled  
Fleet and Battle of Jutland. 49 This represented "a remilitarisation of public 
opinion."'" The Moltenort U-Boat memorial begun in 1927 opened in 1930, with 
Nazi rededication and enlargement in 1936. 42 It is the only German memorial 
common to both wars. 43 Interwar German books had a jolly tone. Numerous 
U-Boat captains, including ones read in translation in English such as Freiherr 
von Spiegel's U-Boat-202 (1919) and Hashagen's 1931 Log of A U-Boat 
Commander, saw things simply. War was a game. The relative immunity from 
attack and loss that U-Boats enjoyed was apparent. The cruel Allied blockade 
of Germany's trade caused much suffering, and the war was a just one, though 
the enemy's humanity was never forgotten. 
There was "a glut" of such books by 1934, on the eve of the official 
rebirth of the U-Boat, according to F-0 Busch, who, introducing his own first 
work tried to separate the good from the mere hacks.  were 
heroes who broke the Allied starvation blockade and almost won the war at 
sea, not reviled murderous pirates, which is the usual notion outside Germany. 
The participants had powerful memories, and this power was transmitted to 
39 Hadley, 1995 op.cit, p.37. 
ao 'bid, p.55. 
41 lbid, p.56. 
42 Nazi additions were an 85' brick Viking-ship prow and emblem; Second World War losses were added 
in 1969. See Appendix Ill for their appearance. 
43 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.75. 
" lbid, p.68. 
37 Cited in Hynes op.cit, p.445. 
38 Ramsden op.cit p.41. 
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readers effectively, as the large number of later accounts Hadley describes 
attest. 
Only Martin Niemoller was counter-mythical. A former U-Boat 
commander, he alone stood aside from glorification and mythologisation. This 
earned him his comrade's odium. He was eventually imprisoned by the Nazis, 
including four years in Dachau for church involvement and passionate 
opposition to Hitler. Post-war he opposed fascism, militarism and nationalism 
until his death in 1984. Niemoller was a distinct iconoclast. Later writers such 
as Werner and Buchheim evolved from propagandists to dissidents as much 
through the desire for profit and fame as conscience. Buchheim was re-
mythical. He made new myths instead of opposing and discarding old ones. 
U-Boat man as victim preceded Buchheim, even if the theme of betrayal of 
naïve youth, 'just obeying the orders' of political leaders, only gathered force in 
Germany after 1945. 45 Only Nazism put this moral aspect to their lives: 
submariners of other nations never underwent such examination, save 
Japanese indicted of killing men in lifeboats:46 
Aside from the contention between repetition and innovation in 
portrayals, there was continuity between First and Second World War tactics 
and strategy. Mass-construction of shipping and warships, the wholesale 
dedication of economy and population to war, and eventual tactics and 
training, all originated after 1914. Germany's total tonnage-war on shipping 
was a Great War strategy. Convoy, an ancient strategy derided until 1917, 
was delayed. After scientific analysis of its effects and effectiveness, it 
counteracted early shipping losses and the impotence of escort forces both 
numerically and tactically. Only technology: radio and direction-finding, radar, 
ASDIC (known afterwards as SONAR), and their interleaving communications 
practices were Second World War responses. 47 Planning, the application of 
science to effectiveness of procedures and weapons testing in the Second 
World War, was the other difference between the two Battles. 
45  Ibid, p.70-71. 
46 Four incidents as against one known German, and at least one known British. 
Even cryptology was a Great War practice. The British read German naval codes from 1915 onwards. 
See Beesly's Very Special Intelligence: the Admiralty's 0.I.C. in WW2, and Room 40, both Hamilton, 
London, 1982, and Secrets of War: "Ultra.", Prod/Dir Alan Gordon, The Documedia Group/Pearson TV, 
1998. 
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The Germans used new technologies, but didn't interlock scientists, 
manufacturers and sailors together, and nor did they rigidly analyse 
performance. Because they began with strategic and tactical advantages (if 
not numerical ones) there was no need to examine why things worked. Allied 
Operational Research was able to combine existing procedures and 
technologies with primitive analysis of new tactics in order to improve methods 
of finding and attacking U-Boats. The rest was numbers: enough shipping 
effectively used and managed. It was also the planning, construction and 
deployment of escorts, sufficiently trained crews to man and fight them, 
enough aircraft to patrol transit areas, and sensors to find U-Boats either from 
land or from small carriers organically integrated with escorts. Enough 
sufficiently lethal weapons to drive off damage or sink U-Boats were also 
required, as were enough research, experimentation and marshalling of 
resources. Dedication and fortitude among civilian seamen to keep working, 
despite poor pay, hours, and conditions, amidst the battle fought only around 
and because of them, were vital. This was principally why the Allies won. 48 
48 Till, G, "The Battle of the Atlantic As History" in Howarth & Law op.cit pp.585-95 & pp.587-89; 
Zimmerman "Technology & Tactics", in Howarth & Law op.cit, pp.476-99. 
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PLATE 2.2: CHRONOLOGY OF THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, 1939-45 
The Second World War's Atlantic Battle has been divided into 8 phases, based on growth in 
intensity, geographical variations & U-Boat & escort deployment: 
Phase 1: 319139-3115140 
Aug. U-boats commence intensive training; commerce-raiders sail to war positions. 
Sep. War declared, liner Athenia torpedoed contrary to head-of-U-boat-arm Commodore Diinitz's orders. 
Shipping losses to U-Boats, mines & aircraft climb steadily. Convoy routes slowly extended; drastic 
escort shortfall. 
Dec. Battle of the River Plate, commerce raider Graf Spee sunk. 
1940 
Mar. Relative lull in Atlantic as U-Boats are withdrawn with surface fleet in support of Norwegian 
invasion. US increasingly bends Neutrality Laws to supply UK (Lend-Lease) & escort Western Atlantic 
convoys. 
Phase 2: 1/6/40--31/3/41 
Jun. France falls, U-Boats' use Atlantic bases, cutting distance to convoy routes; corvette escorts first 
used, convoy losses rise dramatically - the First "Happy Time" begins. 
Commerce raiders strike in central and south Atlantic areas. 
Oct. Convoys SC-7 & HX-79 slaughtered in surfaced U-Boat night attacks, perhaps worst single convoy 
losses ever. 	This is the exception recalled as the norm in many later accounts. 
1941 
Feb. RN Western Approaches Command set up in Liverpool UK solely to counter U-Boat & aircraft threat. 
Mar. Key U-Boat Aces lost, though first use of Admiral Danitz's Wolfpack tactic offsets this. 
First "Happy Time" ends. 
Phase 3: 1/4/41-31/12/41 
May. Bismarck voyage disrupts Atlantic convoy routing, though commerce-raider threat is afterwards all 
but eliminated due to U/tra-directed hunting of supply ships. Growing numbers and experience of escorts 
swinging Battle in Allied favour. 
Sep. Arctic convoys begin, growing in size & losses as Germans attempt to stem supplies to USSR. 
Nov. Escort-carrier HMS Audacity first used, by Cdr.Walker, RN, in support of Convoy HG-76. 
Dec. US enters the war; escorts support US military; no convoys on US coast mean heavy losses 
(Second "Happy Time") begins there - U-Boat war now all-Atlantic affair, with coast-to-coast convoy 
escort, though U-Boat concentration on US coast relieves pressure elsewhere. 
Phase 4: 1/1/42--31/7/42 
Germans first oppose Arctic Convoys. Atlantic losses continue to climb - 4million tons (1,000 ships) in 
first 6 months. Blackout, convoys, escort etc introduced on US coast, so U-Boats move to Caribbean 
(Jun), where there are none. Shipping losses continue. Explosive growth of US warship, cargoship & 
aircraft production begins. Escort & aircraft numbers, with improved, sonar, radar, High-Frequency 
Direction-Finding, & better weaponry, tactics, & experience grow, as do U-Boat numbers. 
Second "Happy Time" ends, but shipping losses do not decline significantly: diversified, not 
concentrated in one area. 
Jul. Arctic convoy P0-17 disastrously scattered due to Admiralty mistakes; 75% of ships lost. 
Phase 5: 1/8/42--31/5/43 
Nov. Operation Torch concentrates escorts away from Atlantic, & losses rise in "Black Gaps" without air 
cover. 
1943 
Jan. After failed warship attack on Arctic convoy JW-516, DOnitz becomes head of German Navy. 
Casablanca & Washington Conferences finally commit all available resources to winning Atlantic 
campaign, as serious losses there are stalling Allied advance in other theatres. Additional escorts, 
Escort carriers, & Very-Long-Range aircraft deployed to fight convoys through. Initial shipping losses, 
however, heavy. 
Feb. Terrible weather foils both U-Boats & escorts, though convoys ON-166, ON-167 badly mauled. 
Mar. Slaughter of convoys peaks - 50-121 mauled; SC-122 & HX-229 merge due to heavy losses. 
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Apr. Terrible weather; U-Boats withdraw to prepare for final offensive to cut Atlantic routes. 
May. Escorts, Escort-carriers & VLR a/c sink 41 U-Boats, shipping losses drop sharply, in key battles 
round convoys HX-233, ONS-5. SC-130 last Atlantic convoy to be seriously threatened by U-Boats. DOnitz 
admits privately on 24May "We have lost the Battle of the Atlantic." U-Boats withdrawn to rearm for less 
risky areas. "Black Gaps" finally closed. Adm.King sets up 10 TH Fleet to centralise USN Atlantic Battle & 
ASW operations, like WAC. 
Phase 6: 1/6/43--31/8/43 
Jun. RAF "Biscay Offensive" sees DOnitz order U-Boat groups to transit Bay surfaced to fight off aircraft, 
& many lost. 
Jul. USN CVE-centred escort groups & aircraft push aside new U-Boat offensive in central Atlantic. 
Phase 7: 1/9/43--31/5/44 
Aug-Sep. N.Atlantic offensive by U-Boats with accoustic torpedoes, snorkel & radar-warning systems 
fails to regain initiative; U-Boat losses remain high, shipping losses remain low. U-Boat attack escorts, 
but are foiled by simple anti-GNAT (Ger.Nav.Acc.Torp) countermeasures. Radical Type XXI, XXIII 
hydrodynamic Electro-Boats rushed through design to production. 
Oct. U-Boat offensive in Central Atlantic equally foiled. 
Dec. Battlecruiser Schamhorst sunk attacking Arctic Convoy JW-55B; only Tirpitz remains to threaten the 
Kola Run. 
1944 
Med.Sea all but closed to U-Boats, despite use of better sensors, snorkel, Radar-Absorbent Materials, 
& decoys. U-Boat offensives continue, but without any change: U-Boat losses remain higher than 
shipping losses every month. Escort & Support-groups, Escort carriers & VLR ASW a/c hold the initiative; 
there are too many ships to sink. Increased bombing of Germany disrupts U-Boat production, including 
radical new types; Soviet advance in East drains manpower & resources away. 
Phase 8: 116144--615145 
Jun-Jul. U-Boat offensive on D-Day channel convoys fails, low shipping losses inshore do not halt Allied 
advance. 
Sep. Allies isolate French Atlantic bases, U-Boats begin withdrawal to Norway, meaning dangerous 
longer voyages to sealanes. European & Canadian inshore U-Boat offensives bother but do not 
endanger Allied supply lines. 
Nov. Tirpitz sunk by RAF, removing last surface threat to Arctic Convoys; prompting reduction and 
transfer of RN battleships. 
1945 
Jan. Radical hydrodynamic fast quiet Type XXI, XXIII U-Boats scare but do not pose real threat to Allied 
supply lines. With RAM, snorkel, GNAT, & decoys, they are true submarines, but too few too late. 
May. VE Day; many U-Boats scuttled to avoid capture; many hundreds more awaiting crews & fuel 
discovered by advancing Allies:- dangerous future offensives foiled by manpower & fuel situation. 
There was no patriotic fanfare when war began: it could be justified but 
not glorified.° Britain and Germany's Battle commenced on the 3 RD of 
September 1939, when U-30 torpedoed the liner SS Athenia and the 'pocket-
battleship' Graf Spee was already hunting in the South Atlantic. Almost to the 
very last day, 8T"May 1945, almost-permanently submerged U-boats tracked 
ships with passive SONAR and attacked escorts with acoustic torpedoes. 5° 
Navies on both sides had to improvise, having prepared for different sorts of 
4s It was also relief: the suspense of the increasingly-impending doom of the 1930's had arrived. 
Winter, J, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.8. 
Almost a 1980's Cold War scenario: see Clancy's Red Storm Rising (Collins, London, 1986), in Ch.5. 
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war. All had strategic, tactical, training, and technical difficulties. Weapons 
and sensors were as inadequate as rest and food at sea. Without detracting 
from the hard battle escorts fought, for long few, outranged and 
underequipped, they suffered less than the merchant ships they escorted, 
always slow, unarmoured, and unable to attack their tormentors. They were 
forced by tactics and circumstance to keep on moving in their vast oblongs, 
hammered by the dreaded Atlantic weather, picked off by faster opponents not 
even the escorts could always see. As losses thinned their ranks they rarely 
dared rescue survivors, for fear of disrupting the convoy, and being hit 
themselves. Myth described seamen living on Bully-beef and cocoa for weeks 
at sea, never long enough to develop scurvy, long enough to be harmful, with 
stress. 51 Some sailors and seamen ate very well ashore in America and 
Canada, as their widely-varying stories attest. Food and health were as wide-
ranging as experiences and conditions, never typical. 
Seamen received a sort of rank, a sort of uniform, status as almost-
servicemen as losses grew and morale wavered. There was no 'buddy' 
system ingrained to make men perform. The US Merchant Marine expanded 
enormously and suffered due to its high proportion of raw landsmen. 52 Until 
late 1941, men's wages stopped the moment their ship was sunk. Seamen 
still had to replace their own personal gear after every sinking, though some 
compensation was available. 53 They were not initially conscripted or enlisted, 
ordered, or forced into service. 54 They went to sea because they were already 
seamen, that was their job as well as their duty. Generally they considered 
themselves sailors, separate from landspeople. They were subjected only to 
the war measures everyone had: rationing, the blackout, the inevitable 
shortages and risks of total war. Unlike other civilians, they had a very good 
idea of just why and how the shortages were occurring. 55 
51 In both fact and fiction, see the opening paragraphs of MacLean's HMS Ulysses, 1955. 
52 Valle, J, "US Merchant Marine Casualties in VvVVII" in Runyan & Copes 1994 op.cit, p.264. 
53 Hope, S, Ocean Odyssey Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1944, p.62. 
54 They were a reserved occupation, like doctors, fishermen, nurses, miners, etc. After 1941 the 
Merchant Seamen's Pool guaranteed employment & compelled third choice of ship if first two were 
rejected; Lane 1990 op.cit p.31, 54. 
55 !bid, p.9. 
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Wartime commands received their full due of publicity. Their temporary 
nature only affected postwar publicity of their efforts. Western Approaches 
Command was set up in February 1941 to explicitly control Royal Navy escort 
forces in the growing battle off the British coast. America was a nearly-
belligerent but still benign neutral, all Europe lay at Hitler's feet. New and 
converted vessels for convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare needed 
effective employment in groups. Such wartime expedients, like emergency 
ship, escort, aircraft and electronics building, and the Prime Minister's own 
Battle of the Atlantic Committee, the result of emergency powers acts, did not 
need public approval, or publicity. Western Approaches Command lobbied the 
leadership directly, and ceased to exist at war's end. Composed largely of 
Naval and Volunteer Reserves, & Hostilities-Only personnel, these returned to 
Merchant Navy or civilian life after VE Day. Without a post-war successor to 
promote wartime exploits, as Fighter and Bomber Commands, the army, and 
even the regular, conventional Royal Navy had, Western Approaches 
Command's story was less prominent, as were the new, different, complicated 
stories of its convoy battles and anti-submarine warfare combats, its 
technology and experiences. In this area Western Approaches Command did 
no better than the Royal Canadian Navy, though it had the benefit of a few 
literary and cinematic classics and an unbroken series of personal, 
operational, incidental, technical and official accounts.56 
RAF Coastal Command began the war with small numbers of old 
ineffective aircraft, almost no sensors or weaponry, and a mixed bag of tactics 
and ideas for patrol, search and rescue, as well as escort and anti-submarine 
warfare. 57 It grew slowly to its eventual war-winning combination of skill, 
experience, weapons, sensors and numbers. It ended the war like the escorts, 
with a hidden victory: a high proportion of U-Boats sunk, of men not killed, 
convoys not attacked, ships and supplies not lost. Coastal Command had little 
in the way of individual battles compared to Bomber Command's epic losses 
and very visible devastation of Germany, or Fighter Command's obvious 
For Western Approaches Command operations & experiences, see most general Battle books, & 
works specific to Western Approaches Command; see particularly VVhinney 1986 op.cit; Winton 1983 
op.cit pp.172-320passim; Maclntyre, D, The Battle of the Atlantic Batsford, London, 1961, pp.68-178 
p.assim; Costello & Hughes 1977 pp.107-322 passim. .. 
a'  "300 fewer aircraft in 1939 than 1918", Costello & Hughes 1977, op.cit p.33. 
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defence of the UK and the stirring, chivalric idea of the single-combat pilot 
passed down from Great War exploits. 58 Coastal Command's battles and 
combats were at sea, unseen, and individual. Lone aircraft surprised and 
fought lone U-Boats. Each combat helped the struggle, but no one fight was 
conclusive. 58 
Canada's Battle experiences began within days of the British, and the 
last ship sunk, five hours before the ceasefire, was the Canadian-built British-
manned Avondale Park. 6° Canada's navy had a darker, harder experience 
than Western Approaches Command, its enormous expansion and importance 
tainted by external perceptions of being dangerously incompetent, and internal 
of heading in the wrong direction, away from the long-desired balanced fleet. 81 
One fifth of Coastal Command personnel were Canadian, in addition to six 
separate Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons in Coastal Command. 82 The 
Canadian Merchant navy was created largely from scratch as a wartime 
expedient. It was directed by the Canadian and British governments, disposed 
of after war's end, and continually struggled with problems of pay and 
conditions, public image, in addition to losses and deaths. Its seamen were 
outnumbered by industrial workers, servicemen, and even other seamen, even 
in Canada, and resultingly had a tough war. 83 Throughout the war Canada 
strained to contribute, while the media publicised and exaggerated both the 
enemy threat and the armed forces' actions. 84 
The US Navy began its own Battle later than the Royal Navy. It was 
neutral, gaining escort experience in quiet seas far from U-Boat 
concentrations, while expansion began. A few incidents such as the attack on 
USS Greer and the sinking of USS Reuben James were instrumental in slowly 
moving the navy and the nation toward war. The sudden shocks of the Atlantic 
53 Relative losses in Merchant Navies, Navies, & Air Forces can be found in Plate 2.4 of this thesis. 
59 Every Coastal Command U-Boat sinking is laboriously related in Franks, N, Search, Find & Kill, Grub 
Street, London, 1995. 
so The equivalent of the Liberty [but not identical, Canadian Merchant Navy historians hotly point out]; 
Harbron, J, The Longest Battle: the RCN in the Atlantic 1939-45, Vanwell Publications, St.Catherines, 
1993, p.42. 
61 Another Mahanian idea, for the second-rate fleet: be balanced, for all eventualities. 
iv Bowyer, C, Men of Coastal Command, William Kimber, London, 1985, p.127. 
s3 As recent works attest: White, Halley, Parker and Halford. 
64 See especially Hadley, M, "The Popular Image of the Canadian Navy", in Hadley et al 1996, op.cit and 
U-Boats Against Canada: German Submarines in Canadian Waters,  McGill-Queens University Press, 
1985. 
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war moving into US operational areas, U-Boat attacks, followed by Pearl 
Harbor, left a navy caught between conflicting needs, conflicting civilian and 
naval leaders, the pains of expansion and inexperience, and a strong sense 
that the Pacific was the 'real' war. These ideas would imprint themselves 
permanently on post-war writing as well. There would be a marked difference 
between European and U S perspectives. American experience and 
representation was overall less personal and more officia1. 65 
Germany's Battle, as the aggressor, was separate. Its strategy was 
based upon attacking, not defending, vital maritime trade convoys. Germany 
was blockaded, its ships penned in harbour by low numbers and lack of fuel. 
Surface raiders had initial successes but depended on supply ships, which the 
larger, hard-pressed Allied navies could hunt using cryptology. U-Boats were 
a well trained and led minority hamstrung by poor torpedoes, initially 
underrated by the naval command. This fact was largely submerged by post-
war historical concentration upon the U-Boat's threat and successes. 66 The 
Second World War repeated the Great War, with little surface action and 
growing, eventually unrestricted, U-Boat warfare. As before, accidents 
confounded attempts to keep to treaties and restrictions. No one expected 
Germany to, and the few accidental breaches became the internationally 
mythologised, reviled, norm. 67 
Germany's U-Boat war was limited by slow construction, manpower, 
and Allied countermeasures, even while successes were frequent. Advancing 
on all fronts, Germany lionised her new U-Boat aces in their periods of 
runaway success, though propaganda and misconcption clouded analysis 
and interpretation from the beginning. 68 By the time Allied countermeasures 
became effective, Germany was committed to revolutionary types of U-Boat. 
Until these entered service the U-Waffe had to continue with its existing types, 
6.5 Allard, D, "Introduction: An American Strategic Assessment" in Runyan & Copes 1994, op.cit, pp.xviii, 
xxi; Love, R, "The US Navy & Roll of Drums, 1942." lbid, pp.97, 99, 102-3, 110-1, 114-5 & 119; Blair 
1997 op.cit p.692. 
66 Mallmann Showell, J, [ed] The Fuhrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-45, Greenhill Books, 
London, 1990, introduction, p.vii-xi. 
67 Lemp's accidental sinking of SS Athenia only nine hours after the declaration of war did not help. An 
entire set of myths legends and misconceptions grew around German submarine brutality; see Lane 
1990 op.cit. 
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obsolete though they became. Population and servicemen alike were 
continually reassured by DOnitz and propaganda the new types would come, 
and popular history, biography and newsreels went on reinforcing this. The 
war ended before many were ready, and there would not have been enough 
men or fuel for new offensives had it continued. The loss of the Atlantic 
campaign enabled the application of that overwhelming force Churchill had 
prophesied would be the decider once the USA joined Britain. 69 
In-depth research of convoy attacks (principally by Roskill, Rohwer, 
Tarrant, Terraine, and Blair) reveals not only how few there were compared to 
overall operations, but that the classic, well-remembered, convoy attacks were 
quite unusual. They were tactically and strategically significant due to high 
shipping losses or as striking examples of effective or ineffective anti-
submarine warfare. "Happy is the convoy with no history."7° Only those which 
were heavily attacked, and had significant losses, are 'historical' - well-known 
and written about - sometimes at great length or with great repetition. There 
are no hidden, shocking, untold stories of slaughtered convoys waiting to be 
treated. There are still dozens of individual untold accounts of sinkings, and 
thousands of stories of individual sailors. The limits of the men, their 
perspectives, contemporary means of reporting, and the limits of fiction and 
memoir all meant that the same types of story were told, in the same ways, 
almost inevitably. The genre and perspective of previous decades of writing 
about maritime life constrained style. There are few other attacked convoys 
not covered by at least one book, and apparently none entirely missed by 
historians. All the others involved small losses to a few U-Boats making brief 
attacks. Cumulatively they seem and were shocking, in terms of the actual 
material, personnel, and personal losses, but there were only a dozen or so 
'classic' battles, and only a few dozen attacks, in convoy, when more than a 
few ships were lost. These are clustered after mid-1940, and before mid-1943. 
Thereafter U-Boats and escorts were more often lost than shipping!' 
68 For German Battle & U-Boat experiences see especially Kaplan, P, & Currie, J, Wolfpack, Aurum, 
London, 1997 for a non-German semi-mythologised view; also Costello & Hughes op.cit pp.29-322 
passim. 
D9  Cited in Terraine, J, Business In Great Waters: U-Boat Wars, 1916-45, Puttnam, NY, 1989, p.402. 
70 Milner, M, North Atlantic Run, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 1985, p.269, "anonymous". 
71 Blair op.cit 1997 and 1999 relates every patrol, attack and sinking, which see, in laborious detail. 
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It is an exaggeration that seamen suffered en masse during the war. It 
is equally an distortion that few did: 25% were killed. The actual is between 
the mythic extremes. Only 10% of Atlantic convoys were sighted by the 
Germans, and only 3% attacked. Those attacked suffered, but thousands of 
seamen must have served unexposed to death or injury, even if it struck their 
convoys. 72 Admittedly much shipping was built and moved only after the Battle 
was won, when vast convoys moved unmolested across the expanse of the 
Atlantic. For seamen and sailors, in their time ashore, and in their tight 
communities, death and injury and loss must always have been present. Even 
their families were exposed to danger as never before. Belgium, Norway, the 
Netherlands, France, and Denmark were occupied while seamen were 
overseas for five years. •Air raids on port and harbour facilities continued at a 
low rate throughout the war, unlike the Blitz on cities. 73 British seamen were 
often less at risk than their families, which directly goes against the grain of 
historiography. There was more risk at sea than home only for US, Caribbean, 
African, and Canadian seamen. Some Indian and Chinese families stood even 
greater risk of loss and death than those in occupied Europe or bombed 
Britain. Their stories are also yet to be told. 74 British Merchant Navy losses 
can be represented variously: 
PLATE 2.3: BRITISH MERCHANT NAVY LOSSES, 1939-45 
Period Ships Crews Casualties Percentage 
Sep-Dec 1939 53 1466 490 33.4% 
Jan-Dec 1940 363 12206 5553 45.5% 
Jan-Dec 1941 416 12756 6873 53.9% 
Jan-Dec 1942 427 17927 7622 42.5% 
Jan-Dec 1943 202 8418 3923 48.1% 
Jan-Dec 1944 71 2380 1087 45.7% 
Jan-May 1945 33 998 316 31.7% 
Totals 1565 55882 25864 av.46.3°/0 
Source: Slader, J, Fourth Service, 1994, p.312. 
This plate excludes seamen in the Royal Navy 75 , and those killed after 
rescue or lost on passage in other vessels. Other Merchant Navies are also 
absent here, though their losses were commensurate. No really accurate 
cross-national figures have ever been completed. Each country did not 
72 Lane "The Human Economy of the Merchant Navy" in Howarth & Law op.cit, p.50-1. 
73 The author's father was born during an airraid on Glasgow from Norway in September 1943. 
74 Lane 1990 op.cit, Ch.7, "Sons of Empire", pp.155-88; Forgotten Heroes, BBC-TV, 1994. 
75 	• Signed-on under TX124X articles: in requisitioned trawlers, troopships, Landing Ships, Merchant 
Aircraft Carriers. 
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adequately account for its own losses. Several did not even clearly define 
them unless required to, usually by lobbying for access to pensions and 
compensation on behalf of seamen and their families. 78 Such figures show 
much aside from the changes in campaign intensity, and the hardening of 
attitudes in wartime!' These figures show, just for the British Merchant Navy, 
that even when shipping losses were comparatively low, as in 1939 and 1945, 
lives lost varied much less. Depending on variables such as where attacked 78 , 
the vessel's cargo, when it was sunk, as well as weather conditions, personnel 
losses in winter, in the North Atlantic, at night, in bad weather, could decimate 
crews even when only one or two ships were sunk. This had little effect on the 
war as a whole, but it takes apart the dry, tonnage-based strategic view and 
'demythologising' stance of Smith and Blair: men killed and injured, meant 
sorrow and hardship, irrespective of circumstance. 79 
A quarter of white British seamen [24% or 35,000 of 144,000] were 
killed in the Second World War, the vast majority in the Battle, depending on 
definition of geographic and demographic boundary. 28,000 have no known 
grave. No armed service lost more than 10%, and 5% was normal, expected, 
and regarded as 'acceptable'. This was still a higher percentage than any of 
the armed services except commando units and bomber crews, who 
represented only the tip of RAF and USAAF personnel: one in 40-50. 80 Those 
35,000 killed were not killed in the continuously intense campaign which 
representations portray. All seamen were aware of equal exposure to risk, 
even those never attacked or sunk, injured, or witnesses. Risk of death, and 
the strain of continual worry, for self and family, are the key to seamen's 
trauma. They are also the key to the representations. Participants saw 
enough men killed or wounded, enough destruction, to be radically changed by 
their experiences. Hardship, risk and death were the essence they later 
forcefully communicated to their readers. 
76 Halford 1995 op.cit, pp.105, 241-2, 250, N.5 to p.253. This is also the Australian experience: Campbell 
1996 op.cit. 
I.e. willingness of U-Boats to tow or direct boats to land; willingness of ships in convoy stopping to 
rescue survivors. 
78 I.e. equatorial Atlantic compared to the Arctic ocean. 
79 Lane in Howarth & Law loc.cit. Smith and Blair are not counter-mythical: they are re-mythical: 
promoting US myth. 
Bowyer, C, Images of Air War, Batsford, London, 1983, p.4. 
80 
NOTES 
AboUt 35,000 of 144,000 British at sea [24%] in 3,557 ships; 12 6 tons in the North Atlantic, of 14 6tons in the Atlantic." 
1.Averaged Allied Total: British, Canadian, French, Belgian, Netherlander, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, US, 
Australian, NZ, from all available sources. Losses were from total personnel of at least 530,000: 185,000 British, 
25,000+ Norwegian, 290,000 US, 14,000 Australian, 12,000+Canadian, & other Occupied & Neutral Europeans. US 
MM losses were only 6,100, or 2 1%, though largely in the Atlantic & Caribbean; vastly less than the average 24% 
sustained by MN's worldwide. Even 63,912 of 530,000 is still 12%, higher than any armed service, averaging 5-6%. 
2. Hough, R, The Longest Battle: the War at Sea Pan, London, 1987, p.274. 
3. The Imperial Japanese Navy also lost 687 warships of 1.966 6t 1941-45: Winton 1983, op.cit, p.320. 
4. Ditto footnote 1. 
5. Bowyer, C, Images of Air War, Batsford, London, 1983, p.70. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Buchheim, U-Boat War, Knopf, NY, 1977, np; individual estimates range from 28-32,000; Hadley op.cit p.174. 
10.Bowyer, loc.cit. 
11.Largely from Slader 1994 op.cit p.320. Slader's Australian numbers (109), however, were drastically inaccurate. 
The Australian War Memorial hold the names of at least 647 Second World War Australian MN dead, not 
counting Australians signed-on as 'British' or 'British Empire/Commonwealth' & recorded/excluded elsewhere. Given 
this discrepancy (109>647), it is probable other national figures are equally in error, especially where recent efforts to 
identify dead seamen (spurred by requests for adequate recognition, remembrance, pensions and compensation) 
have not been carried out, or not exhaustively. Valle stated "No figures have yet been developed for the Danish, 
Dutch, & Belgian Merchant Navies, but it is probable they were even heavier than the British", in Runyan & Copes 
op.cit p.267. 
Australian MN dead of both wars were at least 820 of about 14,000 who served in total (Campbell, I, 1996 
p.19). More precise figures have not been calculated; the relevant source files being scattered between State and 
Federal archives, at the PRO in London, & MN Records held in Cardiff UK. From AVVM & Australian Archives 
searched by the author for All In The Same Boat: the Australian Merchant Navy in the World Wars 1914-18 & 1939-45  
the Australian War Memorial, Historical Research Section, Summer Scholar paper, February 1996. 
12.108,000 of 130,700, in Valle, J, "US Merchant Marine Casualties" in Runyan & Copes 1994 op.cit, p.267. 
13.Including 1,651 groundcrew, Bowyer, op.cit, p.70. 
14.64,000 Bomber crewmen, ibid. 
15.4,200 serious wounds & 2,985 PoW British seamen; Slader 1988 op.cit p.16. 
16.Major vessels; 84 in the Atlantic; Appendix S, Table III, Roskill 1963 Vol.III, Part 2, op.cit p.448. 
17.Slader 1994, op.cit p.275 & 320. 
[ ] indicate losses of relevant forces. 
CC= RAF Coastal Command 
Ftr C= RAF Fighter Command 
IJ= Imperial Japanese 
Bmb C= RAF Bomber Command 
U-Waffe= U-Boat arm of the Kriegsmarine 
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Plate 2.4: RELATIVE LOSSES: 1939-45: ALLIED & AXIS NAVIES & AIR FORCES 
MN' Ger.MN I I.J.MN s RN4 RAF CC 6 Bmb C6 Ftr C 1 LuftVV8 U-Waffe USAAF' 6 
KW 63,912" N.Avail 108,000 
[79.42 
51,000 10,327' s 55,500 
[125,000] 
3960 44,065 30,003 
[39,0001 
80,000' 4 
[64,000 B] 
Wnd lb N.Avail 8403 1215 28,200 
PoW N.Avail 9838 601 27,610 5000 
Sh/A 
C 
4786 N.Avail 2345 431 16 3,500 10,724 782 6,866 
Tons 21,200 6t 1.226 t. 8,6176t — — ----- ---- 
Merchant vessels carried fewer men, and many more merchant than 
warships were lost: 3557; 14 million tons in the Atlantic, 12 on North Atlantic 
routes alone. 81 Had Merchant Navy personnel losses been more clearly 
stated, they might have received better postwar coverage. The scale of the 
sacrifice might have meant more publicity. The U-boat services' leading 
exponent of losses, remembrance and guilt, Buchheim, never hesitated to 
81 Merchant ships, due to design and cargo, also sank faster: 75% sank within 15 minutes; Slader, 1994, 
op.cit p.275. 
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point out that 28,000 of 39,000 (72%) were killed. 82 By comparison, 51,000 
Royal Navy personnel were killed in the Second World War, but the vast 
majority were not killed in connection with the Battle, save the Kola Run, which 
killed more (2000+) Royal Navy than Merchant Navy personnel (829 - one third 
in PQ-17 alone). 83 Liverpool cathedral holds the names of 6081 Western 
Approaches Command dead, though servicemen from other commands - 
Home and Atlantic Fleets - must have died on convoy duty as well. 84 Most 
Royal Navy personnel died around Norway, in the Mediterranean, (both due to 
Axis air superiority) or in the Indian Ocean, where the Japanese advance took 
a heavy toll. Royal Navy losses were in serious single incidents, rather than 
slow steady attrition. 85 
Fussell tells us that men in combat have a limit, and that a maximum of 
200-240 days fighting is as much as anyone, even the most resilient, can 
take. 85 Merchant Navy, Western Approaches Command and Coastal 
Command crews never went 200 days non-stop in combat, even in critically 
bad convoys. They were frequently exposed to danger for 12 or 14 hours, 
longer than bomber crews in action, and generally longer than individual 
infantrymen and tank personnel. Merchant Navy and Navy crews were under 
stress for weeks at a time: the perceived risk was ever-present. "Madness did 
not need the spectacle of bodies torn apart. Fear continued over long periods would 
do the job, as on the Kola Run, where 'Grown men went steadily insane before each 
other's eyes.'" 87 The sea's wartime risks always awaited them, not only its 
peacetime dangers of wind, storm, and ice. Maclntyre had four solid years in 
Western Approaches Command before the loss of his ship, with low crew 
losses, drove him ashore. Walker had two widely separated 'rests' in staff 
positions between time at sea, and his style and method of working and 
fighting at sea eventually killed him. 88 Even if men spent only a maximum of 
87 
88 Jones, Heart of Oak, 1984, cited in Fussell 1989 op.cit p.293. 
Walker's style was intensely personal: he never delegated attacks to subordinates. This method 
meant long hours or days on open bridges, high stress, little sleep and poor nourishment. Such universal 
practices also caused ill-health in many who had shorter, harder post-war lives as a result. Robertson, T, 
Walker RN, Evans Brothers, London, 1956, passim, but specifically p.199; Walker being the most 
prominent clinical example. 
82 Buchheim, U-Boat War, Knopf, NY, 1977, np. 
S,  The War At Sea, 1939-45, [3 vols in 4 parts], HMSO, London, 1961 op.cit, vol 3 part one, 
004. 
1'4 Cremer, P, U-333, The Story of a U-boat Ace, Ul!stein Verlag, Berlin, 1982, p.213. 
es Courageous 519, Royal Oak 883, Barham 830, Hood 1400 [3 survivors], Dasher 350+, and so on. 
as Fussell 1989 op.cit p.281. 
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14-18 days at sea, they were often turned around very quickly, in both Western 
Approaches Command and the Merchant Seamen's Pool, irrespective of their 
mental state. Whether just off a typical, incident-free convoy, or a very bad 
one, there was no difference in terms of service. This was clearly something 
that never occurred to other services personnel: a damaged ship, or one which 
had lost much of its crew, needed repair, replacement, retraining. 89 Seamen, 
unlike sailors, were crew, not a 'ship's company': they came and left merchant 
ships individually at will, not by posting. 9° 
Landspeople often treated seamen as noncombatants, 'army dodgers' 
avoiding dangerous war work by 'hiding' in the Merchant Navy. Men from ships 
sunk were sometimes turned away from clubs and hostels because they were 
not servicemen, or were improperly dressed, after having been torpedoed, 
mined, or bombed and adrift in the North Atlantic or Irish Sea for a week. They 
were insulted or harangued for "taking it easy", and told to "be real men and join 
up."91 This was at a time when the Merchant Navy was suffering higher losses 
than any save the U-Boat men who actually opposed them. 92 Most accounts 
attempted to exclude the war from ordinary life: more so in the Merchant Navy 
than Western Approaches or Coastal Command. 93 Accounts of experiences 
were press creations or Ministry of Information propaganda, not from seamen 
or companies. Like Great War troops, seamen, sailors and airmen usually 
never saw the enemy, either. Opportunities to confront the enemy were few: 
attacks and sources of destruction were generally anonymous. Germans 
rarely saw seamen save through periscopes, or if surfacing to cruise among 
wreckage. 94 
U-Boat men took on the association with war and aggressive 
nationalism, and hence the darker aspects of Nazism, from their leader, 
DOnitz: supposed font of Great War U-Boat strategy, last Fuhrer of Germany. 95 
a9 MacIntyre, D, U-Boat Killer Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1956, introduction & p.174. 
93 While damaged merchant ships retained no crew during repairs, unlike their naval counterparts. 
91 Forgotten Heroes 1994, op.cit; Lane 1990 op.cit p.53-4, 145, 211; Hay, op.cit, p.105. 
92 In addition to the Japanese Merchant Navy, which suffered 79% wartime fatal casualties. Valle, J, 
loc.cit. 
93 This was not, however, mundanity. Accounts emphasised peaceful voyages, civilian seamen in ships 
on their lawful occasions", disrupted by attack, damage and destruction, not peaceful voyages 
uninterrupted by incident. Lane 1990 op.cit p.7-9. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Many tactics he claimed his own had been the Great-War tactical evolutions of other commanders. 
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German tactics and strategy were largely in his hands, left alone to fight his 
war till he took over the entire German Navy, without any change of strategic 
focus or direction. He considered technological advance would keep him 
ahead, little realising that American help had already allowed Britain to keep 
fighting till strategy (convoys and escort groups) and a few technologies 
(especially radar and cryptology) were fully deployed. American entrance and 
industrial might made the rest of the Battle a contest of losses versus 
construction: a contest Germany could not win, though it might inflict grevious 
losses in the process. 96 Many authors, including Roskill, pointed out that mid-
late 1941 was the last time DOnitz's tonnage-war strategy could have won the 
Battle. 97 
Representation lagged behind events. Reporting of the Battle was 
immediate, with the loss of Athenia and the U-Boat odium that went with it. 
Terminology, propaganda and portrayal were still indistinct. The term Battle Of 
The Atlantic, inevitably Churchill's, dated from 19 March 1941, when it was first 
openly recognised that conditions in the Atlantic, for the whole war effort, were 
grave and growing worse. 98 A few vulnerable commerce raiders, and the 
growing reach of U-Boats (from captured French Atlantic bases) meant the 
campaign revolved largely around offshore escort and anti-submarine warfare, 
not more 'traditional' forms: blockade or protecting the battlefleet. 99 With the 
immediate danger of invasion over, and the Blitz not proving the terror to end 
all terrors prewar analysts expected, focus was given to this campaign to keep 
the people concentrating. Official need to inform combined with the powerful 
experiences of participants to produce a wide range of popular and personal 
accounts, incidental and operational histories. It kept up the spirit of defiant 
resistance which had got them through the Battle of Britain and beyond. 
Britain had no powerful Allies to speak of, having only Free French, 
Norwegian, Dutch, Polish and others in addition to the Dominions, and was 
nowhere on the offensive. 166 America had to be interested and involved. 
Padfield, "DOnitz" in Men Of War: Great Naval Leaders, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1992. 
97 Sinkings in convoy by pack were higher in 1943, but technology, training, weapons, cryptology, 
numbers especially of escorts aircraft and shipping, were very much on the Allied side. Only 574 of 2775 
British vessels lost were in convoy. Even this averaged forty ships per month. Noble, in Creighton 1956 
op.cit, p.11. 
Roskill 1954 op.cit, p.609. 
ss Trade protection was even more traditional than battlefleet protection: Winton 1990 op.cit, pp.13-16. 
lc° Nowhere on the offensive save North Africa, and through strategic bombing. 
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Propaganda and official publicity kept the Battle in the public mind, even if it 
was not usually the first military priority. It was not until 1943, with both the 
USA and the USSR onside, that at Casablanca - and once there and never 
again - Churchill's staff pressed for the Battle to be made the first Allied priority 
in the West. Roosevelt agreed, and within six months the Battle was 
effectively won, with a key five-week period at the end, so convincingly that 
even DOnitz admitted it to his staff. The Atlantic route to Europe and the 
Second Front, was finally secure. 101 
The British offensives on the Western Front 1916-18 and in the Atlantic 
1939-45 demonstrate how inadequate the term Battle is for describing and 
defining mass warfare, and how misleading it could be for cognoscenti and 
layperson alike. Use of the term attempted to fix in the public mind a new kind 
of fighting with a familiar but inadequate term. 102 These 'Battles' went on for 
months, with few distinguishing large-scale conflicts, akin to classic land 
campaigns of old, where manoeuvring and skirmishes led to set-piece 
battles. 103 Convoy warfare can only be described as campaigns, with attacks 
on trade better imagined as interceptions of individual ships, or of caravans of 
merchants. Growing public awareness since 1989 has been due to better 
overall education by general historians of the Second World War. The Battle 
has no battles, only a Battle, 1939-45, featureless to the outsider. Only 
conventional engagements had names: Plate, Denmark Strait, Barents, North 
Cape.. .even the famous sinking of Bismarck had no title. Convoy numbers 
had no ring; names like Paukenschlag could be smugly applied only by those 
in the know. 
Despite constant media presentation of the war at sea during hostilities 
(both of overall losses and individual stories) public awareness of seamen still 
lagged behind that of the 'armed' services. 104 'Realistic' reporting 
strengthened national resolve, making the population more determined to 
sustain losses in order to achieve war aims: but in Germany it emphasised 
conflict, exposing people to the war without showing what was actually 
101  General accounts of the Battle are now legion, this was derived from Costello & Hughes 1977, op.cit. 
102 Like Bomber Command's use of the terms 'Battle of Hamburg' and 'Berlin'. 
103 See Plate 2.2 "Chronology of the Battle of the Atlantic, 1939-45.", of this thesis. 
104 Lane 1990 op.cit pp.9, 63, Lane in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit pp.49, 54. 
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happening to actual Germans. British 'realism' emphasised the intrusion of 
war on the normalcy of peace (not the normalcy of conflict), the dangers of 
war, and accepting the sacrifices and limitations of the situation. 105 
It is normal in war for opposing sides to demonise 'the enemy', less so 
to demonise vulnerable sections of 'your' side. 'Lazy', 'overpaid' seamen were 
occasionally demonised by the crews who escorted them, more often by 
civilians ashore. U-Boat men were demonised by seamen and escort men 
alike; escorts and especially aircraft, by U-Boat men. Royal Navy escort forces 
demonised Canadians for their incompetence and poor discipline, (they were 
'letting the side down') unaware of the expansion, training, and technical 
problems bedevilling their ally. Towards the end of the war, U-Boat men 
demonised their own leaders, save their commander, Admiral DOnitz. Only 
post-war would some U-Boat men come to regard him, not Hitler, as the one 
who sent them out to die. 
Wartime representations concentrated on the Battle's early years. 
Authors reiterated the intrusion of war into peaceful lives, the forced dangers of 
seamen's lives, the imposition of naval discipline onto civilian seamen, and 
'Hostilities Only' recruits in the Royal Navy & Royal Air Force alike. Shipping 
and personnel losses were reiterated continuously, rarely as actual 
percentages of voyages, convoys, personnel at sea. That only three percent 
of ships were attacked remained unknown. 1°6 Monsarrat's Corvette trilogy 
exemplified wartime attitudes and writing, if less fervent hype. "The whole world 
was composed of violence, fatigue and worry." 107 He separated the rare actions 
from the chronological flow of his rise from raw playwright-yachtsman to 
seasoned anti-submarine warfare captain. He kept, as Lane identified, the war 
at bay. "Now and again ships sank and survivors were rescued. ..it was hard to find 
any variety. 008 He "stuck to truth's bare outlines, sacrificing a spy plot and a love 
interest for more fashionable austerity." 109 Telling words: spies and lovers would 
dominate the sea and land in postwar works, beneath only relentless action. 
105 Calvocoressi, P, Total War Allen Lane, London, 1972, p.422. 
106 Participants, relatives, afficionados and some historians have all reacted negatively to the 
'revisionism' of lowering the dangers and regarding the Battle as anything but a series of suicidal 
missions. 
107 Monsarrat, N, Three Corvettes, Cassell, London, 1946, p.5. 
108  Ibid, p.208. 
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Other 'Britishnesses' were displayed; "Inequality of weapons is how we always 
fight our wars." and "You can't recriminate against a national characteristic like lack of 
foresight." 11° Seamen were never forgotten, "theirs the ordeal and brave 
endurance", no Briton was treated worse, or more brutally disregarded in the 
1 930s." 111 
Secrecy and the diversion of authorial effort to other areas necessarily 
conditioned the content and tone of history during hostilities. The wartime 
public could not be told how the Battle was being fought with new 
technologies 112 , so they had to be told something else, which contained but was 
more than 'the truth'. 113 In Britain drastic reductions in paper importation and 
wartime publishing meant that much representation was not serious 
literature. 114 Entertainment occupied much of the remainder not used for 
administration or propaganda. Lower quality and reduced standards were 
norma1. 115 Popular general magazines and serials (now a vanished genre) for 
adults and children portrayed pictures and easily-digested subjects. Official 
reports and longer, government-approved narrative informative texts such as 
Hodson's British Merchantmen at War (1944, from the Ministry of Information), 
featured incidents and operations already famous in the news. Davis's Atlantic 
System, Johnston's Battle of the Seaways, and Woon's Atlantic Front: the 
Merchant Navy in the War, all 1941, were populist and informative, not 
academic. 116 They gave general accounts of the Battle so far, while Jesse's 
immediately filmed Saga of the San Demetrio, 1942, recounted a mythically 
inspirational incident. 117 
109 !bid, p.78. 
!bid, p.134. 
111 !bid, p.42, 221. 
112 Such as Radar, HF/DF, Hedgehog & Squid, diverting convoys round U-Boats with Ultra. 
113 Calder 1991op.cit p.92. 
114  I.e representation of thought was commercial fiction and nonfiction, not deliberately artistic or avant-
rde. 
"5 Reduced standards of quality of paper and binding, printing, photographs, jackets, and the like. 
"During the war, the government instituted both de facto censorship and publication priorities, for political 
and security reasons, and due to the lack of supplies. All books had to be passed by a board...those 
deemed to have the highest merit were allotted paper first.", Grotta, D, Tolkien: Architect of Middle-Earth, 
3rd Edn, Running Press, Philadelphia, 1991, footnote 16 to p.112, 186. 
116  While titles like Seaways' and 'Front' demonstrated unfamiliarity with maritime writing, and a desire to 
give the public ideas and themes understood from the Great War. Unrestricted U-Boat and NS warfare 
had clearly not penetrated. 
117 Also reflecting the sense, dispelled by Pearl Harbor & Paukenschlag, that the Battle was turning in the 
Allies favour. 
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Lane devoted an entire chapter to Second World War Merchant Navy 
representations. The distinct, brave 'Britishness' of the seaman were 
emphasised. 118 "Genre conventions seem to require a set of morality tales which 
reiterate - and through reiteration honour - the heroic values of British and European 
culture." 118 The regular services paralleled these forms, with better funding, 
given comparatively primitive and unsophisticated publicity-management 
standards. 12° Publicising the Merchant Navy was only of value, with Transport 
Ministry backing, in wartime. This disappeared post-war, save as supplements 
to British government gazettes published 1947-50. 121 
Representations informed and supported the myth and perceptions 
government required. Blore's 1944 Turning Point, 1943 covered all the naval 
advances, not just the Battle, while Armstrong's Battle of the Oceans related 
more Merchant tales. 122 Tunstall's Ocean Power Wins summed up cross-
service supremacy. Hope's 1944 Ocean Odyssey, from the Merchant Navy 
point of view, made an optimistic, interesting comparison to Dennis's mythic, 
grimmer The Rest Go On of 1942. Monsarrat's HM Corvette 1942, East Coast 
Corvette 1943, and 1945 Corvette Command, related mythic personal 
experiences: losses and the struggles of poor training, equipment and stress. 
Later, Ommanney's Flat-Top 1945, illustrated escort carriers on the Kola Run, 
less mythically, but with victory flushing the text. Edwards' Men of Action, 
1943 described central British figures. 123 
In Germany representations reflected the U-Boat's dominance of naval 
iconography, despite the greater entertainment potential offered by recreated 
battles. 124 In addition to 'autobiographies' of U-Boat aces, inspirational 
operation accounts were a collaboration of Propaganda ministry and Donitz's 
U-Waffe, one in which he participated. As well as brilliant photographs and 
118 They were poor, poorly-educated, unimaginative, free-spirited, fancy-free, hard-drinking, hard-living, 
irresponsible, but dependable for the dangerous, low-paid, uninspiring job they were called upon to do. 
Lane, 1990, op.cit pp.33-66. 
119 lbid p.244. 
120 Fussell, P, Wartime Oxford University Press, London, 1989, pp.153-4, 160-1, 286, 288. 
121 !bid, pp.33-66. 
The other naval advances included Allied supremacy in the Mediterranean, defeats of German 
surface forces in the Arctic, and the offensives against the Japanese in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
Terms like 'Ocean Battle' also reveal how amorphous the terms and perceptions of commerce warfare 
were. 
123 Compare Howarth's 1992 Men Of War [Weidenfield & Nicholson, London] : very little revision to who 
is now central. 
124 Hadley op.cit p.79. 
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propaganda from Buchheim, other authors promoted U-Boat warfare. After 
initial successes, the works were vital to sustaining national and U-Waffe 
morale, as the struggle never improved. 125 No Allied anti-submarine warfare 
aces were created like Germany's, though a few officers were prominent. 126 
Wartime cinema was as rigidly focussed on the war as other media, 
without in Allied countries being expressly controlled. Cinema benefitted from 
directors and producers being able to call on government and service support 
and assistance. In Germany naval cinema necessarily came under Nazi 
control and produced only approved materials: a single mythic feature, U-
Boats Westwards, in 1941 and a historical narrative of the nineteenth century 
submarine developer Bauer, not about events in this war, the following year. 
Had German successes continued there would doubtless have been more 
stirring recreated combat features and narrative works extolling the model 
national characteristics of the U-Boats and their crews. 127 
Feature films and newsreels made during hostilities were either 
propaganda pieces or quietly effective, well-acted docudrama using real 
navies and seamen. The early comedy Neutral Port [1940] presented both 
British and foreign stereotypes. British seamen were stubborn, forthright, 
dedicated. 128 Convoy (1940), San Demetrio: London (1942), and Western  
Approaches (1944), as a contrast were all classics of the excellent British 
wartime docu-dramatic genre, and starkly more well made, if not always as 
exciting, as post-war efforts. Both Convoy and San Demetrio: London  
appeared to be written about convoy HX-84, attacked by a surface raider 
(hardly a usual occurrence), but Convoy eerily Predated the event by 
months. 129 These contained several kinds of myth. One was the myth of 
prewar expectations: surface attack on a convoy. Another was the myth that 
surface warship combat would resemble Great War actions. 136 The myth of 
125 For a full discussion of wartime German popular accounts see Hadley 1995, op.cit 79-108. 
126 Walker, Maclntyre, Gretton, Broome, Campbell. 
127 For detailed exploration of German national characteristics exemplified by the U-Boat, see Hadley, 
o.p.cit, p.90-92. 
1 Will Ffyfe starred as a master who steals two interned German ships from a fictional Hispanic republic 
after his ship is sunk by a U-Boat. They in are sunk by U-Boats and British aircraft, without loss of life... 
129 Convoy opened in July, Scheer attacked HX-84 & escort HMS Jervis Bay 5/11/40; Winton 1990 op.cit 
p.160. 
30 As with the 'Mary Rose' and other Great War North Sea convoy incidents: Bennett et al, op.cit. pp.36- 
7 & 70. 
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the dominance of surface warship action would go on to be the post-war 
cinematic convention. Western Approaches, though having unlikely plot-
elements (a U-Boat using a damaged freighter as bait) was about submarine 
attack, even if not the classic Battle story: mass U-Boat attacks on a convoy, 
seen from U-Boat, escort and Merchant Navy perspectives. 
U-Boat warfare on escorted convoys violated audience expectations of 
naval warfare. These expectations were created by existing accounts of past 
centuries: the Armada and the Nelsonic era, by interwar films such as Jutland  
and The Battles of Coronet and Falklands, and by swashbuckling pirate 
movies such as those made by Fairbanks and Flynn. 131 This is partly why 
massed U-Boat attacks on convoys were not clearly absorbed and 
remembered. HX-84 became, like post-war recreated battles, a classic, but 
only in wartime. The attack on the convoy and its scattering were unique, 
which also enhanced their fame and force. This was not the typical 
experience, even if we are intended to think so by many novels and other 
concentrations on the short glorious lives of such ships. 
Between 1939 and 1945 the Battle appeared in no less than seven 
British features, ironically more than the regular navy, Fighter and Bomber 
Command. They were blended with documentary, either in style and content, 
or less deliberately by being over-informative and illustrative rather than 
narrative: telling rather than showing. Awareness of gender was slightly better 
1939-45 than before or after. There were thousands of voting women in 
factories and the forces. British wartime films were both more realistic and 
.\ technically accomplished, and better guided by the viston of their makers, than 
post-war Atlantic works. 132 Partially this is due to the lack of conventional films 
about the regular navy and its operations compared to the Merchant Navy and 
131 These were what audiences paid to see. Audiences sanctioned other forms and topics with low 
interest and sales. No post-war convoy warfare films were made, save Cruel Sea, though several were 
planned, including Poolman's 1959 Wolfpack. A novel tie-in was published of its screenplay. Paris 1990, 
op.cit, under "Titles: P." What these mainly show are the audience's opinions, tastes, ideas, 
expectations, not just the author's. They supported what they wanted and negatively sanctioned what 
they didn't want or like, as they do today. Non-commercial films are labelled 'arts', or ethnic', rather than 
being regarded as part of the mainstream. 
132 Both in terms of content and dramatic flow, and in terms of the sets, costumes, lighting, models, and 
cinematography. 
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Western Approaches Command. 133 RAF Coastal Command received from the 
Crown Film Unit its only cinematic attention, in a Target For Tonight-style 
drama resituated in the Atlantic. 134 Coastal Command ran 73 minutes and 
featured music by Vaughan-Williams, while Ealing's Find Fix and Strike  
concentrated on the less mundane offensive fighter and bomber operations of 
the Fleet Air Arm. As with Merchant Navy pieces, it had to inform as much as 
entertain the public, as it was made with or by Government, for propaganda, 
not commercial purposes. 135 
Only here were seamen and their experiences visible, in the short, 
docu-dramatic Merchant Seamen, fuller features such as Western  
Approaches, the American Long Voyage Home and Action in the North 
Atlantic. Hitchcock's Lifeboat was hardly about seamen per se - or the 
Battle. 136 Western Approaches was a colour semi-documentary of great 
effectiveness, using ships, location work and real sailors and seamen. The 
more narrative, less documentary San Demetrio: London, used models, tank 
work, and heavily-controlled, coached actors working closely with writers and 
actual seamen to capture the perspectives, mannerisms, and realities of real 
individuals. Both were thus very effective for their time, not least because in 
near-real situations not only their natural stiffness and awkwardness came out, 
but also their natural ease and consistency. Audiences long remembered 
them, and they are still available today. 137 Professionals were cyphers by 
comparison in Coward's 1942 In Which We Serve. All of the works were 
mythical: few would have made or watched a film where hardly anyone was 
sunk and no combat took place. Nor was any mention made of how many 
ships were getting through unscathed. 138 
133 Further elaboration of wartime representation would merely repeat Hadley, and Suid, "the Battle of the 
Atlantic in Feature Films", in Runyan & Copes op.cit pp.311-21. 
134 Save the post-war peripheral feature The Sea Shall Not Have Them, about rescue launches, not anti-
submarine warfare aircraft. 
135 Manvell, R, Films and the Second World War, Barnes & Co, New York, 1974, pp.70, 83, 85,110-12. 
136 	• Lifeboat instead merely used the Battle to put contrasting characters in a closed environment: 
passenger & crew survivors from a ship with the captain of the U-Boat that sank it. Highly implausible, 
and indicative of the later misuse of the Battle as setting for drama, rather than exploring it via characters 
and events. The Cruel Sea exemplifies the latter, all later battle novels the former. 
137 As several mail and Internet-order sites attest: http://members.aol.com/marbooks/videos.html  
138 Manvell, op.cit, p.107-9. 
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The Battle also featured on the periphery. Past Dutch hero Piet Hein 
was the theme of a patriotic 1943 film about a shipyard owner who operated 
under the famous pseudonym to sabotage a U-Boat built for the Nazi 
occupier. 139 Other films produced other myths. The wish-fulfilment piece 
Shipbuilders was made the same year, where workers, unions, and 
management of a 1930s northern English shipyard came together to resolve 
their differences and overturn the decay and conflict strangling their 
industry. 140 This vital overall reform never occurred in British shipbuilding. 141 
In addition to merchant navy and escort films, pictures like Neutral Port [1940], 
49TH Parallel [1941], and Day Will Dawn [1942] focussed attention on the U-
Boat to the total exclusion of battlefleets, as well as on propaganda for 
Canada, or seamen. 142 The public therefore always had the U-Boat in mind. 
Postwar features reversed this deficit, portraying only traditional actions or 
special operations, not anti-submarine warfare. 
The Battle also received American attention, of a different kind. The 
Long Voyage Home 143 was an (unsurprisingly) "Stagey - looking dramatically 
interesting amalgam of four one -act plays by Eugene O'Niell with talent abounding", 
including real seamen playing themselves, where "Seamen on leave get drunk, 
philosophise and have adventures." Pauline Kael considered it "One of the finest 
of all movies that deal with life at sea." 1 " It had a more honest ring than various 
fleeting depictions of seamen post-war, and was the equal of its British docu-
dramatic propaganda contemporaries. America was uneasily neutral 
supporting the Royal Navy during the early years and thus its features. 
focussed on preparations the US Navy and Army Air Force were making for the 
country's defence. Submarines, aircraft, and ships in training featured. No 
studio could present the vital escort work the US Navy carried out, save in 
newsreels which took care to avoid any mention of fighting. Once war arrived 
attention was focussed on the Pacific, but the Battle received big-screen 
139 The Silver Fleet, 1943. Manvell, op.cit, p.162. 
140 Halliwell's Film & Video Guide,  [ed. John Walker], 12th edn, Harper-Collins, London, 1996, p.674. 
141 Burton, A, The Rise & Fall of British Shipbuilding, Constable, London, 1994. 
142 In the former a MN captain avenged the loss of his ship by sabotaging a U-Boat; while in the latter 
Norwegian fighters destroyed a U-Boat base before rescue by British Commandos. These were special 
operations, but U-Boat-centred. Halliwell's Film & Video Guide [ed. John Walker], 12th edn, Harper-
Collins, London, 1996, pp.188, 529. 
143 1940, B&W, 1h40min; Wr: Dudley Nichols, Dir: John Ford, Pro: Walter Wanger. John Wayne. 
Halliwell's op.cit, p.449. 
144 Loc.cit. 
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treatment in Action In the North Atlantic, which starred Bogart in a trademark 
hard-bitten dedicated role, carrying on after his ship was sunk, and getting his 
next ship to Murmansk, on the Kola Run, after the captain was killed. 145 
Fussell remarkably regarded Hitchcock's peripheral Lifeboat, not Action  
in the North Atlantic, as the movie in which the 'Merchant Marine' got its credit. 
Only the European US Army had no wartime feature. 146 Fussell was 
disappointed on behalf of the US Army for not being remembered. 147 He went 
on to deride the desires of Merchant Marine veterans to be adequately 
recompensed and remembered, as if this is somehow unimportant, compared 
to the problems inherent in how we remember. 148 Later, Hawks produced 
Corvette K225 for Universal, where "a Canadian captain encounters submarines 
and bombers in Mid -Atlantic." This "good war film of its period" was, in another 
telling connection to post-war maritime cinema, "marred by romantic interest." 149 
It is also telling that this feature by a US studio and director portrayed a 
Canadian, not an American captain. This was especially strange given 
growing US involvement by 1943. If not on the classic convoy routes, they had 
been escorting troop convoys to the UK and then North Africa since 1941, and 
off the US coast before full offensive operations by hunter-killer groups centred 
on escort-carriers. Despite plenty of US Navy action which could be portrayed, 
the Royal Canadian Navy was depicted because of inter-Allied political need, it 
being the best way of enhancing the Royal Canadian Navy's image after the 
battering it had taken in the winter of 1942-3. 15° 
145 Suid, in Runyan & Copes op.cit, pp.313-4. Amusingly it was banned post-war as the film's destination 
was Moscow in the USSR, with real communist Russians calling out "Tovarishch!" 
146 After Marines, Army, Navy Guadalcanal Diary, Bataan Air Force Destination Tokyo:  Fussell 1989, 
92.cit p.158. 
'41 One hopes he likes Saving Private Ryan, though The Thin Red Line  does nothing to alter the pro-
Pacific bias. 
148 "Today the quest for credit is still going on", Fussell, loc cit. 
149 1h37min, b&w; Halliwells op.cit p.165; marred by romantic interest as Ramsden discussed op.cit p.57. 
189 The Royal Canadian Navy had been given escort of a large proportion of slow convoys [which 
resultingly spent longer in danger areas]. RCN escorts were less well-equipped than RN vessels, 
overworked, and their crews inexperienced and lacking training. These combined with the weather 
created situations where too few escorts were covering too many ships too often, without the sensors, 
weapons, training and cooperation to defend convoys or detect, attack and sink U-Boats. 80% of all 
ships lost in the winter of 1942-3 were in slow convoys under RCN escort, leading to the RN taking over 
these convoys before the May climax. Their ships fared no better, until drastic retraining was 
undertaken, along with more support vessels, very-long-range aircraft, and escort carriers, in the spring, 
when the tide was turned against the U-Boats. Milner, in Sadkovich op.cit p.53, note 42 on p.59; Milner 
in Runyan and Copes op.cit pp.130-35. 
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The Second World War produced a series of nationalistic 
propagandistic, and often accurate documentaries about the Battle and the 
men in it. The post-war era was as devoid of material publicising or presenting 
seamen's or sailor's lives as the prewar era. As Lane relates with insight and 
force, at some length, the wartime Ministry of Information took pains to ensure 
seamen were given recognition for their services, even while they resisted it. 151 
Almost all of the visual material contributed then and now to Battle myths: old 
under-defended tramps and tankers being bombed or torpedoed; clouds of 
smoke in the sky, fires (especially off the US coast) dramatically lighting up the 
night; the few injured, oil-covered, shivering survivors on overloaded boats or 
pitiful rafts. 
Documentary content ran from banal and illustrative to fully dramatised 
and analytical. The feature film Western Approaches had real seamen, in 
colour, playing themselves. Merchant Seamen [1940] featured more actual 
seamen from lost ships vowing to go on Merchant Navy gunnery courses when 
they got back home, and sinking U-Boats with their archaic deck-guns in their 
next convoy. Western Approaches, significantly, was made in 1944, after the 
climax of the Battle, and during a period of readjustment. 152 The Canadian 
Atlantic Patrol [1940] featured a simulated U-Boat hunt. Its chief influence was 
the way its 'authoritatively voiced narration' by "Lorne Greene became a 
convention in the genre", [vide Graves in Victory at Sea and Olivier in the World  
At War]. 153 Davidson produced Heroes of the Atlantic for the National Film 
Board of Canada in 1942• 154 Fifteen minutes long, it purported to show 
Canada what its navy was doing: coastal defence, shipbuilding, with excellent 
footage and narration. Corvette Port Arthur and Action Stations [both 1943] 
similarly presented "dramatic demonstrations of the important roles the RCN 
played in the Atlantic." 155 They did not point out the problems of expansion, 
nor the political causes of the 18-month technological lag behind the Royal 
Navy which was responsible for its anti-submarine warfare impotence. They 
151 Lane 1990 op.cit. ch .3, "Rhetoric"; p.33-66. 
152 Snorkel-equipped U-Boats operated inshore, largely undetected, sinking few ships, yet largely 
immune from attack save in transit and deep water. 
153 Hadley et al 1996 op.cit p.44. 
154 AVVM Film Record Sheet F01758: National Film Board of Canada, 1942. 
155 Hadley et al 1996 op.cit p.44-5. 
94 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	2: COURAGE WAS NOT ENOUGH 
did publicise the Royal Canadian Navy as it never was afterwards. 156 This was 
followed by the US feature Corvette K225 the following year, designed to 
counter much of the criticism Heroes had avoided. 157 
Documentaries provided information and ordinariness, newsreels action 
and drama. Features combined them. 158 While there were house styles and 
minor differences in type, the media during the war were "engaged in mutually 
reinforcing and plagiarising each others works." 159 They co -opted each other, 
producing not only guided propaganda and nationally-reinforcing materials 
acceptable to government. They also constructed, reconstructed, and 
recapitulated themes, subjects and topics acceptable to government 
departments, their owners, and some seamen. All engaged in producing 
images and ideas of seamen and Merchant Navies, and armed services, which 
did not diverge from producers' and audiences' expectations. These images 
and ideas were mythical: it was the action and the drama that won out. This is 
one reason why seamen often were not always grim, or overly worried or 
depressed about service at sea, for all that the myths they contributed to said 
they were. Most of them returned to sea after convoys or sinkings because 
they had to. Professional prewar seamen were placed in a reserved 
occupation after 1941. They couldn't afford to be ashore, not just because 
they felt duty bound, or they felt their nation demanded it. Working at sea was 
what they did. Losses and dangers were rarely so great that there were better 
reasons, for all the long hours, poor conditions and bad pay, to stay ashore, 
even had it been possible economically or politically. Most of them had not 
been sunk and would not be. The risk was present but the actual was not, for 
most of them, most of the time. 16° 
The effect of Great War slaughter on literature and art, in an age (as 
Fussell says) steeped in nineteenth century literature, before film and later 
radio and TV had taken hold, was profound. Opinion is that the Second World 
156 Save its expansion and support for the Royal Navy mentioned in Thames TV's 1973 "Wolfpack", and 
recent works. 
157 See footnote 150 above. 
158 Lane 1990 op.cit p.58. 
159 House styles were "Almost tongue-in-cheek understatement from the BBC, whimsy from Lord 
Beaverbrook's Daily Express, and half radical popularism, half hard-headed calculation about the nature 
of its readership, from the Daily Mirror." lbid p.63. 
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War produced little great literature and poetry by comparison. 161 Nine wartime 
novels involved the Battle. Some led on from prewar Merchant Navy works, 
notably for both boys and adults by Westerman, reinforcing myths and 
attitudes about seamen and Britishness in genera1. 162 Wheatley's Strange 
Conflict prefigured post-war secret-mission novels. 163 Gilpatrick's Action In the 
North Atlantic was the basis of the Bogart film, while Forster's The Ship, 
Dixon's The Devil & the Deep, Jordan's Day Without Evening and Mallalieu's 
Very Ordinary Seaman,  related life in warships and freighters. 
Fiction about naval warfare, for the reasons given above about 
representations, was the least developed and used medium during the Wal". 164 
There simply was not enough time, free imagination, space and commercial 
demand for much written war fiction, save smaller, cheaper versions of pre-
war works. Feature film was propagandist, and it flourished to fiction's 
detriment. Novels conformed to wartime restrictions on quality, representation, 
and focus. 165 "Despite success as engaging narratives, few novels succeeded in 
making a motive...of boredom, or persuading readers that the horrors had not been 
melodramatised. One turned instead to memoirs written by participants not conscious 
of serving any elevated artistic ambitions." 166 Memoirs and news instead provided 
the mythic content fiction traditionally supplied. There was no reason to read 
fiction, when real live people were doing exciting and dangerous, or tragic, 
things. 
War's end brought dramatic changes. The Merchant Navy became 
once again a totally civilian force, benefitting from the wartime culling of old 
ships and improvement in living standards, but little better represented or 
protected from the vagaries of market and government. Its wartime 
prominence in media and consciousness faded rapidly. Coastal Command 
was drastically reduced, and secrecy limited its publicising and demonstrating 
its wartime effectiveness. Western Approaches Command ceased to exist 
166 Regarding sailors lives and perception of duty see Lane 1990 op.cit pp.12-35, also Pinets, J, "Navy or 
Merchant? Torpedoes couldn't tell." at http:Wwww.bergen.com/region/marine9700195.htm 
161 Fussell, P, The Great War and Modern Memory, O.U.P, London, 1975; Calder 1972, op.cit p.517-23. 
162 For more on created and supported Britishness see Lane 1990, op.cit, p.39. 
163 A Nazi shipping magnate used British contacts to entrap shipping.Allied merchant shipping. 
164 See p.87, and footnotes 114, 115. 
165 Fussell 1989 op.cit unfortunately had little on what wartime Germans were reading; pp.239, 240-1. 
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entirely; reduced and reallocated, its end depriving it and its personnel of much 
future voice. This once huge, specialised and war-winning command was cut 
to the size of the Royal Canadian Navy: less derided but little better known 
post-war, save by one film's popularity. 167 Canada capitalised on its war-built 
industrial heartland, while ignoring its navy's most important contribution. 
Canada's Merchant Navy was cut away to nothing and subjected to class and 
industrial warfare when it attempted resistance. America emerged with 
unparalleled power-projection, financial strength, confidence and outlook. 168 
Germany, crushed and largely wrecked, also focussed on the future; rebuilding 
an economy, a private life for its citizens and later a consumer culture, while 
still maintaining some connections to older military and civil citizenship ideals 
and attitudes. All were shadowed by the end of an era, more dramatic and 
forceful than the Great War's end, and the emergence of a new political 
structure with terrible new weapons. 
The next five decades and four eras of history and awareness would , 
see the resolution of many outcomes. Other issues: remembrance and the 
position of ignored and disregarded military and civilian minorities, would 
remain as unresolved as since the end of the Great War. Some earlier 
representations had not been attempts to deal with these: they had been for 
official and service purposes, not private restitution. The war raised some 
representations to an apogee of skill and effectiveness they would rarely reach 
again. Propaganda fiction and history were poor representations, but 
documentary and cinema were distinctly better than almost all of what 
followed. The few naval wars after 1945 did not undermine misconceptions or 
create new attitudes or perspectives. 169 Myth would reign largely unabated, 
with propaganda muted, refocussed on recruitment, not supporting a war 
effort. Continuity endured. Familiar topics, themes, and forms of presentation 
(popular history, docu-dramatic cinema, memoirs), were presented in existing 
ways to a dedicated, informed audience. Mainstream commercial audiences 
wanted and bought excitement and action, perpetuating other myths, through 
166 	• ILA p.291. 
167 The Cruel Sea, 1953. 
168 Power-projection is a military term denoting the ability to project power: military forces, authority. 
169 Indeed the Falklands experience of naval and shipping co-operation, national pride and outrage, poor 
planning and 'muddling through' reinforced and supported existing memories, attitudes and portrayals. . 
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book and cinema ticket sales. 	Eventually commercial and purely 
entertainment interests would dominate remembrance and balanced 
presentation of Navy and Merchant Navy operations and experiences. 
Memories and representation were here to stay. The consequences of the 
Battle were felt in debt, financial and manufacturing policy and relations for a 
decade and a half after the end of the war. Shipping and personnel losses 
impacted deeply upon ordinary people. They remembered such things as 
orange and sweet rationing ending in Britain in 1953, eight years after VE Day, 
and a decade after the climax of the campaign. 
98 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 3: THE CRUEL PEACE 
HISTORY, CINEMA, FICTION AND DOCUMENTARY, 1945-60 
This is a story of the Battle of the Atlantic. A story of an ocean, two ships. & a handful of men. The heroes are the men. 
The heroines are the ships. The only villain is the sea - the Cruel Sea - which man has made more cruel.' 
Monsarrat 
When the Battle of the Atlantic ended in May 1945 its myths were firmly 
ensconced. The production of representations paused, as writers and 
audiences were perhaps simply too used to war and works about it. It was 
several years before participants began to record and rework their experiences 
and myths into forms others could read. Images and impressions of the Battle 
emerged and stabilised very quickly once that establishment phase began. 
Except for academic revisions, they have changed little since. What they did 
do was take on the power and force of the experiences they were drawn from. 
The style, tone, and content of the works became set forms of representation 
which have varied slightly and moved only slowly. In place of propaganda, only 
promotional materials for recruitment had government support. This deprived 
cinema of enormous resources and direction, as well as a focus on the 
majority of actual operations and experiences. The drive of cinema became 
solely commercial. 
Personal accounts flourished, amid a huge burst of memoir and 
incidental writings about all aspects of the war. They were the most mythic. 
Propaganda and sensationalist emotions were gradually replaced by more 
staid, considered, but not analytical writing. Official accounts of operations 
and incidents dominated this Immediate Postwar phase. They were neither 
commercial nor emotively personal, but they too contributed to myth about the 
Battle. These works gave their audiences the classic impressions of the 
campaign. The brave seamen in their rusty old ships, the overworked escorts, 
the piratical enemy U-Boat men in their evil iron serpents, were one side. The 
other side was of an equally brave, dedicated band of elite submariners 
betrayed by leaders and technology, hunted by a powerful, vengeful, 
remorseless enemy backed by enormous resources. 
Personal and biographical accounts from senior figures dominated 
history. Official unit and command accounts, (from flotillas, RAF squadrons 
and groups) emerged later. As mythology abounded in novels and films, (the 
latter largely silent on the Battle), the lack of counter-mythology in popular 
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accounts formed or hardened attitudes, with nothing factual or exploratory to 
analyse or counter them. General secondary accounts were understandably 
few and thin without the primary materials only official historians had access to. 
Only slight differences in tone and description [ie of the Germans] were visible 
between 1945 and 1960, or even 1974. General attitudes and descriptions 
changed little. Sources did not grow until the early 1970s. There were rigid 
walls between the services once the postwar sense of collective victory faded 
and competition for funding became an issue in changing times. These walls 
were even more rigid between the Merchant Navy and the services, due to 
differences in perspective, and the lack of appropriate lobbying. All of these 
affected what and how things were written. 
Fiction emerged slowly, but was bolstered with a few early classics, 
providing templates for repetition and imitation used by following commercial 
successes. Only the Ultra era would be more prolific. Early war memoir-
fictions of other campaigns such as the Quick and the Dead, the Thin Red Line 
and Catch-22 were as close to great literature on war as the Second World 
War produced compared to the Great War, producing only a few great works. 1 
Maritime cinema in Britain depended on re-releases of wartime films for the 
rest of the decade, save the semi-peripheral Ealing comedy Whisky Galore 
[1948]. US cinema produced a near-peripheral classic tale, of ship versus 
submarine (though more than first appears), in 1957, then a poorly received 
raider versus convoy drama in 1960, before silence. The 1950s was the era of 
British war cinema heroes, and maritime stories. They, like US and German 
war cinema, flowered in the 1950s. British war films were overshadowed and 
demoted by new topics in the 1960s. 2 
British maritime films contained the Battle, but were combat films about 
incidents, not convoy dramas. Only two did not recreate famous events. All 
were commercial and limited in quality. All but one did not support the myth of 
the Battle directly. They used the Battle and parts of the myth from participant 
and recent memory to promote other things: surface actions or exciting 
incidents rather than the mundane vital convoy and anti-submarine warfare 
1 Paris, M, op.cit p.ix. 
2 S.Frears in "Typically British: 100 Years of British Cinema", British Film Institute for Channel 4, 1994. 
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work the war depended on. Coastal Command was excluded, as was the 
Battle itself after 1952. This in a sense made up for the exclusion of 
conventional battlefleet features during the war. Cruel Sea singlehandedly 
represented Atlantic, Battle, and Western Approaches Command experience 
and myths, as well as Merchant Navy myths by inclusion. Though combat was 
popular, there were no films about Mediterranean surface operations. 
An interesting and forgotten exception to the silence in postwar 
documentary about the Battle was India Strikes, made in 1946 by Bishu Sen. 
It covered war contributions to the army, Royal Air Force and Merchant Navy. 
Rarely before or after were Indians or their activities mentioned. 3 TV 
documentary material produced a single classic. In the less busy but less 
archived days of the 1950s and 60s, there may. have been others. 4 NBC's 
reasonable effort in 1952 was the classic Victory at Sea: from the US Navy's 
near-official point of view. It was US-focussed almost all the way through, but it . 
did place the Anglo-German war in context first, for all its wartime-style 
propaganda and mythologising of the enemy and the U-Boat. 
Howard touches on the relation of remembrance to causes of conflict. 5 
It was starkly different to the Great War, though its mourning language was still 
used. 6 Memorials had a different purpose.' Destruction of civilisation was 
emphasised instead of transcendental sacrifice. Mass death was common, not 
limited to the stereotypical Front. The Second World War moved, its Western 
Front was everywhere, even where no soldiers were. Remembrance was 
tempered by a peace and Cold War that lasted decades. Social life changed 
in Europe to a marked degree while wars were fought elsewhere. Morality 
wrestled with strategic bombing and its inevitable connection with Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. The very threat of nuclear war, and soon nuclear annihilation, 
made commemoration take on an entirely new aspect. Global extinction had 
never been possible before. If deterrence failed there would be no after to 
remember in. After thin attempts at civil defence, the public adjusted to a 
3 Until 1994's Forgotten Heroes; Manvell 1974, op.cit p.233. 
4 They are probably beyond recall now, if they existed at all. 
5 Howard, M, 1983 op.cit. 
6 Winter, op.cit, p.8. Such language is still used today. 
7 Mosse in Fallen Soldiers, (Oxford University Press, NY, 1990), discusses the differences in memorials 
between the UK, West and East Germany and the USSR, p.201-25, but not the U-Boat memorials at 
Laboe or Moltenort. 
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preferred loosely- fatalistic attitude, perhaps familiar to seamen on the Malta 
and Kola runs. These men knew there was nothing they could do and no rest 
to be gained by preparation. 8 
Fascination for Second WOrld War deeds and a belief in a moral, decent 
fight by ordinary individuals and famous people was strongest in Britain. 9 The 
experience of war remembrance took a different form from that of the Great 
War, in more cinema and radio, then much more TV. 19 Media remembrance 
reminded the contemporary audience or informed and reinforced subsequent 
ones. It did not need to unrealistically communicate the experience as much 
wartime media had, or in stark horror; the antipathy of war was taken for 
granted. Everyone knew people killed by bombing, by fighting overseas or 
nearby, overwork, poor food or medicine. Universal suffering and loss was 
reinforced by the war's proximity and scale in a way the absentee slaughter of 
the Great War had not. Later,. war also became again exciting (if not glorious 
or fun), especially for the postwar young untouched directly by the war, in an 
age of ever-increasing prosperity. The Great War at sea had been separate 
too: concentrated on U-boats and shipping, cruisers and capital ships. War on 
land and air was more often communicated directly, not via newsreels or 
newspapers. The war at sea remained separate and more alien than ever. 
"The fighter pilot, the Panzer Leader, and especially the Para, were far 
more potent symbols of military machismo archetypes for adventurous 
adolescents....a more dramatic image than silent, invisible navies, 
bureaucratised mass armies and the disciplined destruction of bomber fleets." 11 
No trivialisation of the Atlantic battlefield or warrior was possible. The 
Atlantic experience could not be reduced as the Western Front had. It could 
not be put on a cigarette card, postcard or picture; made manageable, 
comprehensible. 12 For the Atlantic, unlike the Great War's Western Front (and 
more recent journeys to El Alamein, the Death Camps, the Burma Railway or 
Normandy) no 'battlefield tourism', whether pilgrimage as a sacred journey or 
as mere curiosity, was possible. There were no places to visit, only 
8 Howard, op.cit, p.29-30. 
9 Ibid, p.68. 
10 The average person listened to 4.5hours of radio per day during the war, an analogy to TV's current 
domination of culture and decline in literariness after the Great War; akin to low quality of war literature 
during and after the Second World War; Fussell 1989 op.cit, p.181. 
11 Howard op.cit p.68. 
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coordinates on an ever-changing, if not featureless, battlefield which seemed 
clean after swallowing all the devastation and death. Only Monsarrat, postwar, 
noticed what the last generation of liner passengers were actually travelling 
over, to his horror, disgust and recurring realisation. 13 Official commemoration 
paled beside the commercial demand for model tanks, guns, planes, and real 
memorabilia. After the Great War trivialisation had, as Mosse relates, taken 
the form of postcards, tin soldiers, theatre film and songs, as well as that 
battlefield tourism which ebbed away by 1928. 14 After 1945 it re-emerged 
later, but remained. 15 Tin and later plastic war toys and models, both boy-
sized and miniature, were more popular than ever, though mass-production 
and cost meant the wooden homemade was for long the rule. Model-building 
and toy-gun-using children in the 1950's became the gun-badge-and-
miniature-collecting adults of later decades. Expensive miniatures and copied 
relics marketed to middle-aged Baby-Boomers are now as profitable as toys. 16 
Ship models, especially Second World War ship models, remain the least 
popular of all genres; science-fiction has a larger share of the product, below 
tanks aircraft and soldiers, well behind cars bikes and trucks. 17 
Official naval commemoration, after as before the war, could not 
compete with other services. This meant that the Battle became relatively less 
visible, less commemorated. Tanks on manoeuvres, artillery, and aircraft - 
especially exciting new jets roaring low overhead - captured the imagination. 
Navy days were as before the war: pageantry, children clambering around 
shining brass and gleaming paint, slides and sticky buns, big guns and big 
things. There was even a little gunfire. There was no movement: no realistic 
manoeuvres, no simulated sub-hunt by a corvette, the naval equivalent of 
attention-grabbing mock battles with smoke drifting and guns cracking over a 
well-mown grass field, or aerobatics and noise overhead. Ships were 
12 Mosse, Hynes, Samuel, Fussell, all discuss trivialisation of the Western Front, excluding battlefields 
elsewhere. 
13 Monsarrat, N, Monsarrat At Sea, Cassell, London, 1976, p.6. 
14 Mosse, op.cit p.126-56. 
15 Those who served now wish to remember, and being retired, are able to travel; they were not able to 
decades ago. 
16 Bailey, S, "Born Again Kids", Black&VVhite Magazine, Australian Edition, Number 25, June 1997, 
p_p.18-20. 
" Model ships require more complicated injection-mouldings, thus making them more expensive (with 
lower sales), as well as more complext to assemble; from British, German, American, & Japanese 
catalogues reviewed, 1960-98; Kawlath, W, Plastic Model Kits Falken-Verlag GmbH, Niederhausen, 
Germany, 1990, p.6-7. 
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stationary, when people viewed them. 18 Before the war corvettes did not exist. 
There had been only rare sub hunts by fleet destroyers practicing capital-ship 
defence, no anti-submarine warfare trade-protection exercises involving ASDIC 
since its invention. 18 
In factual and fictional material there was a strong but explicable 
concentration upon the activities of surface raiders, which determined capital 
ship operations and dispositions more than the Battle. Graf Spee, Bismarck 
and Schamhorst, which had to be fought and sunk by Royal Navy warships 
(with a little help from aircraft), ended up disproportionally famous for their 
effectiveness. The same happened across the Atlantic in Canada. Ironically, 
the "wartime experience so shunned by the regular Royal Canadian Navy became 
raison d'être for Cold War expansion and world -class anti -submarine warfare 
capability." 20 'Future' Battles were manipulated to maintain anti-submarine 
warfare against attacks in the 1950's. "Staff histories of the Battle were 
forgotten." 21 
The power of lobby-groups was plainly visible, even as the big gun was 
scrapped and the Royal Navy became the carrier and escort force it has 
remained. The essential lessons of English seapower that Drake and Nelson 
knew were pushed aside for the glory we remember them for. This was more 
than just a fight for funding and security. Glory was all-important, even at the 
expense of reality and perspective. Concentration on the big gun led to the 
peripheralisation of anti-submarine warfare technology and convoy escort 
before the war. 22 This caused chaotic and dangerous deficits in planning and 
escort provision until 1942. After 1945 the media cor1centrated on the same 
outdated concepts and events, not the lessons and rules gathered so painfully 
in 1939-45 (and 1914-18...). Grove discussed postwar British naval policy, 
and the Battle's effect on Cold War anti-submarine warfare, not publicity or 
perceptions. 23 Why both Battles were not used to promote Cold War anti-
submarine warfare remains inexplicable, save that discussion of and support 
18 Kennedy, L, 1974 op.cit, p.58. 
18 Winton, 1983 op.cit p.123. 
213 Milner, M, The U-Boat Hunters, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 1994, p.258. 
21 Grove, E, "The Modern View: the Battle & Postwar Naval Policy" in Howarth & Law op.cit, p.581. 
22 Lobbying, glory and naval guns: van der Vat, D, Stealth At Sea, Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 
1994, p.136. 
23 Grove in Howarth and Law op.cit, p.576-83. 
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for it proceeded between Royal Navy and Government, in secret, and would 
be fought with classified technology, not public support. 
The gradual recession from memory and the lack of trivialisation 
possible on the battlefield had entirely different consequences. They were 
both positive and negative. No trivialisation meant the Battle could not be 
parodied and mocked. It also meant it hardly penetrated culture. It created a 
plainitive sense of loss and inadequate commemoration among its participants. 
This was directly transferred to their writings. Instead of their commemoration 
and recognition being official, public, and prominent, it became private, 
individual, and continuous. Their works took on not only the strong memories 
and impressions of their experiences, they also took on an increasing sense of 
being forgotten and bypassed. They felt people had moved past them. The 
world got on with rebuilding, with living with austerity, with the boom that 
followed it, with new wars and new events, and then with commemorating 
other things. 
After the initial wave of personal Royal Navy, Coastal Command and 
Merchant Navy books, in the decade following the end of the war four of every 
five books about the Battle was by a Naval man. Each service and lobby-
group tried to prove that it had been the key to defeating Germany, with the 
other services aiding, abetting, and attacking its efforts. 24 There were a 
number of books written by researchers of the Merchant Navy's story or 
merchant captains, most too scarred to talk about or publicise experience, but 
none lodged in the national consciousness. 25 Royal Navy convoy stories were 
of warriors and warships, convoy though central to theme was peripheral to 
action. No histories entered mass awareness. 'Classic' histories, novels and 
films, only entered a 'canon' of Battle works. There is little agreement about 
which works are in it. The public, both during and after the war, were aware of 
the enormous sacrifices made by seamen, but they never gained the glory that 
24 Bomber Command's refusal to pass long-range aircraft to Coastal Command undoubtedly lengthened 
and deepened the Battle: the five-week victory over the U-Boat in April-May 1943 was ensured with a few 
dozen transferred aircraft, mostly VLR Consolidated Liberators. 
25 The way combatants commemorate Anniversaries, but bombing survivors did not, until recently. 
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Royal Air Force Bomber and Fighter Command, or Monty's Eighth Army 
achieved for their self-promotional efforts. 26 
The real composition of crews - largely Commonwealth but with 
international members - was also pointed out, but with decreasing frequency 
after the mid-1950s. 27 One third of British crews were colonial in origin: 
Lascars, Indians, African, Hong Kong Chinese, Caribbean. Very few photos in 
early books, and none in later ones, were of these men. As Lascars and 
Indians were usually engine-room and boiler staff, not deck personnel 
(depending on the company involved), their losses were highest, when ships 
were hit. Chinese stewards were unseen. Not until the late 1970's did histories 
begin to re-admit the presence of these loyal subjects of the Crown despite 
their numbers and losses. These men were ignored by history, and even 
when seen, their sacrifice went unrewarded. 28 Unlike the `Fuzzy-wuzzy 
angels', however, the white merchantmen in this story were little better 
rewarded than their colonial comrades. There was certainly no compensation 
or pension provision for non-white seamen in the British Merchant Navy, nor 
has any been given or considered. 28 This was the result of Indian and 
Pakistani independence in 1947: no-one felt responsible, and other more 
massive problems took priority. 
Merchant seamen and navies were gently and slowly forgotten after the 
Second World War. Thousands of medals were awarded, and a memorial was 
built in London with the names of all British ships lost and the names of 28,301 
men with no known graves upon it. Rarely elsewhere was it mentioned. 36 The 
Imperial War Museum had small displays in the 1950's,\ but in the annals of the 
War, in memories and on shelves, it occupied a small place. 31 Seamen and 
what they accomplished and endured faded from sight. Unlike the Navy or Air 
Force, there was no Admiralty or Air Ministry to back them. The Board of 
26 Self-promotion took many forms: lecture tours, memoirs, public appearances, ongoing roles in NATO. 
Merchant Navy men, senior or otherwise, had much lower profiles, compared to senior wartime Air or 
army figures, who could draw support from battles like Alamein or operations like the Dams Raid. 
27 Cameron did, but not later accounts. 
28 Like the 'Fuzzy-wuzzy angels' of the Kokoda Trail. 
29 Forgotten Heroes, 1994 op.cit. 
3° The Imperial War Graves Commission Tower Hill Merchant Navy memorial to "Merchant seamen with 
no known grave" was approved by HM Queen Elizabeth in March 1955; Trident magazine, April 1955, 
p.179. 
Maclntyre 1956 op.cit, introduction. 
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Trade had no interest in captains or seamen, only with the resumption of 
normal trading and shipping after the victory. Shipping companies were more 
concerned with trade, postwar conditions, ships and cargoes than in any 
recognition or memorialisation of the men who had the highest percentage 
losses in any theatre save the U-boat crews who actually opposed them. 32 
After this the Battle itself largely faded. 
The Merchant Navy's postwar loss of prestige and fame was due to 
several factors. They were not 'fighting men' like the Navy or the bomber 
crews. They had no lobby group representing them other than the civilian 
shipping companies, and the Board of Trade, neither of which was concerned 
with demanding publicity or memorials to the suffering and sacrifices. 33 The 
role and effectiveness of seaman's unions was not great. Unions were the 
only organisations which could take on the job of promoting and supporting 
seamen's rights to deserved rewards, yet they were rarely mentioned. 34 
Wartime agreements between Governments and Unions were partly to blame 
for this silence. Industrial action could be defined treachery in the face of the 
enemy and dealt with accordingly. Unions should have been very active in 
promoting the needs and sacrifices of seamen during and after the conflict. 
Their powers and rights were overridden by wartime emergency legislation, 
and it was simpler and easier to agree with government rather than face legal 
attack and extinction for 'the duration', and perhaps beyond. 35 
There was an essential lack of glamour in the Merchant Navy. There 
was precious little in escort forces but shooting and steaming could be made to 
seem as such - and certainly heroic if necessary - \compared to steaming 
slowly in large groups and dying undefended. There was and is nothing heroic 
about plodding in lines and ranks getting killed helplessly while your 
companions were forced by circumstance to keep moving past your sinking 
ship or lifeboat. Thus there was very little that could be eulogised or publicised 
32 Apart from extensive mentions in Company histories, which were only read by employees and other 
members of the minority audience; Lane 1990 op.cit pp.25, 227. 
33 Sources are regrettably largely negative: there is no evidence that they did. Memorials and 
commemorations were not within their brief. Those were handled by the services and the Imperial War 
Graves Commission, which considered then that merchant seamen did not fall within their scope. 
34 Postwar unions were more concerned with rebuilding power-bases eroded by wartime practices, and 
with holding or improving existing rights for seamen, not with building monuments to the fallen. 
as Lane 1990 op.cit pp.41, 61, 80, 111, 145-7, 174, 184. 
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in the way gun battles, torpedo runs, depthcharging and ramming, could be 
made exciting, glamorous, heroic and famous. Compared to attacking enemy 
warships against poor odds, cavalry charges against artillery, or dambusting, 
Merchant Navy activities had little or no potential for permanent mythologising 
in the Hollywood or Borehamwood traditions. 
Most operational and personal histories and memoirs were written in the 
Immediate Post-war period, in a time of relatively high public interest. This 
was largely before Roskill's official Royal Navy history, War At Sea, was 
published (1954-61), but the period during which it was researched and 
written. Histories were mythical or non-mythical, merely presenting operations 
unalloyed with personal or general misconceptions about the Battle's losses or 
effectiveness. Official histories tended to non-mythology, with editorial styles 
as part of larger official series. They were staid in approach, free of hyperbole, • 
excessive attention to detail, or particular viewpoints beyond their service. 
Popular histories and memoirs had fewer restraints. All supported mythology - 
in certain ways. Like wartime works, there were silences, omissions, and 
types of representation. Royal Navy/ex-Royal Navy authors used Admiralty 
sources, which immediately gave structure, rationality and selection. None 
such existed in Merchant Navy records. 36 
Pulleston's early Influence of Sea Power in WW2, 1947, intended to 
"observe strategic leadership, and the consequences of battles." It was "not a 
narrative, nor critique of operations." After defining Mahanian seapower, treaties, 
disarmament and build-up, it concentrated however or seabattles rather than 
campaigns, on naval actions, not the Battle. Convoy or anti-submarine 
warfare shortcomings were little discussed. America's relative ignorance of 
Britain under threat solidified. Two of Morison's classic non-official History of 
US Naval Operations in WW2 volumes covered the Battle very well, avoiding 
wartime judgements by or of the US Navy, bypassing much of the controversy 
which flared and simmered due to political and strategic differences. 37 He 
gave seamen and auxiliaries their due, as well as shipbuilding and operations, 
36 The use of RN sources also tended to reinforce certain tones and styles on the writing. 
37  Morison did however pillory King for his policies regarding and resulting from the U-Boat offensives off 
the US coast. 
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while keeping a US Naval and national focus. It set the standard. H.M.S.0 
published lists of British Vessels Lost at Sea, and gazettes, in 1947. 
Roskill's Official Royal Navy history emerged later, covering the entire 
war, though Atlantic anti-submarine warfare chapters could be read separately. 
Ultra was excluded but not missed. There was no separate official history of 
Royal Air Force Coastal Command, only classified staff histories almost 
unavailable until recently. 38 Coastal Command never received adequate 
coverage or analysis, much less recognition, sandwiched uncomfortably in 
Royal Air Force Official History between far more famous fighter exploits, and 
more derided and ineffective but very forceful and emotive bomber 
operations. 39 Much of the achievement, and the weapons and sensors used, 
were kept secret, now there was a new enemy, with a burgeoning submarine 
fleet of its own, and access to captured German technology. It lacked the 
famous biographical books and features both Bomber and. Fighter Commands 
benefitted from. 49 Thompson's little-known Aircraft Against U-Boat, gave an 
official account of Royal New Zealand Air Force operations. Later secondary 
works accidentally continued this exclusion and sidelining. Early personal 
accounts by senior personnel like Joubert and Slessor only partly covered the 
Battle. Much later works by Bowyer were only read by participants and the 
converted.'" Kemp's Victory At Sea, 1957, Creswell's Sea Warfare 1939-45, 
Hinsley's Command of the Sea, 1950, and Hitler's Strategy, 1951, discussed 
the seapower of the opposing nations. 
Standing between official naval histories and shipping company works, 
was Strong's centennial commemorative  Flying Angel: the Story of the 
Missions to Seamen, 1956. Only a limited amount covered both wars, with no 
experiences, partly due to space. It assumed "the reader's familiarity with the 
courage of seamen."42 It mentioned Western Approaches and also J. Lennox-
Kerr's 1953 oral history Touching the Adventures of Merchantmen in the 
38 Law in Howarth and Law op.cit p.600. 
39 Akin to the highly-charged, mythologised, service and slaughter of the Great War's trenches. 
40 Admittedly the RAF legend is borne almost entirely by Reach For the Sky, [1953] and The DamBusters 
[1955]. 
41 Such works were highly specialised, without the background and supporting information required by 
the general public. They were also technical and often deeply jargonised, further narrowing their 
demographic. 
42 Strong, L, Flying Angel: the Story of the Missions to Seamen, Methuen, London, 1956, p.147. 
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Second World War. It pointed out "the unspectacular and the merely useful never 
gets its due."43 Missions played, though it was not said, an important role in 
supporting seamen from sunk and damaged ships, as well as those merely 
down on their luck. Behrens' classic Merchant Shipping and the Demands of 
War, 1955, provided administrative and operational history, but brief, mythic 
experiences, and captioned photographs of 'types' of British master.. .while 
Campbell's Salute The Red Duster, 1952 and Lewis's Ships and Seamen of 
Britain, 1946, related mythic experiences only. Self-promoting American 
shipping head Land provided Behrens' American equivalent with Ships For 
Victory, 1951 and Winning the War With Ships, 1958. Logistics not described 
by Roskill or Behens had to be dug from Postan's British War Production, 1952 
& Hall's North American Supply, 1955; lengthy, adequate, but disparate. 
Merchant operations were not a unified as naval operations. 
Saunders' Valiant Voyaging and Holman's In Danger's Hour were 
typical of the solid shipping company histories which made up the limited 
history of the Merchant Navy at war, along with Roskill's A Merchant Fleet at 
War, dealing solely with Holt's Blue Funnel Line. Their coverage tended 
towards the thorough, but often included occurrences outside the Atlantic. 
Seamen had no phoney war, even if accounts of actions and losses were 
staid. These were top-down master/chief-engineer's histories: ordinary 
seamen were not authors and Lascars and other non-British were also limited 
participants. Content kept the war at bay and lessened its interference with 
ordinary life. In Danger's Hour spared the reader common trite nothings of 
great company management and happy workers. Roskill pointed out Holt's 
insistence on boat drill, small-vessel handling and survival training kept many 
seamen and passengers alive. This was not boasting: experience and 
knowledge are generally all that stands between life and death in war, luck 
plays a very small part in a lifeboat or bomber." Valiant Voyaging ignored 
analysis of shipping's value or its relationship to the war effort; the climax of 
1943 was mentioned, but not discussed. This could be taken as read in 1948. 
43 [bid, p.130. 
" Those who could handle their lifeboats and survival gear, had a better chance, just as those bomber 
crews who knew about icing and timing and manoeuvring had a better chance over Germany. On the 
other hand, when A Merchant Fleet at War [Alfred Holt & Co, London, 1962] was published, it was 
available to current Blue Funnel employees at a reduced price, not free, and some who paid never saw 
their copies: Bell, T, pers comm, 1998. 
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Always at the back was a list of ships employed, ships and men lost, or if too 
many, those awarded medals. In Valiant Voyaging even Lascars given awards 
were included. At least some were officially recognised postwar, for service 
and sacrifice. 
Postwar representations continued the same vein as wartime 
propaganda, slowly losing hyperbolic description and tone but never their 
unrepresentative focus on action and drama. Creighton's Convoy 
Commodore, 1956, contained an early counter-mythical statement. 
"Atlantic convoys were drab, monotonous, and unending. Some trundled back 
and forth for five years without seeing ships sunk or a shot fired." 45 . 
Elsewhere it was close to prewar content, mixing discussion of the Great 
War's Atlantic Battle, "Canadian Britishness", Merchant Navy snobbery and 
independence, 46 spivs and black marketeers, with tales of cargo shifting, 
collisions, bad weather, and inevitably, attacks and sinkings. 47 
Campaign history varied from Campbell & Maclntyre's classic The Kola, 
Run, 1958 to the early Ordeal Below Zero, 1955 by Blonde, the first Arctic 
Convoy book. Patchily based on eyewitnesses, press reports and Admiralty 
gazettes, it focussed on fighting. PQ-17 featured, yet with the pointed 
Admiralty silence about the convoy, there was little to be said beyond the bare 
events. It was to be nearly two more decades before both official documents 
and Ultra would reveal who was responsible, and how decisions were made. 
Famous events received coverage in Kenworthy's Battle of the River Plate, 
1946, later supporting commercial film in Powell's well-researched Last 
Voyage of the Graf Spee, 1956. Prominent young historian Pope provided 
another version of the Battle of the River Plate, 1956, nd later the same year, 
another less known, never filmed account of the Barents Sea battle, 73 North. 
Schull's Far Distant Ships, 1952 described Royal Canadian Navy operations, 
largely neglecting the Atlantic battle as all Canadian sources would until 
1 979 • 48 
45  Creighton 1956 op.cit p.124. 
46 Creighton, op.cit, p.18, p.141; p.55-6. 
47 Ibid, p.34, 132-8; see Ch.5: 1974-89" of this thesis for discussion of equally mythic cover art. 
48 Save Easton's excellent 1963 memoir 50 North. 
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Chalmers's Max Horton & Western Approaches, 1954, described the life 
of a key figure, while his less flamboyant predecessor Noble received little 
attention. Wemyss's Relentless Pursuit was written for a knowing audience." 
Robertson's Walker RN, 1956, gave a better picture of the man and his ships, 
though written shortly after Wemyss's re-release. Robertson's 1957 Golden  
Horseshoe related the life of opponent Otto Kretschmer, in standard populist 
form. Famous escort commander Maclntyre interestingly commented 
introducing his 1956 memoirs U-Boat Killer that it was unrealistic Atlantic Battle 
novels that drew him to write. 50 While it was "a radical polemic against wartime 
Royal Canadian Navy shortcomings", this was confined to a few pages only, even 
if he did not examine or illuminate the referred-to vast expansion and problems 
the Royal Canadian Navy was experiencing. 51 He lost few ships from all the 
convoys he escorted: none before March 1943. He pointed out the clear 
statistic that of 2353 British ships lost 1939-45 only 19 were lost while under 
joint air and surface escort. 52 Counter-myth was present, but hard to find. 
Other key men received biographies in later eras, after Vian's autobiography 
Action This Day, 1960. Pears' British Battleships, 1957, was an early technical 
volume, before Bradford's 1959 Mighty Hood narrated the life of Britain's most 
beloved warship. 
German works appeared after 1952. The most prominent feature of all 
postwar German writing was the exclusion of political and moral judgement, 
save a few pieces by Niemoller. 53 As with former Allied writers, Germans 
described actions and operations without relating actual experiences. The 
extreme and the exciting were included, but rarely the mundane, and never the 
boredom and tension between. One major change from earlier works was that 
the latter revealed, before Buchheim, the toughness and terror of U-Boat life, 
though he remained its most potent and literate exponent. "Defeatism was 
equated with authenticity". 54 All were spread on a spectrum of tragedy-
hagiography-defamation. Another new feature was the idea that all U-Boat 
men were neither heroes nor war-criminals, merely dutiful and obedient. U- 
49 Such as slang, terminology, assumed familiarity with Liverpool environs. It was reprinted from 
Walker's Groups in the Western Approaches published by the Liverpool Daily Post newspaper. 
One inevitably wonders which unrealistic novels....MacIntyre, 1956 op.cit, p.ix. 
51 Milner, 1994 op.cit, p.259. 
52 MacIntyre 1956, loc.cit. 
53 Only very much later Cremer 1982 his last page) & Topp, 1991, have moved beyond mere narrative. 
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Boats were animated, men reduced to pawns in their bellies, prey of 
technology and leadership. The U-Boat as icon was separated from other 
representations. 55 The other new genre was East German. These were, 
naturally, anti-fascist and anti-capitalist, equating socialist struggle against 
wealth with servicemen's struggle, making the poor serving men as much 
victims as apologist West Germans did. They added little to the mass, other 
than equally turgid, this time Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist, jargon. 56 Ironically, as 
Hadley points out, two of the best books on or about U-Boat men were British, 
with participant's assistance: Robertson's 1957 Kretschmer biography Golden  
Horseshoe, and Griffin's 1968 novel An Operational Necessitv. 57 This did not 
sit well with many German participants, who deplored the need for non-
participants and foreigners to tell the tale. Political and moral issues, as in 
technical histories and East German accounts, remained absent. 
All postwar German accounts shared a light speaker-to-reader style, 
distinct from jolly Great War books, save Donitz's autobiography and Ruge's 
academic history. 58 Post-Second World War works showed what Hitler's 
aggression had brought to Germany, and the impact of defeat. There was 
discussion, without celebration, of events and operations, though there was 
often pride in the ships and men. Bekker had been a wartime Naval 
Intelligence officer: avoiding personal attacks by using a pen-name. 59 He had 
nothing to fear from old comrades, never deviating from dogma. Busch had 
been a Great War U-Boat officer, and continued postwar to write equally poor 
and inaccurate U-Boat 'faction'. Ruge's Sea Warfare, 1939-45, a German  
Viewpoint, uniquely presented a German academic account of the war at sea. 
It reflected wartime perceptions rather than the actual situation, much like 
Swastika at Sea. It established Germany's significance between the USSR 
and the western sea-powers, defined seapower but never applied it to 
operations, largely ignoring war on commerce which was the focus of German 
seapower. Odd pages on U-Boat war were scattered among minesweeping 
54 Hadley op.cit p.112. 
55 [bid p.127. 
56 lbid 121-3, 136-7. 
57 See Chapter 4, "1960-74.". 
58 Brenneke's Ghost Cruiser HK.33, 1954, and The Hunters and The Hunted, 1958, F-0 Busch's The 
Drama of the Schamhorst, Bekker's Swastika At Sea both 1954, and later Hitler's Naval War, and The 
German Navy, 1974. 
His real name was Hans Dieter Berenbock. 
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and Luftwaffe operations. It explained the command structure, but nothing of 
German grand strategy, Donitz's staff or personal relations, the heart of 
German experience of the Battle. There was no analysis of German collapse, 
or the war's beginning or ending, no condemnation of any leadership. Very 
emotionally restrained, there were no German equivalents of Vian's "the 
Navy's here."6° 
In all these works Nazism was never mentioned, and nor was there any 
discussion of war aims other than generally about blockade-running, 
commerce raiding, and ships and U-Boat roles. This was partly done to avoid 
any discussion of whom the authors had been employed by and dedicated to. 
It was also a sign of their struggle with Nazism, warfare, and killing. Metzler's 
Laughing Cow covered 1941-45 in only 11 pages toward the back of his book, 
after the 'Happy Times'. As with all pre-war U-Boat commanders he had 
merchant navy training before service in the Kriegsmarine, and hated sinking 
merchant shipping and harming civilians, even armed and hostile ones. All 
strove to be non-political. Schaeffer, who refused to surrender on 4 May 1945 
and in agreement with his crew, took U-977 to Argentina submerged, even 
went so far as to say his work could "offend no-one." 61 He concentrated on the 
famous long run to Argentina, which everyone wanted to read about then. As 
with Allied writers the famous unusual incident was concentrated on, the 
'Knight's Cross factor' in place of the 'VC' factor. 
Weyher and Ehrlich's Black Raider and Brennecke's Ghost Cruiser HK-
33 were works characteristic of another kind of war, with the same tenor as U-
boat memoirs. The war was kinder for surface raider, for they could rescue 
seamen before they sank ships, and took prisoners where time and situation 
allowed. All raider captains save one were honourable, careful, humane men, 
who provided for their prisoners, and save when attacked by Royal Navy 
warships rarely lost a seaman. As all the Hilfskreutzer ["auxiliary cruisers"] had 
only one mission each, they were invariably tales of preparations, escape from 
British blockade, commerce-raiding in distant oceans - Pacific, Indian, South 
6° This famous catchphrase of the Altmark operation was quite apocryphal, according to Vian. 
61 In which case, why bother writing at all? Schaeffer, H, U-Boat 977, William Kimber, London, 1953, 
Introduction, np. 
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Atlantic - and the inevitable, fatal meeting with a Royal Navy warship. 62 For 
most this meant a short hard fight and sinking, with great losses. Only 
Kormoran got in the lucky first hit, though she was lost sinking her attacker. 63 
As with U-Boat books there was the light, familiar style, no joy in sinking 
merchant shipping, and nothing of government, regime, or war aims. 
Hessler's 1989 U-Boat War in the Atlantic 1939-45 was a reprint of a 
once secret Admiralty work, combining all the operational reports captured 
from German records in 1945. It was a goldmine of primary operational 
information for the serious researcher, but contained little for the ordinary 
reader of 1989. Long restricted, it played little part in generating perceptions. 
As Admiralty serial restricted documents, the Fuhrer Naval Conferences, 1946, 
with commentary (in Brassev's Naval Annual for 1948) had value in 
documenting wartime German perceptions, but the sheer fact that it recorded 
only perceptions about what was actually occurring, with little recourse to 
commentary, limited it. Reports drawn from rough notes or memories 
afterwards lowered its accuracy. It was of most value to the academic due to 
its content, not its focus or brief narrative. All this could be gained from the 
1990 Foreword, by noted German historian Mallmann Showell. 64 The rest of 
the foreword was explanatory: terms, prominent people mentioned in the text. 
Mallmann Showell seriously downgraded Donitz's importance at the beginning, 
stating (correctly) he was at the bottom of a long Chain of Command, in what 
many considered an undesirable and unimportant position, like Royal Navy 
anti-submarine warfare; as Kommodore of U-Boats [FdU] holding the rank and 
responsibility of a cruiser captain. 
Raeder's 1960 Mv Life portrayed the German navies of both wars as 
apolitical, failing to illustrate its or his culpability. The ancient Hanseatic league 
died long before the creation of the German state, and the German merchant 
service's influence over the Reichsmarine ebbed quickly after the ascension of 
Kaiser Wilhelm II. Raeder was nevertheless self-serving, inaccurate, and 
misleading, to distance himself from his government, the Holocaust, and any 
notion of aggression and delusion. There has been no other biography of 
62 Only Orion survived to return to Germany, though Thor began a second cruise before her destruction. 
6.3 HMAS Sydney, though conspiracy theorists would have it otherwise. 
64 Mallmann-Showell, J, 1990 op.cit, p.vii-xi. 
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Raeder since, save Bird's brief account. 65 He was quite as misled as any 
naval leader between the wars as to the real nature of seapower, and while he 
considered U-Boats and aircraft important, he nevertheless committed the 
Kriegsmarine and Germany to secret reconstruction, commerce raiding by 
large warships instead of small craft, and enhancing his position with Hitler by 
allowing his leader his head. 66 
DOnitz's 1959 Ten Years and Twenty Days was total myth. While a 
solid autobiographical and operational history, detailing his early life and Great 
War service, it lacked any appealing personal touch. With Ruge it was devoid 
of the light, easy, comfortable flow which characterised German writing about 
the war. After decades of writing emotionless reports Donitz could no longer 
do otherwise. Everything happening to the U-Boat arm and then to the navy 
as a whole, was coldly related. There was nothing of his personal life, little 
even of headquarters life and the very close relationships with staff officers, 
and individual commanders, who all benefitted from personal interviews and 
contact at every stage of their careers. This was one reason (along with 
DOnitz's concern for their safety), morale remained so high until the end. A 
critical biography did not emerge until 1984. 
Prien's I Sank The Royal Oak, ghostwritten by Weymar, portrayed a 
successful man. Wartime novels and nonfiction are propagandist, and 
ghostwritten works for aces are likely to be more so. Hurriedly published in 
1940 by the Wehrmacht and Goebbel's propaganda ministry, but not in English 
until 1954, it resembled another, better known, wartime volume by another ace 
who had a famous operation but didn't survive. Gibs8n's 1943 Enemy Coast 
Ahead had the same blend of childhood memories, unfolding professional 
service, and classic famous operation. We perceive them differently, Gibson a 
'good guy', Prien a tad'. Even if he was brave and dutiful, he was still a Nazi 
as most Germans professed to be (ie a supporter of Hitler and making 
Germany strong and respected again). Prien like Gibson distrusted the 
machinery of fame and fortune; this U-boat ace, like flying aces, preferred the 
company of equals. We perceive them differently because ex-seaman Prien 
65 Bird, "Raeder" in Howarth 1992 op.cit. 
66 
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saw the effects of his war. None of this made it into the autobiography. 
Weymar based his account on a few hours with Prien and "his own hyperactive 
imagination", and later admitted "it was written for schoolboys." He "made a liar 
and a braggart out of his subject", and "was horrified" to find his 'spatchcocked text' 
being published unmodified, "complete with swastika on the cover" in English in 
1954. "He tried and failed to obstruct" this. 67 Most importantly, it shows just how 
popular, irrespective of quality, any material about famous events and people 
was in Britain in the Immediate Post-War era. This kind of popularity had 
already occurred, with Great War U-Boat accounts, between the wars. Royal 
Oak was even reissued hardcover in 1969, probably as a 30 TH Anniversary 
commemorative gesture. This was a little early for the 30-Year Rule, even if it 
had been a reappraisal, which it was not. 
Atlantic Battle fiction took time to separate from other popular and 
prominent theatres - the Mediterranean, fleet or flotilla operations, coastal craft. 
National preferences were based on perceptions of where the action was, 
generated by early postwar and wartime fiction and nonfiction. Novels were 
commercial, as well as personal. They tended to be single, not serial. All, 
even Merchant Navy tales, were by former servicemen. German exponents 
tended, in short cheap Landser novels, to concentrate on U-Boats. Britons 
wrote about destroyers, corvettes, tugs, freighters, and German conventional 
warships or semi-fictional auxiliary commerce raiders. These provided a 
suitably noble and humanitarian life for a 'good German', compared to the 
heartlessness of submarine warfare. It also allowed (given the ability to take 
prisoners) recreating endless pirates versus captive subterfuge, hostage-
hijacker relationships and romance, as in earlier maritime novels, and novels 
set in ages past. Old romantic notions were combined with Great or Second 
World War dialogue. The apogee for submarine warfare was not set until 
1973. The campaign was illustrated by Germans, Britons and Americans 
including the also-filmed (after modification) Sharks & Little Fish and The 
Enemy Below, 1957. 
67 van der Vat, D, "Prien" in Howarth 1992 op.cit, p.395. 
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There were two Canadian contributions, rarely seen after, and never 
copied or repeated. Sclater's Haida [1947] glamorised and celebrated regular-
navy destroyers. This participant carved out a Canadian connection to older 
famous European naval sites. 68 "Landlubber Hugh Garner" added Storm Below 
in 1949. This less-authentically told contribution to Canadian myth was the 
story of a corvette of raw landsmen in the Atlantic. They purported to be 
Canada itself: a mix of backgrounds converging into a Canadian Naval identity. 
Men from the plains and the cities, from East and West coast middleclass jobs 
and rural occupations, Jews, antisemites, and a stereotyped Quebecois with 
"atrociously fractured English". 69 
These ordinary commercial fictions used the same actions, characters, 
plot elements, beginnings, descriptions, climaxes and endings as other genres. 
Men to be identified with were introduced, their past and plausibility 
established. Situations were established, problems demonstrated, then the 
course of the novel set to run. Difficulties and enemies were confronted, and 
faced down or run from, to lead to later confrontations. The climax was 
approached, the foe beaten, the loose ends of the novel tied up. 
C.S.Forrester, a man rightfully noted more for his Napoleonic-era warship tales 
(including the immortal, if not brilliant Hornblower), was thin on the Second 
World War era. His 1955 Good Shepherd was indicative of the straightforward 
convoy-escort anti-submarine warfare novel of the time, less developed than 
Cruel Sea but better executed than its descendants. This was surprising given 
Forrester's meticulous skill at writing multi-volume episodic literature of another 
era. 76 Single novels freed writers to be less romantic about and attached to 
their heroes. They could be more brutal, and extreme: killing their characters 
in the cause of the plot or theme. 71 Later decades would bring repetitive 
novels populated with familiar character types led by miraculously surviving 
heroes. The power of real events infused fiction: the wrecking of SS Cabinet 
Minister [in reality, SS Politician] in Whisky Galore, the Scapa Flow mutiny in 
HMS Ulysses  - along with the events and characters perhaps plagiarised from 
Hadley et al 1996 op.cit pp.46-7. 
69 Ibid, pp.47-8. 
70 Even if his prewar Homblower was markedly better than his postwar. 
71 Though no-one defined HMS Ulysses as tragedy, some elements were present: calamity, striking in 
nature, proceeding from actions and chance befalling conspicuous people, contrasting previous 
happiness or glory, evoking pity and so on. 
118 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 3: THE CRUEL PEACE 
Northern Escort - as well as all of Monsarrat's experiences, in The Cruel Sea. 
Another feature was their victim-focus: the ship was always under threat 
whether merchant, escort or raider, never on the offensive, even when 
counterattacking. 
Even the good novels were stuck with what the Oxford Book of the Sea  
described as "an exhaustion of descriptive metaphor" common to all commercial 
fiction of the twentieth century, whether British, North American or German. 72 
Most readers and authors moved in the literary tradition of the later, lesser, 
commercial works of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, not the 
high, rich literary tradition of the early to mid nineteenth century. 73 Atlantic 
Battle authors were raised in a tradition of short, light commercial 
contemporary works as ephemeral as today's TV drama or news. Past Battle 
novels were as much a part of this "Contemporary Ephemeral Fiction" as other 
genres. 74 Their formulaic repetition was due to few people writing or reading 
the great novel any more, save old classics. 75 What distinguished the best 
Battle novels of the 1950s was that the ocean was made the centre and core 
of the tale. The fashion with later fiction, especially commercial rather than 
personal, was the ocean was just where the tale occurred. No-one could 
argue The Cruel Sea or HMS Ulysses were not totally bound with the sea they 
move in, as Monsarrat so rightly put it, the only villain. Even their imitators, like 
Moore's All of One Company, 1957, written about life aboard a Kola Run 
escort carrier, captured more of this than modern novels, many written by 
younger men who gained their Atlantic experience in other ways - by travel, 
reading, or listening to participants. Unlike nonfiction, this changed the fiction's 
focus: the ocean became the stage, in a way the ocean could not be mere 
backdrop in nonfiction. The weather and the sea were never absent. 76 
The Cruel Sea was instantly recognised and remained a classic. It was 
the only work given even passing notice by critics. Other writers of the war at 
sea and the Battle: (Forrester, MacLean, Mowatt, Shute) were ignored by 
analysts. Cruel Sea became a scholarly and academic curriculum favourite, as 
72 Raban, J, 1992, p.33, cited in Hadley 1995 op.cit., p.ix. 
73 Fussell 1989 op.cit p.181. 
74  Such as westerns, war, romance, Science-Fiction & Fantasy. Fussell 1989, op.cit p.239. 
75 Gore Vidal, in Gore Vidal's Gore Vidal, BBC-WGBH Boston, 1995, Part 2. 
76 When written by younger men, who never experienced wartime Arctic or Atlantic conditions. 
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the Dambusters and the best Great War fiction did. This enhanced sales and 
broadened popularity, as did instant sale of the film rights. n Like H M S  
Ulysses, it was based on wartime experiences, and in many ways was as 
effective, and as limited, as Monsarrat's wartime works. 78 When read straight 
afterwards, Cruel Sea appeared little developed, though greater length and 
fictional characters and scenes made it richer and deeper. To participants and 
their relatives it was soon the book, immune from criticism. A corvette of raw 
landsmen go to war, and their lives develop. The reality and myth of the escort 
Battle were established: too few escorts, not many U-Boats, but enough to be 
a worry, the fear and tension of escort, and the greater suffering the Merchant 
Navy underwent, even if they were rarely seen. Monsarrat's themes were bias 
against the public's waste and profiteering, women in the Royal Navy and at 
home. 79 Curiously, author Ewart Brooke noted in his 1953 minesweeping 
novel Proud Waters "This is the story of two ships and two men, 
minesweeping.. .and it is fiction." There was no mention of The Cruel Sea, or of 
the enemy. 
The Cruel Sea provided the personal, psychological template for Battle 
novels, along with wartime cinema's In Which We Serve. Both had more or 
less the same set of women; all relatives or girls of the crew. The fears and 
uncertainties of the men for their wives and families, cities and country were 
shown. So too were the deaths. These served the plot: reinforcing the 
connection between land and sea, the worries and fears of this psychological 
novel, as well as those of the time. After a succession of convoys Liverpool 
was hit in the `big week' of May 1941. Calder showed one limitation: 
Monsarrat's portrayal remained trapped in a myth of the home front. Calder 
only discussed Cruel Sea due to its small segment on the Blitz, and excluded 
all reference to the Battle, or its realities and myths. He considered 
messdecks mere transferred bombshelters. Even if Monsarrat did spend time 
in one during an air-raid, it is hardly grounds for assuming he was merely 
transferring the myth of the bombshelter direct to sea. Calder did not explore 
these myths further. The Atlantic myth was more than the exclusive, anti- 
77 Ramsden 1998 op.cit, p.38. 
78 Monsarrat's Corvette trilogy; HMS Marlborough Will Enter Harbour, etc. 
79 In Which was more sympathetic to civilians or women, than the postwar Cruel Sea: Calder, 1991, op.cit 
p.230. 
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American, anti-woman opposition to the Blitz myth that Calder propagated. 8° It 
was more inclusive, in that it had all nationalities and all services, but also in 
that it was primarily created by its particpants, for their consumption, not by 
Government for the populace. 
HMS Ulysses provided the unrelenting action template, excluding 
everything but the sea experience. Its plot can be seen in underdeveloped 
form in J.E Taylor's short, forgotten Northern Escort, 1945, which in a few 
ways - length, intensity, the number of events, and the ship's survival - was 
more representative. There was no captain-focus as in films, nor copious, 
unrelenting action. The action was still abundant, however. 81 A destroyer 
under air attack on the Kola Run was illustrated from the viewpoints of too 
many crewmen. 82 MacLean reduced these to a manageable number. These 
formed the basis of almost every set of characters in later novels: a lieutenant. 
or two, a gun-crew, engine-room personne1. 83 The novel attempted to pack 
less in, and though lacking the character development or tragic progress of 
HMS Ulysses, still grips the reader. It was closer to the psychological focus of - 
Cruel Sea. The worry of the characters was more prominent than the action. 
MacLean's debut was an overnight success, an instant classic, 
permanently in print. 84 What HMS Ulysses had that Northern Escort - and 
most following novels - lacked was its 'inner reality', the sense that its situation 
happened (though nothing like it ever did), that its events were actual, its 
characters - "Socrates" Brookes, Stoker Riley, the Kapok Kid - were existing 
legends to be found in the pages of some wartime newspaper. 85 It was 
regaled the greatest sea saga of them all. It would be the instantly imitated 
template for Atlantic and Arctic action novels. It was heavily mythic, making 
8° Ibid p.165-6. 
81 Drawn from the experiences of the Polish ORPGadand, convoy PQ-16, May-June 1942: air attack, U-
Boat attack, bomb hits, cases of cowardice and wounds, fires aboard, another air attack, another U-Boat 
contact, air attacks, fog. 
82 No less than 16, all met in sequence: signalmen, lookouts, gunnery engineering and navigation 
officers, NA crews. 
83 Some have identical characters in HMS Ulysses: the usual rating with "12 years undetected crime." 
This also appeared in the sole postwar Canadian Atlantic novel, Garner's Storm Below, of 1949; Hadley 
et al 1996 op.cit p.47-8. 
84 Film rights to HMS Ulysses were sold but never developed. Details of the ongoing story of attempts 
can be found in Webster, J, Alistair MacLean: A Life, Chapmans, London, 1991, pp.73, 76-7, 236-243. 
David [Chariots of Fire] Puttnam in 1988 almost developed Ulysses, including having two screenplays 
written, but chose Memphis Belle instead. He agreed HMS ULysses was a viable proposition, giving 
some indication of the success it might have had: ibid pp.241-3. 
85 The capitals in Kapok Kid alone seemed to connect both to wartime news, and to the Wild West. 
121 
t1t 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 3: THE CRUEL PEACE 
central the weather, continuous attacks, and losses to a skilful unseen enemy. 
It also largely excluded the Merchant Navy such operations protected. In 
naval fiction shipping was absent though its defence was the theme. It had 
many factual elements. The ship's type did exist. 86 The mutiny which 
occurred aboard before the novel commenced also occurred. The brother of a 
colleague of the author was a crewmember of HMS Swifftsure in Scapa Flow, 
and was almost indicted for a murder despite his absence. 87 Whether 
MacLean knew of Northern Escort, can never be known. Perhaps it was so 
little known a decade after its publication that MacLean got away with it. HMS 
Ulysses now seems a little less a brilliant original novel and more a plagiarism 
filled out with more developed characters, scenes, tension and less realism 88 , 
in a more commercial format, in a time primed by fame of Atlantic Battle novels 
and movies. He later reused sections of descriptive text from one novel to 
another. MacLean was perhaps applying his own style, later to be reused, to 
an existing story which he extended, deepened and modified. 86 The possibility 
exists of more than recycling. This went on in wartime, and was mutually 
rewarding. It has later parallels. 6° 
There was a pause in war movie production after 1945. With the war 
over, other topics and ideas were wanted: producers and consumers alike 
were sick of the subject. 61 The 1950s was the era of the great British War 
Movie, as Clive James put it in Fame In the 20 T" Century, "now, ten years too 
late, came the flowering of the Great British War Hero, determined to make up for lost 
time and US dominance during and after the war". 92 It was also the era of the 
indifferent US war movie, though more were made 1960-70 than 1950-60. 
Germany, separated from the Allies culturally and iconographically, made two 
U-Boat films. Other war movies would still be made, but only one naval, more 
es HMSRoyalist command-ship; Raven, A & Roberts, J, British Cruisers of WW-II, Arms & Armour, 
London, 1980, pp.290-97, 438. 
87 D.Overton, pers.comm, 1995-8. 
88 The number of carriers, the size of the escort, the extremities of the damage, all compressed into one 
convoy. This is however typical of the compression of events and action which novels are forced to do. 
89 Biographies of MacLean point out the novel was written in 9 weeks, with little editing afterwards: that it 
was written for profit after a publisher's offer following the winning of a newspaper writing competition 
prize, and that MacLean never intended to write another novel. The explosive success of HMS Ulysses 
forced his hand and defined the rest of his life. Webster 1991 op.cit pp. 36-40, 44, 68-74, 75-81, 163, 
234-5. 
9° See Ch.6; Reeman's Killing Ground, 1991, a poor combination of Cruel Sea and Das Boot. 
91 Manvell op.cit p.232; Frears 1994 op.cit. 
92 James, C, Fame In The 20TH  Century Penguin, London, 1990, p.143. 
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distinct, U-Boat film. 93 The classics were 1950's movies, as were the pair of 
German films before Das Boot. There have been only two others - one did not 
appear until 1999. 94 
As the Battle-related movies were confined (with two exceptions) to the 
immediate post-war era, they did not offer any deep insight into knowledge, 
perceptions or expectations of the Battle. They offered a limited view of 
expectations and assumptions of that first era. The movies were British, apart 
from two peripheral American, and three German works about the U-Boat. 
The latter were of a longer, deeper genre of men and submarines, not the 
Battle, in German naval tradition, history, memory and public awareness. 
Other European countries, Canada, and Brazil covered other areas and topics 
in their films, perhaps looking at war's meaning in film rather than the basic 
reminiscence/reenactment/entertainment of British or American productions. 
European popular cinema has tended to be dominated by American, as has 
South American. 96 War features being dominated by popular accounts, and 
European involvement in the Battle being small but entirely unheralded even in 
their own countries, there was no interest or productive 'space' to make any 
films about what their sailors or seamen had achieved. Even in Britain the 
Battle was a peripheral matter despite the success and popularity of naval 
combat films. With no 'space' in Britain for more than one 'real' movie about 
the Battle rather than combat, what chance smaller countries? 
"The Golden Age of British Cinema" was between 1943 and 1949. 96 1950- 
60 was the 'Golden Age of movies.' 97 This was partly a pause for reflection, 
equivalent to the few naval and Atlantic fictions published 1945-51. The times 
indicated the limits the wretched state of the British economy placed on movie-
making. Epic action war films needed large amounts of sets, props, costume, 
and effects, as against thoughtful films, which could do more with script, acting 
and characters. Britain had failed to survive the war economically even while it 
had emerged triumphant emotionally and psychologically. Coupled with a 
93 Epic disasters (distinct from disaster epics) like The Battle of Britain, A Bridge Too Far and 1941. 
54 The peripheral novel-adaptation Murohv's War, 1971. The heavily-reworked actioner U-571 has now 
been released. 
95 Saunders, T, "Weimar, Hollywood & the Americanisation of German culture, 1917-33° PhD.Diss, 
University of Toronto, 1985, cited in Hadley op.cit pp.55 & 239. 	. 
96 Frears, ibid. 
97 Or the 'Era of Bad Movies'. 
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strong desire to look forward and rebuild, the British film industry was more 
concerned with comedies and lighter material. No less than 55 wartime 
movies were re-released 1946-51, filling the hole otherwise created in this 
genre. 98 A convergence of economic limits and existing representation with 
box-office requirement was also a telling premonition. War films would always 
look, be, the same, again, for between 1946-52 they literally had been. The 
most clear characteristic of the movies, 1939-60, was low cinematic quality. 99 
All were indifferently made, save one outstanding in content and viewpoint. 
They lacked the direction and clear motives given wartime works by focus on 
the war effort and propaganda, beyond 'commercial' action. There were now 
only audiences to entertain with familiar, reassuring material. British war film, 
and British film in general, shrank and changed after funding cuts in 1960, as 
tariffs on British content in cinemas were removed. 109 The present Britain was 
the dominant subject, with surprising results. Tiger Bay [1959] featured a 
Polish seaman on the run for murder, in a Welsh port where Welsh, English, 
Indians, West-Indians lived and worked together in relative harmony. 101 Their 
lack of segregation was taken as a norm, something unusual in 1950s film. 
These films could not support Battle myths, for only one illustrated it. 
Most involved convoys and merchantmen. All were about escorting or 
attacking shipping, or pursuing commerce-raiders. They were not about 
seamen, or shipping itself. There was no Merchant Navy presence in these 
films, save survivors in Cruel Sea. Captain Dove in River Plate was used as 
an near-impartial spectator of the combat, not any examination or expose of 
Merchant Navy lives or experiences. In film and reality he came to know Graf 
Spee's Langsdorff well, if briefly, foreshadowing the relationship of the 
destroyer and U-Boat captains in Enemy Below. Films supported regular-navy 
myths (as against 'Hostilities-Only' Navy) myths about important incidents, and 
public impressions about what was exciting. On seamen, sailors, and airmen 
there was silence postwar, the myth of invisibility. Coastal Command suffered 
the worst exclusion of all save seamen, but Royal Air Force personnel at least 
98 Ramsden op.cit p.45. 
99 The meaning or depth of the script, the quality of the characters, the absence of cliche, the lack of 
dependence upon stereotyped events and plot-elements, the sophistication of shots, scenes, lighting. 
Itx) N.Pronay "PostBellum British Cinema", cited in Ramsden op.cit p.36. 
101 The murder committed by the Polish star was not due to his ethnicity, but due to jealousy and 
accident, something which crosses ethnic social and other barriers. 
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had squadron association support, and service pensions. 1940s and 1950s 
ethos's were very much on display. 102 What better place to show team spirit 
and sacrifice for the greater good (a Great War idea, surely?), explained by 
senior officers, never questioned by other ranks, than a ship's crew? 
Hollywood or Borehamwood never attempted to make Merchant Navy stories 
the general public could understand. Advancing in lines and ranks was for 
Great War movies, men falling to machine-gun fire at every beat of a drum. It 
was not the sea. These movies supported ideas of why and how the Allies 
had won. The sea had become neutral, not wartime's memory: grey-green, 
omnipresent, and cruel. Above all, they gave audiences what they wanted: 
uncomplicated action reworks of real events. There was no subversion 
comparable to the wartime Went The Day Well? 103 
Commercial pressure for excitement combined with readily available 
sources (both novels and popular histories), to produce a lengthy, 
unremarkable series of increasingly nostalgic, romanticised, unrealistic, 
unrepresentative but very popular and profitable movies. They were the top-
grossing films in their year. 104 Though critics saw these film's limits technically 
and thematically, they garnered large audiences, growing more expensive as 
the taste and budget for epic adventure grew. Character and thematic 
development regressed to the wooden setpieces made after the Great War. 
All save Cruel Sea were "cliche-ridden" limited, repetitive, predictable pieces, as 
coolly received or criticised as middle and lowbrow fiction. 105 The "semi-
documentary" 1°6 River Plate [1956] was already being seen nostalgically by 
audiences. 1960's Sink the Bismarck! was "incredibly old-fashioned, as if a 1940 
flagwaver, not a 1960's drama." 107 
These films were made for a commercial market, and supported by the 
Royal Navy and government as they portrayed things these institutions wanted 
told and found acceptable. The Merchant Navy and its troubles were no 
longer a concern, requiring promotion, or encouragement. Films (art) and 
102 Ethos's such as sacrifice, team spirit, tolerance, working or fighting for freedom and a better future. 
103 Ramsden op.cit p.60. 
104 War films first or second every year 1955-60. Cruel Sea 1953, Dambusters 1955 + 4 others lower 
down, Reach For the Sky 1956, River Plate 1957, Kwai 58 Dunkirk 2nd, Bismarck! 1st 1960: ibid p.42. 
105 Ibid p.40. 
los Halliwells 1997 op.cit p.57. 
107 Sight & Sound Winter 1956-7, Spring 1957 cited in Ramsden op.cit p.41. 
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movies (entertainment) echoing In Which We Serve, such as Gift Horse, the 
adaptation of Cruel Sea (1953), and purely Naval epics like Plate (1956) and 
Bismarck! (1960) served to promote the interests of powerful Government 
lobbies. Armed forces assistance and help were vital to all productions, as 
they had been for interwar recreations and wartime features. 108 All Naval 
movies glorified the defeat of the enemy, not the U-boat. Only Corvette K225 
in wartime and Cruel Sea postwar described the peril, struggle and sacrifices 
made by small, underequipped and often pitifully few escorts. 109 Cruel Sea  
was a fictional adaptation, as was The Key, not a recreation of a famous event, 
and nor was it supported or endorsed by the Admiralty as much as other films 
had been or would be. A tight, psychological story focussing on the 
relationship of two officers offered much less in the way of recruiting 
enticement than general movies with lots of action, based on familiar, famous 
events seen from all ranks' perspective. All the Naval movies were depicting 
events which were directly or indirectly involved in the defence of shipping, 
though there were no movies or stories written from the point of view of 
merchant captains or seamen, or from the point of view of the Merchant Navy 
as a whole. 11° This was one key to their causes, development, and 
appearance. Germans were never employed as advisers. 111 Participants, 
including famous ones, were de rigeur for painstakingly recreating and 
synthesising famous events or examples. 112 
All British war films conformed to an "identikit" designated by Ken Gay: 
seniors stern, other ranks comic, stirring climax music with flag flying. 113 In 
general, James' comments held largely true. Class dominated narration, upper 
perspective illustrating the story with various lower ranks. The commander 
was a high, distant, stern figure to the rest of the crew, 114 using up most of the 
108 "Film clearly mattered for the armed forces.", ibid p.51. 
109 Except, conceivably, before its famous-event climax, Gift Horse. 
110 No such perspective existed to portray; even in the services it would exclude and marginalise some. 
Except Langsdorff's family, who were interviewed by Powell and Pressburger for River Plate: 
Ramsden op.cit p.50. 
112 Cameron for Waves, "Hooky" Bell and "Drunkie" Lewin for Plate, Esmond Knight for Bismarck!, most 
remarkably: a man blinded on the bridge of Prince of Wales by the guns of KM Prinz Eugen, playing 
himself in the same position 19 years later. Even Broome, of PQ-17 infamy, was an adviser to The Cruel 
Sea, as well as steering the corvette. So he should have been. Ramsden op.cit p.49-51. 
Though present in the 1937 MGM Mutiny on the Bounty: a US view of a wholly British event and 
descended Royal Navy traditions; Dening, 1992, p.351. Strangely, apart from writing and actors in 1984s 
The Bounty, there has never been a British Bounty movie, only 2 Australian [1917 and 1933] and 3 US 
[1937, 1962, and 1984]. 
114 Something seemingly odd but close to reality: captains are (or ought to be) always respectfully distant. 
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allotted dialogue from the bridge, quarterdeck, or a stack of carley rafts, 
"addressing the chaps, man to man." Others were reduced to playing ciphers of 
themselves, infrequently replying to the skipper, usually in a strangled regional 
accent. 115 There were no lower-deck' naval movies. Crews spent their wars 
in dank, perpetually-moving messdecks, awash with broken equipment and 
spilt meals, or at action stations in tin boxes. 116 Movies or films set entirely in 
such locations were not exciting. Class prevented a movie solely from the 
lower deck perspective where everything could be seen: a rating on the bridge, 
a rating in the radar office, a rating in the engine room, which is partly what 
made, in many ways, both Monsarratt's wartime nonfiction"' and his and 
especially MacLean's fiction so effective. 
Postwar naval films resembled wartime works. They remained tied to 
the same storylines, themes, shots and set-pieces. Coward's 1942 In Which  
thematically and textually guided, then straight-jacketed, all later naval films. 
Above Us the Waves resembled We Dive at Dawn, Run Silent Run Deep did 
Close Quarters. 115 Beyond aspect ratio and representations of actual 
personnel, much of Dambusters resembled Target For Tonight, a 1941 docu-
dramatic reconstruction of a bomber mission over Germany. The Sea Shall  
Not Have Them resembled For Those in Peril (about the Air-Sea Rescue 
Service), and in many ways even Cruel Sea resembled In Which's 
appearance, not plot, though this was as much due to author and Royal Navy 
traditions and routines as to screenwriter's limitations. This also made them 
ideal for -TV, and this is the medium most remember them from. 119 TV made no 
distinction: wartime and postwar films alike are of an older, stolider past where 
everything becomes quaintly remembered through its cinema portrayal. 
Women had only minimal roles without real responsibility, as in Cruel Sea or 
Bismarck. 12° America was ignored. 121 Canadians were absent after Corvette  
K225. 
115 James, C, op.cit p.143. 
116 Of the sort that so distressed Richard Attenborough in Coward's In Which We Serve. 
117 HM Corvette, East Coast Corvette, HM Frigate/Corvette Command . Monsarrat commented admiringly 
on signalmen, who could see everything, and study their officers, p.218 of the 1-volume 1945 edition 
Three Corvettes. 
lia Above Us... would be recycled in 1967 as Submarine X-1, with a fictionalised story and a new cast: 
see Ch.4. 119 They were black & white, no widescreen aspect ratio; hence ideal for TV. Ramsden op.cit p.37-8. 
120 Compared to wartime cinema roles, and actual service in WRNS and WAAF; Ramsden op.cit p.57. 
121 Ibid p.58. Though the real Ed Murrow was used as an introductory announcer in Bismarck!  
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Postwar movies replicated the tone and structure of Coward's In Which, 
if not his (Mountbatten's) emotional sensitivity. 122 Partly this is mere 
recreation, not cliched movie-maker's inventions. Ships did operate 
repetitively, following rules and regulations. Captains did, infrequently 'clear 
lower deck' and address the entire ships' company. Even Cruel Sea has this, 
in vestigial form, otherwise noticeably devoid of the cliched captain on a carley 
raft found in British movies of the time, military or otherwise. 123 Emotional 
sensitivity also played a part, from the clearly psychologically focussed 
screenplay of the novel of Cruel Sea to the more conventionally-stiff-upper-lip 
River Plate and Bismarck! The captain was always sensitive, emotionally 
movable, even quite feminine, without being effeminate. This was perhaps the 
most curious feature of wartime and postwar British cinema, the lack of 
distinctly American physical heroes. 
An early "conventional popular seafaring war adventure" piece was 1952's 
Gift Horse. 124 Starring Trevor Howard and Richard Attenborough, a disgraced 
officer reluctantly took command of an old US destroyer [one of the infamous 
'4-stackers'] given to Britain. This film played the usual role in forming or 
diverting mythology: recreating the famous incident. It described the life of 
HMS Campbeltown. 125 Equally unrepresentative was Rank's 1955 Above Us  
the Waves. 126 Here as elsewhere there was 'meeting the chaps man to man', 
all he had served over before, in the Pinewood tradition. There was one 
Aussie, among fewer strangled Cockney accents. Even the crews who attack 
Tirpitz were so anonymous that each X-Craft has its number on a bulkhead. 
This did not stop you forgetting who was who. The 'VC Factor' was 
concentrated on, as in Reach for the Sky, Plate, Bismarck!, and Dambusters,  
which limited films and constrained the entire industry and audience. 127 One 
critic said "thankfully there are no stereotypes of wife, mother, sister, grieving 
12 James, C, op.cit p.115. 
123 See for instance the Sellers comedies of 1945-60, such as The Ladvkillers and I'm All Right Jack, set 
in factories, etc, with 'leaders addressing the chaps...'. 
124 US title Glory At Sea; 1h4Omin, B&W, British Lion/Molton; G.Pitcher: Halliwells 1997 op.cit p.296. 
125  Modified to resemble a German torpedo-boat, loaded with explosives, and used in 1942 to destroy the 
gates of St.Nazaire's drydock; the only one large enough to repair the battleship Tirpitz, denying her a 
refuge for future Atlantic sorties. 
126 Prod. William Macquitty for London Independent Productions, Mills, Gregson, Sinden. Screenwriter 
Robins Estridge, Dir. Ralph Thomas, Music Art Benjamin. Adviser Cdr.Donald Cameron VC RN, the 
senior surviving officer. 
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relative. ,128 Genre resemblance and parallels between this postwar effort and 
wartime We Dive at Dawn could be easily drawn. 
The Cruel Sea stood alone in content, subject, and indeed quality. Star 
Jack Hawkins was instantly aware it "was unlike any film I have made before or 
since. From the outset I had the feeling it would either be a complete flop or a very 
great success, but either way it would never be mediocre." 129 He only took Cruel 
Sea as it "wasn't an 'Errol Flynn taking Burma singlehanded' role" and "avoided 
Plate for the same reason." 13° Almost alone, it was not a reconstruction of a 
famous event. Within its limited script, character, plot, setting, props and 
effects, it was effective as well as realistic. If it didn't quite measure up to the 
box office successes of its followers, and it was very successful, it did create 
the profit and audience which made them possible. It was however, not copied 
or remade. More conventional topics would be. 
It was one of the shining examples of 1950's British filmmaking, a 
triumph of the Ealing style, though less known than other, flashier, US efforts 
like Enemy Below. It also posited psychological stress and competition as the 
focus of the work, rather than sheer action, but the centrality of the sea and 
convoy experience, the rigours of life in the stormier North Atlantic, the unseen 
enemy, and the sea itself, made Cruel Sea by far the greater work. Civilians, 
women, the war on land - especially Liverpool - were never forgotten, for all 
they might not be what Coward had made of them. 131 A resemblance to In 
Which (where the entire life of HMS Torrin [Kelly] was told in flashback) was 
the flashbacks to the men's key scenes, as they died after the corvette was 
sunk. The sea was usually excluded from the shotdn order to make it as 
menacing and uncomfortable as possible, making it the rarely seen 'villain' 
Monsarrat intended. 132 The sea never had this quality in other features, the 
127 The 'VC' (Victoria Cross) factor, mentioned earlier, was/is the tendency to exclude or minimise 
portrayal of the general or common experience in favour of the famous incident or individual, the 'great 
man' theory of cinema portrayal. 
128 Ramsden op.cit p.57. 
• 129 Hawkins, Anything For A Quiet Life,  Elm Tree Books, London, 1973, p.101. 
130 Ibid. Oddly, almost all of the 9 pages in his 1973 autobiography dealing with Cruel Sea cover the 
production team, especially adviser Jackie Broome, who conned the ship from out of shot. Hawkins's 
own experiences background his reminiscing about Broome's style and influence. One clearly wonders if 
this had to do with Broome's prominence in 1970-72 due to the Irving libel case, in addition to the respect 
Hawkins openly felt for the 'real' men of the Battle. 
131 Part of Calder's accusation of sexism in the novel was the killing of women. In the film Julie Hallam 
[played by Virginia McKenna], theist Lieutenant's Woman" was not killed and married him. 
144 Deighton, L, "Sand & Sea" in Sight & Sound, vol.5 no.1, Jan. 1995, p.33. 
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sunny blue South Atlantic in River Plate, or the greyer, rougher, but neutral 
inconsequential North Atlantic in Bismarck, unlike actual memories of the 
ocean. Even when war-winning technology, here ASDIC and radar, had to be 
the centre, it was old less-effective depthcharges rolled off the stern, not the 
later, far more effective ahead-thrown weapons, that sank U-Boats. 133 Cruel 
Sea's Battle lacked other ships helping hunt, and all mention of Coastal 
Command, with whom so much cooperation and cover occurred, and with 
whom so many U-Boats were destroyed. 
Separate from recreations of combat was a more confused effort, The 
Key. Adapted from a long novel, this suffered from rearrangement to fit 
cinema's different constraints. The novel was "about tugboat captains passing 
between them the key to an apartment and the girl who goes with it." 134 The novel 
focussed on their lives in and out of the Battle. The film seemed more intent 
on exploring the apartment and the 'girl' as the men, perhaps a better fate for a 
script, but less good for Battle myth, or the confused state it left the cast and 
audience in. Despite Trevor Howard, William Holden and Sofia Loren, it still 
ended up a 
"rather foolish symbolic melodrama which never makes its purpose clear, 
but along the way provides fragments of love story, chunks of the supernatural 
[?], and dollops of war action, rather languidly assembled with great technical 
competence but little real feeling. Talent occasionally shows through." 135 
Representation, as with Private Ryan, provided an unexpected 'reality': this 
was how the Battle looked to its participants: a confused jumble of danger and 
relief, sex and combat (against the elements or enemy), with no real meaning 
or sense; no clear, regular, settled, comprehensible tale. If this was the 
maker's intention it succeeded remarkably. The muddled story and lack of 
stereotype were not what audiences or critics were looking for, marring 
acceptance, not cinematography. Cruel Sea opened the gates to profitable 
naval action movies, not small-scale, thoughtful psyche-pieces without any 
glory, battles, or recruitment-enhancing spectacle. 136 
133 I.e. Hedgehog and Squid. See the Technical Terms list folowing the contents for details. Even the 
second, advanced ship in Cruel Sea was portrayed using stern depthcharges, not Squid. 
134 Halliwells 1997 op.cit p.407. 
135 Ibid. 2h14m, b&w. 
136 Peacetime movies such as Sea Fury [1958] were based upon it, this involving feuding salvage tug 
captains off Spain. 
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Though a British novel, Enemy Below was largely based on separate 
classic incidents from US Navy official history. 137 It became remembered as a 
contest between two non-obsessional personalities (contrasting Moby Dick or 
Caine Mutiny, other classic American sea tales), not a US Navy Battle feature. 
It also became remembered for depicting the 'good German' (even if he was a 
submariner), a non-Nazi in the least-Nazi service, whose criticism of leaders 
and war prefigured Buchheim's commander in Das Boot. The U-boats 
preferred targets, shipping, were unseen and irrelevant. 138 He was not a 
recognisable German doing historical things. Good, realistic Atlantic cinema 
was defined by the weather: spoiled meals and spilled cocoa. In American 
movies, it was so mild the worst the men faced was a squall which prevented 
sleeping on deck in Equatorial heat. No-one ever even spilt a drink. The 
ocean was irrelevant as it wasn't in wartime or the best histories, novels, and 
movies. The Battle became irrelevant too. The story was fictional and highly 
improbable, convoys couldn't be further from the rationale, though the original 
novel involved a British destroyer further north. 139 
Rayner's novel deliberately explored what couldn't happen: plot and 
theme subjugating fact, plausibility, and experiences. It might be good fiction, 
in developing characters and the plot, but was as bad for Battle myths as 
British combat films. The basic idea, structure, and much of the dialogue were 
lifted to the movie, the captain continually second guessing his not too 
stereotypically rigid thinking German opponent. The whole situation though 
unlikely was based on fact. There was however no movie of USS Kearney, the 
first US escort to be fired on by a U-boat, nor USS Reuben James, the first US 
escort sunk, any more than there was a movie of "Vian s real, solid, successes" 
instead of Mountbatten's "famously glorious disasters". 14° Nor were any key US 
Navy antisubmarine successes of the last two years of the war filmed. 
Attention was elsewhere. 
137 Between USS Bone and two U-Boats; and USS Buckley and U-66; Hoyt, E, The U-Boat Wars, Arbor 
House, NY, 1984, p.268. 
138  Which would make him a less admirable adversary. 
139 Rayner also wrote a very good campaign history of the Battle of the Atlantic, a little earlier than Enemy 
Below. 
Howarth,  "Vian" in Howarth op.cit, p.498. Ironically in Coward's In Which We Serve the captain reads 
a newspaper headline "400 saved from Hell Ship", Vian's 'very real success' releasing seamen held on 
the German supply-ship Altmark, in February 1940, when Mountbatten was ashore wishing for action. 
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The other US Atlantic movie was less conventional and more 
interesting. Paramount's 1960 production of deLaurentiis's Under Ten Flags, 
portrayed the life and death of a disguised German auxiliary cruiser menacing 
British shipping. 141 This resembled, or reassembled, in addition to reversing 
the plot of, wartime films. 142 It was also more interesting because it had "too 
many allegiances": balancing portrayal of its competing sides the way Enemy  
Below had. 143 Here audiences were invited to watch the struggle between US 
and German views, opponents now allies, them and us, without Enemy  
Below's relative skill. It was closer to Das Boot in how it made us take on the 
life of the other, defeated, enemy. Unlike the popular, successful and 
controversial Germany-first oriented Das Boot it was intended for US 
audiences. What they thought remains a mystery. Critics considered it 
muddled. Perhaps it attempted too much, or was already dated. Naval films 
not set in the Pacific had less chance of success and acceptance. 144 We also 
forget decades later these were commercial; made for the moment, not lasting 
success. Unlike quality drama, which can be endlessly restaged, reinterpreted 
and remade, released popular movies had a short life before video. In 1958 
cinema still competed with TV, it had not yet accepted that TV would be film's 
eternal afterlife. 
German cinema made two more U-Boat works, one on Prien, as the 
most relevant of U-Boat heroes: more recent than more famous Great War 
aces, and safely dead, unlike Kretschmer, Cremer, Topp. 145 Topp was 
reduced to historical adviser and mildly-enthusiastic supporter of filming the 
novel Sharks and Little Fish [1957]. For Topp this was one of many stages 
between participant and fully separate dissident countermythical thinker, finally 
able to come to terms with the past in 1991, when his autobiography was 
published, not without controversy. 146 Sharks and Little Fish uncritically laid 
out the participant's myth then and now. U-Boat men were solid, dutiful, 
141 1h32; B&W; Halliwell's 1997 op.cit p.787. 
142 Such as Convoy, Merchant Seamen, Atlantic Convoy. 
143 Halliwells 1997, op.cit, p787. 
144 Manvell, op.cit p.309. It will be interesting to ascertain eventually which is more profitable, & which 
more remembered & admired: Saving Private Ryan or The Thin Red Line. The latter did not receive any 
Oscars. 
145 Hadley op.cit p.119-21. 
146 Topp, E, The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander, Praeger, Westport, Conn, 1992, p.166; Hadley's 
discussion of Topp's countermythology pp.180-4, 193-4, is strangely muted compared to his earlier 
analysis. 
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dedicated sacrificial victims, obeying orders, neither heroes nor criminals. 
Hitler, not DOnitz, sent them to their deaths. 147 U-47, Kaleu Prien, the following 
year, was the opposite: critical, remythical, Left-wing. It was the antithesis both 
of participant myth and actual events. Here Prien changed from war hero to 
remorseful dissident, after twice meeting a thinly-veiled copy of Niemoller, and 
seeing the reality of Hitler's antisemitic ideology. Prien's Jewish relations [I] 
were killed; the Niemoller-clone incarcerated for his views. Prien was rescued 
by a ship when his U-Boat was sunk but another U-Boat sank the freighter, 
before being itself sunk. Nothing further from reality could be made, and this 
derided, controversial film, despite its appeal to opposition views, made no 
headway against mythology. 148 
War films "confirmed as well as explained why we won." Nostalgia for 
passed greatness was already visible in the 1950s: Britain felt a very tired 
nation. 149 Technical effectiveness (i.e British knowhow winning the war: the 
'Bouncing Bomb' and radar), was not proved with Battle technologies. 150 Even 
radar got less than its due: Battle of Britain movies concentrated on the 
Spitfire, not the WAAF hunched over a scope, plotting table or radio without 
whom all fighter pilots were helpless. Despite the decline of literary tradition, 
and the rise to dominance of audiovisual media, cinema audiences didn't 
during the war or after demand more of their movies or makers. 151 They got 
what they wanted: a safe, if not always comfortable, limited representation of 
the war. The war became something on a poster, in a trailer, on the screen, 
with definite limits: beginning, ending, something the audience chose to see, 
unlike the real thing; something they went into and came out of. Perhaps 
moved or shocked, more often excited, enthralled or just entertained: but came 
out of: again, like the real thing. Limits, assurance, certainty: with factual, 
semi-documentary features they could even be sure which characters would 
147 Hadley op.cit pp.117-8. 
148 Ibid p.119-22. 
149 Ramsden op.cit p.59. 
15') Liberty ships, Escort carriers, Hedgehog, Squid or Leigh-Light. 
151  Cinema audiences vote with their wallets. They could have sanctioned against such poor movies, and 
indicated by low profits, what they wanted. Combat films were more successful than more artistic 
representations like The Key, so they were made instead. Audiences might have demanded more things 
like Cruel Sea, but instead supported Plate. Dambusters and so forth. Who leads trends and who 
reacts to them is the complex obvious problem. Producers would say they follow, not determine, public 
opinion. 
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live, thus whom to feel for and be involved with, before they went i11. 152 What 
was expected was known, like a modern horror movie. All the tricks and traits 
are used, in a certain way, to frighten very briefly under very contrived and 
controlled conditions. You are controlled and can control, the war you are 
experiencing, and you are not likely to be shocked, or disappointed, unless it is 
radically different from the norm, and then it is the departure, not the content, 
that causes disappointment. British commercial war film gave the public what 
they wanted to see, how they wanted, associated with war in very definite and 
reassuring ways. 
These films did penetrate the national consciousness to some extent, 
though success was commercial, not critical or enduring. 153 Penetration was 
as ephemeral as any success in the pre-video and mass-TV age. 154 If Atlantic 
or naval movies did capture and profit from public attention, they were not 
remembered as fondly, permanently, as The Dambusters was, for all that the 
Goons' Cruel Sea parodies (1954) were known in their time. Several episodes 
also contained direct references to Victory at Sea, with its catchphrase "And 
Now...", to Dunkirk and the invasion fears of 1940-41. 155 One episode 
continued with a troop convoy to Algiers, and a mined ship sinking while 
"Bloodnok and Seagoon floundered in The Cruel Sea... .forty days they drifted in an 
open boat." 156 These like many other representations, helped people 
remember the war in certain ways and not in others. In 1954 rationing had just 
ended, there were still vessels being sunk by drifting mines at sea, and bombs 
discovered regularly ashore. The war, if not the Battle, was still in, or on, 
everyone's mind. The public didn't reflect on the Battle, or Bismarck, however, 
quite the way Dambusters or Reach For the Sky made them reflect on the 
Dambuster's mission or the Battle of Britain, later, when memories became 
blended with cinematic portrayal via TV. Naval warfare movies were not 
realistic, and only connected to really famous events for ex-participants. Many 
more people had been through the Blitz, or could feel that they had. 
152 Manvell op.cit p.241. 
153 Penetration of the 'national consciousness' is defined by the number of people who had seen or were 
aware of such representations, and how many people are aware of them today, by comparison. 
154 Once films finished their run, they were largely forgotten, except by participants et al. There was no 
way for them to re-enter the public mind, until they were run on TV years later, and later made available 
on video. 
155 "The Dreaded Batter-Pudding Hurler of Bexhill-on-Sea", BBC radio, season 5 number 3, first 
, broadcast 12-10-1954. 
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Penetration of culture depended on fame as well as representations. The 
Battle wasn't famous or eventful enough to lodge in the mind as effectively as 
more mainstream films, no matter how profitable or well-known Cruel Sea was. 
Reach for the Sky and Dambusters followed it and overtook its fame. 
Wartime and postwar features removed or reduced almost totally the 
scope of documentary. About prominent events, postwar war features covered 
much the same territory as wartime documentary, leaving little the public was 
interested in. They often used a semi-documentary style as well as combat 
footage and perspectives, black and white stock, and the same aspect ratio. 
They also seemed to leave little for documentary makers to expose and 
expound, though there were thousands of stories needing telling. The British 
Merchant Navy's decline was an excellent subject, especially as the 1950s 
progressed, with the wholesale changes wrought by containerisation, 
automation, the growth of foreign shipping fleets and more importantly of 
shipbuilding, with consequent dramatic permanent and traumatic change for 
the Merchant Navy, its life, and that of ports and shipyards and the 
communities they had supported for decades or centuries. 157 
The Immediate Postwar Era had limited documentary representation of 
the Battle. In comparison to fiction and even popular history, the Battle was 
apparently little explored, and was covered early, mythically, from a US 
standpoint little changed from wartime propaganda. Perhaps no-one now 
could discover, whether there were other documentaries, without vast research 
into decades of TV programmes. TV companies have not had the time or 
money to conduct such research themselves, this is a task for future 
researchers in the countries involved. 158 There were no German 
documentaries before 1985, as far as Hadley, or the Cuxhaven U-Boat 
Archives could ascertain. 159 
1952 saw the 25-episode NBC series Victory at Sea. It was later 
regarded as a classic, perhaps because no-one, possibly excepting Sea War, 
attempted another. This was largely due to Graves' unrelenting, catch- 
156 Ibid. 
157 Described at length in Lane, T, Grey Dawn Breaking, Manchester University Press, 1986. 
158 BBC email reply, 1998. 
135 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 3: THE CRUEL PEACE 
phrased narration of semi-propagandist wartime material, dramatic description 
of mythical content, and Rodger's memorable music. It arguably covered the 
subject reasonably for its times, using vast amounts of wartime footage, some 
authentic, to describe all the fighting, and most of the support and logistics. 
The Battle was illustrated in four episodes, its vital role underneath the other 
action in the West in seven. Necessarily and naturally, for a series fully 
supported endorsed and assisted by the US Navy, it had an American 
perspective. Most surprising was the series' beginning in 1939, not 1941, 
something few American representations would attempt later, although the 
Battle is a less partisan subject than much war writing. Perhaps authors feel 
the sea is common to all, which makes the perspectives less blinkered. 
Episode one, the beginning of the war, pointed out the vital US 
contributions of shipping, and later escort, long before Pearl Harbor, as well as 
the shock and shift of perspective between peace and war, of being driven to 
this unpleasant duty. It illustrated the Atlantic Charter, Lend-Lease, the 
bending of neutrality laws, and Iceland's occupation. Shipbuilding and war 
construction were included, as were Allies: Canadians, British, Brazilians. 
Exactly how the U-Boat was beaten was lost. There was abundant footage of 
depthcharges being dropped, but nothing of the actual process of search, 
contact, chase, attack, or evidence of sinking. Episode three returned to the 
Battle, for the vital period of US belligerent neutrality, the coming of Drumbeat's 
mythologised slaughter on the US East Coast, remedied with convoys, training, 
and construction. Some things were out of context: December 1939's Battle of 
the River Plate was in Episode 10, South Atlantic. More of this episode dealt 
with classic ship actions and raider operations than long-range U-boats. 
Surface raiders were a threat, and tied down warships needed elsewhere, but 
U-Boats were the greater danger. 
Episode 11, the Arctic, began with weather-watching and surveillance in 
Alaska. It dwelt almost as much on very limited commando operations off 
Norway and in the Aleutians as the Kola run, never mentioning US supplies via 
Vladivostok. It underplayed US escorts and freighters, focussing excessively 
159 Hadley, op.cit, p.232-3. 
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on the surface threat and air raids. 16° It did not distinguish clearly between US 
and British shipping and supplies, Allied status after 1941, when or why the 
Arctic convoys began, nor the almost total British escort presence. Episode 
15's D-Day illustrated US shipping, and shore bombardment in support of the 
landings, but not the extensive Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy anti-
submarine operations. How U-boats were driven from the channel was not 
told. 
Episode 16's mid-1943 climax was regrettably only the US Central 
Atlantic efforts, not the British escort and aircraft triumph further North. U-boat 
construction, propaganda, and Donitz's leadership were noted, the growing 
ring of airbases - Bermuda, Newfoundland, Iceland, Britain and (out of context, 
too early) the Acores. The Black Gap remained. Unidentified Royal Air Force 
Biscay anti-submarine warfare patrols were shown. Strategic bombing of 
shipyards and railways, the keys to dispersed U-Boat construction, were 
detailed, as were US efforts, the escort carrier [without mentioning its British ; 
origin], training and deployment. The 10 T" Fleet's overall US Navy anti-- 
submarine warfare control was related. The rest of the episode described 
technologies - SONAR, radar, HF/DF - and their integration into escort-carrier-
centred hunter-killer groups, by the operations of USS Guadalcanal, and 
capture of U-505. This at least, gave some indication of how anti-submarine 
warfare vessels and aircraft actually operated. The best-publicised incident 
thinly described the general victory over the U-Boat. General and American 
mythology were clearly and persuasively put. If nothing else they countered 
later American arguments about the lower significance of the Atlantic. 
The Immediate Postwar Era was the era of definition and description. It 
laid out the causes, progress and conclusion of the Battle, setting out its myths 
and portrayals, depending on author and audience. Official histories kept clear 
of hyperbole and lurid description, but continued static modes of 
representation. Popular histories began the specific and all-encompassing 
coverage of the campaign which never lessened. The audience neither shrank 
nor grew significantly in size, diversity, or sophistication. Novelists produced 
160 Footage shot during PQ-17, when there was a US naval presence? 
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almost all the classic texts of the genre, and many commercial successes. 
The classic novels endured, if not generally known beyond their audience. 
They did more to start and secure novelist's careers than evolve portrayal. 
Cinematic adaptation followed, continuing rather than developing another 
medium, in representation. Cinema used the Battle peripherally, largely in 
Britain, for profit, giving little in return. Documentary appeared in the new TV 
medium, but for all its good beginnings in scene-setting, was only a few 
episode's view of a very wide and complicated campaign, from a single 
service's standpoint. Victory at Sea's true impact was its permanence in the 
mind, the cultural penetration rarely paralleled later. The Battle was mundane 
and bypassed, as the world moved beyond remembrance. When change 
eventually came it would be distortion and diversion, not improvement. 
Chapter Four illustrates the years between repetitive activity and distorting 
change. 
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HISTORY, FICTION, CINEMA AND DOCUMENTARY, 1960-74 
• This is a novel, but not a work of fiction. The events recounted here were witnessed by the author." 
Lothar-GOnter Buchheim, Das Boot. 
The end of cinema features and the steady release of novels and 
popular secondary histories separated the Immediate Postwar Era from the 
Intermediate Period. There was a great deal of social change during the 
1960's, and it was in many ways like the 1980's, a forward-looking, optimistic 
decade.' Portrayal of the Battle evolved little after the 1950's. There were no 
more official histories, and fewer personal accounts. Secondary works 
emerged, limited by restrictions on source material, and technical books began 
a never-slackening stream. The era of classics was over, the concentration 
was on hoped-for success: another HMS Ulysses, another Cruel Sea. Cinema 
of the Battle was limited to a single peripheral story, adapted from a novel. 
The decline of British cinema meant there was less productive space for 
Second World War naval films, while America preferred the Pacific. Towards 
the end of this era infamous convoy PQ-17 became a cause celebre when 
straying professional historian David Irving, showing the topical divergence 
which would guide the rest of his career, published a controversial libel of 
many participants. He lost the case, while the interest, opinions and ideas 
generated by the book and its controversy took on a life of their own. The 
author can remember as a child ex-servicemen and seamen arguing heatedly 
at social gatherings about who was to blame how much and why. P0-17 did 
not end the era: the case did not provoke a new round of works or responses. 
Personal, biographical and general historical works emerged steadily 
after 1960, though not like the flood of stories following the war. These hardly 
changed in content or form before the middle of the 1970s. In many ways 
these types are still dominant, though they are more aware of their limitations. 
Save for a trickle dealing with the Arctic convoys, which could hardly ignore the 
merchantmen in their midst, or the easy topic of the slaughter of the ships of 
PQ-17, almost all narrated naval operations, and excluded the Merchant Navy 
and Royal Air Force. Early in the 1945-60 era there were a fair number of 
Merchant Navy works, though by journalists and writers, or senior Trade and 
company figures and captains, not seamen. 2 Technical histories began to 
Hobsbawm, 1995 op.cit, p.324-34 passim. 
2 See the bibliography for details. 
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appear. They were at first limited to technical data, not exhaustive 
presentations of equipment. They never attempted to examine the relationship 
of technology to the operating personnel. As small, thin, Observers-style  
volumes, they were eventually comprehensive, but initially intended to fit the 
overcoat pocket, in keeping with the publisher's format for such works, like a 
birdwatchers handbook. 3 There was no Battle-watching to be done, only a few 
museums to visit, and monuments and galleries to peruse. 4 Until the middle 
1950s there were sad 'trots' of reserved or mothballed escorts in many ports, 
but these yielded to the scrapyard cutting-torch long before little books of 
details were written for the specialist. 5 
Fiction in the Intermediate Period was prolific and more interesting. 
Seamen began to write their own novels, previously the province of ex-
servicemen, imagining things from within the Royal Navy. There were no 
classics save 1967's minor An Operational Necessity, until Das Boot ended the 
era as clearly as the 30-Year Rule and Ultra divided historical phases. 
German works still focussed on the U-Boat and remained separate from Allied, 
until the novel which ended the era: Das Boot; the first major German Battle 
fiction to be translated and noted beyond Germany. In keeping with the 
German focus, it was about the U-Boat, not the Battle, but it was a change 
from German mainstream work. There were no developments, only imitations 
and replicas. Contemporary topics overshadowed Second World War and 
Battle fiction in the 1960s and early 1970s. Television rose to dominate other 
media, and to be the leading edge of what experimentation and innovation 
there was in popular culture. 
Cinema turned gradually away from war in the 1960s, though the US 
made more combat films than in the 1950s. 6 British war films, combat or other 
wise, declined as cinema evolved into new subjects with new directors. Only 
three dealt with the Battle in any form; British film never would again. In 1971 
3 Observer's Guides, published by Warne, began with hobby-topics that could be observed: birds, 
flowers, aircraft, etc, before branching out into other technical and graphic subjects of minority interest. 
This was before the present era of conservation and 'heritage'; most wartime hardware and relics had 
simply been thrown away, replaced by 'new' modern things: Smith, P, Destroyer Leader: the story of 
HMS Faulknor, William Kimber, London, 1968, p.174. 
Ireland, op.cit p.133. Indeed the entire world had to be trawled for flightworthy Lancaster bombers for 
The Dambusters (1954) and for a Flower-class corvette for The Cruel Sea 1953. 
28 major films 1960-71:12 UK, 18 US. Between 1952-60 UK: 38, US: 26; Manvell op.cit. p.310-21. 
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a British-American cooperative produced Murphy's War, a very peripheral story 
based on a novel with themes and plot very divorced from the Battle as 
classically received or otherwise. The innovation and experimentation 
mentioned did not apply to TV documentary about the Second World War in 
general or the Battle in particular. Innovation drove modern cinema and 
music, not the memory and exploration of past conflicts. In 1960 an unknown 
British maker transmitted Sea War. 7 As part of the excellent early 1970s 
series World At War, Thames TV made "Wolfpack": still the most effective 
single documentary on the Battle, though it ended with 1943, not 1945. It had 
the most perceptive interviews of participants, description and technology, if it 
still supported mythology: 'seamen were slaughtered', `U-Boats few', 'escorts 
even fewer', 'the US left its lights on', 'it was a close run thing.' The mundanity 
and routine nature of much of the Battle was lost in a blaze of combat and 
statistics. Existing impressions were recapitulated. 
General works such as Schofield's British Sea Power in the 20'  
Century, 1967, attempted to analyse its decline. Warner's Great Sea Battles, 
1968, merely illustrated famous events. Calvocoressi's massive Total War 
was a solid early attempt at general history. Much of Smith's 1996 viewpoint 
was from Calvocoressi. 8 The traumas of wartime British shipping were due to 
the interwar collapse of shipbuilding, protectionism, lack of shipping, losses, 
and dependence on imports, US shipbuilding, and weapons. 9 Almost alone of 
writers about sea-warfare Calvocoressi put conventional sea battles in their 
proper place: last, behind convoy actions and trade defence, behind shipping 
and the rationing situation. 19 He did not relate the climax of 1943, though he 
described earlier the problems of trade defence and anti-submarine warfare. 
The Arctic convoys were overemphasised compared to the Atlantic, though he 
avoided making PQ-17 the only example. Perhaps he was mindful of the 
contemporary legal case over Irving's work. The 1973 World At War chapter 
on the Atlantic began, "one reason Britain was not starved and forced to surrender 
was the extraordinary tenacity of seamen", presenting the very real, if not always 
7 Neither the BBC nor ITN found any details, though it was transmitted in mid-1960, cited in Irving, D, The 
Destruction of Convoy PQ-/ 7, 2 ND Edn, William Kimber, London, 1980, p.389; M.Lumsden, pers.comm, 
19.12.98. 
8 Calvocoressi op.cit, pp.437-8. 
See Ch.6 "1989-99". 
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balanced, presentation of loss statistics. 11 This was followed by a heavily 
emotive, mythic account of a sinking and lifeboat voyage, before cold dry 
technical exposition of strategy, without any other experiences - escorts, U-
Boats. 12 
The first secondary text (based on other books on the Battle), 
Woodrooffe's Battle of the Atlantic, 1965, attempted general campaign history 
without primary sources. He concentrated from the point of view of the 
escorts, on the usual basic famous events: Spee, the Fall of France, Condors, 
Bismarck, the 'slaughter' on the US Coast, key convoys SC-7/HX-79, HG -76, SC-
94, SC-121, ending with the climactic convoy ONS-5 in the Atlantic. Included 
were Biscay offensives, excluded were Coastal Command and the Royal 
Canadian Navy - though it did mention 50% of escort forces were Canadian. 
This, due to an Royal Canadian Navy officer's help mentioned in the foreword, 
was almost the only reference in histories to the Royal Canadian Navy before 
the late 1970s, other than Maclntyre's "radical pOlemic". 13 Woodroffe was clear, 
consise, unsentimental, but hindsight-driven, collecting earlier misconceptions, 
as if this reflected the attitude of the time, undermining perceptions of the 
seriousness of the situation. The work ended with the climax of 1943, as did 
Maclntyre's 1961 Battle of the Atlantic, [due to space limitations in a serial 
volume], which was not the end of the campaign. Allen's Battle of the Atlantic, 
1973, attempted the same coverage just before more primary sources were 
made available. Dupuy's Naval War in the West: The Raiders,  1964, 
concentrated on German regular and auxiliary warships for junior readers. The 
following year his Naval War in the West: the Wolfpacks, completed coverage, 
as part of a series dealing with the entire war at sea, on land and in the air. 
Incidental history was now possible, with Seth's 1962 Fiercest Battle:  
ONS-5 illustrating the key convoy when the U-Boat was clearly routed. It was 
wholly mythical, concentrating on a single famous convoy. Much of the book 
10 Significantly Grove & Ireland's Janes War at Sea: 1898-1997 [Harper-Collins, NY, 1997] is a more 
recent work operating on the same principles, but with updated perspectives. 
11 Arnold-Forster, M, The World At War, (Revised Edition), Methuen, London, 1989, p.85. 
12 !bid, pp.85-88. 
13 Other than Easton's excellent 1966 memoir 50 North. The Royal Canadian Navy turned its back on 
the vital unglamorous Battle in favour of more famous exploits, the poorer cousin of the other services, 
themselves overshadowed by the Royal Navy and US Navy. Milner, 1994 op.cit, p.259; see Ch.3: "1945- 
60", p.100 and Note 51. 
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consisted of attacks by or on U-Boats, and experiences on sinking ships. The 
rest was scene-setting and background to the convoy from both Wars. 14 
Gretton's Convoy Escort Commander, 1964 and Crisis Convoy, 1974 (the 
latter pre-Ultra) were less mythic. They gave carefully restrained accounts 
from the senior officer's perspective. West's Lifeboat Number Seven, 1960 
related now largely-silenced Merchant Navy survival tales from a famous liner 
sinking. Brown and Meehan's Scapa Flow, 1968, was another early oral 
history, of the great naval base in two world wars. As curious as Prien's 
'fictionalised' ghostwritten autobiography 15, Poolman, populist doyen of 
incidental books, finding himself unable to write a brief history of all Catapult-
Aircraft Merchantships, in 1960 wrote a novel as a history, The Giant Killers. 
"I imagined a typical pilot of the Merchant Shipping Fighter Unit, and I have 
tried to encompass and symbolise the whole story of the unit, their difficulties, 
dangers, fears.. .great courage and skill as a tribute to them." 16 
No more telling description of mythologisation could be wished for - by the 
author, not a critic or commentator. Poo!man had to novelise in order to 
reduce the subject, to reimagine it for the reader. The work seemed a novel, 
but was still, in most senses a history, in that it described actual events. Here 
there were no named individuals, and nor much analysis, only narrative, which 
is where this 'history' fell down. Ironically he managed that history, The 
Catafighters, in 1970. 
The only change during the mid-1960s was the growth of technical 
histories, increasingly-comprehensive 'how it worked' books for adult males, 
who wanted to know (and be able to identify, like trainspotters) each tiny 
variation between one corvette and her sisters, between one model of Bofors 
and the next. These books often also contained much not written elsewhere, 
but rarely valuable analysis of systems, for all the fascinating detail and focus. 
They did not, for instance, analyse the interfaces between technologies and 
people, and their consequences for the Battle, nor for perceptions and 
perspectives on naval warfare. No shift in perception underlying the change to 
technological warfare from earlier forms, or from traditional surface fights to 
14 Seth, R, Fiercest Battle: ONS-5 Norton, NY, 1962: Attacks pp.72, 84, 117-21, 96-8, 105, 108, 125-6, 
133-5, 144-5, 148-55, 158-62, 165, 167-9, 170-85, 187-9 shipping sinkinqs pp.99-101, 126-32, 136-42, 
145-7, 149-55, 165-4; SC-130's U-Boat sinkinqs 197-201; no ships lost. 
15 Prien, G, I Sank the Royal Oak (1940) Grays Inn Press, London, 1954; in Ch.3: "1945-60" of this 
thesis. 
16 Footman, K, The Giant Killers, William Kimber and Sons, London, 1960, preface, p.7. 
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anti-submarine warfare, was even hinted at. New types of presentation of sea 
warfare were not used either. "Early wartime reports were distinctly traditional, 
easily explained in familiar language. By 1943-4, anti-submarine warfare was hunting 
submerged targets with technical jargon, no longer nautical narrative, which kept 
historians away." 17 Technical histories were eventually available of every class 
of ship and aircraft, every type of weapon, individual vessels and weapons, 
from all sides; detailing every ship or U-boat loss, every U-boat sunk by the 
Royal Air Force during the campaign, when lost, by whom, and how, including 
many previously unpublished photographs. 18 
Why this genre (for the general reader, not the serious researcher, 
academic, or industry professional) became popular and profitable was never 
asked. The material was very gendered, aimed at the same male audiences 
that were interested cars and motorbikes. Youths and men were interested in 
description of technology compared to narrative of operations, but it is 
surprising how much of the market has been taken by such representations. 19 
Cold-War politics led to an interest in nuclear weapons information, in addition 
to existing interests in technology. 20 These were bolstered by limited access to 
the latest secrets, and raised awareness (due to calls for arms limitation and 
disarmament), and the subsequent publication of comparative arsenals. With 
Second World War technologies and operations becoming declassified, there 
was a convergence of interest with availability, as there was previously with 
1950's war stories and cinema. 21 
Technical histories thus abounded. Smith's Destroyer Leader: the story 
of HMS Faulknor, Maclntyre's Famous Fighting Ships, 196822 , and Hough's 
Fighting Ships, 1969, stood out, being as much narrative as technical 
description. Others remained merely details and data. 23 Preston and Raven's 
17 Milner 1985 op.cit, pp.xiv-xv and 278-9. 
18 The introduction of new cheap offset reproduction technology from 1968 made greater photographic 
quality and diversity much more affordable. 
Their market dominance is indicated by the amount of shelving within subject areas taken up by 
technical volumes in bookshops, libraries, and in catalogues. Today almost all representations are either 
technical or personal accounts. 
20 Audio, domestic, automotive, then space race technology, information on all of which were freely 
available. Later, it would be computers. 
21 The "Now it can be told" phase of war memoirs and movies. Howard 1983, op.cit, p.30-31. 
22 Itself mythical: 75% of its ships were Second World War capital ships, the rest minor vessels from 
sailing-era actions. 
23 Manning's British Destroyer, 1961, March's British Destroyers, 1966, Landstrom's Ship 1961, 
Archibald's Metal Fighting Ship in The Royal Navy 1860-1970, 1971, Thornton's Warships 1860-1970, 
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Flower Class Corvettes, 1973, rose above these, their content showed the 
technology through the story: showing, not telling. Sawyer and Mitchell's 
Liberty Ships, 1970 and Victory Ships and Tankers, 1974 began a long series 
of works of pure details, relating the design, construction and fates, without 
narrative, of these vessels. Mallmann Showell's U-boats Under the Swastika, 
1973 was a German equivalent, though even it managed more than bare 
technical description. Brown's Carrier Operations In WW-II, 1974 limited itself 
to describing actions. There were now enough books and interest for 
Manwaring's A Bibliography of British Naval History, 1970 and Albion's Naval 
and Maritime History: An Annotated Bibliography,  1973. By comparison, 
McLachlan's Room 39: Naval Intelligence In Action 1939-45,  1968 related the 
operational experiences of the Admiralty's radio-intelligence unit, illustrating 
much material later works ignored in favour of the glamour of Ultra. More 
peripherally, Operational Research In WW2 [1947] was published unmodified 
in 1973, declassified, clearly intended to capitalise on the 1970's war book 
boom, even then only for the serious student of science, not the general public. 
Focussing on O.R. principles, myth was as absent as narrative. It left 
'unspoken how much Coastal Command needed Operational Research to 
improve its effectiveness. 
The first German technical history, Herzog's, limited by access to 
sources (still held in Britain) and as devoid of narrative and analysis as later 
Western works, appeared in 1959 24 , with more analytical work from 1966, as 
well as photo-essays, from Rossler and Rohwer, from 1966. 25 Gasaway's Grey 
Wolf, Grey Sea, 1972, was an abberation. She wrote an 'Allied' account from 
German sources of U-124. It had German myths of service and sacrifice, 
Merchant Navy myths of slaughter, and Royal Navy myths of overcoming 
operational and technical impotence. Also standing alone, Millington-Drake's 
Drama of the Graf Spee: A Documentary Anthology 1914-64,  1964, gave a 
whole history of the South Atlantic fights, from 1914's epic combat, 26 through 
1939's battle to its filming in 1956. Southall's Seventeen Seconds, 1973, 
1973, Lenton's Warships of WW-II, 1964, German Submarines, 1965, German Surface Warships, 1966, 
Lenton and Colledge's Warships of WW-II, Parkes's British Battleships, Warrior to Vanq_uard, 1970, 
Taylor's German Warships of WW-II, 1969, Kurti's Battleships and Battlecruisers and Fitzsimmons's 
Warships of \AAN-II, 1973. 
24 Hadley 1995 op.cit 125. 
25  [bid p.137. 
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reprinted early Coastal Command experiences, while Fly West, 1974, narrated 
Coastal Command myths effectively for children: long hours, mechanical 
troubles, the dangers from U-Boats and aircraft, the unending tension. Half of 
the myth was excluded, the contrast of life carousing and relaxing ashore, in 
comparison to operations. 27 
All arctic convoy books began with Hitler's attack on the USSR. From 
1955's Ordeal Below Zero to Convoy! Action In Arctic Waters published in 
1994, sweeping paragraphs related Hitler's promises being dust, and his 
legions rolling forward over an unsuspecting ally. This was a blindness to 
other interpretations, an enforcement of genre or formula. 28 Schofield's 
Russian Convoys, 1964 was a member of the same serial as Maclntyre's 1961 
Battle. A sturdy, less mythic work than Kola Run, not a classic, nor as well 
written, it too was unable to answer questions about PQ-17. 29 Lund and 
Ludlam's P0-17: Convoy to Hell: the Survivors Story, 1968, related, without 
accusation, mythical experiences, moving beyond narration into melodramatic 
horror. Their 1973 Night of the U-Boats, gave the same treatment to SC-7, the 
worst-hit of early Atlantic convoys. Mundanity was nowhere to be found,•
among unrelenting graphic tales of death and destruction. Later, more 
analytical books such as Irving's libellous (almost blasphemous) work on PQ-17 
dealt with strategy, tactics, and the lack of escorts. Their themes were the 
mutual suspicion of the Allies, the political imperatives driving the Kola Run to 
its detriment, and the mismanagement of resources generally agreed to have 
been better sent through Iran or the Bering Strait. Other books vigorously 
defended the Kola Run, not only as the shortest, easiest route (like rounding 
the Horn to the Pacific.. )30  but also as the last great campaign of the Royal 
Navy, against difficult odds and to a sad lack of recognition. 31 All books of 
every era did not go beyond these topics. 
26 See footnote 34 to Ch.2, "1914-45" of this thesis; on the 1914 Battle of the Falklands. 
27 Presumably regarded as not suitable for children. 
28 Such as that used in Mills and Boon romance novels, or Star Trek episodes. 
2° Despite mention by Roskill (War At Sea Vol II, 1957, op.cit), revelation about who was responsible for 
the scattering had to wait for the 30-Year Rule's access to documents, and Ultra's revelations. 
3° Kemp, P, Convoy! Drama In Arctic Waters, Arms and Armour, London, 1993, p.227. 
31 Those on Arctic service received no separate campaign medal, like bomber crews: Woodman, 1994 
op.cit, p.459. 
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Broome's 1972 Convoy Is to Scatter ought to be seminal. It was a 
personal eye-witness account of PQ-17, not omniscient narrative. 32 It was also 
recognisably separate because it was the aftermath of a libel case surrounding 
the publication of Irving's 1968 history. 33 Broome made little mention of 
Irving's book or his interpretation. Most significant was the use of the actual 
signals as an undiluted primary source. These raw signals could be used 
technically. They could be separated, if required, from Broome's interpretation, 
itself even more separate from drier, more distant accounts such as Campbell 
and Macintyre, Schofield, or P.Smith. The signals' value and uniqueness was 
clear: there were many sides to the story, many stories about the event. 34 This 
was perhaps not yet counter-mythical, but distinctly new. No-one had 
presented the history of an event in this way before, as the jacket blurb said. 
More importantly, no-one did it afterwards. There was sadly no penetration of 
historical method, theory, or culture. 35 No new genre of raw signal based 
histories resulted from Broome's work. 36 Most interestingly, it was 
accomplished before the revelations about Ultra in 1974. The libel case meant 
the raw signals could be shown, after the 30-Year Rule. 37 Sea-battles and 
campaigns could not and cannot be represented so simply. Life and battles 
were not too complex, they merely happened in ways not easily reduced to 
signals exchanged. War movies are much the same; they do not show the 
whole battle, they recreate a smoky noisy large-scale commotion filmed from a 
distance, and then fill in close-up vignettes for narrative and dramatic point. 
It is difficult to understand the furore over Irving's 1968 general history 
PQ-17. It actually blamed all involved for incompetence, not merely Broome; 
though enough for him to launch and win his libel action. Broome said he "had 
32 For brief details of P0-17, see footnote 57 to Ch.1, and Plate 2.2, of this thesis. PQ-17 had an Anglo-
American 'Cruiser Covering Force' in addition to an even more 'Distant Heavy Covering Force' of 
battleships and an aircraft carrier. The German Naval High Command was worried about their ability to 
attack Tirpitz if she sortied to attack P0-17, after a carrier-based airstrike on her during a sortie against 
P0-12 in March 1942. 
33 See below. 
History was a varying set of stories about what happened; Charmley, J, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1995, p.356. 
35 Almost all signals - 2 tons of them - were destroyed after 'first round' historians' and biographers' used 
them between 1950-63. 
36 Broome's 1973 second edition of Make Another Signal, followed on both from his autobiographical 
account of PQ-17, after the Irving case, and updated his humorous 1953 original volume with Cold-War 
era signals. 
37 The 30-Year Rule on releasing government documents came into effect by Act of Parliament in May 
1967, replacing 50 years as the delay before they could be made public. 
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never been able to see anything controversial about PQ-17." 38 Controversy 
surrounding the court case dominated the book, so much so that the 1980 
expurgated edition received little attention. The events, rightly, dominated the 
representations. 39 The key libellous passages stated that Broome broke radio 
silence once he was sighted by a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft. Due to 
slow communications between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine, the 
message reporting PQ-17's course and composition reached the Kriegsmarine 
commander about 24 hours later, long after PQ-17 had been located by its 
radio signals. 4° Broome was not to know that, given the continual daylight and 
clear weather the convoy was steaming through. Irving stated Broome was 
unaware the cruisers had been ordered to withdraw.'" This was patently false, 
as Broome knew the operational orders, which stated the cruiser covering 
force would withdraw at 25°East. Indeed that withdrawal was overdue by 24 
hours when it occurred, as they had been ordered to remain with PQ-17 to 
await developments.42 
For Irving the point of no return was Broome ordering his destroyers to 
join the cruisers "on his own initiative." 43 Irving made it appear that Broome had 
abandoned the convoy. The actual point of no return was Pound's order to 
scatter, badly worded and appearing to indicate action was imminent." The 
situation appeared to be rapidly growing more serious. 45 Broome ordered the 
anti-submarine warfare escorts to proceed independently to Murmansk. 46 
There was no point Broome taking his destroyers there, when the convoy 
38 Broome, J, "I Am Willing and Ready to Go Back" in Winton, J, Freedom's Battle V.1, Hutchinson, 
London, 1967, p.247. 
39 Though from the vociferous arguments at social gatherings of seamen, tailors, airmen and subsequent 
readers, the representations were driving many of the controversial interpretations of experiences; 
providing ammunition for the factions. Nor was the controversy a published one: seamen and sailors 
read and wrote largely to separate publications, their opinions rarely crossing. 
Irving, 1968 op.cit, p.55. 
41 !bid, p.305. 
18:58 hours, 4 July 1942: SECRET; IMMEDIATE: From Admiralty to Cruiser Squadron 1: "Further 
information may be available shortly. Remain with convoy pending further instructions.", cited in Broome 
Capt.J, Convoy Is To Scatter William Kimber, London, 1972, p.156; also Woodman 1994, Kemp 1987, 
Campbell and Macintyre 1957. 
43 Irving 1968 op.cit p.306. 
44 21:11 Hours, 4 July 1942: SECRET; MOST IMMEDIATE: From Admiralty to Cruiser Squadron 1: 
"Withdraw to westward at high speed", cited in Broome 1973 op.cit, p.172. 
45 21:23 Hours, 4 July 1942, SECRET; IMMEDIATE: From Admiralty To Escorts PQ-17, Cruiser 
Squadron 1: "Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports." 
cited in ibid, p.178, then 21:36 Hours, 4 July 1942: SECRET; MOST IMMEDIATE: From Admiralty to 
Escorts PQ-17: "Regarding my signal 21:23/4 July: CONVOY IS TO SCATTER." cited in ibid, p.181-2. 
46 22:20, 4 July 1942, From HMS Keppel to Escorts PQ-17 (pass to convoy), "Convoy to scatter and 
proceed to Russian ports. Escorts, negative destroyers, proceed independently to Archangel. 
Destroyers join me.", cited in ibid, p.190. 
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heading for Archangel was scattering without any hope of regathering them. 
Broome formed his ships on Hamilton's cruisers, as destroyers (not anti-
submarine warfare ships) would be useful in action against the German heavy 
units. 
The issue here, as later with Buchheim, was less what the book said, 
more the reaction to it, and what that revealed of the times and memories. It 
qualified as blasphemy, not because of its content or interpretation, but 
because it dared attack all the men there, not just Broome. Blasphemy 
traditionally attacks the status quo and its dogma: deeply held beliefs and 
opinions. Irving opened a whole containershipfull of worms. It did not matter 
that he was wrong, or misusing his sources and skills. It did not matter that he 
was building a giant delusion about naval warfare and the Admiralty, as he did 
after with the Holocaust. Nor is it that Irving had no right or experience to 
judge these events and men by. The book is valuable in its blasphemy, and its 
interpretation. It is both regrettable and thankful that no 1990's raking over the 
coals of PQ-17, has appeared, that there has been no 'anniversary revision'. 
The DamBusters, far less controversial, received three. This subject could use 
three different and viciously vying versions of PQ-17.47 The controversy may 
be largely worked out, though not totally, as Woodman found." The overall 
stability of the history and personal interpretations and opinions, remains. 
Counter-mythology like Irving's was and is vital, for all that it may be poor 
history in terms of its conclusions. Conclusions could be disproven or 
countered. No attempt at change was worse. 
German works were completely separate. They had other purposes, 
tones, and contents. Several serious works were written by Kurowski, who 
masqueraded, like many western popular authors, more profitably under a 
pseudonym." The existing stream of unremarkable, heroic, nationalistic, 
operational, biographical and incidental books did not slacken. Preceding 
Buchheim's fictional and factual exaggerations, but with less effect, was US- 
47 With at least one steeped in Political Correctness. 
48 Woodman, relative of a participant, who wrote an operational account: 1994 op.cit, note to footnotes on 
p.467-8. 
49 As Karl Alman, "Karl the German.": Hadley 1995 op.cit p.129. 
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dwelling Werner's memoirs, Iron Coffins. 50 It was roundly regarded as a great 
work worldwide for its stolid, unchanging representation of dutiful U-Boat 
youths. As Gannon pointed out, its purpose was political, "to protest that our 
lives were squandered on inadequate equipment and the unconscionable policies of 
U-Boat Headquarters." 51 It was roundly criticised as exaggeration and distortion 
by historians like Rohwer and western specialists. It was merely the latest in a 
long line of limited non-fiction popular works fully integrating U-Boat myth and 
legend: the political misuse of powerful machines and scared, weak youths. 
Discourse here was as stuck as elsewhere. Content, representation and 
marketing were all in a timewarp. 52 Iron Coffins is perhaps the anomaly 
between earlier phases of German writing and the later, 'Regret Publishing' 
era after Buchheim. It was inaccurate and exaggerated, but no more than 
many books by former Allied participants. 53 
Lane pointed out that participants always needed to over-dramatise, as 
if the memories and experiences themselves weren't dramatic or traumatic 
enough. They wanted to capture and hold their reader's attention, and more 
importantly, to leave the reader with the powerful impression the events had 
left on them. They had much myth and expectation to live up to. Iron Coffins  
was criticised from all points: exaggeration from outside Germany; 
misrepresentation of old U-Boat men; extolling warlike wartime virtues and 
ideas from the anti-military Left factions of public and critics. What set Werner 
apart was his ruthless self-promotion and publication, of book as literature and 
self as celebrity. This did not sit well with quiet former U-Boat men, any more 
than it sat well with others who disagreed with its content and attitude. It made 
the book, never filmed, nevertheless a huge success nd its author a wealthy 
man. His preoccupation with gaining fame and wealth more than anything 
upset and disturbed all who felt their past, heritage, and traditions exploited 
and belittled. 54 This would come to a head after 1973, when a better book, a 
novel, would reap all sides of the debate, commercial, artistic, memorabilic, 
5° Farcically by 1998 it was being advertised via the Net republished as a novel: at http://www.u-
boat.net/books/english 
51 Werner, H, Iron Coffins, Holt Rinehart & Winston, NY, 1969, p.xix & 1995 interview, cited in Gannon, 
M, Black May: the Defeat of the German Wolfpacks, Harper-Collins, NY, 1998, p.453. 
52 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.166. 
53 'bid, p.130-33. 
Loc.cit. 
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commemorative, social and cultural, and begin an enduring controversy within 
and without Germany of fascinating contortions, indications and conclusions. 
In fiction, themes and focus remained unchanged, though there was a 
slow but steady move toward more action and less thought and pondering. 
The action novel was far more frequent, and likely to be read, than serious 
rumination of war's meaning or power. The Kola Run was still a popular setting 
for novelists, given the continuing popularity of HMS Ulysses and All of One  
Comoanv. 55 Merchant Navy novels were also popular, though rarely written by 
seamen. The Battle novel was settling into subgenres: Atlantic, Arctic, Royal 
Navy, Carriers, U-Boats, Merchant Navy. These were separated from 'the 
more character-based works of 1945-60. That era's fewer titles stood out 
more. These genres would be the only ones in future, almost nothing would 
fall outside their boundaries. There would not be any thematic departure, 
apart from Griffin, until 1973. 
Battle fiction changed little until Ultra belatedly added a new topic; 
secret codes and the possibilities for refighting the Battle with the new 
methods this offered. Convoys being hunted piecemeal was a favourite 
device. It was good for raising tension and maintaining interest: who is next: 
when will the blow fall on our hero?56 It had links to earlier, more popular 
fictive settings like the 'wild west' wagon train under siege, desert caravans 
beset by Tuareg, or wagons in a forest attacked by bandits. Unfortunately, 
such events in convoy warfare were as mythic as the losses and combats, and 
the mythologised historical slaughter they claimed to, recreate. Royal Navy 
and seamen gunners shelling an attacking U-Boat was another favourite. 
Such things were very unlikely, even given the chance of a merchant ship 
sailing alone sighting one. Over three-quarters of ships sunk were 
independents, but as gun duels remained few, hitting or sinking a U-Boat was 
even less plausible. It could hardly have ever happened to novelists, but it 
was the kind of event they wanted to happen, remember, to believe in. Novels 
were the essence of what they remembered, long periods of tedium broken by 
brief violent incidents. Novels were also the antidote to their wartime sense of 
ss There were 6 Kola Run novels 1945-60, 8 in 1960-74. Paris, 1990, op.cit, passim. 
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powerlessness. Describing frenzied action and drama compensated for the 
inability to see, confront, and hit back at the enemy they had actually 
experienced. 
Not until the Anniversary era grew closer was there a slow increase in 
overall numbers. This was combined with an industry-wide move toward serial 
novels with continuing characters. The 'secret-mission tacked onto Battle' type 
novel continued to be' popular, though not as much as it would be once Ultra 
entered the fray. Callison's 1970 Flock of Ships was mythical, 
unrepresentative and peripheral, featuring codes and banknotes being 
delivered in a special small convoy hunted piecemeal. The seamen were 
strongly drawn, but unrepresentative. Increasingly weird goings-on were 
eventually seen as the works of a German agent in the crew, while action after 
action showed the same super-adaptability, stalwartness and strength wartime 
news and fiction overloaded ordinary seamen with. 57 The Germans were 
unseen but always one step ahead; mythically cruel when at last met. They 
killed captured seamen. 58 
Griffin's An Operational Necessity 1967, became a minor classic of the 
era, and also spurred some controversy, though not like Irving. It fictionalised 
the only known incident of U-Boat men massacring survivors, that of U-852 
sinking SS Peleus, and the lone survivor who eventually enabled the execution 
of the three senior officers for War Crimes. It became controversial in 
Germany, for a number of reasons. Like Robertson's 1956 Golden  
Horseshoe, it was one of the few outstanding works about the U-Boat and 
men, from either Germany or Allied nations. It was criticised for celebrating 
their 'unjust' executions, not their heroism. It did not even, in former U-Boat 
men's opinions, defend them for merely carrying out misinterpreted orders. 
They were the only U-Boat men executed for such a crime, and DOnitz was 
imprisoned, not executed, for his orders, misinterpreted or otherwise. U-Boat 
men were and are still bitter that a similar British case was never tried. Most of 
all, U-Boat men criticised that this story was written by a foreigner about 'their' 
men's story. Only former submariners, if not U-Boat men, could write about U- 
56 Unadorned by secret missions, later another plot fashion. 
57 Lane 1990 op.cit p.63. 
58 So did the U-Boat crew in 1999's movie U-571. 
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Boat war properly. 59 This foreshadowed much of the abuse and derision 
directed at Buchheim a few years later. Griffin's book, after the interval of 
attention on Iron Coffins, became lost in the debate and furore over Das Boot  
and is scarcely remembered today. Significantly, because both Robertson's 
biography of Kretschmer and Griffin's novel were written by foreigners to 
Germany and its U-Boat iconography, they were also separate from the 
influences of its historiography and culture. Both fiction and biography stood 
out in quality as well as approach, without the nefarious force of decades of 
propaganda, reminiscence and bias. 
What ended the Intermediate era in fiction was Buchheim's long Das 
Boot of 1973. Generally only seen translated and abridged, even more 
famous after inevitable television and cinematic versions, it was an anti-war 
work of some power and weight. Like the best other Battle fiction, it was still 
'middlebrow'. As he pointed out, it was "a novel, but not a work of fiction." 60 , 
drawn from his experiences as a war correspondent on the late 1941 cruise of 
U-96, during the first, almost strategic supremacy, of the Royal Navy. It 
skilfully blended factual events and experiences 61 , glaring errors62 , and a 
derided, impossible, but plot-serving apocalyptic conclusion. 63 Much of what 
he saw was in the novel more or less as it happened. As borne out by his later 
nonfiction coffee-table photo-essays U-Boat War et al, the leaving of La 
Rochelle, meeting U-572 in mid-Atlantic, the terror and horror of hours of 
depthcharging, and the usually empty sea, were real. The attempted 
penetration of the Straits of Gibraltar by U-96 and the attack on her there were 
greatly exaggerated. 64 
59 Topp 1992 op.cit p.166-8; Hadley 1995 op.cit, p.133. 
Buchheim, L-G, Das Boot, [Abridged, translated], William Kimber, London, 1974, Author's note. 
61 Such as boredom, the emptiness of the ocean, the nervousness and exultation of approaching and 
penetrating a convoy, and the shock of counterattack by escorts, as well as drunkenness, fear, and VD. 
'32 Operating depths, and political dissent. 
63 Fighter aircraft sinking U-96 and killing the crew while finally docking at home base La Rochelle, after 
escaping from their position trapped on the bottom off Gibraltar. This was drawn from later incidents i.e. 
U-981; Blair Vol.2 op.cit, pp.609. This kind of ending, killing almost all the characters, was vital to its anti-
war stance. Their survival would not signal that war really was evil, dangerous, deadly, serious, 
repugnant. 
64 In reality it was not a fighter, but a radar-equipped Royal Navy Swordfish from Gibraltar, left after the 
sinking of the famous carrier HMS Ark Royal, which attacked U-69 in the Straits, early in the morning of 
1.12.41. 
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It was to change everything. It changed the expectations of all exposed 
to it, and the standard of what could be expected of war fiction, popular 
German fiction, and portrayals of the most idealised German ex-servicemen. 
Das Boot acted much as The Cruel Sea had 22 years before, but at the same 
time polarising and pushing out attitudes and ideas other than those 
supporting or attacking it. It was not a new type of novel, it broke no ground in 
style or approach, only in content. It exposed previously unspoken and 
unrevealed experiences, and regenerated mythology about the Battle. For this 
only, and largely in Germany, the novel and resultant film are controversial. 
Many old U-Boat men kept silent. Many of them were generally horrified by 
Buchheim's portrayal of them as sex-and-alcohol-obsessed adolescents led by 
genuinely thoughtful, good, anti-war anti-Nazi officers. Buchheim's fictional 
officers lacked not only a Prussian sense of duty and sacrifice but even much 
semblance of military discipline and soldiers' determination. 65 
Buchheim countered that his work was a novel, but not fiction: his 
photographs could substantiate practically every page. 66 What could not be 
substantiated in photographs were men's opinions: the Goring-taunting, 
Tipperary-Song playing captain, the loose, sloppy, slack ramblings about girls 
and beer from 'the Lords': the ordinary U-Boatmen. While the squalor, danger, 
fear, tension, drudgery, boredom of life on patrol could be seen, what men said 
could not. Young men and boys without women spent a good deal of their 
time thinking about sex.67 It was less defensible that Nazi-trained, ex-
merchant service U-Boat officers would criticise their leaders, especially Hitler, 
openly. They were raised in both the Kriegsmarine and merchant service's 
traditions of duty and service, and the ordinary German citizen's attitudes and 
expectations of country and society before self. These men would be very 
unlikely to act or speak as Buchheim portrayed them. 65 Men would be jokingly 
subversive, as 'Teddy' Suhren was, even pessimistic, but not treasonously 
defeatist. 69 
67 Kennedy 1974 op.cit pp.74, 136-7; Mulligan, T, Neither Sharks Nor Wolves US Naval Institute, 
Annapolis MD, 1999, p.17. 
se Indeed the German focus on duty to and sacrifice for country pervaded all works, not just the military. 
69 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.154. U-Boat commander Suhren asked once during docking on return "Are the 
Nazis still at the helm?!" 
es Hadley 1995, op.cit p.143. 
es Almost every page; ibid p.151. 
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By 1973 Buchheim, former Second World War propaganda ministry 
photo-journalist, had spent the previous three decades reassessing his 
experiences, almost alone among U-Boat men. Das Boot remained the "finest 
piece of U -Boat literature"70 , but it was still inaccurate, distorted, in comparison 
to his photos, for all his protestations. 71 He felt betrayed, used, made a pawn. 
He spent increasingly obsessed years after 1945 shifting blame from himself, 
German attitudes and aspirations, to DOnitz and Nazism. It was an indication 
of the book's power that both Left and Right had opposing criticisms. U-Boat 
men increasingly jeered at his counter-traditional opinion, for illustrating and 
describing the war the way he had, and lastly for being apparently repentant 
for his service, while gaining as much publicity and prominence as possible. 72 
Germany's left criticised book and film for celebrating Nazism, though the film 
clearly criticises that leadership. Buchheim's criticism of Donitz was as 
unceasing as U-Boat men's respect was almost unbroken and absolute. Very 
few regard 'Onkel Karl' as former RAF bomber crews regard 'Butcher' Harris. 73 
Books other than, and indeed including, Buchheim, were in a timewarp, twisted 
in upon themselves. The German public were as undemanding as the British 
or American. 
Buchheim became the ultimate exponent of Nazi-style propaganda, if 
the most vehement opponent of their politics and activities. Much of his 
opposition was due to resentment of their wasting his youth. His "unsubtle" 
messages, "pure debunking", without "finesse", were different. 74 Even his 
controversial dissidence was apolitical and amoral: failing to accept his own 
part in Nazism by explaining it as naïveté, instead of conventionally regarding 
it as orders. U-Boat literature is now most clearly separated into pre-and post 
Buchheim. This is not due to his literary ability, but only to the high profile of 
the continuing controversy. Since 1973 there have been films, mini-series, 
making of documentary, responses in books, public and associations, 
70  [bid, p.142. 
71 See the quotation at the head of this chapter. 
72 Being an einzelfahrer, "separate farer", or independent sailer, in German parlance: Hadley 1995 op.cit 
p.163. 
‘3 RAF Crews called their 1942-5 Commander-in-Chief "Butcher"; Australian edition 60 Minutes 1993; 
55,500 were killed bombing Germany and killing more than 500,000 Germans. Bomber losses were the 
true heir of the mindless sausage-machine sacrifice of 1914-18's trench-warfare. 
74 Hadley 1995 op.cit p.165. 
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disavowals, counter-revisional documentaries, more photo-essays. 75 
Everyone in Germany, not merely participants (who must be very few in 
number, if only 11,000 survived the war) has contributed their portion to the 
debate. Their feelings and impressions are still strong, which is why this 
controversy has not ended. They are all still trying to support or attack 
orthodoxy and the power-groups involved. They are still disturbed by 
opponents who have different views, and want to portray different versions of 
their experience. 
This period's exceptions to the 'Era of Bad Movies' were peripheral. 
They involved the Battle only by featuring dramatic operations outside convoy 
life. In 1962 a special operation featured in Mystery Submarine, where a U-
Boat was captured and sent out, another unremarkable recreation of a 
celebrated incident. 76 By 1967 memories of famous operations were 
sufficiently dim to permit both We Dive At Dawn and Above Us the Waves to 
be retold more fictionally in Submarine X-1. 77 The 1971 film Murphy's War, 
was from a novel by Max Catto peripheral to the Battle. Starring Peter 
O'Toole, it was a different kind of anti-war film to Das Boot. It was heavily 
mythical, as only a novel by a former seaman could be. It featured seamen 
slaughtered by criminal U-Boat men, revenged by an independent, inventive, 
Irish seaman relentless in his pursuit. It predated Das Boot. There was little 
hint of the fear, worry and tension that U-Boat men actually felt. These U-Boat 
men were the war-weary but coldly efficient supermen of 1939-45. They were 
not the frightened weak slovenly adolescents of Buchheim's re-
mythologisation, or the deluded stalwart victims of politics and machinery U-
Boat men felt themselves to be. There were hints of this in Murphy's War, for it 
was set at VE-Day, when even U-Boat men in the Orinoco knew the war was 
lost and defeat only a matter of time. Once the ceasefire was heard the U-
Boat men were only too ready to stop fighting. It was Murphy who could not. 
This was not a typical experience for any Battle participants, so it was even 
75 See Ch.1, Plate 8, for a graphic representation of Hadley's chronology. 
76 U-570 became HMS Graph; Halliwells op.cit. 523. 1999's U-571 has many similarities, as well as an 
Ultra focus. 
77 Men are trained [more dramatically] to attack a fictional German battleship; Halliwell's op.cit p.719. 
Recently there has been controversy over the American reworking of the British capture of U-571, into a 
pro-heroism, action movie. 
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more mythical than most. Even the killing of survivors was unique, though an 
apparent commonplace in memory." 
Documentary material was minimal but as classic as its 1950s 
predecessor. It was long enough after earlier works to allow change in 
perceptions, as well as relying on a more sophisticated audience. In 1960 the 
British series Sea War was transmitted. Details of this series are still scarce, 
other than one episode, on PQ-17, being scripted by Broome, according to 
Irving. 79 It was one of several British equivalents of Victory At Sea. No 
comprehensive sources for this era's general television, apart from popular 
collections of memories of the very best drama and game-shows, are 
available. 80 Its use of and place in mythology therefore remains obscure. It is 
hardly possible it was revolutionary and ground breaking. It would have been 
better remembered. It cannot have been so radical it was forgotten or buried. 
It could be concluded it was ordinary, and perhaps less exciting than Victory. 
It could have been a more thorough, or less propagandised and official 
account. It could hardly have been less mythic. There has never been any 
indication that a Battle documentary has gone against the expectations of the 
period. 
Thames TV in 1973 produced World At War, which contained the 
episode "Wolfpack: U-Boats in the Atlantic 1939-43." In many ways this 
remained the single best documentary on the Battle. It was mythological, and 
it had a diverting gaze from typical experiences to combat and excitement. 81 It 
hardly suffered from a lack of Ultra, managing, as Roskill had, to show its 
consequences without revealing it. It was unique among Battle documentaries 
in its great coverage, depth, and proper and careful representation of all sides 
(Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, US Navy, Coastguard, Kriegsmarine, 
Luftwaffe, RAF, and Merchant Navy) and key elements (men, ships, tonnage 
war, technological race, tactics and strategy). It was perfectly placed to benefit 
from new writings based on primary sources, and a mature three decades of 
78  See Lane 1990 op.cit, pp.240-1, 257, for analysis of alleged German cruelty. It had also already been 
the subject of Griffin's celebrated and controversial 1967 novel, the closest the Battle ever came to 
demythologisation in fiction. 
79 TV Times, Summer 1960, cited in Irving 1968 op.cit, p.313. 
8c) I.e Forty Years of British TV 1995. 
81 It had the same type of touching music and catching narration as Victory at Sea. 
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perspective. It was also perfectly placed to exploit the memories of ageing but 
alert men. Not until Donitz: the Successor (which has many failings, not least 
the exploitation of its interviewees) in 1994 would there again be so many key 
people in one Battle documentary." 
Despite its magnificent concentration on the Battle, especially its 
normally neglected early stages, "Wolfpack" still narrated famous incidents: 
SC-7, HG-76, ONS-5; concentrated on offence not defence, even though it 
importantly showed convoy to be an offensive, not defensive strategy. It failed 
to illustrate the boredom and worry of Battle life: of convoys not attacked, U-
Boat operations which never sighted convoys, escorts, or aircraft. "Wolfpack"s 
only other defect was its conclusion in mid-1943, when the "Atlantic lifeline was 
at last secure." 83  It confined itself to illustrating how the Battle was limiting Allied 
advance. The Battle had to be won for the war to be decided: thus the Battle's 
story appeared to be over once supremacy was achieved. Reality was 
different. The fighting did not stop: the killing was just more German than 
Allied. 84 Allied strategic victory in 1941 and tactical supremacy from 1943 were 
its centre. 
The Intermediate Period was a time of little change. It was also a period 
when continuity and the force of experiences continued to be effectively 
transmitted to audiences in diverging representations. The period between 
1945 and 1974 is too large to be studied whole, containing much change 
elsewhere to be regarded as a single era, devoid of socio-cultural pressures. 
New representations appeared, but revealed relatively little compared to the 
scene-setting and perception-forming between 1945-1960. Non-mythical 
works remained less popular than fully mythical ones. Counter-mythology was 
impossible without new sources. Fiction continued to sell steadily, but unlike 
e2 Gilbert Roberts, (head of WAC's tactical school), escort captains Gretton, Sherwood and Hart: all 
illustrating the same vital convoy battle; OuIton of Coastal Command [killer of three U-Boats in May 1943] 
in a very even-handed display of inter-Bomber/Coastal Command problems; an unfortunate 
concentration of white British Merchant Navy masters and officers instead of seamen, though there are 
Royal Navy ratings; lastly, Donitz and three of his ablest U-Boat commanders: Hartwig-Looks, Cremer, 
and the Second World War tonnage king (world ace), president of the World Submariners Society until 
his death, 'Silent Otto' Kretschmer, 1918-98. 
83 In Sir Laurence Olivier's narration. 
84 Milner describes it well: on 5.5.45, the day BdU [U-Boat Command] ceased operating, there were 25 
U-Boats in British waters tying down 400 anti-submarine warfare vessels and no less than 800 aircraft. 
The threat, if not the risk, remained very real. Milner 1994 op.cit, p.255. 
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1950s bestsellers, only within its core audience. 85 The emergence and steady 
growth in popularity and quality of technical histories boded well for future 
researchers. British cinema diverged, new forms were the fashion in place of 
stolid portrayal of wartime ideas or values. Cinema portrayal of the Battle 
reached its nadir in 1960, with stiff presentations of famous events perhaps 
little recalled or valued by the British public. In America different ideas, which 
might perhaps influence later generations, failed to make a mark, due to poor 
execution and the limitations of war cinema. Television significantly promised 
an eternal afterlife for both documentary and cinema. 
The passage of time also had effects. Memory of the war developed 
into a quiet, comfortable reminiscence, unwilling to change, and rarely 
stimulated. Distortions could creep in, and the audience remained 
undemanding. The war could now be parodied and twisted, with effects on 
participant and subsequent audiences. The Battle's authors, without new 
official portrayals and recognition, lacked the impetus to develop 
representations. They were presenting their memories as they saw fit. There 
had been few new sources to attract and stimulate the academic. Those 
available did not reveal anything starkly surprising or reinvigorating. There 
were only wartime controversies. When reawakened, one of these caused a 
victory for the forces of order and myth as well as justice. It was not counter-
myth in any case, it was an attempt, like Buchheim, at re-myth. It was to be 
the last of its kind. Scholarly debate remained stymied, and popular debate 
was limited by myth and sanction. All was about to change. New sources 
were steadily released in the last years of the period, and a revolutionary, re-
mythical novel appeared at the same time. They would also not change greatly 
for another generation. Diversion and distortion were on the horizon, not 
rebirth or maturation. Myths would be added to, not explored, or replaced. 
85 Cruel Sea and HMS Ulysses had broad appeal, as their popularity, sales, and inclusion in school 
syllabi indicated; Ramsden, op.cit p.38; later Battle novels (bar Das Boot), never did. 
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HISTORY, DOCUMENTARY, CINEMA AND FICTION, 1974-89 
'Be pleased to infomi her Majesty that the White Ensign flies alongside the Union Flag on South Georgia. God Save the Queen.' 
--Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward's Draco-Nelsonian signal to 10 Downing St, Sunday 25 TH April 1982. 
'Failure? The possibility doesn't exist.' 
P.M. Thatcher's conscious evocation of Churchillian defiance, April 1982. 
The release of wartime materials held under the 30-Year Rule ended 
the Intermediate Period. New information on British and German policy and 
errors, classified cryptography and technology fed a new anniversarialism. 
These new sources and a disillusionment with the ideology and attitudes of the 
1960's supported a general interest in past achievements and events. Britain's 
continuing decline as a political and economic power, and an integration with a 
Europe it had helped to save, fostered an inward and backward view.' It was 
easier to hark back to old glories, and revel in the British tradition of fighting 
against impossibly long odds (or so the socially constructed mythology would 
have us think). 2 It was convenient and reassuring to extrapolate the Dunkirk 
Spirit created during the invasion crisis of 1940 forward or backward to any 
conceivable event. 3 Canada's Battle remained in its long drought, America 
was preoccupied with Vietnam and Watergate, other nations with their own 
problems. Germany concentrated on its continuing economic miracle. Former 
participants focussed on the effervescing Buchheim affair. What did change 
was the origin of the drive behind representations. The new era was as much 
driven by commercial and professional interest as actual experience. A 
significant part of the Ultra-era material was written by non-participants, Who 
did not have memory of the events infusing their work. This type of work was 
instead founded on primary and secondary documents, at once drier and more 
staid, and also more mythic and emotive, depending on the source. 
The second half of the 1970s was revolutionary in some ways but not 
others. For popular and academic history, the release of British diplomatic and 
military sources meant a vast new field of primary materials about all facets of 
the campaign. This was followed by the only revolution: Ultra. The availability 
of primary materials ought to have changed the outlook and appearance of 
Hobsbawm, op.cit p.228. 
2 The British have probably won as many battles by luck or by opponent's incompetence as anyone, and 
have often won or negotiated from a position of considerable economic and naval strength. lute, W The 
True Glory, Macdonald, London, 1983, p.34. 
Its most potent demonstration was the Falklands war, in the conscious adoption of Churchillian myth 
and phraseology by media, government, and public alike. See Barnett's Iron Britannia: the Falklands 
War & British National Opinion, Allison & Busby, London, 1982, for details. 
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Battle history. Certainly some 'myths' were laid to rest, and much factual 
discrepancy and error removed. Much, especially dealing with shipping and 
personnel losses, remained. It also enabled technical and specialist weapon 
and incident histories based on previously secret data to grow further. As with 
other types of history, and other technical works, this material took time to 
become comprehensive, sophisticated, and to rely as much on photographs 
and graphics as text. 
Ultra had a more dramatic impact, if less useful in the long run. Instead 
of merely being incorporated as an important but minor factor, it tended to 
became the focus of the Battle. This distorted representation of the campaign, 
and created new myths. 4 Merchant Navy stories were slightly enhanced by the 
prominence of shipping service and losses in the 1982 Falklands war. Old 
ideas about tonnage war and the Battle's criticality, largely disproved after the 
war in gazettes and official publications, were still as current as 'all seamen 
were overpaid', or 'their horrendous losses'. Coastal Command was still 
largely excluded, though technical works and secondary histories began to 
appear. Released sources at least meant previously routine but unavailable 
materials were accessible. 
The 1973 German novel Das Boot, translated into English the following 
year, changed the thematic and commercial direction of fiction. It became, like 
Cruel Sea and HMS Ulysses before it, an instant classic, and practically the 
only controversial fiction of the Battle. 5 It was never the subject of a court 
case, as was Irving's PQ-17, but having polarised debate in Germa‘ny, 
dominated other issues. The controversies over Dths Boot were separate. 
Outside Germany there was slight debate over whether Buchheim was a Nazi 
apologist by excluding Nazism rather than not openly portraying its evils. 
There was also debate over the taste of a novel which ought to be condemning 
U-Boat men, not supporting and celebrating them, even if not celebrating 
sinkings. For Buchheim to condemn his characters would be like a British 
author condemning a successful anti-submarine warfare captain: unrealistic, 
4 Post-Ultra Battle history mirrored what had always been considered of Second World War Pacific 
history: we had their codes all along, and were able to anticipate their moves, which was how we won. 
None of which explains Pearl Harbor. 
5 After Griffin's 1967 An Operational Necessity. 
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unnecessary and unwanted. For Atlantic cinema, the rush of new sources and 
then the revelation of Ultra did nothing, while the inevitable filming of Das Boot, 
contributed the last Battle film (and later TV mini-series) of only two after 1960, 
and a new dimension to Germany's debate. National perspectives were as 
separate in 1973, or 1985, as ever. 
Documentary was slightly more active, though not in new forms. It 
moved away from the infrequent general coverage of 1952-72 to more typical 
territory: the particular and disregarded. Technology was the focus of one 
documentary per decade. The 1978 Battle of the Atlantic production covered 
the challenge and response of weapons and sensors for the first time. It 
brought Ultra to television, but nothing integrated this with earlier general 
material. Only the imaginative viewer and the academic could benefit. It has 
been rarely mentioned since. 6 Even where TV documentary tried to take 
objective, scholarly account, as did the German Against England (1987), 
promotional material undermined it. This accidentally lessened and diverted 
controversy.' German documentaries have been as pro-Allied as official works 
in the deNazification era 1945-52, or as supportive of Left or Right Wing myth 
and position as other media. The Left was pacifist and critical of all military 
service, the right traditionally supported military service, sacrifice, and duty. 
A cross-media mythical element prominent in the revisionist and 
republishing era after 1974 was the nature and use of cover art. 8 It was mainly 
a marketing phenomenon, not only of new novels, but more so the reissue and 
republishing of old. The distinction between academic and popular history 
may have been blurred in writing. There was no distinction between popular 
history and fiction artwork and marketing. 9 Most covers used the same, 
usually unrealistic, elements: Fw-200s diving on helpless ships, or surfaced U-
Boats shooting it out with destroyers. These were not corvettes or frigates, 
converted trawlers, or even clearly-modified older destroyers; but the modern, 
gun-heavy fleet destroyers rare in Atlantic anti-submarine warfare. The 
6 Never used by academics; Sgt. Luker, RCAF, in Bowyer, 1979 op.cit p.80. 
7 The promotions presented only the usual, mythic, 'U-Boat men as heroes' angle, not what the 
documentary actually said. As a result the countermythic stance of the documentary, which could have 
attracted odium, was hidden. 
8 For detailed examples, see the attached plates 5.1 - 5.15. 
9 This blurring was distinct from Poo!man's fictionalised CAMShip history The Giant Killers. 
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artwork of books reissued in the 1970's was clearly less representative than 
first editions. Irrespective of story, content, even of the type of history, a 
dramatic and unreal image was employed to gain attention, and attract both 
knowing affigionados and unsuspecting general readers. 
In some cases it was justified. Irving's 1985 expurgated paperback PQ-
17 had ships dive-bombed by Ju88's; real, if hardly common. Even this, 
however, was from Schofield's 1964 paperback Russian Convoys. This, and 
other Arctic Convoy, books usually used one or other of a pair of classic 
images from PQ-18, taken a few hours apart. 1° The Battle, fortunately for its 
credibility and resistance to trivialisation, unfortunately for its lack of cultural 
penetration, has had no single classic image. Robertson's 1956 Walker RN  
paperback art contrastingly displayed Walker over depthcharge-crews on a 
backdrop of a column of water, clearly from photographs. This, or a variant, 
perhaps of an elderly destroyer, should be the cover of every Atlantic book. It 
would be repetitive, as is much of the literature, but only slightly mythological. 
A destroyer, freighter, U-Boat or corvette alone [e.g plates 5.5, 5.6, 5.7] in 
mountainous seas, would be entirely appropriate. 
Others were totally mythical or unrealistic. The paperback Kola Run  
[Plate 5.9] had three elements: a surfaced U-Boat at night with gun manned; a 
rugged-up Royal Navy officer with binoculars and reddened bare face 
centered; while on the right a freighter with a waterline explosion which ought 
to be a torpedo hit but was probably intended to be a hit from the rarely-used 
U-Boat's gun opposite. Even Broome's second edition of his humorous history 
Make Another Signal (1973) had a stereotypical fleet-destroyer's guns warding 
off a departing Fw200. 11 These covers not only comprised the marketer's 
conception of how to sell, but also the commercial terminus of the myth and 
myth-making. This was and is how the factual and fictional Battle is seen by 
the publishers. This is how it has been presented to the Battle's audience, and 
how they have tended to see it, continually reinforced by such stereotypes. 
10 Either the explosion of the ammunition ship Mary Luckenbach, or "bomb from a German Ju-88 bursts 
close alongside Hunt-class destroyer HMS Wheatland as Tribal-class destroyer HMS Eskimo speeds 
between convoy lanes, PQ-18, 14.Sep.1942." 
Evolutionary Biologist Stephen J. Gould lamented about the lack of control over the misrepresentations 
of illustrations and cover-art in foreign editions in Wonderful Life: the Burgess Shale & the Nature of 
History, Hutchinson, London, 1989, p.33. 
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The tales themselves tended to contain more gun duels and bombings than 
mere escort and convoy drudgery, in both fact and fiction. When the novels 
did contain such things, the cover art, jacket blurb and teasers never let on. 
In one sense, 1969-75 was a watershed. 1974 made permanent and 
radical changes to how Second World War and Battle history would be written 
and viewed. Documents released under the 30-Year Rule made dramatic 
changes to historical content. Publishers had constant pressures to produce 
more marketable material, just as postwar revelations had enabled 'now it can 
be told' novels and films. 12 Winterbotham's Ultra Secret, 1974, as Gardner 
relates, said little about the Battle but revealed Ultra to an amazed world. 13 
Roskill's general Naval Policy Between the Wars, 1976, set out how Britain 
came to be poorly prepared for the Battle, while Churchill & the Admirals, 
1977, demonstrated his nefarious effects on the Admiralty, 1912-45. Roskill's 
posthumous 1986 Strategy of Sea Power described more Mahanian and post-
Mahanian theories. Hough's Longest Battle: the War at Sea, 1987, gave 
overall coverage, adding Ultra. Underlining the slow change, P.Kennedy's 
Rise & Fall of British Naval Mastery,  Second Edition, 1983, was the first book 
since Mahan in 1890, to take sea-power theory apart. 14 Busch's German  
Navy, 1939-45, 1974, provided a comprehensive photo-essay while Hitler's 
Naval War related operations, with myths but without operational 
experiences. 15 
Costello & Hughes's Battle of the Atlantic, 1977 was the first single-
volume comprehensive secondary history. Not academic, and supportive of 
myth as any, its coverage was good for the time, though the Royal Canadian 
Navy and Brazil were all but unmentioned. It exemplified the new era. These 
two professional TV authors created a general account. This type was 
previously written by participants: dry operational history such as MacIntyre's, 
or melodrama such as Lund & Ludlam. Van der Vat's later Atlantic Campaign, 
12 As seen with the 1969 anniversary republishing of Prien's autobiography: maintaining sales and 
interest. 
13 Gardner in Howarth & Law op.cit. p.530-1. 
14 Rodger in Rodger, ed, 1996 op.cit, Introduction, pp.xix. 
15 Myths were that the Kriegsmarine was outnumbered, overshadowed by the army and Luftwaffe, that 
early advantages and successes were not built upon, and that the men were brave and served well. No 
opinions, anecdotes, or information were given about personnel, and thus nothing of how the war felt or 
changed. 
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1988, was more inclusive. Pitt's Time-Life: WW2: the Battle of the Atlantic, 
gave coverage in text and photo-essay fashion, but little insight, nor did 
Botting's Time-Life: the Seafarers: the U-Boats,  1979. Keegan's Price of 
Admiralty, 1978 summarised the Battle in a chapter among other key historic 
battles, Potter's (ed) Seapower: A Naval History, 1981, included both 
campaigns, something generally neglected from general works like 
Chambers's 1978 War at Sea. Hoyt's simplistic and frequently inaccurate U-
Boat Wars, paraded limitations and omissions. While he focussed on British 
as against American Ultra work 16 , unlike more recent accounts, he nevertheless 
excluded other services, concentrating on US efforts at sea, from the early 
'benign' era incidents (Greer, Kearney and Reuben James) to the later Carrier 
Task Groups in the central Atlantic. Hoyt mythically discussed horrifying 
losses along the US East coast but never condemned King's policies. PQ- 17 
was made an example of, without condemning Pound - or those at sea. 
By comparison Joneses trio showed what was possible, given limited 
space and resources, from the very large story of the Battle. U-Boat Aces and  
Their Fates, 1988, related stories of the great ship-sinkers; Prien, Schepke, 
Kretschmer etal. Month of the Lost U-Boats, 1978, had limitations Autumn of 
Lost U-Boats, 1984, overcame: it didn't explain the Battle or place the Month 
(May 1943) in context. It was intended for those who merely wanted the 
stories of all 41 U-Boats lost that month, in sequence, and as much detail 
about each, without resorting to bare statistics. Milner's 1985 North Atlantic 
Run was the first major monograph to discuss the Royal Canadian Navy's 
Battle since 1952. 17 Here were first laid bare the technical and training 
shortcomings and governmental and leadership over-ambition, for the 
specialist and generalist. Boutilier's 1982 RCN In Retrospect, conference 
proceedings, covered the whole navy, with three papers relating to the Battle. 
Macpherson's River Class Destroyers in WW2, 1985, was a technical 
discussion. Hadley's 1985 U-Boats Against Canada, related neglected inshore 
operations, in addition to integrating technical developments to some degree, 
and providing a vital view of Canadian wartime perceptions. Douglas's 1988 
RCN In Transition was another conference proceedings, which heralded 
16 A very ploughed field, with US neglect due to later, more rigorous classification of cryptology. 
17  Earlier works like Lawrence (1979) were personal or general. 
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growing academic interest in the campaign and Canada's role. Zimmerman's 
excellent Naval Battles of Ottawa, 1989 revealed the technical and political 
interface problems at Headquarters which caused so many operational 
shortcomings. 
Personal histories continued to be as popular as broad works or 
narrowly-focussed technical books. There was little consistency in any area. 
Pearce's 1975 Ship that Torpedoed Herself initiated his three works. Last Call  
For HMS Edinburgh, 1982, more melodramatic but as mythic, read like 
Morrison's Journal of the Bounty: a poorly written personal story enhanced with 
unlikely vignettes and rewritten choice extracts from HMS Ulysses and Kola 
Run. What he did or thought was never seen, only what happened from an 
anonymous observer in his position. Runninq the Gauntlet, 1989, covered the 
entire campaign. Smith's 1975 Arctic Victory, perhaps the first incidental 
history written by a relative, described PQ-18, the key balanced convoy after 
the scattering of PQ-17. 18 Schofield's updated, Ultra-inclusive Arctic Convoys,': 
1977, compared well with Taylor's junior-orientated 1976 US Merchant Marine-
based Battle in the Arctic Seas: the Story of PQ-17.  Irving's 1980 revised PQ- 
17 removed the passages accusing Broome, and thus much of the original 
edition's force. Kerslake's Coxswain in the Northern Convoys, 1984 was 
another personal account, of the same events. Hough's 1985 biography 
Fraser of North Cape described his efforts for prewar anti-submarine warfare, 
and Schamhorst's sinking, among other activities. P.K. Kemp's 1978 Decision  
at Sea: the Convoy Escorts, added to his 1957 Victory at Sea. His Russian  
Convoys, 1987 was an effective photo-essay by the imperial war Museum's 
head of naval photographs. Grano's PQ-17 account "Zig-Zag" described one of 
a very few Australian seamen's Arctic service. 19 Poolman's representations 
varied through 1982's Sea Hunters from light tales of glory and death in 
1985's Armed Merchant Cruisers, to solid technical and operational history in 
Escort Carrier: HMS Vindex at War, 1983. 
18  Broome was also there, but 'safely separated, escorting the covering battleships. Smith, P, Arctic 
Victory: Convoy PQ-18,  William Kimber, London, 1975, Appendix 4, np. 
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, August 1987, p.63-74. 
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A few personal, incidental, technical, or ship histories stood out. 
Lombard-Hobson gave the clearest presentation of Allied Battle myth yet in 
1983's A Sailor's War: 
"Documentaries and films on the Battle have tended to mislead the public into 
thinking it was plain bloody murder all the time by giving the reader or viewer a 
vivid picture of frightful slaughter lasting many days and nights, and resulting in 
appalling losses. Monsarrat's epic of the U-Boat war certainly describes every 
convoy passage as one long night of terror and destruction, and every ocean 
crossing a relentless struggle.. .taken over the whole period, the great majority of 
convoys got through without interference or mention; and the Atlantic, more 
often than not, is agreeably kind." 20 
Whinney's 1986 U-Boat Peril covered much the same ground as those 
preceding: Athenia's sinking, Courageous, Royal Oak, Spee, before personal 
U-Boat hunts. It was less mythic, blending mundane events with restrained 
description of attacks and sinkings. 21 Van der Vaat ended his otherwise 
outstanding The Atlantic Campaign of 1988 with 
"The campaign was not an exercise in statistics, but a story of waste on a 
numbing scale, whether of men, ships and submarines built in haste and 
destroyed in moments, food and precious cargoes sent to the bottom, vast 
sums of money. A few vivid images remain: of seamen burning and choking in 
blazing oil, instantly freezing to death in the Arctic, flashing magazines blowing 
warships to smithereens, unspeakably gruesome remains rising from 
submarines, the haunting death-throes of stricken ships, of endless cries for 
help from the water. Here and there a dash of chivalry in total war." 22 
This was still how the Battle was seen and presented. 
Kennedy's Pursuit: Chase & Sinking of the Bismarck, 1974 was an 
excellent narrative: blending a series of personal and accounts; literate, 
emotional, analytical, omniscient. Hoyt's Life & Death of HMS Hood, 1977, 
('rebadged' as Sunk By the Bismarck, 1980) was a travesty by comparison, 
though both concentrated on the famed incident, not the mundane campaign. 
Coles's 1980 Flagship Hood, improved, while Baron iVlullenheim-Rechberg's 
Battleship Bismarck, 1980, was a more detailed German account. 23 
Kennedy's Menace: Life & Death of the Tirpitz, 1979, lessened his evocative 
narrative style in favour of technology. Roberts' Battlecruiser Hood, 1982, 
confined itself to schematics, as did Archibald's Fighting Ship in the Royal 
20 Lombard-Hobson, S, A Sailor's War, Orbis, London, 1983, p.54. Lombard-Hobson was Monsarrat's 
captain for a time; one of the models for Cruel Sea's Ericson. Here he even debunked myth of the 
Atlantic's notorious weather. 
21 VVhinney, Cdr. R, The U-Boat Peril, Blandford, London, 1986: for convoy life, sans combat, on p.123 
only. It was reprinted in 1998 with more of his own photographs, but no changes to the text. The new 
photos alone had the effect of giving a more personal slant to the account. 
" van der Vat, D, The Atlantic Campaign, Hodder & Stoughton, 1988, p.382. 
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Navy 1894-1984, 1984. Other general and technical volumes grew in size, 
quality, and frequency. Westwood's Fighting Ships of WW-II, Ellises Famous  
Ships of WW-il, van der Porten's Pictorial History of the German Navy in WW-II  
(all 1976), Casey's Naval Aircraft 1939-45, 1975, and Connell's Fighting 
Destroyer, 1976, all showed the benefit of contemplation after access to 
sources. Schmalenbach's 1979 German Raiders focussed on glorious ships, 
as had Garrett's 1978 Schamhorst & Gneisenau: the Elusive Sisters. 
Bassett's Battlecruisers, 1981, was narrative but peripheral. More largely 
technical non-mythic works emerged, spreading like oil over the surface of 
topics. 24 Gibson's Death of a Phantom Raider, 1987, not only elaborated yet 
another raider's career, it also discussed a small German controversy. As with 
Buchheim, the lone survivor was subjected to ridicule and abuse for his story 
and portraya1. 26 
Omnibus editions in addition to biographies were possible by 1976, both 
for MacLean and other thriller novelists, and maritime , authors. Monsarrat at  
Sea collected wartime fiction and autobiography. His captain, Lombard-
Hobson, gave a staid autobiography in A Sailor's War, 1983.26 Baker's Terror 
of Tobermory: An Informal Biography of Gilbert Stephenson,  1977 begged the 
question were any formal. Williams's Capt.Roberts & the U-Boat School, 
1979 filled vital spaces about these two key men, while the long silence on the 
Royal Canadian Navy ended with Waters's Bloody Winter, 1984, after 
Lawrence's unrepresentative 1979 A Bloody War: One Man's Memories of the  
Royal Canadian Navy, 1939-45. 27 Wellings's 0.H.M.S: Observations of the 
Royal Navy Home Fleet, 1940-41,1983,  related an American attache's 
23 It compared well with Brennecke's thoroughly unreliable 1960 Schlachtschiff Bismarck, (Kohlers 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Herford) though that contained information not seen elsewhere. 
24  Hansen's Ships of the German Fleets 1868-1945, 1974, Preston's First Submarines, Submarines  
Since 1919, 1974, Illustrated History of the Navies Of MN-II, 1976, Battleships 1919-77, 1977, U-Boats, 
1978, Aircraft Carriers, 1979, Cruisers, 1980, Dreadnought to Nuclear Submarine, 1980, History of the  
Royal Navy, 1983. Lenton's German Warships of the Second World War, 1975, Young's A Dictionary of 
Ships of the Royal Navy of WW-II, 1975, Raven and Roberts's British Battleships of WW-II, 1976, and 
British Cruisers of WW-II, 1980; Pemsel's Atlas of Naval Warfare, 1977, Ireland's Warships, Lyon's 
Encyclopaedia of the World's Warships. 1900-78, 1978, Haines's Cruiser at War 1978 and Destroyers at 
War, 1982, Moore's Warships of the Royal Navy, 1979, Grove's Hardware of \AAN-II, 1984, and VVhitley's 
German Cruisers of WW-II, 1985. 
Declared dead, rescued from a raft of suspiciously-injured dead men, he spent the rest of his life, like 
Anastasia Romanov, trying to establish his bona fides. Blair's purely operational account makes no 
mention of any controversy, vol.2, op.cit p. 199. 
26  Lombard-Hobson was, unlike Cruel Sea's Merchant Navy-transfer Ericson, however, a regular Royal 
Navy officer unwillingly in anti-subrnarine warfare. 
27  Lawrence like Lombard-Hobson was another regular who felt unhappy in ASW, unlike VVhinney qv, 
who realised its importance. 
168 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	5: IN BONDAGE TO THE BOMBE 
experiences. Buell's 1980 Master of Seapower: Adm.Earnest J King  gave a 
balanced picture of the man, demonstrating that much myth and controversy 
were contemporary and political, not actual and supportable by sources. 
Padfield's 1984 Danitz: the Last Fuhrer remains the only critical and analytical 
biography: Howarth called it magisteria1. 28 Marcuses DEMS? What's DEMS?, 
1986, complained about forgotten Australian navy servicemen on merchant 
ships, mythically ignoring the merchant seamen who actually manned the 
guns. A.Kemp's 1982 German Commanders of WW-II included Donitz only 
because he became Fuhrer, ignoring any stories of dull but vital leaders such 
as Raeder or Canaris, or numerous ace U-Boat commanders. It was 
symptomatic of the lower esteem held of naval and maritime matters compared 
to other Second World War interests, for the modeller-buff-collector techno-
historical readership' which comprises much of the current market. 28 
Broad selections of mythic experiences were provided by Hay's 1982 
War Under the Red Ensign and Slader's 1988 Red Duster at War, while Evans' 
"Merchant Mariners" showed that commemoration and adequate support were 
still lacking. 3° Padfield's 1981 Beneath the House Flag of P&O  avoided 
mention of war service almost totally. Cowden's Price of Peace, 1981, was a 
limited, almost 'vanity publishing' history of Elder Dempster's war losses. 
Assembled ship by ship from convoy reports, without experiences, only the 
final voyage of lost ships were mentioned: nothing of the company, or its 
service. All were typical tales of a few founderings and constructive losses 
among bombing and torpedoing. By comparison, Barker's Goodnight, Sorry  
for Sinking You  was far more thorough and worthy, even while it only told the 
ordeal of the survivors of one sinking. It combined Lccuracy and humanity 
without sentimentality, and made the important distinction between what 
people thought, and what some of the facts were: their opinions were 
presented as such, not the case in many personal or oral accounts. The Ship 
28 An uncritical German biography, Steinert's Capitulation: the Donitz Reqime (Constable, London, 1969), 
was limited to the last months of the war; there is also the rare Busch's GrossAdmiral DOnitz: Gross 
Strateqe des U-Boot-Krieqes, [Landser Military paperbacks #105], Erich Pabel Verlag, nd. The only 
other account of Donitz is also by Padfield, in Howarth's Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of VWV-II, 
1992. 
Soldiers and airmen are better known and more popular, therefore books intended for this audience 
concentrated on them. Presumably no-one would paint tiny figurines of Canaris or Ribbentrop. 
33 Australian Reveille V.55 N.2, March 1980, p.15. 
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reviewed it as "an authentic picture of life and attitudes in the 1940s". 31 Barker 
always kept the human story at the centre. There was unfortunately nothing of 
the Battle's context at all: the lives and backgrounds of the passengers were 
related, not why life at sea was dangerous, and why the ship was sunk. 
Perhaps the best description of a single convoy battle, in its narrative 
balance and style, was Revelly's 1979 ONS-154: the Convoy that Nearly Died. 
A post-Ultra account, before Milner's revision of the Royal Canadian Navy's 
escort shortcomings, it featured very effective diagrammes of the whittling-
away of the convoy over time. Almost a top-down history, it balanced a 
personal story with official texts from the Merchant Navy, Royal Canadian 
Navy and U-waffe. It was a little more mechanical when describing the losses 
of other ships, though the U-Boat sections were lively (as a result of meeting, 
as old men, with a former U-Boat Commander). Inventiveness, clarity and 
style prevented the narration of shipping losses one after the other becoming 
tedious, though the usual 'waiting to see who survived' remained. 
Text and style were slower and less deft in Middlebrook's 1976 Convoy:  
the Battle for SC-122 & HX-229. Combined with Rohwer's equally scholarly 
Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943, it provided a complete picture of convoy 
life, with one important exception: the 97% of convoys, ships and men never 
attacked. During the crisis of December 1942-May 1943 there were few 
convoys which escaped unseen or unmolested. That was partly why those 
months were critical, but it has skewed thinking of the whole Battle as being 
like this. Creighton had counter-mythically stated the forgotten experience of 
the majority in 1955. 32 Rohwer and Middlebrook Were more praised for 
attention to detail, non-sentimentality and calm viewpoint, as well as factual 
grasp, than presentation sans mythology. Middlebrook took a personalised, 
unsentimental, participant's viewpoint, from both sides, mainly of Royal Navy 
and Merchant Navy crews. Rohwer concentrated on grand strategy and 
technology's devolution onto tactics, avoiding diversion by Ultra. He noted it 
came too late to advantage comprehensive rewriting; as no primary documents 
were yet available. In later translated editions Rohwer was skilled and 
3 ' From its jacket blurb. 
32 See Chapter Three this volume. 
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restrained enough not to allow Ultra to dominate. He recognised the vital truth 
about Enigma, Ultra, HF/DF, and SigInt. HF/DF played the larger part, even at 
this late stage of the cryptological game. 33 
Beesly's 1982 Very Special Intelligence,  supplanted McLachlan's 
1968 pre-Ultra book on wartime naval radio-intelligence; his Room 40, 
described its Great War predecessor. His "Operation Intelligence & the Battle 
of the Atlantic" countered Ultra myths. "The role of intelligence was vital...by this I 
do not mean the struggle was won by backroom boys sitting in comparative comfort 
and safety."35 This was a point often lost on audiences of populist books and 
TV, such as Station X and Very Special Intelligence. "We must be careful not to 
overemphasise the value of decryption." 36 Russell's 1980 "Ultra & the Campaign 
Against the U-Boats in 1NW2" was for long a classified American National 
Security Agency document, now available electronically. 37 Winton's Ultra At 
Sea, 1988 bought into the muted controversy, less effectively than his masterly 
generalised Convoy of 1983 and 1990. This related the entire history of 
commerce protection from the Roman era forward, concentrating on both world 
wars. It demonstrated continuity and change over an even greater period than 
usual. Effective debunking of the Ultra myth began with the 1981-89 Official  
History of British Intelligence in the Second World War,  but only began to 
gather force after 1990. 
Doyen of postwar aircraft historians, Chas Bowyer, also contributed to 
Battle myth. Coastal Command at War, 1979 combined earlier experiences 
and myth, as Southall had. By 1985 he was writing what had always been 
understood, less frequently stated: "If U-Boats had cut off the UK, it could not have 
survived more than a few months." 38 This was in every Battle and U-Boat book 
but rarely put so explicitly, or its timeframe (months, not weeks) laid out. This 
33 In that it allowed the escorts on the spot to run down the bearing of a signal and scare off or attack a U-
Boat, dispensing the complicated expensive and above all incredibly classified work at Bletchley to 
extract what the signal actually said: more valuable in the long run but of less use to an SOE beset on all 
sides by elusive, deadly, enemies. 
34 Subtitled The Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre in World War Two. 
35 Beesly "Operational Intelligence & the Battle: the Role of the RN's Submarine Tracking Room" in 
37 Russell, 1980, "Ultra...Against the U-Boats in WW2": http://omni.cc.purdue.edu/—phaiultraffiavy-1.html 
3a Bowyer 1985 op.cit, introduction, np. 
Boutillier [ed] 1982 op.cit p.176. 
36 Douglas & Rohwer in !bid, p.189. 
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gave rise to several interpretations. 39 The Orbis Illustrated Encyclopaedia of 
Aircraft, Issues 83-87, 1983, included the Battle's air operations, serialised and 
mythic, for aeroplane buffs only. Aberrations like Ratcliffe's Liquid Gold Ships:  
a History of the Tanker, 1859-1984, 1985, avoided the war completely. It 
covered economics and brief technology, like Padfield (P&O, 1981), despite the 
construction, experiences, and high losses requiring attention. Hamilton's 
1986 compilation of oil paintings on key events and scenes War at Sea 1939-  
45, was as mythical as any text or photo-essay, devoid of mundaneity. 
A template for an as-yet-unwritten comprehensive technical history, 
Watts' U-Boat Hunters, 1976, was almost outstanding. It covered not only all 
Allied vessels, technologies and equipment, but also had a short but detailed 
concise and effective history, phase by phase. It was unfortunately a 
secondary-source based account, though with Ultra and Signals Intelligence 
there was no official history for another decade in any case. It also lacked a -4 
conclusion or overview. A text combining and analysing technology and 
events is yet to be written. What it lacked most was a chapter on men other ; 
than leaders. It would have benefitted enormously from a discussion of their ' 
impact on strategy, morale, and tactics, as well as Stephenson at Tobermory 
and Roberts at WATU. 4° Women were even more strikingly absent, 
considering their large role in operational administration, in cryptology at 
Bletchley and training at WATU and Tobermory's HMS Western Isles. 
Discussing the skills, ideas, and effect of the great Escort commanders would 
have perfectly complimented weapons and sensors. 41 
ROssler's huge comprehensive technical history\ The U-Boat was totally 
outside the realm of the buff and fan. "Sadly, technical history remains the poor 
relation of history and engineering, even though it should play a key role as a lynchpin 
between the two disciplines. Many historical events can only be explained within the 
framework of technical developments, of important events and even of large 
misconceptions, just as technical developments may only be appreciated when one 
39 The Battle was never close, and should not have been a worry; or months were not long, given the 
needs of peacetime nations increased with war construction. Trade convoys "replenished the nation's 
larder", perhaps the best definition of them. They were not an instantaneous feed, with instant effects 
following on every loss, but everything they carried, and everything lost, was vital. Ibid. 
ao Tobermory was the tactical base for working up new crews in seamanship, weaponry and tactics. The 
Western Approaches Tactical Unit trained captains and officers in leadership tactics and offensive anti-
submarine warfare strategies: how best to confront U-Boat pack-attack at sea. 
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takes account of the historical background." 42 Here ROssler put his finger on the 
problem later brought up by Milner in the second of his two RCN volumes, and 
by Zimmerman at the British fiftieth Anniversary conference. There is still very 
little idea of the influence of technology beyond broad strokes which highlight 
the significance of HF/DF, radar, ASDIC, Snorkel. There is nothing at all on 
how these and the human-technology interface actually operated, or were 
perceived. 
Counter-mythology was rarely served directly. Hinsley's Official History 
of British Intelligence in the Second World War, (Six vols, 1979-90) finally 
actually showed the relative roles Ultra, HF/DF, et al played, compared to 
fighting and logistics. Such non-or-countermyth was buried by the scale of the 
surrounds. Barnett's Iron Britannia: the Falklands War & British National 
Opinion, 1982, related the myths of 1982 to the Churchillian ones of 1940, as 
well as Thatcher's "abuse of Churchillism". 43 It also unintentionally showed the 
gap between media opinion and public opinion, passing off the former as the 
latter.  Grey Dawn Breaking: British Merchant Seafarers in the Late 
20Th Century, 1986, made the point that "everyone at sea since 1945 has worked 
with wartime seamen."45 , one reason Battle myths have been pervasive. More 
recent seamen have absorbed the mythic experiences of participants. 
There were slow shifts in Battle writing between 1980 and 1995. 
Certainly 1960 was a date after which there were no more movies, and after 
which a social revolution began swamping the memorialisation of past 
events.46 In another sense 1969 and 1974 were not so much watersheds, as 
Ultra impacted in Britain first. When Canadian writings emerged, Ultra was 
already part of the historical landscape. Academic history was more prevalent. 
41 Such as Walker, Gretton, Broome, MacIntyre, Campbell. 
42 	op.cit, p.9. 
43 Such as the British 'right' to defend sovereign territory, the 'Britishness' of responses to the crisis 
[defiance, moral outrage, national unity in a time of decline], compared to Churchillian language, and the 
sense of Elizabethan and Napoleonic-era invasion peril prevalent in 1940 and 1982. In 1982 it was 
largely only British rights that were infringed, though it was portrayed as if Britain had been invaded, not 
merely tiny dependent territories 8800miles away. Events were seen almost exclusively through 
Churchillian—Elizabethan eyes, rather than coolly describing the overseas deployment of military forces. 
Cited in Calder 1991 op.cit p.xiv. 
" The press and parliamentary reports were not identical to opinions by ordinary people. Indeed the 
strongly patriotic and militaristic opinions of both sides of parliament were distinct from many ordinary 
citizens as well as the academic left. 
45 Lane 1986 op.cit p.41. 
46 Frears, loc.cit. 
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Canadian Battle history, unadorned since the early 1950s, was never as 
revolutionised as British or American. 47 Practically all Battle work in Canada 
occurred after 1979, given the availability of primary sources, admission of 
neglect, and the desire to revise. Both Gardiner and Law (1993), and this 
author agree these distinctions are convenient clarifying tools for manipulating 
the past. The revelations of 1974 did not change cinema. Documentary was 
so infrequent it played no part in or could be affected by any changes, though 
1978's Battle documentary featured Ultra. 48 Little changed in fiction. No new 
perspective emerged after Das Boot. That was different content, not style or 
theme. Clear distinctions have been difficult and broke down under too much 
analysis. New histories in the style of 1950's works emerged from established 
and new authors. Much new material after 1974 merely inserted Ultra with 
little consideration of its ramifications for events, or how it and the campaign 
were represented. 
Schofield's 1981 article "Defeat of the U-Boat in W.W.2" pointed out it 
was Winterbotham and then the November 1978 German naval history 
conference which set Ultra as the revision point. 49 At this conference all points 
leading to the defeat were given equal time: Ultra, convoying, escorts, training, 
radar, HF/DF, diversion, escort carriers, and very-long-range anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft. By late 1978 the general impression, even if not borne out by 
most texts upon a closer reading, was that Ultra alone won the Battle, and the 
war. It had lodged in the minds of many participants, and penetrated the 
public mind. Populist books and TV series like R.V. Jones' Most Secret War, 
(1979) emphasised and permanised ideas of a clean,war fought and won by 
'boffins', backroom boys and black boxes, instead of the bloody, personal war 
of attrition fought by combatants and civilians alike. Schofield was careful to 
point out the key elements of the struggle and defeat, non-mythically making 
the distinction between how things seemed and how they were. His position in 
hindsight did not blind him to how things might have concluded. 50 Schofield 
made no mention of any postwar taking-up of the myth of disastrous losses, 
and clearly he could see there was a difference between wartime perception 
47 There was no canon, nor a vast body of existing work and opinion for Ultra to overturn. 
48A little too early to be 'reinterpreted in the light of Ultra"; though it did describe Ultra's participation. 
49 Schofield, B, "Defeat of the U-Boats During World War II", Journal of Contemporary History Vol 16, Jan 
1981, p.127. 
174 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	5: IN BONDAGE TO THE BOMBE 
and postwar fact. He also pointed out how considerable morale problems, 
especially in the Merchant Navy, offset shipping repair and construction. It 
was not all myth, nor all merely competing British and American demands on 
shipping allocations. 51 
As with the Immediate Post-War Era, the '30-Year Rule' vein ran thin. 
Analytical accounts and taking stock did not make good cinema, even if they 
might make good documentary. 52 It did not have to contend, as did British film 
in the 1960s, with an end to tariffs or a consequent fall in funding. 53 This boom 
was self-supporting, lasted longer, and merged with the Anniversary era. 
Events and controversies had been reassessed in the light of new sources and 
new interpretations fit for a world thirty years on. Very little new was present, 
showing why things happened, why others did not, what people knew. 54 Many 
participants were too traumatised or indifferent to be inspired. Military history, 
with its apparent fascination with war, killing, weaponry, and death, did not 
attract historians who could have pushed theory forward. Left-wing historians 
critical of the policy and actions of their imperialist forebears were yet to be 
heard. They were involved with other topics in the new era of slightly-right-
wing operational history after 1969. 55 
The limited British fascination with the Battle is partly explained by its 
importance as a historical and national event. It was the most vital part of a 
deadly serious war for the survival of the nation, the most grave test it has ever 
faced. 56 British perceptions of the battle and the Battle remained less than the 
fascination with Dunkirk, D-Day and the Battle Of Britain. Despite the Battle's 
growing profile in the public mind, the obsession remained a component of the 
general British fascination with the Second World War as a whole. As John 
Cleese pointed out, by way of his 'Germans' episode of FawIty Towers, the 
5° Blair (1997) saw wartime conceptions as being accepted postwar perceptions. 
51 Blair did not go as far as Smith in excluding ships or fighting from his account, but he still obscured the 
human cost. 
52 Such as happened to Great War disasters such as Coronel, and Cressy Hogue and Aboukir see Ch.2: 
1914-45. 
53-Tars, op cit. 
54 But couldn't say: the Ultra secret. 
55 They were suspicious of military history: "a handmaid of militarism..its chief use propagandist and 
myth-making." What no-one considered exploring was how, what, why, when & where those myths 
occurred; Howard, op.cit, p.188. 
56 Hobsbawm, op.cit p.38-9; Overy, R, Why the Allies Won Jonathon Cape, London, 1995 p.13; Costello 
& Hughes 1977 op.cit p.9; Charmley, 1995 op.cit, pp.46 & 359. 
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British stayed enthralled by it and its public presentation. "It was simply the last 
time Britain was even remotely significant on the world stage, and they cannot let go 
of that legacy of empire and world power."67 British history of the events was as 
much tied to the era in which they were written as to any tradition of British 
myth-making, or the events themselves. Though constants run through all the 
histories of the five eras, to some extent why histories were written, and the 
audiences they were written for, were plainly creations of their times. 68 These 
were more than mere opportunities presented by new sources and 
anniversaries. The wealthy, secure, and above all growing UK of 1960-72 did 
not need the memories of 1939-45 the way the weakened, tired UK of 1969-79 
did. Britain at the time of the first series of Fawlty Towers (1975) was in the 
grip of a financial, industrial and sociocultural crisis. Wartime power and fame 
became an excuse for self-pity and reminiscence without connection to the 
world at hand. "In the 1950 -60's, war nostalgia was submerged by an optimistic, 
forward-looking Britain; in the bad-tempered Britain of the 1970's, angry Left-wing 
dramatists turned to the Second World War to find the origins of the present crisis in 
the betrayal of ordinary people after 1945." 59 
Britain's withdrawals from Empire 1945-1982 were largely a civilian and 
military affair, none requiring convoy. The Navy had very little chance to make 
publicity from its activities, especially after the debacle of Suez in 1956. 60 
Even the Navy's fame and acknowledgment of its finest hour faded somewhat. 
The Falklands War of 1982, after years of relative neglect, brought the Royal 
Navy back into the limelight in a way that no NATO exercise or deployment 
could. Had Argentine submarine activity required convoy, the Battle might 
have been reused, and remembered differently. 61 Depite her avowed dislike 
of the Royal Navy and its traditions and resistance, Thatcher could not do 
without the Royal or Merchant Navies to retake the Falklands and make her 
political name. Both the Royal and Merchant Navies suffered losses and 
gained media attention, and the long road back for the 'Senior Service' in both 
prominence and in actual forces, and for the Merchant Navy, at least in 
57 John Cleese in A-Z of British Comedy, Channel-4, 1994. 
58 Constants are strategy, tactics, technologies, and the minutiae of operational reports: names, 
tonnages, and losses. 
59 Calder 1991 op.cit, p.266. 
69 Save the Yangtse River/HMS Amethyst incident of 1949, filmed 1957 as Yanotse Incident. 
61 Winton 1983 op.cit p.323. 
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prominence, began.62 	The most rabid opinions and emotional 
demonstrativeness since VE-Day served the multiple goals of promoting 
national unity, political solidarity behind the Tories, a distraction from social 
and cultural problems at home, and a growth of public spending and 
employment in defence production (something the Thatcher family and the 
Tories have never left behind). 63 The other consequence was a little belated 
recognition for the Merchant Navy, much less than in 1939-45, but more than 
1945-82. The Falklands War marked the turning point: if 1971 was the nadir of 
Merchant Navy fortunes, in terms of representation and public perception, 
since 1982 the position and awareness of the Merchant Navy in the public eye, 
and its place in scholarship and general writing, have grown steadily. The 
fiftieth anniversary none too soon integrated the Merchant Navy into general 
war histories. 
Also starkly obvious about the Falklands conflict were the limited 
evolution (in approach or conceptualisation) of its representations. General, 
operational, campaign, incidental, personal, memorial and technical accounts 
emerged, as did TV news-based general documentaries supportive or critical 
of the Government. 64 Dramatists made a single work on the life of an injured, 
disadvantaged soldier. 65 There was more realism due to a less restricted 
(though still jingoistic) press, and more acknowledgment by the Navy of the 
famous, vital participation of the Merchant Navy's containerships and liners. 
Documentaries and books commemorated Atlantic Conveyor and Canberra, 
the 'Great White Whale', as much as any warship, sourced from news reports 
and TV footage. 66 The Royal Navy and the public finally realised, in merely the 
latest of a long line of maritime crises, just how important the Merchant Navy 
had always been. The Falklands was a clear case of harking back to past 
glories. This time the past glories were merchant as well as naval. 67 
62 Barnett 1982, op.cit. 
63 C.f. the actions of Mark Thatcher, international arms dealer supported by his mother's personal 
contacts. 
64 Critical naval documentary, like Rule Britannia [Channel-4/Genesis Productions, 1992], was at least a 
new theme. 
65 Tumbledown, BBC-TV, 1992. 
66 "Canberra cruises where QE2 refuses!", from a soldier's painted banner aboard her. 
67 Both books about the Battle, and about the Falklands War emphasised continuing Merchant Navy 
traditions; how its members felt themselves to be following the service and sacrifice of both wars. 
Atlantic Conveyor's Captain North was last seen searching alone amid her fires for overlooked survivors, 
refusing to save himself. More importantly, his crew consciously regarded "Captain Birdseye" as an old- 
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Military and political works were unpopular in Germany 1970-88, in stark 
contrast to the US and UK.68 They only appealed to tiny numbers of ex-
participants and small numbers of unseen younger hard-Right Affigionadoes. 
Neo-Nazis of later years would feed off these continuing obsessions. 69 Ultra 
penetrated German writings as everywhere else. It came first with journalist 
Boddeker's Caught in the Net, 1981.7° Intended as an expose, it merely 
translated existing Western perceptions of Ultra's domination of the Battle, and 
the ease with which it alone won. The principal effect in Germany was to add 
to the sense of sacrifice and victimisation some former U-Boat men felt, or had 
come to feel as a result of mid-1960's books and Buchheim. A few ex-
submariners were on Buchheim's side. Boddeker broke new ground in 
content, but was trapped in the same narrative tradition as earlier works. 71 
Cremer's  U-333, the Story of a U-boat Ace, 1982, barely indicated the 
beginning of a new perspective from other memoirists. That would come 
later. 72 
Buchheim's 1978 photo-essay U-Boat War and sequels were, without 
flippancy, 'Regret Publishing'. 73 This began in a sense with Werner. They had 
no glory, no triumph. The books were devoid of a sense of achievement or 
even of the necessity of fighting.74 This regretful mood (without exploring 
consequences), the theme of all postwar German writing, usually remained 
absent from non-German books about the Battle. What coffee-table books 
lacked in content and analysis they compensated for in removing any sense of 
joy, importance, artificially achieved status or rank, or other ascribed terms of 
reference for seeing the events and the people involved. Here there was only 
sorrow, awareness of the stupidity, waste, and futility of it all. There were no 
gains, advances. These were not unit histories, nor proper memorials: they 
were not written to remember the dead, only the overall losses. 
style captain of the wartime mold. Hay 1982 op.cit, p.167-8; Villar, Capt. R, Merchant Ships at War: the 
Falklands, Conways Maritime Press & Lloyds of London, 1984, p.82. 
6Er 	 — Hadley o p.cit p.140. 
69 Kettenacker, L, Germany Since 1945, Oxford University Press, London, 1997, p.319. 
70 Hadley, op.cit, p.153. 
71 !bid p.154. 
72 Cremer (1982 op.cit, p.269-70), at last reflected on what the war had done to Germany. Only Topp 
(1991) went further. 
13 Like coffee-table books on the Holocaust, or the Nevada Test Site's effect on surrounding 
communities. 
74 For postwar German writers there was naturally less ability and opportunity to dwell on necessity, as 
they had begun the war against Poland and thus France and Britain. 
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After Buchheim, fiction shifted from the Battle itself to novels about U-
Boats, or about ships, or about codes, rather than the sea and the men. Re-
mythologisation distorted already limited and formulaic representation. More 
novels were about warships than freighters, tankers or tugs. Controversy 
continued, and copies of and variations upon Das Boot as well as earlier 
works, appeared. Nothing new was attempted by authors, publishers, or 
audiences. Innovators were working elsewhere: feminism, ethnic minorities, 
post-modernism. Innovation and de-mythologisation brought attacks, isolation, 
or legal action, as to Irving and Buchheim, not merely criticism. Nothing 
counter-mythical emerged from ex-Allied or German writers. Buchheim was 
re-mythical, he had changed . content, but not focus and point: the U-Boat was 
still the mythical core, now demonised and animated, and the men in it even 
smaller and weaker than in earlier representations. 75 
A new feature was the reissue and republication of old novels, echoing 
the rerelease of wartime cinema 1946-52. With new blurb, in glossy new 
covers, they appeared to be brand new titles for the 1970s and 1980s, not 
reprints of titles from twenty years before. This has recent parallels, like the 
current boom in CD remarketing of old music, and remakes of old TV serials 
and cinema films.76 Another key feature was the way that real events were 
fictionalised, how actual events infused the fiction, at times enriching it, as with 
The Cruel Sea and Whisky Galore. More recently actual events were used to 
exceed the bounds of credibility and to make some novels truly unbelievable. 
This would never be accepted by audiences during or shortly after the war: 
memories were too fresh. 77 Nonfiction began to play more often with non-
mythology and counter-mythology, even if the majority of popular and 
remembered works remained mythical. However, while nonfiction continued to 
raise awareness, and exorcise personal demons for long-silent authors and 
readers, novels remained stuck in commerce. Precisely because of their 
limitations to formula they spoke little of their time or ours, save producers and 
audience's expectations. Because they needed to sell, and were required by 
75 Hadley op.cit p.166. 
76 Such as The Fugitive, Lost In Space, Sergeant Bilko. 
77 The Objective Burma rule: from Flynn's very-humorously derided 1-man US Army assault on the 
Japanese in Burma. 
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publishers and audience to be released regularly and smoothly, Battle fictions 
became just another subgenre, unlike nonfiction. 
Atlantic novels appealed to the same limited market as nonfiction, but 
had mainstream mass-market competition. Consumer demand from within the 
limited market was sufficiently high and uncritical that these books continued to 
be produced by a growing number of authors, in a bewildering diversity of 
topics and settings and plots, with no improvement in quality or composition. 
These novels were still limited, inaccurate, episodic, formulaic and boring. 
They contained little of the tone or subject of their 1950's predecessors, or 
even the (relatively) beautiful writing of the classics. Even these at times had 
been less than they appeared. 78 Ultra even penetrated post-Buchheim fiction, 
in that it became the key to novels such as Williams' Atlantic Convoy (1979) 
and Pope's Decoy (1983). Pope worked in minesweepers and ASW trawlers 
during the war and became the outstanding young new popular naval historian 
of the immediate post-war era. 78 Secret-mission novels had always existed. 8° 
Now they had factual codes and hardware. This further excluded and 
sidelined the actual ASW Battle seen in the classics with carefully placed 
characters of earlier decades. It was no longer enough. 'Realism' and actual 
fighting were as exhausted as descriptive metaphor. Only implausible 
missions or ludicrously-compressed action were worthy of description. Now 
serials became possible: historian Poolman created Chanter, RN, about the life 
of a pilot, who flew, fought, and romanced his way through the war. 
Prominent and original novelists were no more attracted to the Battle 
than academic historians. Some, like postwar searn6n, wrote about the war 
absorbed or inspired by parent's stories and memories, or endless TV repeats 
of movies. Professionals wrote more accurate, better written, more worthy 
books than participants. They conformed to fiction's standards without the 
hyperbole and histrionics participants seemed to think necessary to enhance 
the events, as if the events themselves were not exciting enough. 81 There 
were few narrative paths. Convoys could be fought through heavy odds, seen 
78 Monsarrat's wartime nonfiction; HMS Ulysses' origin or resemblance to 1945's shorter Northern Escort: 
see Ch.3. 
79  Histories such as 73 North, The Black Ships, The Battle of the River Plate, not all Atlantic-related. 
8° Callison's A Flock of Ships, 1970, for instance. 
81 See Ch.2: beginning, introducing characters, development, use of plot devices, climax, conclusion. 
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from individual or several ships. In others the central character repeated 
incidents in novel after novel, with supporting characters changing names, not 
roles. 82 Others featured unlikely secret missions grafted onto routine 
operations. 83 There were contemporary ephemeral fictions set in every 
possible area and aspect of the Battle: regular warships, anti-submarine 
warships, merchant vessels, aircraft, submarines, even shore bases. All were 
similar in tone and narrative, differing only in name, setting, luridness, or the 
use of supposedly secret, revolutionary, breakthrough technology to win the 
Battle at a stroke. 84 
Williams' 1979 Atlantic Convoy was as indicative of the genre as any. It 
literally had a dozen viewpoints, instead of one in Forrester's The Good  
Shepherd. 85 Its short chapters jumped from ship to shore to U-Boat to aircraft 
to ship, advancing every subplot little by little. Devoid of the excessive 
expression typical of former participant-fiction, it instead had multiple 
relationships, and too much happening. There was little character 
development, many, hardly being introduced before their deaths. There was 
romance and sex, in unlikely and uninteresting liaisons between the head of U-
boat Operations Paris and his secretary; a U-Boat commander and a rich 
French girl. Nothing had any emotional weight for them, or the reader. If this 
author did not feel involved or could not identify with these characters, would 
other readers? It bulged with 'Objective Burma' errors no 1950's popular 
author would contemplate: ordinary WRNS knew and used Ultra, there was 
continual dialogue between Bletchley and the Operational Intelligence Centre, 
one ship carried materials for nuclear research from America to Britain, with a 
German agent aboard. There was material enough for half a dozen novels, 
and a full year's TV-drama serial, but compressed into 237 pages it hardly 
outlined events before sweeping to the inevitable massed-action climax. No 
character was familiar enough to care about; it was mere moving of men - and 
women - and machines about a vast role-playing gameboard. 
82 I.e series such as Chanter Royal Navy: Convoy Commodore; paralleled by other eras: The Great War, 
Napoleonic, Late Victorian, post-Second World War. 
Im U-700 Decoy. 
An outgrowth of fiction's long preoccupation with counterfactual history, changing to suit whim, 
especially getting characters out of inescapable binds with miracle weapons or tactics. 
85 Harking back to 1945's forgotten Northern Escort's undeveloped multiplicity of characters: see Ch.3. 
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Though it was a Cold-War novel, Clancy's 1987 Red Storm Rising  
indicated continuity as well as change. It was inspired by an actual wargame, 
and indeed had much less developed narrative and characterisation than his 
first and later novels. It had the role-turn, move and counter-move feel of a 
game, not the fuller structure of a story. The wargame, Convoy '84 was an 
attempt to allow civilians to fight the Battle with modern weapons and sensors, 
which only NATO powers had done in secret games before. In Red Storm an 
Islamic attack halved Soviet oil production. 86 It demonstrated another Atlantic 
Battle Would still be a key factor in fighting the resulting non-nuclear ground 
war in central Europe. It also showed the Battle was still in someone's 
consciousness: a destroyer was called Reuben James. 87 Weather, convoy 
and escort, airpower (both very-long-range and organic) were explored. 
Though technology advanced, the rules did not. The Soviets seized key 
Atlantic defences Norway and Iceland early. Initial conquests determined the 
Battle's progress, the Battle and possession of bases, as well as adequate. 
convoy defence, partly determined the course of the land war. Echoing The . • 
Cruel Sea, the novel ended with the ship mooring, an officer reflecting on life. 88 
Writers of quality popular fiction operated elsewhere: in the horror 
genre, or in historical or 'thoughtful' (if not serious) fiction. Unlike Monsarrat or 
MacLean they were not compelled by commercial interest or internal desire to 
write in an era recovering from a monumental global conflict. Nor did they 
need to define a relationship to the event. This also accounted for the total 
silence, bar Das Boot, of warship films after 1960. Studio executives instead 
concentrated on other issues (rock and roll, social ,change, espionage) or 
clearly more famous events, more likely to attract audiences - hence the 
steady output of fighter plane and commando films until the late 1960's, 
already exploiting the incipient nostalgia market. 89 
es Prompting a Soviet attack on NATO to prevent European intervention in a Soviet attack on Middle-
Eastern oilfields. 
87 After the first US Navy destroyer sunk in the Second World War's Atlantic Battle. 
88 Clancy 1986 op.cit, p.830. 
es Manvell op.cit pp.316, 318. 
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The last exception to 'the era of Bad Movies', 1950-60, was the 1981 
German anti-war Das Boot, from Buchheim's famous 1973 novel. Due to its 
success and media profile, its rights were quickly sold, as The Cruel Sea's had 
been, thirty years before. The film and longer TV mini-series, and eventual 
Director's Cut (1997), were however, Petersen's, not Buchheim's, as Hadley 
pointed out. 9° Buchheim carried the criticism from Germany and elsewhere, 
and also disagreed with Petersen on some points of the film, though less with 
the longer better-paced miniseries, and, one assumes, the much later 
Director's Cut. Its distortions of fact to fit the needs of cinematic storytelling 91 
and distortions of perspective 92 were pure myth: Petersen's re-mythologisation 
of Buchheim's re-mythologisation. This was how Buchheim coped with his 
views of the war, DOnitz, the Battle; why he survived while others did not. 
Oddly, Suid considered Das Boot both covering and whitewashing the Nazi 
regime, while its characters criticised it. "The filmmakers took pains to remove the 
issue of the nature of the government for whom the sailors were sacrificing their lives"; 
then "the manner in which the makers of Das Boot manipulate audiences to forget or 
forgive the true nature of the Nazi government is insidious", while later "throughout 
the movie the officers make clear their displeasure with the Nazi regime." 93 So did 
the film itself: a fly walked across a framed picture of Donitz: whom Buchheim 
held responsible for all the killing, then and later. In the novel the 
correspondent Lt.Werner (Buchheim) only wished it would. 94 This was 
Petersen, yet Buchheim never spared his criticism of Donitz. His life since 
1945 became increasingly bound up with his growing obsession with U-Boats 
and DOnitz. 
Das Boot was, despite its content, aimed at the youth market: edited 
and advertised as action and excitement, not tension and boredom in between. 
Even though it was an anti-war film by a relatively young director, it still had to 
aim at a young action movie audience, not an adult, film audience. 95 This is 
one reason why the film's derided lack of discipline aboard existed: to present 
1980's youth with Nazi-era discipline would have looked ridiculous. It was not 
91 Men alive on a burning tanker 6 hours after torpedoing; or many crew killed and U-96 sunk by strafing 
at the climax of the novel. Buchheim witnessed such events towards the end of the war, in late 1944. 
92 Anti-Nazi crewmembers openly ridiculing and condemning Hitler, Goring. 
93 Suid in "The Battle in Feature Films" in Runyan and Copes op.cit p.319-20. 
94 It is highly tempting to consider Lt.Werner was named after the author of Iron Coffins... 
93 Hadley op.cit pp.148, 151-2. 
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aimed at those on the right who criticised its misrepresentation, or even those 
on the left who criticised its apparent lack of condemnation of Nazism. It was 
trapped with the wrong editing for the wrong audience in the right time and 
place. As Hadley related, the brooding electronic score by Doldinger had none 
of the upbeat, glory and pomp of earlier combat films, or even the subdued 
dramatic theme of The Cruel Sea. Even Das Boot's exciting sections did not 
have the positive, militaristic tones of most war films, which enhance the action 
and support the direction and viewpoint of the characters and plot. 96 To this 
author the action tracks have an urgency coupled with frantic agitation, not 
excitement. 
In January 1978 BBC-TV broadcast episode four of the documentary 
series The Secret War: "The Battle of the Atlantic." 97 Despite the broad sweep 
of its title, it concentrated on Allied technical and tactical responses to high 
shipping losses. Description of losses were confined to one mild incident. It 
focussed on radar, ASDIC, HF/DF, Hedgehog and Squid, O.R., new U-Boat 
types, air power, and Ultra. Its problem, or rather the problem for the scholar,. 
was that the Battle and famous participants like Leigh and Maclntyre were 
used to illustrate these technical advances, rather than illustrating the changed 
to the campaign through the technology. Content and focus were restricted by 
serial intentions. 98 The author saw this documentary in Australia in 1980. 99 
Only in Germany were there Atlantic documentaries in this period: though 
naval warfare, the Merchant Navy, and myth were well served by several about 
the Falklands war. The Hunters & the Hunted [1985], based upon Brennecke's 
book, countered Petersen's TV miniseries of Das Boot, presenting mythic 
participant's experiences. Buchheim riposted with Victoried to Death, from his 
viewpoint. Against England [1987] was balanced and non-mythical, including 
testimony from both of the Battle's sides (not of the Buchheim debate) but 
attacked German actions more than Allied. Its promotions stayed mythical. 
The Grey Wolves [1990] was a reactionary counter-Buchheim counter-Left- 
Hadley op.cit p.149. 
96. . ibid p.192-3. 
97 Sgt. Luker, RCAF, in Bowyer 1979 op.cit, p.80. 
se I.e only topics which fitted the needs of the series were discussed and developed. 
99 And again at the Mitchell Library in Sydney in 1999, startled by how much he remembered of narration, 
content and style. 
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Wing documentary from the participant's perspective. Both sides of the 
Buchheim controversy took turns stating U-Boat myths and portrayal. These 
were not seen and did not penetrate culture outside Germany. 10o  
The era of Ultra and Buchheim must have been ultimately frustrating for 
those to whom remembrance and recompense were important. Many 
participants began to die of old age or the medical complications of wartime 
service. There was a vast amount of activity, (little academic) but nonetheless 
sources were available and busily used. Interest had risen again. A whole 
genre of work on the war and the Battle was created, the Merchant Navy 
featured strongly in a small well-televised war, and anniversaries of famous 
events eventually occurred. Even official history of intelligence became 
available. What happened was largely distortion. Sources tended to go to the 
heads of researchers who did not look beyond simple solutions, or who did not 
have access to all materials necessary for a balanced judgement. Even once 
official Intelligence history was available, the idea that Ultra had been 
everything to winning was difficult to modify. Everything was "reinterpreted in 
the light of Ultra." 101 Other technologies did not receive their due. The 
experiences and traumas of participants were lessened once it became 
possible to imagine a Battle won at Bletchley, not at sea. Documentary could 
do little to change this, with the excellent "Wolfpack" from the pre-Ultra era, 
and other representations extolling Ultra's virtues, as well as continuing 
shipping-loss myths. 
Cinema produced a single memorable re-mythologisation, reaching a 
newer, younger audience, both for the Battle and the novel. The debate about 
it flourished in new media, bisecting into opposing camps. The filmmaker 
escaped becoming the butt and fulcrum of the odium, redirected at the 
novelist. Commercial fiction of the Battle continued to flourish without 
movement. Serialisation began, for commercial purposes. Ultra's effect upon 
Atlantic novels with or without secret-mission components, was as profound as 
its effect on popular and general histories. It would be many years, another 
loo As with other German works, to continue would be to merely repeat Hadley op.cit, which see pp.164- 
72. 
101 Gardner in Howarth & Law op.cit p.530. 
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era, before the Ultra diversion faded and the discourse returned to its previous 
track. There was more, but frustratingly slow, movement in academia. 102 The 
Battle continued to be relatively neglected, navies at the expense of fighter 
aircraft and Merchant Navies at the expense of battlefleets. Recompense 
beyond ordinary pensions in the UK, and for special benefits in North America 
and elsewhere, took decades of lobbying to achieve. To paraphrase Simone 
de Beauvoir, it was not the inferiority of seamen that caused their historical 
insignificance, it was rather their historical insignificance that doomed them to 
inferiority. 103 Anniversaries to come promised new recognition. 
102 The discourse remaining as stuck as always. 
103 Dillon-Malone, A, Women On Women, Macmillan, London, 1995, p.10. 
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HISTORY, CINEMA, DOCUMENTARY, AND FICTION, 1989-2000 
"Much history is revisionist. The Battle seems to be an exception. After 50 years, apart from the question of Ultra, 
no-one has seen any serious need to alter MacIntyre's judgement of 1961 in his classic history of the Battle: 
'It can fairly be said it was in the Atlantic that the Allies could have been most surely defeated. 
It was there, instead, that the war was won.'" 
Derek Law, at the Liverpool Fiftieth Anniversary Conference 
The Fiftieth anniversary era opened quite mutedly, much of the world 
focussed on the ending of the Cold War. By the end of 1989 a different 
Europe was in a better position to view the events of five decades before. 
Their conclusion had finally arrived. 1 The following five years saw the Fiftieth 
Anniversaries of everything, no matter how small or peripheral. The Battle was 
commemorated with ceremonies, exhibitions and conferences.2 It became a 
little submerged among more famous events and better remembered 
campaigns, even as it received greater attention. Ex-participants and their 
relatives were given a chance to be seen in Liverpool (the place most 
cognisant of the Battle), Halifax, Toronto and elsewhere. 3 French Atlantic 
commemorations were conditioned by their relationship to wartime German 
occupation and Allied bombing, rather than being key sites. Commemoration 
and memorialisation was made for some forgotten incidents. There were also 
works of all types deliberately written during this period, an 'Anniversary' 
genre. They were specifically created both to take commercial advantage of 
heightened interest, and to look back on the campaign from fifty years later. 
As such they had features that earlier works did not. They did not merely 
report on the past, they used the artificial space of five decades to discuss 
changes in attitude. The occasions and works were most obviously 
memorials, for both living and dead. 
A different view of the Fiftieth Anniversary in Liyerpool from the official 
publications, reminiscences and conference was provided by a local poet, Matt 
Simpson. The only man of his family's generation who did not go to sea, he 
saw life from a different perspective, even compared to counter-mythical 
sociologist Lane. Simpson significantly criticised the recollection and 
commemoration, not the Battle itself. He contended that official 
1 Hobsbawm, E, op.cit, p. 256, 487-8. 
2 Exhibitions at the National Maritime Museum, London, Albert Dock Museum, Liverpool, the Museum of 
the Atlantic, Halifax NS. Conferences were at Liverpool (29-31/5/93), and Washington-DC. Another on 
Kola convoys was sponsored by the Moskva Military History Centre and the Roskom Archiv, Moscow, 
Russia, 17-20\2\93. 
3  Beside memorials in Halifax and Toronto, is there one in Winnipeg? Though they weren't all 'prairie' 
sailors as Zimmerman pointed out in Hadley et al 1996 op.cit pp.257, 278. 
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commemoration was not representing the participants properly. It did not 
capture the experiences while avoiding securing the status quo, nor allowing 
other, different, less commemorated pasts. 
As with previous periods, forces of continuity dominated. Many old-style 
volumes were written. Change, driven by a broader range of authors, did 
begin to take effect. There has been increasing professional and academic 
interest. Representation has been more open to reinterpretation and new 
theories. New types of representation appeared, significantly, in this era. Both 
Lane and Hadley moved to the analysis of myth. Second World War seamen 
received limited de-mythologisation and exploration, as against exposition 
mainly from seamen themselves. Unexplored areas were introduced, chiefly 
the service of women, of homosexuals, and of some ethnic minorities. 4 A few 
academic volumes cannot quickly undo a generation's stolid and solid cultural 
effort or centuries of myth and relative neglect, but both a distinct shift of 
influence, and new perspectives, arose. There were more academic subjects 
given attention in more scholarly surroundings. U-Boat iconography as well as 
representation was for the first time available to the English reader in an open, 
easily-understood manner. This was no complex, poststructuralist account for 
the specialist. Though the book lacked deep meaning and abstruse 
conclusions, Hadley pointed out that little that is profound can be said of works 
that are not profound themselves. It was unfortunate there are few other 
works attempting to push beyond mythologised experience. Powerful 
experiences still drove many new memoirs, and were communicated to 
readers. 
Exactly what place the Battle had within the Second World War as a 
whole in the hearts and minds of the public was difficult to gauge. It may never 
be clear, without mass surveys soon. Those remaining participants 
remembered, fondly and otherwise. The vicarious audience was a different 
story. No one has yet completed extensive, scholarly, analytical oral history of 
what people remember of the perceptions of their postwar childhoods. 5 New 
4 The greater part of ethnic service by Indians, Africans, West-Indians, Chinese and Lascars, who were a 
high proportion of merchant navies, have yet to be covered. This will be a task for a new generation of 
ethnic researchers and authors. 
5 Other than the populist multi-part multinational TV series People's Century 1900-99. 
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media like computer games, CD-ROM, and the Internet also contributed to 
myth and history. 1980's computer games, no longer available, naturally 
focussed, like board games in decades past, on combat rather than narrative 
or strategy. 6 There were U-Boat games, where escorts and aircraft must be 
braved to reach Allied shipping; and warship games with individual or fleet 
encounters. None involved ASW save the short-lived Atlantic Storm, a card-
game where players chose to attack or defend convoys.' CD-ROMs could 
provide a multimedia information bonanza for the researcher, though more 
likely for the fan. 
The Internet became the growth area in memory-keeping and opinion-
making about the Battle. The Net was still American-dominated, which meant 
a certain sort of Battle was remembered prominently, just as it was 
remembered differently in American text and cinema compared to elsewhere. 
Armed services had their reasons for remembering certain aspects, while 
museums, being geographically fixed, also had reasons to attract the public 
and former participants. The Battle was also harder to find, among millions of 
sites on the WWW, than in a library or bookshop. Many participants and their 
relatives placed memories on the net, where there were no editors or 
publishers, and no market forces, comparatively, to suppress memories. 
There was unfortunately little chance for the radical and revolutionary to break 
through the mass of ordinary mythical works and ideas. 
The World-Wide Web, after 1995 began to connect media, in a vital new 
way. The combination of text, images, animation and/or graphics with 
communications enabled many to correspond via errail or through the post. 
Sites typerlinked' together meant that ex-servicemen and their relatives, fans 
and researchers, could find each other much more readily. Though all 
participants and contemporary members of the public were by this point very 
old, and the WWW a media and technology dominated by the young, 
simplifications and advances in software and hardware allowed participants, 
6 Many 1980's games were bypassed by software and hardware advances. 
7 Atlantic Storm's winner "received the convoy as a prize": misrepresentation continued. Recently more 
computer or internet submarine and fleet simulations appeared, for the serious adult user: Silent Hunter 
II Fighting Steel, Iron Wolves Aces of the Deep, Wolfpack, Drumbeat, and Grey Wolf; 
www.Uboat.NeWspecial/games.htm. These are only popular with adults; adolescents preferring less 
serious fictionalised subjects, and more action. 
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and second and third generation vicarious audiences to put the Battle 'on the 
Net' in increasing numbers and diversity. Websites were still largely official or 
commemorative rather than commercial, reflecting the lack of commercial 
appeal dogging memory of the Battle. Websites did however reflect general 
ideas. There were links to other, more frequently visited official and 
commemorative and information sites. There were more naval warfare sites 
than naval history, more combat and ships than events, more commemorating 
famous battles than campaigns or operations. Due to American domination, 
far more sites dealt with Pacific operations. 8 
Official sites demonstrated what services and governments wanted to 
promote. Museum sites were warship or place-related, though their coverage 
of more general and mundane topics and themes steadily improved. Private 
individuals were left to demonstrate the lag in recognition and support for the 
forgotten and bypassed. There were still less than a dozen sites about the 
Battle in 1997, spread between Canada, Britain, America and Germany. 
There were no more than a dozen with Merchant Navy coverage at time of 
writing. 8 In total there were more than 60 sites by mid-1999, though a quarter 
were Canadian Veterans-Affairs sites and linked pages, the majority of the 
remainder American 'Merchant Marine' commemorative and Veterans Affairs 
sites. 1° Specific sites about exciting events would continue to keep ahead. 
The prominent U-Boat website was run by a young man in Iceland, 
Gudmundur Helgason. He became aware of naval history as a child during 
the 'Cod War' between Britain and Iceland. This became a fascination with the 
U-Boat, and once he became aware of the Net, it was natural to put this 
fascination there, there being no U-Boat sites in 1995. He rarely 
communicated with former U-Boat men, mainly because he was more 
interested in machines and operations than experiences. 11 
Historical writing was the area of most change. General histories began 
to integrate the Battle more. This will only pay off in decades to come, 
8  From surveys of websites and listings carried out May 1996-March 1999. 
9 March 2000. They are at least hyperlinked to each other, and to other websites. 
lo Websites appear, disappear and move with great frequency, so no list have been made here. Typing 
'Battle of the Atlantic' into search engines now yields some hits, (64 the current record] whereas it 
yielded none as recently as 1996. 
11 Helgason, G, pers comm, November 1998. 
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unfortunately, when all participants are dead. There was not yet enough 
academic interest to drive new theorisations. Atlantic history was becoming as 
much the place of experienced, analytical writers as survivors, descendants 
and 'people with an interest'. The Fiftieth Anniversary era was not prolific in 
novels, though men continued to write moved by old anguish now bearable in 
their later years, and commercial pressure to innovate in scene and setting if 
not style. The Battle was used for the same old tales. Modern convoy and 
Atlantic-related fiction did not tell as much about their era (or today) as 
burgeoning non-fiction. Both were a growing market in numbers, and apparent 
popularity, if not quality or insight. It seemed unlikely another classic novel, or 
even another bestseller, would result. 
War films and combat movies were once again popular in the 
anniversary era and beyond. Nothing came of this for the Battle, save the 
release of the director's cut of Das Boot. Restored and with enhanced sound, 
it bridged the gap between the short original action version and the long TV 
mini-series. It was still the film Petersen, not Buchheim, always wanted. 
Reaction in English was muted. Only time will reveal the long-term response. 
Extended, with tension and tedium replacing action and drama, it could not 
help improving the original. Fear, worry, claustrophobia and grime were better 
represented. Enhancement and the strictures of cinema-going made this 
version quite an experience, without commercials or pauses. It was at last 
presented to its intended serious adult audience, not the young of the original. 
It was not promoted this way, but it stood more chance of being seen by those 
it was meant for. Documentary was more prolific. Individual, particularist 
documentaries covered the seaman's experience, mythically and 
overpoweringly, and Black US Navy Atlantic service, poorly. Code-making and 
breaking featured repeatedly. Most recent and least edifying were mere video 
compilations of footage. The Battle was also mentioned in other, specific 
series: oil, ocean liners, general histories of war. There was not enough 
interest, controversy, or desire to produce more, better TV, though the 
Anniversary era generated more interest and activity than the previous four 
decades. 
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Much history continued mythical content in addition to staid or effusive 
descriptions, depending on the author. Keegan stated in The Battle For 
History: Refighting World War Two,  that "the history of the Second World War is 
not yet written: perhaps next century." 12 , still too close and passionate to be 
written about. 13 His Battle at Sea, 1993, was a reprint of Price of Admiralty. 14 
Keegan was both right and wrong: certainly time needs to elapse for 
perspective to gain. A history acceptable to all would be a useful way of 
getting everyone to see the same points, even if they didn't agree. Keegan 
related Ultra's importance without overstatement, allowing Hinsley to be 
modest about its actual value. There was no chapter on sea warfare as on 
intelligence, logistics or production. It remained uncertain whether only land 
events were important, even as he pointed out the divergences in US and 
British strategy, or the dangers of invading Northern Europe before securing 
the Atlantic lifeline. The vast majority of the audience were unaware of sea 
warfare to the same degree. Keegan seemed unwilling to challenge their 
viewpoint. His discussion of history of the Second World War emphasised 
works in English, tacit acceptance of its dominance of and dominant interest in 
the English-speaking world. His description of Irving was also useful, given 
that P0-17 remains the only historical controversy of the Battle. 15 
Mythic continuities of misconception persisted. One particularly 
fostered by popular aircraft magazines was the achievements of the FW-
200Condor, the "Scourge of the Atlantic", in Churchill's words. 16 This was myth 
of both sorts. 17 Headings and blurb announced the terrible losses inflicted by 
these aircraft, yet the text always explained how fragile those few aircraft were. 
Comparison with U-Boat sinkings after the first few months was never made, 
leaving no benchmark to judge performance. Such articles defeated their own 
purpose, de-mythologising themselves en route. 
12 Keegan, 1995 op.cit, p.30. 
13 A 1-volume history of the US Civil War acceptable to most parties has only just been completed, 134 
years afterwards. 
' 4 See Ch.5: "1974-89.", of this thesis. 
15 Keegan 1995 op.cit p.50. 
16 I.e "Convoy Killer: the Fw Condor, Aviation History Magazine, V.6 N.6, July 1996, pp.38-44. 
17 I.e. both the literary definition of myth as understanding, and the common definition of myth as 
deception. 
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General works varied. Messenger's 1994 Century of Warfare was a 
lightweight accompaniment to TV, poorly covering sea warfare. By 
comparison, the 1989 World At Arms: Reader's Digest Illustrated History of 
World War Two, (intended for the anniversary market) managed consistent, 
detailed and accurate coverage of naval warfare. 18 Combat took precedence 
over convoy18 , with four more pages demonstrating that Ultra's dominance of 
naval historiography was alive and well in 1989. Arnold-Forster's 1989 revised 
companion to World At War, and Ballard's Discovery of the Bismarck, 1990, 
again demonstrated how little some representations could evolve since 1972. 
Willmott's Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War, 
1989, peripheralised sea warfare in favour of redefining Axis army 
effectiveness. Miller's War at Sea and Boyne's Clash of Titans, 1995 were 
American-centred academic histories, almost entirely battles and Admirals 
without convoys. 20 By comparison, Sadkovich's outstanding Reevaluating the  
Major Naval Combatants of INW-II, 1990 contained academic essays resetting 
or restating important performance elements. Young's Britain's Sea War,, 
1989, again reviewed existing accounts, while Barnett's Engage the Enemy  
More Closely, 1991, refreshingly criticised many. Mallmann Showell's U-Boat 
Command & the Battle of the Atlantic, 1992, stood between national 
perceptions, outside the Germanic view. Written by two Britons, Kaplan and 
Currie's Wolfpack (1996) and Convoy (1998), were totally outside it: 
remarkably comprehensive, balanced, almost academic, combining rare 
pictures, quotations and artefacts, in a large-format coffee-table style. 21 Still 
mythically concentrating on sinkings and deaths, there was not the same 
sense of regret as in German accounts. 22 
Smith's Conflict Over Convoys, 1996, proclaimed a breakthrough in 
combining diplomatic and operational history about shipping. It actually had 
little Behrens' classic official work had not in 1954. Smith forcefully argued the 
conventional American myth. He described the lack of shipping and 
18 Twenty good pages out of 465 overall. 
19 Four pages on Bismarck, and two Schamhorst &Tiipitz versus one page on Atlantic victory, if very well 
summed. 
20 Or even logistics. 
21 It features contemporary and consequent artwork, memorials, museum relics, and unremarkable stills 
from action and film, including Cruel Sea, Bogart's Action In the North Atlantic and even Hawks' long-
forgotten Corvette K225. 
22 The 'Regret Publishing of Buchheim and others. 
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shipbuilding, and America's importance to continuing Britain's war. America 
attempted to dominate transport logistics without experience. The US military, 
a terrible waster of shipping, mistrusted and disliked Britain. Both British and 
US civilian shipping authorities were less than competent or honest, though 
Britain's was more effective, due to Great War experience and the worry of 
possible starvation, which never faced the US. 23 Smith also concentrated on 
diplomacy to the almost total exclusion of the pressures the campaign 
generated between Britain and America. He considered concentration on 
operations blinded most researchers and readers to the truth of the Battle and 
the war. It depended ultimately on seamen and shipping allocations. He even 
described anti-submarine warfare as "glitzy wargames". 24 Atlantic anti-
submarine warfare was neither glitzy, nor a game, as almost every book 
overemphasised. Burton's 1994 Rise & Fall of British Shipbuilding by 
comparison compressed two millennia into three hundred pages, leaving little 
on purely wartime problems. 
Revision of attitudes, change in criticism or presentation was slow. 
Exploration of myth was absent. Howarth's Men of War, 1992, was instructive 
when compared to Edwards' wartime collective biography. There had been 
little revision or reconsideration of significant leaders and personalities. 25 
Robertson's 1956 biography covered more, better, than The Fighting Captain  
published in 1993 by Walker's remaining 'old boys', his senior officers and 
ratings. This has since been supplemented by their excellent "Old Boys 
Association' website" at httpA\www. geocities.com/pentagon/4926/index.html . This 
includes text, images, and links in addition to details of their creation of a 
memorial statue to Walker in Liverpool, which ‘Afs dedicated in 1994. 
Robertson lacked only the lower-rank contributions of the later book, a defect 
all books of the early era had. Vause's U-Boat Ace: the Story of Wolfgang  
Luth, 1992, while separate from German typology, nevertheless produced little 
of interest, and no new perceptions. Shean's Corvette & Submarine, 1992, 
• 
well-researched and written, showed up continuing problems with primary 
23 !bid, pp.86, 138-9, 218-9. 
24 Smith, K, Conflict Over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in WW2,  Ball State University, 
Indiana, 1996, p.63. 
25 See Edwards, Men of Action 1943, for who has changed prominence, Ch.2: "1914-45", this thesis. 
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sources, while minimising myth. 26 Jackson's autobiography Sailor of Fortune, 
1993, excluded his war service without explanation. 27 
Websites and commemorative conferences continued the focus on 
operations, technology, and experiences. Buckley's "Air Power & the 
Battle...1939-45" pointed out Coastal Command's low effectiveness before 
1943, not its myths. 28 Gallant's "Battle of the Atlantic", and Germinsky's "World 
War 2 Convoys: the Runs to Russia", (Navy & Marine Corps WW2 
Commemorative Committee, 1993), were both early official American netsites. 
Howarth & Law's 1994 Battle of the Atlantic: the 50 T" Anniversary International  
Naval Conference, gave naval-dominated but thorough coverage from fifty 
contributors. Shipping was less featured than fighting and weapons, but 
history and the Battle's consequences were considered. Kessler's paper on 
French Atlantic U-Boat bases was something of a disappointment, largely 
concerned with French intelligence and resistance operations, not the activities 
or experiences of those within the German bases. 29 Scarth's paper on 
Liverpool contrastingly gave a detailed operational, statistical, and personal 
account. 39 Even Lane's Merchant Navy article sadly concentrated on 
experiences, not perceptions or myths, as in his groundbreaking earlier book. 31 
Runyan & Copes's (ed) To Die Gallantly: the Atlantic 50T " Anniversary 
American Conference, 1994 was a little better balanced, including Brazilian 
contributions, as well as port and Merchant Marine training activities. 
Royal Canadian Navy and Air Force history grew. Canada's Merchant 
Navy received no work at all save some oral history in Salty Dips until 1994's 
Unknown Navy. It was a quality, footnoted, single volume, semi-official 
account of wide range, comprehensiveness and force. It had no British, 
American or Australian equivalent, though their Merchant Navies were much 
larger, with more problems and incidents to cover. Mythic oral history followed 
26 Major problems were that German and Allied sources were naturally generated separately, and were 
eyewitness reports by often tired or inexperienced men. Often they were impressions, not substantiated 
diplomatic documents. 
23 Perhaps aware of the preponderance of wartime experiences, though he left the sea at war's 
outbreak... 
Z8 Buckley, J, "Air Power & the Battle...1939-45." Journal of Contemporary History  V.28 Ni, Jan 1993, 
p,142-62. 
Kessler, J "U-Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay" in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit pp.252-65. 
3° Scarth, A, "Liverpool as HQ & Base" in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit pp.240-51. 
31 See below. 
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with Parker's Running the Gauntlet: Oral History of Canadian Merchant 
Seamen, 1994. As leading historian Milner wrote, there was "no major 
monograph on the Royal Canadian Navy between 1952-85."32 The official history of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force appeared in 1986, and a small but steady 
stream of Canadian Battle works followed. It is a shock that their British 
equivalents began appearing in the 1950s, not the 1980s. Harbron's fiftieth 
anniversary focussed Longest Battle: the Royal Canadian Navy in the Atlantic  
1939-45, 1993, also gave coverage of shipbuilding, all personnel, especially 
WRNS, and remembrance, though without mentioning wartime shortcomings. 
It had the air of being a 'family edition' introduction to the subject. 
Milner's comprehensive, clear and very well-written theses, 
monographs, and books, were the best operational works. These covered the 
Royal Canadian Navy's beginnings, failures, and their political, personnel and 
technological causes, without excuses. Miler's paper in Sadkovich contained 
much interesting historiographic comment on postwar ideas and attitudes, 
within and without the Royal Canadian Navy, in addition to wartime perception. 
He condemned MacIntyre's unchanging criticism: the Royal Navy shared many 
Canadian problems. 33 He considered Chalmers Horton biography "a frontier 
thesis": "Canadians as rustic cowpokes escorting herds of ships", and while the 
Canadians dissect the Battle as do the Germans "with their teutonic flair for 
thoroughness", 35 "America remains transfixed by the Pacific and Britain too obsessed 
with 400 years of naval greatness to pay attention to recent events." 36 The 'old' 
regular Royal Canadian Navy found the campaign uncomfortable, due to its 
desire for a balanced fleet, and the strikingly poor, understandable but 
unexplained showing by underequipped, poorly trained reservists and 
volunteers. Postwar neglect resulted from the unification of Canada's armed 
services and other national and service traumas of identity and focus. 37 
Academic papers seemed disconnected to a certain extent. Canadian 
merchant seaman studies such as White's "Hardly Heroes" mentioned Parker 
32 	• 	• Milner Sadkovich op.cit p.45. 
33 For Maclntyre's "Radical Polemic" against the Royal Canadian Navy see Ch.3: "1945-60"; Milner 1994 
op.cit, p.259, & Maclntyre's own 1956 op.cit. pp.79-82. 
4" Milner in Sadkovich op.cit, p.45. 
36 Vide Rohwer, Hessler and Ressler. 
36 Milner in Sadkovich op.cit. p.53. 
37 Ibid, p.55-6. 
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but not Halford. Halley's "Death Was Their Escort" mentioned neither. All 
seemed to be beginning the subject anew. They contained new information, 
but not new perspectives, taking their lead very much from existing styles of 
accounts. White however importantly stated the limitations of oral history, that 
"we should be cautious about accepting such revelations fifty years after the fact as 
the final word on the subject." 38 The similarity of what the representations 
reported all demonstrated the atypicality of seamen's experiences. 39 
Nevertheless White proved that Canadian were buried among the mass of 
foreign seamen in Canadian ports, and thus in history. They were also 
younger, more likely to be married, and outside the landsperson's stereotype 
of the rough, rootless, hard-drinking seaman. 4° This was hardly surprising, as 
Canadian shipping was a wartime expedient, not a permanent force. Halley 
stated that the sensational had tended to dominate representation of seamen, 
but nevertheless followed this with six pages of action and adventures.'" Most 
anecdotes were convoy life and weather rather than enemy action, but they 
were not the routine and boredom either. 42 
The role of women in the campaign also received attention. Winters' 
"Wrens of the Second World War" described previous accounts of their 
service. These had been gender, not military history, dedicated to describing 
the emancipating effect of naval service, then attacking it. 43 Williams' "Women 
Ashore" concentrated on their contributions to science. Sexism and 
parochialism were a necessarily major topic. USN Women Accepted for 
Voluntary Emergency Service were already largely an educated elite, who 
contributed both as replacements for men and with original research to 
American technological development." At war's end "their technical and 
38 White, J, "Hardly Heroes: Canadian Merchant Seamen & the International Convoy System 1939-45", 
The Northern Mariner, Vol 5, N.4, October 1995, p.20. 
38 White and Halley contained the same kind of disparate events and experiences as Slader and Hay, the 
same type of analysis of labour relations and working conditions as Lane, and the same statements that 
recognition has been inadequate. The homogeneity of reporting style pointed out that seamen's 
experiences were similar, but not typical. 
4° White 1995 op.cit, p.28-30. White is sadly wrong about better pay rates than Navy servicemen: 
Halford 1994 op.cit, "The Pay Myth", pp.71-6, 244-6. 
41 Halley, M, "Death Was Their Escort, & Glory Passed Them By", The Northern Mariner, Vol 7, N.1, 
January 1997, p.45. 
42 !bid, p.47-52. 
43 Winters, B, "The Wrens of the Second World War: Their Place in the History of Canadian 
Servicewomen" in Hadley et al 1996, op.cit, pp.281-3. 
44 Williams, K, "Women Ashore: the Contribution of WAVES to US Naval Science & Technology in World 
War Two", The Northern Mariner Vol 8, N.2, April 1998, pp.1 -16. 
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scientific prowess was quickly forgotten." 45 Nowhere more was it ignored than in 
Ultra:46 Winters distinguished Canadian navy from army service, particularly 
regarding rank and pay. Senior female army officers were subordinate to 
lower male officers. Navy officers were equal, and fully integrated into the 
service.47 This was countered by restriction to shore service. Money and 
employment were the chief reasons behind the enlistment of thousands of 
women. 48 These works plainly demonstrate that wartime service, despite 
limitations, did contribute to later though not immediate emancipation of 
women in the workforce. They also demonstrated that plenty of work remains 
to be done in this area. With ethnic history it should be the area of attention in 
the next decade. 
Oral history was another rich field. 1992 saw War at Sea: an Oral  
History, by Smithies (posthumous) with Bruce. It went beyond Gardner's 
description of oral history as a heady mix of fact, hearsay, opinion, and rumour; 
"unchecked reminiscence spiced with prejudice".49 It bore the marks of hasty and 
non-academic writing, though unlike Hendrie it blended pre-war scene-
setting.5° It covered the Merchant Navy, shipping and shipyards, the latter an 
important and hitherto overlooked contribution to the war effort. Previously 
shipbuilding fell between official accounts. It was not covered operationally by 
Roskill or logistically by Behrens, but placed with other civilian services in 
Eldertons' Civilian War Economy. Examined were Maritime Royal Artillery and 
DEMS, the Marines, Fleet Air Arm, WRNS, RNR and RNVR. 51 Regular Royal 
Navy myths were pointed out: it remained 'professional', keeping the big ships 
and traditional roles. It was the 'Wavy Navy' of the Royal Naval Reserve and 
Volunteer Reserve who did most of the fighting and dying, especially in the 
Battle. They became the equals of the regulars who held them in contempt, as 
Monsarratt's (RNR himself) wartime nonfiction made clear. As Gannon stated, 
by 1943, Home Fleet captains were trying to get into Western Approaches, as 
45 !bid, p.16. 
46  Blair, C, Hitler's U-Boat War: the Hunted, 1942-45, [V.2 of 2], Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1998, 
pp.326, 415. 
41 Winters 1996 op.cit p.283. 
48 !bid, p.292-3. 
49 Gardner in Howarth & Law eds op.cit. p.530. 
5° For Hendrie see below. 
51 For DEMS and other abbreviations, see Technical & Idiomatic Terms, pp.6-9. 
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that was where the action was. 52 There was a final but disappointing chapter 
on survivors, little on prisoners of war. Nothing was made of Tobermory, 
WATU, or Bletchley (especially in the chapter on WRNS) where women made 
their most valuable contribution. Presumably it was still regarded only as a 
subject for cryptographic, not oral or gender history. The worthwhile element 
was history from the bottom up, unlike so much naval, merchant, and Battle 
representation. 
Howard Bailey's Battle: the Corvettes and their Crews: an Oral History 
was solid, with many very good contributors and previously unpublished 
photos. The occasional lapses into "reminiscence and prejudice" (hardened by a 
half-century of mental varnishing and recapitulation) which Howard Bailey 
lacked the background to balance with facts and sources, detracted from its 
effectiveness and power. The author was more faithful to her contributors than 
to official and secondary texts. It was more substantial than the American 
Mason's Atlantic War Remembered, 1990, "surprisingly uncritical" of King, PQ-
17 and other bitter points, compared to the Liverpool-based Anthology of 
Personal Memories, 1993. 53 Wise's 1994 Sole Survivors of the Sea gave 
more mythic American tales of shipping, attacks, sin kings, losses and deaths. 
More traditionally-sourced history was provided by Edwards' Donitz & the  
Wolfpacks [1996]. Like some earlier works it was an RN/MN account of U-Boat 
operations, solid but impersonal, subdued in tone but including myth. Stern's 
Battle Beneath the Waves: the U-Boat Wars 1914-45 [1999], was a 
thoroughly-sourced operational and technical account of significant U-Boats of 
both wars, with great accuracy, balance, and restrained style. It still 
communicated the bravery, fortitude, as well as errors of judgment and 
character of U-Boat men, and gave an overall picture of the campaign, not 
merely representative or unrepresentative sorties. 
These paled compared to Thomas's Atlantic Star, which came close to 
being Roskill's successor in writing a large-scale, comprehensive, thorough 
near-official British history of the Battle. 54 Working from a well-balanced mix of 
primary, secondary, and oral material (the latter specially requested via the 
52 Gannon, Michael, Black May: the Defeat of the German WoIfoacks Harper-Collins, NY, 1998, p.118. 
53 Law in Howarth and Law op.cit p.600. 
54 With footnotes! 
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press) he redivided the Battle into nine phases from the conventional eight. 
He unfortunately completely excluded the German experience as well as the 
US Army Air Force, Coastguard and US Navy. He also excluded almost totally 
the Royal Canadian Navy, though "it deserves greater mention for its enormous 
contribution.. .but to have attempted this would have been at the expense of the British 
seamen of the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy, and this patently, would not be fair." 55 
Thomas divided Phase Five in two: ending it on 31/12/42 and commencing Six 
on 1/1/43, running until 31/5/43, in order to distinguish the 'losing' era of late 
1942 from the 'winning' era of the first half of 1943. 56 This was not accepted 
as a new theory. 57 Thomas was right to try reorganising the Battle, though his 
perspective was very British rather than Allied, and ignored the German. To 
divide late 1942 from early 1943 was still incorrect, as German strategy in the 
mid-North Atlantic remained unmodified, and Allied operations and losses 
continued largely unchanged until March 1943, for all the strategic 
improvements decided earlier in the year, which made possible the permanent 
swing toward the Allies, in only five weeks, in May 1943. 58 He benefitted 
markedly from the confluence of oral and text sources. 
Slader's second Merchant Navy book, The Fourth Service (1994) 
presented more mythic 'adventures'; also repeating that the world's Merchant 
Navies had a unique position between regular combatants and ordinary 
civilians at risk, as authors had known, and occasionally raised, throughout 
maritime history. It was and will only be read by ex-seamen, and buffs to 
whom all this was painfully obvious. Edwards' Merchant Navy Goes to War 
[1989] and Pearce's Heroes of the Fourth Service [1996] were also of this 
type, but not of any great distinction. They provided yet more stereotypical 
events. A Pictorial History of the War at Sea,  1995, was an effective selection 
of classic and unknown images, where myth and analysis were absent. It 
appeared to be a collection based on what 'the public' would be familiar with. 
Anti-submarine warfare was separated from trade and logistics. These were 
placed behind the coverage of battlefleets, and conventional cruiser and 
55 This author is astonished and outraged by this statement. Thomas, D, The Atlantic Star, W.H.Allen, 
London, 1990, introduction. 
56 See Plate 2.2, "Chronology of the Battles of the Atlantic, 1914-18 & 1939-45", of this thesis. 
57 It has not been mentioned or seen in any later general or specific work on the Battle. 
58 The improvements were allocations of Very-Long Range ASW aircraft, Escort-Carriers, and Support 
Groups. 
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destroyer operations. There was an entire chapter on midget submarines 
(hardly vital, however famous they were). 59 
Blair's two massive volumes on Hitler's U-Boat War related the Battle's 
operational and incidental standpoint largely from the German side. He 
debunked the "commonly-held" myth that it was a close run thing, of 
horrendous shipping losses by the U-Boat wonder-weapon which twice almost 
starved Britain. He regarded this myth as wartime propaganda created by 
both the Germans and Allies. It was embroidered postwar by official and 
secondary historians as well as other media, and could not survive statistical 
scrutiny. 66 Simply showing the 'illusions' and 'realities' ignored the human cost 
of the Battle. This undermined his concept that the Battle was 
disproportionally presented, largely by British historians, and required putting 
in perspective before being laid to rest. Also lost was the meaning of the 
experiences: why the myths were made. They were intended to cope with 
danger, death, worry and stress, and postwar pain, loss, trauma and lack of 
recognition. They were not intended in the main as dispassionately rigorous 
accounts. Blair pointed out that Americans and Britons saw the Battle 
differently, but placed American perspective - historical myth - first, rather than 
acknowledging and balancing both. He was as much a prisoner of American 
myth as the British are of theirs. 61 He confused wartime anti-submarine 
warfare perspective with postwar historical attitude. 
Gannon's Black May: the Defeat of the German Wolfpacks  contained 
several significant criticisms of Blair. Firstly "King's holding his destroyers from 
escorting British trade convoys in order to escort US trop convoys" missed the 
point. "ASW was the mission of the moment". 62 Both Gannon and "Padfield 
questioned why the troops were the emergency."63 Secondly, Blair contended 
59 Perhaps the selection was based on the naval photograph exhibits created at the Imperial War 
Museum for the Anniversary period, not for any specific campaign or view of the war. A more modern, 
less populist interpretation would give more credit to amphibious and anti-submarine warfare operations. 
60 Blair vol 1, op.cit p.425. 
61  His countermythical fragments could have been more apparent than a page of introduction, and a page 
or two ending each section, of 800. He also forgets Battle myths are held only by minorities, nowhere as 
pervasive among historians or the public as ignorance. Contrary to Blair, there has been counter-myth in 
many mainly recent books, though general impressions have not been reset. Padfield War Beneath the 
Sea, 1995, Winton Convoy, 1983, Tarrant, U-Boat Wars 1989, Terraine Business In Great Waters, 1990 
are all examples. 
62 Gannon 1998 op.cit, p.410-11. 
63  Gannon loc.cit and Padfield, P, War Beneath the Sea, John Murray, London, 1995, p.532 n.61. 
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that the German attacks on shipping off the US coast were offset by US Navy 
success in escorting troops. "The argument assumed that King was forced to 
choose between" escorting troops and merchant shipping, and of the "wrath of 
the US army should the troops be delayed.' Who, knowing anything about him, 
seriously believes that the gun-metal eyes of King ever blinked at the emotions of the 
army?" 64 This was however mainly part of the continuing controversy over 
King's actions, not over the significance of the Battle. 
Arctic convoy books still bore striking resemblance thematically and 
textually to classics like Kola Run. They were not plagiarised or rewritten. 
The source material was limited, the campaign small compared to the Atlantic, 
the same naval and merchant ships and men appeared. The major incidents 
were all dealt with early, leaving little new to include, save more stories of 
individual seamen. Few events were analysed, merely giving more 
experiences. Only the universal 'ingredients' defined by Campbell & Macintyre 
in 1957 were used. The mythic cold, losses, the lethal and U-boat-concealing 
properties of the sea, official Soviet suspicion amid the welcoming attitudes of 
ordinary Russians, the system's ingratitude, waste and stupidity, the 
tremendous pressures put upon the crews, were permanent features. There 
were apparently no others to be explored. Lambert's "Seizing the Initiative": 
the Arctic Convoys 1944-45", merely trotted out the 1950's Royal Navy 
'offensive' view of operations, supporting wartime Merchant Navy 
misconceptions that those convoys were always tait'. 66 Woodman's 1994 
Arctic Convoys, 1941-45 and Kemp's Convoy! Drama In Arctic Waters, 1993, 
both perpetuated earlier approaches, Woodman adding Merchant Navy 
experiences to naval action. There was more colour \ and depth, but no new 
interpretation. 
Beesly's 1990 "Convoy PQ-17: A Study in Intelligence & Decision 
Making", was most valuable in its discussion of earlier works. 66 He admitted 
"having done no further research since" 1977, but that Hinsley's Official History 
judged that Pound had to scatter the convoy, without examining the 
64 Gannon 1998 op.cit p.412. 
ss Lambert, A, "Seizing the Initiative: the Arctic Convoys 1944-45", in NAM Rodger, op.cit. p.151-62. 
se  Intelligence & National Security,  Vol 5 N.2, April 1990, pp.292-322 but mainly 321-2. 
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alternatives. 67 Roskill's 1957 Official History covered the ground without 
requiring Ultra. Irving's PQ-17 was a painstaking account, but Irving claimed 
information from "one or two individuals who were either unwilling or unable to give 
him" any. 68 McLachlan's Room 39 was "not to be relied on for detail, but excellent 
for atmosphere."69 Overall Beesly held that Pound drafted signals which gave a 
false impression of the situation, and did not fully understand the use of 
intelligence or defer sufficiently either his operational or intelligence 
subordinates. Pound did not exercise the alternatives to his actions in the 
limited searoom available. 79 
Non-mythic technical histories continued in popularity, though thankfully 
tailing off with Mitchell & Sawyer's Empire Ships, 1990 and Whitley's German  
Destroyers in WW-II, 1991. Meigs's Sliderules & Submarines, 1990, gave a 
biased and inadequate history of US technological contributions!' Janes 
Fighting Ships of WW-II, 1989, and Lloyd's War Losses, 1991, reprinted 
postwar encyclopaedae. Providing endless fascination for the detail-
obsessed, with little history amid much hardware modifications, they described 
ships, but very rarely the men and conditions which played a vital part in 
seakeeping and fighting qualities. Works like British Cruisers of World War 
Two narrated even less, restricting fates to table form. Eclipse of the Big Gun  
covered only the ship types involved. Anti-submarine warfare was combined 
with minesweeping, behind coastal forces, before amphibious operations. 
Rather than analysing how submarines and aircraft eclipsed the big gun, it 
merely placed them as components alongside cruiser and battlefleet warfare. 
Its radio and technology chapter did not concentrate on Ultra and ECM, at 
least: radar and SONAR were important but Ultra was not vita1. 72 It pointed out 
(without centralising it) how the use of improved ASDIC and depthcharges, 
teamwork, escort groups, escort-carriers and very-long-range aircraft, all 
67  Ibid, p.321. The alternatives were Tovey [CinC Home Fleet] to steam toward PQ-17 while ordering it to 
reverse course toward him, bringing it and any advancing German force under his air cover, especially to 
threaten Titpitz, which the German command would not countenance. The convoy would then have had 
to face only the air and U-Boat forces PQ-18 was fought through in September of that year. 
ea [b id, p.322. 
sa Loc.cit. Quite the impression this author gained. Atmosphere is often lacking in naval narratives, 
Ludovic Kennedy being a strong exponent of the value of including it. 
70 This could serve as a long-term, balanced epitaph to the man and the disaster. 
71 He neither assessed British influence of US ASW, nor examined anti-submarine operations. 
Zimmerman in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit p477. 
72 A post-Ultra work, as Gardner described in Howarth & Law op.cit pp.528 & 532. 
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turned the Battle's tide. 73 Eclipse was very much a technical summary with 
very little basing of these in chronology or history, though some attempt was 
made to integrate technology with tactics and the fighting which produced the 
requirements for new systems and hardware. 
Criticisms of purely technical history could at last be found by the late 
1990s. "A recent review criticised Warship 1996 for being a sort of 'Beezer Book For 
Boys over 35', dealing with what the reviewer dismissed as a `rag-bag of mainly 
technical descriptions of long-dead warships.' That is an unavoidable drawback of a 
publication dedicated to warship history."74 It need not have been unavoidable. 
History is more than designs and construction. The result was that the rich 
analytical narrative of these accounts was restricted to technology, not 
operations or experiences. No work gave the same depth or coverage to the 
lives of the ships or their crews. 75 Grove and Ireland's Janes War At Sea:  
1898-1997 [Harper-Collins, NY, 1997] showed for the first time the difference 
between operational reality and both prewar expectations and postwar 
concentration on big ships and battles. Chapter six began with battleships and 
interwar construction. Chapter seven began with the Battle of the Atlantic, 
continued with the submarine war against Japan, amphibious operations and 
aviation, and lastly capital ship operations. This indicated the general trend 
toward more balanced representation. 
Milner and Zimmerman lamented that technical history was still trapped 
in mere description. There was no technical history of the Battle, or Radar, 
ASDIC, HF/DF's impact, or analysis of how technology changed sea warfare 
and anti-submarine warfare (the Shock Of The New, as it were). Anniversary 
Conference delegate David Zimmerman, himself a technical historian, 
deplored the lack of such a history. 76 This was also made by Milner, who did 
more than anyone to highlight the Royal Canadian Navy's invisibility from 
history and to lead the blossoming of this new area of scholarship!' It was not 
r3 Other interesting comment: IC in ASDIC doesn't mean "Investig. Cttee", but does not say from whence 
it was derived. 
74 Mclean, D, in the editorial to Warship 1997-98, Conway Maritime Press, London, 1997, p.7. 
75 Only immediately-postwar mythic, sanitised books such as The King's Cruisers [1947] had told such 
stories, which were clearly outdated by the turn of the century. 
76 "The task the conference organisers have set me is impossible. Without an understanding of the 
technology or the tactics employed, no history of their relationship is possible." His chapter was an outline 
of the future direction of research. Zimmerman in Howarth & Law eds op.cit pp.476-7 & 489. 
rt 	. 	• Milner in Sadkovich op.cit p.55, & footnote 53, on p.60. 
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new history, nor radical, but it was an area previously neglected. Ironically one 
indication of the direction new technical accounts could go in was provided by 
DK Brown in the same 50th Anniversary Conference proceedings. His 
"Atlantic Escorts, 1939-45" discussed more than the technical aspects of ship, 
weapon and sensor development. He also included more subjective 
parameters such as the effect upon tactics and fighting ability of ship size, hull 
forms, damage control, accommodation and facilities, and even ship's motion 
and motion sickness. 78 When synthesised with Zimmerman's conference 
paper and monographs, Buxton's "British Warship Building and Repair" 78 , 
Watt's 1976 U-Boat Hunters, and other such sources, a more comprehensible 
picture of the relationship of technology and tactics begins to emerge. A single 
scholarly monograph is still required to integrate these with manpower, 
recruitment, bases, training, and service perceptions, on both sides of the 
Battle. 
Hendrie's Short Sunderland in WW2, 1994, was a technical history 
masquerading as an operational one, not a patch on Longmate's equally brief 
Search Find & Kill, which had more technical material, and better operational 
history. 8° Moving beyond technical history was Kahn's clear scholarly 1991 
Seizing the Enigma. Gardner called this story of Allied cryptology, and the 
race to break the U-Boat codes especially, the "first post-Ultra work". 81 Kahn 
stated "cryptology was the chief secret factor in winning the Battle", emphasising 
the importance of Bletchley over US operations. The latter tended to 
overshadow due to their scale and size in some recent works - especially, 
inevitably, on the Net. 82 The US provided listening stations, and the required 
mass-production of complicated technology the British no longer could: all the 
breaksthrough were either prewar in Poland or Bletchley. It depicts great 
troubles and difficulties, personalities at sea and on land, pointing out Ultra 
was not the most important factor, or only important factor, or even necessary! 
Only shipping and escorts (and air support one assumes...) were vital. 
78 Brown, DK, "Atlantic Escorts 1939-45", in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit pp.452-75. 
79 Buxton, L, "British Warship Building & Repair" in Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit pp.80-100. 
80 Every U-Boat sunk by RAF Coastal Command was described. 
81 Gardner in Howarth & Law op.cit pp.528 & 532 & Note 36 of the current chapter. 
82 Kahn, D, Seizing The Enigma, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1991, p.276. For American dominance of 
Ultra on the Net see Russell, J, "Ultra...Against the U-Boats in WWII", http://omni.cc.purdue.edu/—pha/ultrainavy-
1.hmtl. 
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Recalcitrantly reactionary books like Salvo! continued from both 'Allied' 
and German authors, focussing on rare uses of guns, not torpedoes, sensors 
or aircraft. 83 This was the modern equivalent of the interwar focus on 
superdreadnoughts, and the wartime unwillingness to focus on escorts, 
sensors and trained personnel. The reality was blockade, convoy escort and 
ASW. Neither Deighton's "Sand & Sea", Chambers & Culbert's VVW-II Films &  
history, 1996 nor Ramsden's "Refocussing 'The People's War" explored 
myth. 85 Experience as myth remained implicit. James's Fame in the 20 T"  
Century, 1990, in coffee-table companion and enhanced paperback 
discussion, analysed celebrity, cutting through civilian myths, at least. Paris's 
1990 Novels of World War Two showed little change in portrayal or quality. 88 
Winton's Convoy, 1990, took apart its entire history, not merely one or 
both Battles. It and Terraine's marvellous Business in Great Waters are the 
"distinguished historians definitive account of submarine war", post-Ultra Roskills 
concentrating on the Atlantic. Unlike Padfield's War Beneath the Sea, they 
gave a balanced considered account of the entire Atlantic struggle, as well as 
beginnings, technologies and logistics. Padfield's history admittedly was only 
of Second World War submarine operations, but dealt very cursorily with 
development and Great War operations which in so many ways defined what 
its sequel would be like. 87 Terraine explained Royal Canadian Navy problems, 
benefitting openly from Milner. He continually provided the context of what 
was happening elsewhere, how the Battle and the war interacted. Either 
"Bomber Command was irrelevant to the war or the war was irrelevant to it." 88 1941 
was the key year. Padfield pilloried King and the unrestrained Churchill for the 
Atlantic's losses and dangers. 89 He mentioned but didn't condemn the Royal 
Canadian Navy, nor its contributions. He considered radar the chief Allied 
deliverance, against much of his evidence and the general conception, well set 
by 1995. There were half a dozen chief factors. Bombers were more use on 
83 Edwards, B, Salvo! A history of Classic Naval Gun Actions,  Arms & Armour Press, London, 1995. 
B4 Deighton, L, "Lawrence of Arabia vs The Cruel Sea" in Sight & Sound, Vol.5, No.1, Jan 1995, pp.30- 
33. 
88 Ramsden 1998 op.cit, pp.35-63, 1998. 
es Pans 1990 op.cit, introduction. 
87 See Ch.2: "1914-45.", of this thesis. 
se Terraine 1990 op.cit p.355, on how Bomber Command kept long-range aircraft needed for the Atlantic 
over Germany. 
89 As Blair [1997] showed, this is insufficient: King was no Anglophobe, merely too pro-US Navy and anti-
everyone else. 
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patrol than bombing Germany, but Padfield surprisingly claimed escorts a 
better investment than mass-produced merchant vessels. 90 van der Vat's 
Stealth at Sea: the Submarine, 1994, was another, less comprehensive, but as 
mythic as his 1988 work. 
Of all the recent books, Steele's 1995 Tragedy of HMS Dasher was 
perhaps the most significant, not only in that it brought to light an accidental 
loss largely forgotten since 1943 91 , but also in that it was intended as an 
Anniversary memorial piece. Wartime and postwar official secrecy and 
disinterest denied relatives the chance to grieve for half a century. Hundreds 
met or were reunited and shared their loss, what could be achieved quickly 
with the force and power of memory where a neglected story "needed to be 
told." The differences between 'Official' and 'Unofficial' mourning and 
memorialisation stood out. Official Memorialisation would be better planned 
and covered, if no better funded. 92 It might be less than the survivors and 
relatives wanted, misplaced or misdirected, or a poor compromise between 
feuding departments and Government ministries. 93 Unofficial memorials, 
supported by private donations and contributions, can be free of any but local 
government regulations, in whatever form survivors or relatives desire or can 
afford. Unfortunately unofficial memorials are also restricted to the involved or 
related, as Dasher's services at Ardrossan showed. The MoD laid on 
helicopters for an emotional flyby but no Ministry personnel. Official events get 
official support and participation, which mean more brass and more profile. In 
this case that may have been contrary to the aim of the memorial, as those 
involved lacked any previous official apology or recognition of grief and 
trauma. 
What was most obvious was how easily things can be forgotten. It is 
difficult to generate remembrance, save with official backing, or among tiny 
groups of interested persons. Steele was "a local man" who remembered the 
loss as a boy. He drew on contemporary and current testimony from survivors 
s° Padfield 1995 op.cit, p.276. 
91 Wartime secrecy till VE Day, the 30-Year Rule, then the silence of relatives' ignorance and official 
disinterest. 
92 Vide attempts by the Merchant Navy War Service League in Australia to achieve equal recognition, 
once equal recompense was gained for sacrifice and service in both Wars. 
93 Or even a political football. 
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and relatives, many of whom had no idea how their loved ones died till the MoD 
released information following his investigations, and a subsequent appeal. 
The fundraising for the memorial, the plaque, and a church plate in Ardrossan 
took only seven months to develop, organise, plan, and raise. The book was 
written with survivors and relatives in mind, as both focus and audience, and it 
did not place Dasher in a Battle context nor avoid mistakes a naval historian 
would see. 
The world of U-Boat myth before Buchheim was divided, like Germany, 
into participants and nonparticipants, those who served and those born after. 94 
After Buchheim there was little communication between two vigorously 
separate camps, one supporting, one opposing, blindly setting out their 
viewpoints. With myths and ideas outside Germany it was less so. PQ-17 and 
the policies of Admiral King were the only areas of division. There was no Nazi 
past to make allowances for, escape, or be proud of. The lessons and 
warnings of militarism and blind service to the state Hadley described were 
less forceful outside Germany. He did not explore the ghost-written nature of 
wartime propaganda. He must have read van der Vat's humorous account of 
Weyher's Prien in Howarth's Men of War. 95 He did not explore the 
separations between the actual and official authors, or reactions. Nor did 
Hadley explore German academic operational histories. Since the mid-1960s 
Rohwer and ROssler ignored mythology and removed misconception, giving a 
better view of U-Boat operations and the German Battle than we have of their 
Allied equivalents. 96 There was a scholarly solidity and thoroughness which 
gave these works, whether purely technical, or experiential and operational, a 
sophistication, quality and accuracy not bettered in Britain or America. They 
were as popular internationally as in Germany. 97 Their lack of cultural 
meaning, their accurate counter-mythology opposed the extremes of the 
debate. They were less open to personal and media reinterpretation and/or 
misuse, less valued by the public, less close to its heart, and less useful as 
tools of memory and meaning, mourning and mythology. 
94 "The grace of late birth", Hadley op.cit p.172-3. 
95 See Ch.3: "1945-60". 
96 Rohwer is probably the single most accomplished and sophisticated Battle historian in any country of 
any era. 
In that they were as frequently quoted, used, and referred to by later writers. 
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Many German writings represented an inability to mourn, grow and 
move on from experience. Mythologisation could do both, especially if 
carefully considered and guided. Remythologisation could give much help in 
comprehending experience, provided it was based in fact and that bias and 
prejudice were clearly identified and analysed. In Germany myth revolved 
attitudes. People often looked forward to forget, not to relive or rethink the 
past. A similar desire to forget and move on seemed to characterise many 
responses to the recent anniversaries of reunification. Germans have put both 
behind them.98 Left and Right politics determined the debate, froze progress 
and limited space for other opinions. 99 Only former U-Boat commander Topp's 
1991 Flares Over the Atlantic reflected in a new, enlightened and progressive 
way. Unlike Buchheim he did not self-promote, nor like Werner exaggerate, 
and as a result criticism was more muted, and less permanent. 1°° Hadley 
exposed other 'myths', not only of the men and the machines, but of maritime 
writing itself: the 'clean sea' mentioned by Monsarrat. 1°1 U-Boats and the 
Battle still had appeal, and not just for former participants. The young, and 
others, brought up in and steeped in lore and myth, perpetuated the themes, 
icons, traditions, and memorabilia. Attacks on duty and heroism continued, as 
did attacks on change and growth. The "Godforsakenness of U -Boat warfare" 
could equally be applied to all involved in the Battle. 102 
The beginning of new counter-mythical scholarly analyses emerging by 
the late 1990s was Mulligan's Neither Sharks Nor Wolves. 103 He explored 
beyond the mythic stereotypes in representations, eventually conducting • 
interviews with survivors as well as comparing documents. Like Lane, he 
broke new ground in creating a well-researched, scientific study, not a 
compilation of oral testimony. 1°4 This subject profited from sociological 
surveying the way Lane's analysis of seamen did. Losses and conscription 
changed the U-Waffe from an elite force to a more typical wartime mix of 
98 Seen chiefly in TV documentaries: Fall of the Wall, Germany: the Reluctant Nation The Iron Curtain  
The Pink Triangle, The Wall. 
Hadley op.cit p.178-9. 
1°3 Topp 1992 op.cit, pp.150-1, 166-7. 
101 Monsarrat, N, 1976 op.cit, p.6: We were sailing peacefully over ground strewn with dead sailors, 
blown up, burned to death, shredded, sucked down...just under the keel.. the sea seemed poisoned for 
ever." 
102 Bitdorff, W, "Making Das Boot" cited in Hadley op.cit p.151. 
103 Mulligan 1999 op.cit. 
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seamen, sailors and conscripts. 105 Mulligan proved this did not lower 
performance, nor the public perception of the men, or their special treatment. 
He also analysed the roles and styles of DOnitz, von Friedeberg, their staffs, 
and personnel policy. Both the depth and rigour of the analysis and the 
approach made it a dramatic departure from preceding accounts. The U-Boat 
war was neither a 'children's crusade' [though losses reduced the average age 
of all combatants], nor a cruel campaign fought by emotionless seasoned 
professionals. This study did much to bridge both the national sides of the 
mythology, and the controversy surrounding its representations. Germans 
could now see that the campaign lay between the emotive extremes of left 
'victim' and right 'hero'. Former Allies and researchers could now see past the 
old stereotypes of pirate and Nazi automaton. Hadley re-evaluated U-Boat 
myth for English speakers. Mulligan placed the service itself on a solid 
statistical and demographic base. He stripped it of the misconception, lack of 
knowledge and dissection which made earlier writers view existing accounts in 
purely stereotypical terms. Ironically, as with Robertson, Griffin and Hadley, 
this new groundbreaking work on the U-Boat was written by a foreigner. As 
with research on women and ethnicity, it will bear fruit in years to come. 
Lane's Merchant Seaman's War was written about the sociology of 
wartime seamen, their world and experiences, and the print, newsreel, feature 
and fiction written during the war for propaganda purposes. Its counter-mythic, 
exploratory themes largely escaped notice. 106 What people thought about 
themselves was told, as were the reactions the Battle provoked. Class, race, 
and political awareness were analysed amidst status,, geography, mores, and 
1 
values. Many such questions had never been raised before. Other recent 
representations complained of lack of postwar recognition, the poor state of 
wages and conditions, but went no further; to explore more of the seaman's 
world, beyond the limited physical sense. There was no comparison to other 
seamen, or other times. There was no connection or comparison to land 
workers. Writers seemed content to keep seamen mysterious and mystical 
even when the writers were themselves ex-participants. They understood 
1°4 Mulligan even provided a sample questionnaire and bias/response formulae in an appendix. This 
demonstrated how thorough and how individual the study was. 
105 Although the Kreigsmarine at large did not consider them an elite prewar. 
los Lane appeared in references elsewhere as a source of information, not a source of ideas or approach. 
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each other, but excluded landspeople; only allowing a view into their world. 
The writers were close to their subject, but their audience was not allowed to 
be. There was no interpretational leap into new territory for the Battle, as 
Isaac re-imagined eighteenth century Virginia, or Dening did the Bounty 
Mutiny. 107 There was no benchmark for new history. The proximity of the 
events did not lend the Battle to such reimagining. Damage to memory and 
imagination by non-press media compounded this. Wartime seamen could not 
be described as Rediker did, nor would they accept complex or pretentious 
reimaginings. 108 There had to be more, however, to these stories than 
hyperbole, mere narration of experiences, or analysis of tonnage. 
Atlantic fiction declined into serialisation and repetition. New authors, 
like Forrester before them, mixed Napoleonic, Great War, Second World War, 
and postwar tales. Almost all were ex-servicemen. McCutchan, a former 
captain, created miraculously-surviving characters: Commodore Kemp, 
Lt.Cameron RNVR. AE Langsford, a woman born in 1959, was the single 
exception in gender. Her work was indistinguishable. There was no early 
MacLean, or Monsarrat. All were clearly aware of what a 'good' novel 
required: a catchy beginning; solid, plausible dialogue and action, a convincing 
and effective plot, diverse and balanced characters for the reader to identify 
and be involved with 109 , and a buildup to an exciting, physically and (hopefully) 
morally and emotionally-challenging climax, finishing with a clear tying-up of 
loose ends. This also left openings for elements to base sequels on. Readers 
received the reassurance of recognisable, familiar character types, situations, 
and predictable plots. Given that McCutchan, for instance, understood this 
and was capable of producing such competent, commercially-satisfying works, 
why were the books limited, inaccurate, episodic, formulaic and boring? The 
authors were wedded to commercial requirements. They totally understood 
the format. They seemed unable to move beyond or even outside those limits. 
Unlike Capt. W.E.Johns (of Bliples fame), McCutchan, Reeman et al were 
writing for an adult audience as old as themselves. 
107 Isaac, R The Transformation of Virginia, Norton, NY, 1987; Dening, G, Mr.Bliqh's Bad Language, 
Cambridge University Press, London, 1992; An Ethnographic History of the Bounty, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton, 1988. 
108 Between the Devil & the Deep Blue Sea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987. 
109 So absent in porn and horror, where the plot is a thin hasty idea to stitch together visual scenes. 
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How much they satisfied remained uncertain. Given the popularity of 
twentieth-century commercial fiction they were probably as valued as other 
genres. 11° The Atlantic's lack of cultural penetration was indicated by the low 
overall numbers of novels set there compared to other theatres. Equally 
noticeable was the very low frequency of maritime stories among war 
comics.'" Perhaps as little as one in 30 or 40 involved warships, even fewer 
seamen or convoying. Combat remained the thing. The only developments 
were the sex in the relationships, the violence of the combat. 112 None 
challenged their readers. "The serious novel seems pretty much dead" stated 
American cultural guru Gore Vidal, "and partly because great literature requires 
great readers as well as great writers." 113 Serial naval fiction already existed, but 
was clearly The Anniversary period did not raise interest. 
McCutchan et al were already present. The Battle was buried under more 
famous events. The general focus on anniversaries led older men to seek new 
fictions reliving those times. Other genres - especially crime and western, 
which leant themselves to characters having adventure after adventure - used 
this format for decades. It is not known why such adventures took so long to 
be grafted onto a Battle setting. McCutchan was not pulp: hardcover editions 
were as well printed on good paper, bound and jacketed, as any modern 
commercial novel, and distinctly better than their equivalents in earlier 
decades. Some percentage of sales was library editions, where old men could 
get attached to characters and themes without purchasing relatively expensive 
single volumes. 115 
McCutchan's Commodore Kemp series exemplified repetitive Battle 
fiction. This series replicated a set of events and myths from novel to novel, 
only the principal character remaining. From 1986 this ex-Royal Navy officer 
produced tales of minimal variation of the war service of a recalled, retired 
Admiral. These novels were devoid of the animated, emotional description of 
'noble bows pointing upwards in salute' characteristic of earlier periods. 116 
1143 Westerns, Conan, Mills and Boon, or the violent desperate combat novels of Kessler or Hassel. 
111 Commando Magazine and War Picture Library, an apparently (thankfully) dying genre. 
112  Mirrored by the slowly-growing sexual explicitness of romance novelettes like Mills & Boon. 
113 Gore Vidal, "Gore Vidal" op.cit. 
114  Such as J.E Macdonnell, who wrote dozens of cheaply printed and bound novellas about submarines, 
ASW, shipping and surface combatants, in all theatres, between 1950 and 1970. 
115 Publishers consulted refused to elaborate. 
116 Such as Callison's Bone Collectors, 1984; commented on by Lane op.cit 1990, p.238. 
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McCutchan's novels were devoid of feeling, their characters as restrained as 
description. Full-blown mythic content was the order of the day, some of it 
Merchant Navy, but mainly Royal Navy myth of seamen and Germans. 
Convoys were used as decoys. 117 U-Boats attacked and sunk were 
considered more valuable than ships defended. 118 In each novel there were a 
cast of similar Merchant Navy characters: alcoholics, the perennially sexually-
dysfunctional. In Convoy East, 1989, there were WRNS aboard to complicate 
social interaction. Shipping losses were always high, as were losses of 
seamen. U-Boat losses were also high; twelve round one convoy in 1940 118 , 
three round another, 120 a U-Boat and two enemy destroyers sunk attacking an 
early arctic convoy in late 1941). 121 North also had a captured German secret 
agent (a friend of the captain) to pick up off Norway and deliver to the USSR. 
The Russians discharged ships faster than the British 122 , something that would 
surprise many who steamed to Murmansk more than once. 123 
Convoys were scattered monotonously regularly, in nearly ever' .  
nove1. 124 There were only two scatterings in history. 128 In Battle fiction, 1945'-
2000, HMS Ulysses to Convoy Homeward, scattering was de rigeur, the 
ultimate act of fatalistic resignation. McCutchan's other episodic novel serieg, 
Lt.Cameron RNVR, showed Royal Navy life in the same way: bad Captains, the 
usual gang of Hostilities-Only reprobates. The usual leading-seamen's 3 
good-conduct badges which meant "12 Years undetected Crime", first seen 
fictionally in HMS Ulysses in 1955. 126 "Anti-submarine warfare escorts had priority 
over cruisers for radar." 127 This was myth pure and simple: deception and 
mangling of real experiences for dramatic purpose. These novels were written 
by participants who perhaps ought to have known better. 
117 McCutchan, P, Convoy Commodore, 1986. 
118 'bid, p.27. 
119  Ibid; in reality 20 U-Boats were sunk worldwide in the whole of 1940...Costello & Hughes 1977, op.cit 
pz.328. 
I 'm Homeward, 1992. 
121 North, 1987. 
122 	 d, p.85. 
123 Woodman 1994 op.cit, p.182-3. 
124 In his 1986, 1987, 1989 novels. 
128 HX-84 under direct attack by raider Scheer, PQ-17 equally famously, by Pound's error of judgement 
and drafting. 
128 McCutchan, P, Lt.Cameron RNVR, p.29. 
127 !bid, p.13. 
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In 1998 there was another fiftieth anniversary. The Cruel Sea was 
finished in 1948 and to commemorate this the BBC commissioned a three-hour 
radio dramatisation. Continuity and change were prominent. Donald Sinden 
(Lt. Lockhart in the 1953 film) was in this version. He played the kind of 
pompous, omniscient narrator both novel and film did not have, lending the 
radio version a mythic gravitas its predecessors did not require. In this 
version, as in the novel, Julie Hallam, the 'First Lieutenant's woman', died 
accidentally. Naturally sound effects of waves, ASDIC and depthcharges 
evoked the cinema edition. The original music from the film was also used, 
connecting it even more to past representations. These versions of The Cruel  
Sea are interwoven and interdependent, not oppositional or revisionist. They 
are variations on the same representation. They are more like the evolution of 
Das Boot than reworkings, new insights into the original, or new editions for a 
later era. 
Cinematically released internationally 1997-8, the Director's Cut of Das 
Boot perpetuated controversy over Buchheim's perspective of the U-Boat's 
portrayal. As usual with Director's Cuts, the director said "this is the Das Boot I 
always wanted to make." 128 Full, restored, it lacked the exciting actions to which 
all war films, and even most anti-war films, helplessly reverted. A longer, 
slower, film, with more tension and stress, and less action, meant less time 
attacking convoys. Only three ships were sunk, during the early centre of the 
film, thus lowering focus on the Battle as the reason for the U-Boat being at 
sea. A new opening scene and a few short scenes were added; the remainder 
of the extra 1h19min added to existing scenes, deepening the film's existing 
tension and power. In addition to sunsets and the occasional beauty of the 
Atlantic, the viewer was taken further into the crew's lives and relationships. 129 
It was no longer an anti-war film masquerading as an action movie. It was at 
last a balance between the under-length, mis-promoted and distorted standard 
screen and video version, and the full TV miniseries rarely seen outside 
128 Petersen, in the 6-minute "Behind the Scenes" featurette of the wide-screen video release. 
128 Several added keys scenes show men dressed as dancing girls celebrating the news that they are 
returning [almost empty handed] to base, to be depressed by news, not of a military disaster, but their 
soccer team's defeat. In Spain, during replenishment before the climactic Gibraltar-penetration, the Chief 
Engineer, and war correspondent Lt. Werner both learn they will not be leaving U-96 in Spain, which 
seals their fate. From Petersen's Director's Cut, Columbia, 1997. 
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Germany. It has most of the scale, impact and claustrophobia the length and 
depth of the miniseries brought. It could not alleviate the basic problems of 
accuracy and attitude encoded in the original film and in the novel. These 
could not be improved with extra footage, restored prints, or sound. The 
depth-charges still burst too close and too deep for realism. Character's 
opinions were still controversial. The climactic air-raid was still implausible: 
more realism could have been made with U-96 succumbing to air attack 
outside the port instead, within sight of home, not the wholly unlikely 
strafing. 13° No new version could change this: audio could be restored, new 
sound effects added, but no new footage could be shot. 
As with the promotional materials for the 1987 German counter-mythical 
reconstructionist documentary Against England, the advertising undermined 
and subverted the filmmaker's intentions. It turned what should be a piece of 
serious, thoughtful drama into 'yet another sub movie'. 131 Both advertising and 
'making-of featurette accentuated action and violence, not tension and drama. 
Trailers contained every explosion in the film, its editing compressed all the 
looks of fear and worry between them. Trailer music was from the 1989 movie 
of a very successful Clancy cold-war submarine novel, The Hunt For Red  
October, containing the Soviet National Anthem....this supreme piece of farce 
was added to a typically gravel-voiced hyperbolic narration. 132 If not mere 
action, like new video dramas, it was advertised to the wrong audience. The 
six-minute 'making-of' featurette, promoted typically as having "never-before-
seen behind -the -scenes footage and interviews", contained footage from the 
original 45min 1981 German documentary. The hydraulically-controlled U-
boat-set, shots of the actors entering, and the backdrops against which the 
conning-tower set was deluged, were featured. These were combined with 
shots of the sound effects being rerecorded and remixed, and present-day 
soundbytes (not interviews) from director Wolfgang Petersen and lead actor 
130 In the novel another U-Boat was sunk outside the port as U-96 returned. This was another incident 
from 1944, not from the late 1941 the remainder of the novel was set in. Blair vol.2, p.609. 
131 Like the imitative Cold-War period submarine-claustrophobia dramas Crimson Tide and Hostile 
Waters 18, 2. 
The most recent descendent of Lorne Greene's narration of the 1940 RCN documentary Atlantic 
Patrol. From the cinematic trailer and Behind-the-scenes featurette included in the video release. 
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Jurgen Prochnow. 133 Only the Cut's producer, Ortwin Freyermuth, was 
interviewed, extolling its - his - improvements. 
The German controversy and interest were absent, as were why the Cut 
was made. Such undertakings are expensive and their purpose commercial. 
It was never, no matter what the makers say, simply a case of "it felt like time 
to do it." Clearly Columbia and BavariaFilm thought there would be a market 
of raised interest after the Anniversary era. Perhaps they also wanted to take 
advantage of The Hunt For Red October. 134 Clearly Petersen's recent success 
with semi-dramatic action pieces like Outbreak and Air Force One indicated he 
was popular and highly considered among executives. This made it easier to 
pitch an non-commercial representation like a restored, 3h2Omin subtitled 
German-language anti-war submarine drama. 
Evidence of the Battle's limited cultural penetration outside Germany 
was given by the 1994 film An Awfully Big Adventure, from Bainbridge's 1989 
nove1. 135 A city more than any other affected by the Battle, Liverpool became 
one of the two great British Battle terminals after the near-closure and 
restriction caused by German mines, S-Boats and air-raids on East coast 
towns and routes. 136 In February 1941 Liverpool became the base of Western 
Approaches Command, which was (under Adm.Noble and then ex-submariner 
Adm.Horton), to win the Battle and thus the war, for the Allies. Like the Clyde, 
convoys and escorts came and went, but from Liverpool WAC directed the 
campaign. Other Liverpool films of recent years make no such references. 137 
Famous IMerseybeaf representations were a 1960s creation: affluent, forward 
looking, without war on the mind. The Battle was only inescapable to older 
people. It was peripheral to Bainbridge, but central to Liverpool's experience 
of war, as Deighton put it, comparing The Cruel Sea to Lawrence of Arabia. 138 
"Few moviegoers had met T.E.Lawrence, but all knew some bank-clerk or milkman 
133 He was English-speaking, and known, from Beverly Hills Cop 2 and many action-video releases. 
134 As well as the imitative submarine-claustrophobia action video dramas mentioned above. 
136 In 1947 Liverpool, Stella gets work backstage in a theatre, then becomes the lover of an actor, who 
had, as RNVR [a civilian, not a seaman], left the stage in 1940 to command a corvette, as Cruel Sea's 
Ericson & Monsarrat had before him. He realises Stella is his daughter, but is killed accidentally before 
taking any action; from the novel & film. 
136 Liverpool handled 13,000 ships [120million tons] per year 1939-45; & 4.7million troops. Burn, A, The 
Fighting Captain, L.Cooper, London, 1993, pp.54, 58-9. See also Scarth "Liverpool as HQ & Base" in 
Howarth & Law 1994 op.cit, pp.240-251. 
137 BBC/Film-4's Dancing Through the Dark, 1991, for instance. 
138 Deighton, L, "Sand and Sea" vol 5 #1, Jan.1995, p.30-33. 
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who had gone off to man some warship equipped with no more than pluck, purpose 
and patriotism." 139 Bainbridge, once again, provided a received myth of the 
Battle. George, the prop master, 
'joined the Merchant Navy. Two years later his ship was torpedoed 24hrs 
out of Trinidad. He spent 9 days adrift in an open boat [the boat is always 
open, just as it was in The Goons...] croaking out xmas carols and spitting 
up oil. Stella was used to such stories. Every man she had met told tales 
of escape and heroism and immersion...down in submarines, stolen 
through frontiers, limped home across the channel on a wing and a 
prayer. o40 
The Battle, the city, and their effects on each another, were better executed in 
film than novel. More peripheral material has since been released. U-571 is 
currently screening. Early advertising indicated "Michael McConnaughey leads a 
group of soldiers in Italy to recover an Enigma machine 'hidden' somewhere aboard a 
U-Boat." 141 Eventually it was set in the Atlantic, a navy not an army story, and 
a traditional action movie rather than a historical film. It remained about 
Enigma (a secret mission to recover secret enemy technology). 142 It is based 
on the actual capture of U-571 by the British, and had advice and historical 
accuracy added after ex-participant's protests. 143 None of this prevented the 
director from denouncing U-Boat men as Nazis "for only dedicated Nazis would 
have put up with what they went through", or the needless and inaccurate 
portrayal of the U-Boat crew machine-gunning seamen in a lifeboat in order to 
keep the damaged U-Boats' location a secret. 144 
Anniversary documentaries were more prolific, not otherwise beneficial. 
Awareness was raised by these particular, specific works, but served only as 
backdrop to other issues and experiences. Seamen, black Americans, 
leaders, and cryptology were the focus of these litile-seen short-lived TV 
works. While this needed doing and also had links to 1950s Battle cinema and 
1970s histories, spreading the 'now it can be told' genre across media types, 
the Battle was incidental to these men and their experiences. Compilation 
139  !bid, p.33. 
140 	• 	• Bainbridge, B, An Awfully Big Adventure, Duckworth, London, 1989, p.39-40. 
141  Michael Douglas pulled out due to other commitments; Neon Magazine, October 1998, p.27. 
142 	• 	• This is perhaps an indication of how far behind cinema is: history having moved beyond Ultra-
domination. 
143 Helgason's U-Boat Website featured details of this controversy, and pictures of the sets and full-scale 
U-Boat props. 
144 Jonathon Mostow, director, quoted in the Washington Post, 23-4-00. Other information from the 
movie, & from Tonya Allen, pers.comm, of www.U-boat.net ., and her review of U-571 at 
www.uboat. netispecial/movies/u571_review.html. 
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editions, such as the American Atlantic War, combining dramatic footage (not 
always balanced with oral recollections), were becoming vogue in all forms of 
war documentary, as it was with motor-racing crashes and other 'sports'. 145 
With a preponderance of wartime footage and the ease of combining any 
conceivable group of images, 'best-of', `naval video time capsules' were 
inevitable. 146 What must be emphasised is that they were merely compilations 
of imagery, some with original sound, not analytical or narrative 
documentary. 147 Analysis was incidental. Documentaries only established 
events, without exploring myths. Indeed 1994's "Donitz" was promoting the 
pro-Buchheim, left-wing, anti-participant myth. This added another voice to the 
pro-and-anti-Buchheim debate: it was not a new perspective or 
interpretation. 148 No-one provided the middle ground, despite the best efforts 
of the interviewees to be fair or at least balanced. In Germany, for the U-Boat 
and Donitz, there was none. 
No doubt intended to capitalise on raised awareness among all the 
other commemorations of the Anniversary period, October Films and Lionheart 
TV made Forgotten Heroes for BBC broadcast in 1994. The only documentary 
since the war to deal solely with seamen, it had a representative sample of 
nationalities: British (less than 70% white), US, Canadian, Indian, Norwegian. 
Ordinary seamen were its only advantage over "Wolfpack"s wholly white 
British ex-masters and officers. Heroes was from the bottom up: five British 
deckhands and engineroom men, an ordinary US deckhand, a Lascar stoker, a 
Norwegian radio-operator. Intercut was footage of the only remaining Liberty 
ship, a moving museum which does annual voyages.around the US coast to 
remind the relatives of the participants of their Second World War 
experiences. 149 Fortunately what also received coverage was the lack of 
recognition and recompense for non-British seamen after the war. The Lascar 
interview concentrates on the lack of pensions medals and acknowledgment 
145  50mins, archival material and participants interviews; http://www.u-boatmetfispecial/movies/the_atlantic_war.htm  
146 Others were RN in WW2, "researched from British archives by Roland Smith over ten years," part 6, 
'Perilous Waters', the Atlantic Battle and part 7, 'Hazards of Russian Convoys', proudly stressing "all the 
known archive film, this programme must be the only ever devoted to the emotive subject." Also 
available from DD Video was the 1978 BBC technical-history documentary Battle of the Atlantic, among 
compilations of carrier and battlefleet footage, and features Lifeboat, Western Approaches, and Coastal 
Command. The latter is clearly stated to be "Official 1942 documentary", demonstrating that blindness to 
the difference between Feature and documentary is as alive as ever! 
147 
All above were available by order from the Internet at http://www.members.aol.com/marbooks/videos.html  
148 It was new in the sense it was seen, translated, outside Germany. 
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for non-white seamen, though wartime shipping line histories record that 
awards and medals were made to some Lascars, Indians, Chinese and West 
Indian seamen - at least officially. The Tower Hill Memorial names were 
shown, but not mentioned. 15° 
The content of Forgotten Heroes was too confronting, and without 
breaks or respite from harrowing material. It did not connect these tales to the 
overall picture. It narrated a few of the tens of thousands of stories of suffering 
which merchant seamen, but none of the hundreds of thousands of stories 
without suffering. The effect was to desensitise the ordinary viewer, who had 
little conception of life at sea and almost none of war on or in it. Without 
balancing the trauma with hope, viewers would not want to remember. There 
was little of the positive, normal, aspects of life, the enormous fund of 
anecdotes, humour, and scene-setting also available. It was too grim, too 
painful to be acceptable, even possibly to relatives of the participants. In 
earlier Battle documentaries explaining to Europe and North America exactly 
what the Battle was, why it was important, and needed remembering, was 
explicit. 151 
The seamen's Battle myth was presented in all its glory: life was hard, 
the weather was the greatest danger, conditions were poor, pay terrible, life 
ashore cheap, fun, rich, and exciting, especially in America. Fear, worry, 
attack, injury, and long open-boat survival ordeals and/or death were the 
irreversible, everyday war experience. Interviewees spoke of "fear all the time", 
the "horrific casualties", were "just picked off"; are "still outraged at their treatment"; 
"never enough recognition" during the war or after. 152 \There was in wartime, 
more than before or since. 153 There was no wartime footage of life aboard 
ships in convoy or the attacks and sinkings harrowingly discussed. Clearly for 
these men it was harrowing, but they were not totally representative. 154 
Admittedly many convoys were saved by bad weather, by removal of U-Boats 
149 SS Jeremiah O'Brien, the "last Liberty." 
15° The Imperial War Graves Commission Tower Hill Merchant Navy memorial to "Merchant seamen with 
no known grave" was approved by HM Queen Elizabeth in March 1955; Trident magazine op.cit, p.179. 
151 Such as the Victory at Sea episodes; "Wolfpack", and Battle of the Atlantic. 
152 Forgotten Heroes 1994 op.cit. 
153 As described at length in Lane, 1990, op.cit Ch.3, pp.33-66. 
154 As Blair 1997 op.cit p.426 relates, 97% of Atlantic convoys were never attacked, and 80% were never 
even sighted. 
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from Donitz's authority, and many must simply have passed over the Atlantic in 
1943-45, when open-ocean pack-attack had been abandoned, and there were 
many more ships, convoys, and many more escorts to cover them. 
What was less explored, though it was initially mentioned, was the 
unseen, unrecompensed trauma of worry, fear and unending tension all 
seamen - and almost all combatants - were subjected to, irrespective of 
whether they were attacked. Related instead were the usual tales of open-
boat endurance, amputations for immersion foot (one man with terrible 
infections after an operation in a Soviet hospital), accusations of being "army 
dodgers" and official letters home stating that men were lost at sea, pay 
stopped from the day the ship was lost (which did not occur after mid-1941) or 
income tax demands on wages. Also unexplored was the postwar half-century 
of relative obscurity and silence, compared to the relatively high profile they 
only enjoyed (but do not mention) during the war years of Ministry of 
Information propaganda and morale-boosting. 
Attempting controversy, like Donitz, was the Canadian Black Pit. 155 
Concerning only the mythically decimated convoy SC-107, it combined archival 
footage, dramatisation (of bridge scenes, not ships) and interviews. 158 Senior 
Royal Canadian Navy staff were criticised in 1942 and in this documentary for 
negligence, not the crews themselves, in causing the rapid expansion, brief 
training and technological lag behind the Royal Navy which made the 
Canadian vessels ineffective. 157 Comparison was excluded between 
Canadian and British groups, the latter were no more effective against 
wolfpack-attack without air support, when they took\ these convoys over in 
January 1943. Not until the coming of the very-long-range Liberators, and 
organic air cover from escort carriers, as well as additional roving escorts in 
support groups, could wolfpacks in mid-ocean, in poor weather, be fought 
successfully 158 This documentary was an unfortunate revenge on men long 
155 See Appendix 2 for details. 
156 SC-107 [42 ships escorted by 6 Canadian warships] was sighted on 29 October 1942 and attacked by 
more than 14 U-Boats over the following week. 15 ships were sunk for three U-Boats and one damaged, 
making it a rare success among wolfpack operations. Usually weather, fuel or escorts drove wolfpacks 
away after sinking three ships, or fewer. 
157 at http://www.u-boat.netllspecial/movies/the_black_pit.htm  
158 Milner in Sadkovich op.cit p.52.; Milner in Runyan & Copes op.cit p.135. 
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dead, with other elements put aside. 159 It did, however, also raise awareness 
of the Canadian Navy's participation in the Bathe. Very few people would have 
read Milner's books, by comparison. 
Proudly We Served, about USS Mason, the only US Navy vessel 
crewed by black combatants, was misleading, and unsatisfying, even given 
that its purpose was recognition of Blacks, not sailors or the Battle. In 
recognising their service it overplayed their part while underplaying the Battle. 
The few convoys they escorted were assumed to be historic and important; as 
if the US Navy won the Battle single-handed, with no mention of other services 
or nationalities. Mason served in the Atlantic from late 1943 to early 1945, 
after the climax. Despite the fact that US Navy and Coastguard vessels 
escorted at least half the Atlantic convoys of 1940-41, after Pearl Harbor the 
US Navy never contributed more than 5% of escort forces: and then of central 
Atlantic troop convoys and offensively-operating task forces centered on 
escort-carriers. 169 Mason never saw action. Much of the documentary's 
drama, when not misusing footage from other navies, other theatres (and even 
other wars) was of one convoy when the weather was severe. While not 
denigrating their courage, or ignoring the great steps forward they were 
making in an unintegrated Navy, this was hardly the stuff of legend. 
The stories of black US seamen would have made a better subject. 
There were many more than 340 of them, before, during and after the war, and 
some saw action. They had far more interesting and valid tales of suffering 
and sacrifice than 340 navy Men. 161 No-one looked for them (save very 
recently on the Net). There was no credibility to be gained in telling their story 
(which is why the US Navy supported the Mason documentary). There were 
tales of black British (read Jamaican) and American seamen who put up with 
159 As had 1992's Death By Moonlight, [Galafilm/CBC/Nat.Film Board of Canada] which attempted to 
prove that high Canadian Air Force bomber losses were still hidden from the public, fifty years after these 
were actually made known. 
160 Stories of troop convoys are limited almost entirely to accounts by bomber crews who travelled to and 
from training in them: troop convoys were fast and heavily-escorted; rarely sighted or attacked, which led 
to few sinkings or incidents. This meant, in the anonymous memorable phrase, "happy is the convoy with 
no history." 
161 The sole black survivor of the liberty ship Mary Luckenbach, or those mentioned in incidents related in 
Morison's 1960 Vol.10, op.cit, p.140-3. 
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worse than bad weather, and even fought surface raiders and aircraft. 162 
Proudly We Served was intended to raise consciousness among (especially .  
black) Americans. It had the usual "tendency among American historians to 
narrow the focus onto purely national experience" and "national myopia", excluding 
anything not American. 163 The power of establishment lobbygroups donated 
crumbs to the unrecognised, in return for publicity accruing to itself. 
Typical modern representation, chaining history to producer's intentions, 
was the "Donitz" episode of Hitler's Henchmen, a coproduction of ZDF in 
Germany and SBS Australia. It was as misleading and unsatisfying as 
Proudly We Served. Facts and historical documents incline audiences to 
believe documentary, unlike historical films. It was chronologically amorphous, 
non-contextual, and biased. This was despite all but two of the distinguished 
interviewees being pro-DOnitz, or at least balanced: the exceptions being his 
grandson (and son of a leading U-Boat commander, staff officer and postwar 
complier of records, Hessler), who said "Donitz never came to terms with his 
relationship to Hitler"; and the doyen of German 'Regret Historians', Buchheim,. 
He remained as anti-Donitz as ever, refusing to acknowledge salient points. 1 65 
He saw Donitz as a power-hungry, ambitious, unemotional leader, willing to do 
anything for his Fuhrer at the cost of his men. DOnitz did increasingly send his 
men out to die, as everyone did by 1944, and even though he was rewarded 
with the succession, he disobeyed Hitler's final orders and continued the war 
only to rescue refugees from the advancing Soviets. The last loyal man Hitler 
trusted was only interested in preserving Germany, at the Nazi's expense. 
Interviewees had their words twisted into condemnation, in contrast to what 
they were saying. 166 The music was from Das Boot; the whole production 
locked to the serial concept of allowing no defence, no mitigating factors, or 
162 Notably on the Kola Run, SS Stephen Hopkins' fight with a German raider; see also Morison, S E, 
History of USN Operations In WV-II: Vol 10: the Atlantic Battle Won 1943-45,  Little & Brown, Boston, 
1960, vol.10 p.140-41. 
163 Milner in Runyan & Copes 1994, op.cit pp.128 and 131. 
164 Or perhaps a mere case of 'rebadging'. 
165 Such as the number of Allied ships, aircraft, and personnel the Battle consumed [2 million workers, 
according to some estimates, in vessels, construction and support, including electronics manufacture and 
cryptology] and the impossibility of changing the nature of the Battle once begun. Tarrant, V.E The U-
Boat Wars 1914-45, A&A Press, London, 1989. 
Kennedy, Hinsley (who misled by saying, perhaps only meaning the pre-climax era, that evasion due 
to Ultra denied the U-Boats targets, manifestly not true by late 1942); Otto Kranz!)Oilier, lawyer at 
Nuremburg; Ursula Hessler, DOnitz's daughter; U-Boat-West Chief Resing, staff officer Bohm-Tettlebach, 
U-Boat commanders Closen, Hardegen, von Schroeter, and "Silent Otto" Kretschmer. Curiously, 
Hardegen took over U-123 [Oakcrest] from Moehle in June 1941. 
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even any balance. 167 DOnitz was included only because he was Hitler's 
successor. His U-Boat leadership was used not as biography, but only to 
magnify his evil nature, callous personality, and Nazi credentials. 168 
NOVA and WGBH-Boston in 1994 broadcast Codebreakers. This 
celebrated a century of American cryptology, its hook the first viewing of the 
still-secret 'Purple Analog' built in the US to break Japanese codes. It also 
featured Enigma, including a very informative description of its workings, 
thankfully not overstating Ultra. Kahn's influence through interview and feature 
kept this to a minimum. As Law proposed at the fiftieth Anniversary Liverpool 
conference, it was another 'post-Ultra' work. It was not post-mythical. Though 
the secret agent Asche was mentioned, Polish cryptologers were not named, 
nor their research or methods, especially the electromechanical bombes which 
were the key to both British codebreaking and early computing. It discussed 
the importance of British captures of German cypher materials and the ability 
to divert convoys around U-Boats and wolfpacks. The all-important chronology 
and critical nature of the 'Ultra blackout' of February-December 1942 and its 
effect on the Battle were not presented. 169 The shorter, less dangerous 
blackout of March 1943 was featured instead, where to Allied surprise new 
cyphers fell within weeks, not months. 17° Nevertheless, VLR anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft, escort-carriers, and co-operation were seen as the key to 
winning the Battle. Ultra merely enabled diversion: preventing the Battle being 
lost until other resources were strong enough to win it. HF/DF was never 
mentioned, nor were any Germans among those interviewed: including the 
leader of the U-//0 capture party, David Balme. 
Decisive Weapons: "Anti-submarine warfare" continued both trends of 
technical and specialised documentary forms. 171 Shorter and shallower than 
earlier efforts, it concentrated solely on the surface, not airborne, sensor and 
167 In one place, referring to documents we cannot read, the narrator asserts "evidence of criminal 
lunacy." 
168 As with A.Kemp's German Commanders of WW II,  Osprey, London, 1982. 
169 The Kriegsmarine changed U-Boat cyphers from a four to five-rotor scrambler, raising by an order of 
magnitude the number of combinations, and thus the number to be tested, in order to decode an 
encrypted message. Only 10 months of effort and a leap forward in technology and processing speed 
made it possible, while diverting convoys round wolfpacks became difficult due to few positions and 
increasing numbers of boats on patrol. 
170 Associated with the critical losses of those months, this structure made for more dramatic television. 
171 BBC, 1996, 1 episode of 12, 26min, see in Appendix 2: "Battle of the Atlantic Documentaries, 1945- 
2000.", of this thesis. 
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weapon responses to the U-Boat threat. Interviewees included Don Kirton of 
HMS Bluebell, and Robert Atkinson of HMS Pink. Both were in Howard Bailey's 
1994 oral history The Battle: the Corvettes and their Crews. Thilo Bode & Karl 
Topp [whose post-Buchheim counter-mythology was unmentioned 172] gave the 
German view, and historian Dan van der Vat the strategic and technical. 
Sequential topics were SC-7's 'slaughter', U-Boats, corvettes, depthcharges, 
ASDIC, radar, U-Boat mass production, Pearl Harbor & 'Drumbeat' [without 
exploration of its myth], HF/DF, Hedgehog, escort-carriers, convoy theory, and 
the Liberator. These were summed using convoy SC-130 (Cdr.Mike Gretton 
RN described his father's participation, as in Crisis Convoy, 1974, & Convoy 
Escort Commander, 1964 - see Ch.4 & 3). Atlantic supremacy enabling D-Day 
and hence VE-Day was still overemphasised, as in 1952's Victory At Sea. 
Much the same content, style, and sequence as "Wolfpack" were employed, to 
pleasing but limited effect. No new perspective was present. 173 Other 
documentaries - liners, oil, the war in general - were either mythical or 
distorting. They concentrated on famous incidents, emphasised one element 
over many, or emphasised land over sea warfare, without balance. 
The TV series and website Secrets of War provided the vital effect Of 
promoting and moving the Battle toward the mainstream of public awareness, 
but no new information or perspective. The Atlantic campaign and Ultra were 
covered separately, though interconnected. These accounts relied heavily on 
interviews of participants, previous technical documentaries and on familiar 
footage. No new model, computer graphic or other means of presenting 
operations, explanations or experiences was provided. This meant that the 
episodes were less advanced in presentation than "Wolfpack" of 1973. 
VVVVW.secretsofwar. corn also provided raw unedited transcripts of the research 
and televised interviews. Many belied the commercial intent behind the series, 
in undeleted questions such as "Do you have a book you'd like to push?" when 
interviewing men who were often labelled as the author of a new or key 
work. 174 
172 For Topp's countermythology see Hadley op.cit pp.180-4, 193-4. 
173 The actual rate of losses could have been shown, as well as progress in how anti-submarine warfare 
is represented, by the use of computer graphics and animation, to illustrate a U-Boat stalking a convoy, 
and being hunted, in three dimensions, along the lines of dramatised cinema scenes. 
174 From the transcript of the interview of Professor Jurgen Rohwer at 
www.secretsofwar.conl/html/juergen_rohwer.html 
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The Anniversary Era was one of noticeable change in prominence and 
portrayal. The Battle became better known through anniversary 
commemorations and more extensive coverage in general and encyclopaedic 
entries. Remembrance, better handled than in previous decades, informed 
audiences. Clearly counter-mythical works were produced, but were 
dominated by non-mythical and mythical works. Their excellent standard and 
coverage heralded a new period of interest, sophistication and coverage. The 
new medium of the Internet was now the area of growth. Unfortunately this 
resembled and replicated earlier ideas and representations. It also reinforced 
existing ideas, and existing power structures, which maintained the status quo 
where depiction and use were concerned. Museums and armed services still 
dominated public presentation of the Battle, while small private websites, 
generally by relatives, though equally easy to access (the Net's only 
advantage) had to contend with already established sites and the prominence 
of more famous events, battles, and campaigns, in public memory. 175 
Documentary flourished for its own purposes, not that of participants, or 
the kind the Battle required to gain more recognition and better representation. 
Fiction also continued, but with only moderate commercial success as one 
subgenre among many "contemporary ephemeral fictions." 176 It was as devoid of 
critical recognition as forty years ago. The era of the classic novel was over. 
One cinema contribution was only a commercial success. The other had 
critical success with the rerelease of a post-Buchheim film. It was too early to 
tell its eventual value to participants or historians. That was also the state of 
histories of the Battle. It was too soon for counter-mythology's effects on 
portrayal to be visible. No acceptable representation existed which presented 
all participants and nationalities, both genders, the strategic, tactical and 
personal dimensions of the battle and its surroundings, the technological 
competition, and especially the contributing myths and representations 
involved. New sources and interpretations may yield a more balanced 
perspective in years to come. Ways must be found to present mythology and 
reality with respect for participant's memory, while moving beyond mere 
campaign history soon enough for those that remain to appreciate. 
175 The other problem is that minor interests have to be looked for, they cannot be stumbled across by 
the general public. 
176 
Fussell 1989 op.cit p.239. 
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"Face the past - and keep it alive." 
—Dr.ing. Heinz Nordhoff. 
Wiedervereinigung und Vergangenheitsbewaltigung 
The story of the representations of the Battle of the Atlantic is one of 
continuity and change. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989-90 was the 
'historical' end of the Second World War. 1 It marked a reconciliation of many 
national and personal issues. It also highlighted the ongoing need for 
reconciliation between contending groups, for reunification of scattered and 
separate experiences and portrayals, and for facing the past and learning from 
it. 2 The primary message of all these works has been this is the way it felt. 
The secondary message has been by reading or watching them both 
participant and vicarious audiences can experience, comprehend, and 
commemorate those events. All the representations of all the eras were 
attempts to reconcile the pain and discomfort of experience and memory, or to 
remember and commemorate the glory and depression, elation and 
achievement of key incidents. Participants often felt they were not sufficiently 
recognised for their service. The novels, histories, movies and documentaries 
were created partially to correct that deficit. The representations contained the 
essence of the experiences, the very good and the very bad, the most 
powerful, significant moments. These representations were how the Battle 
was viewed by its participants, and how it was passed on to vicarious 
audiences. There was little need for innovation. The myths supplied what the 
participants required. 
Mythologising was an important and effective means of comprehending 
and presenting experience. The creation of myth about events, about 
conditions, and about men enabled understanding and release. The hero 
myths of U-Waffe and seamen commemorated defeated or forgotten 
servicemen. They enabled nations to rework old symbols and archetypes into 
new forms for new crises. These myths were less applicable to the men of the 
escort and air forces, so they had to make their own myths. Strain, epics of 
endurance, and dedication in the face of odds and new technologies gave 
1  'VViedervereinigung' means "Reunification" (specifically of Germany) while Vergangenheitsbewaltigung . means 
"Confronting and overcoming guilt about the past"; Ellis, W, "The Morning After: Germany Reunited", 
, National Geographic, September 1991, p.11. 
2  Facing both the traumas of the past: the guilt of surviving, and the guilt of destroying and killing. 
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them a special sense of purpose, meaning, and service. Those burdened with 
grief could seek solace in seeing what those involved in the events went 
through. They could understand a little better what husbands, fathers and 
brothers did. They also offered participation in the lives and deaths of the 
other: the enemy. They too could be seen, understood, empathised with. 
These representations operated as a myriad tiny obelisks and plaques. They 
were essential for most participants and their relatives, who could never visit a 
memorial. Yet they commemorated more than the events, the passage of time 
as defined by official occasions, and the overt tribute to those who made the 
supreme sacrifice. They operated for the implicitly commemorated survivors 
as well. They have been most significantly memorials for the living. We 
should not have needed obelisks or massive pylons. We should not have 
even needed walls of names or rolls of honour. All we needed was words. 
"Early modernists such as Pound, Joyce, Yeats, and Elliot reacted to the . 
perceived metaphysical crisis of the early twentieth century by creating personal - 
mythologies - mythotherapy." 3 Much Atlantic Battle work can be construed in the 
same way. The need for heightened, beyond merely operational versions of. 
the events, where the essence was expressed in a refined form, was the 
cause of the mythologising. By writing about the Battle and/or their 
experiences in a hyper-real fashion and giving it an even grander scale and 
epic quality than it already possessed, participants and enthusiasts were 
attempting to raise the Battle to 'true myth', to do therapeutically for 
themselves what nation, service and family had not. 4 Recasting events in this 
way made myth, and myth made sense, and gave more relief than any 
restricted, corrected, revised, demythologised, debunked account ever could. 
In some cases myth hardened into dogma, but even that reassured and 
comforted participants. All on each side needed to come to terms with the 
events, to relate to them, even if many were unsuccessful. This was all 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, as much for the Allied participants as the 
German. The Allies did not need to come to terms with defeat, but they still 
required a relationship to the events. 
3 John Barth, in Nelson, TN, Kubrick: Inside a Film Artist's Maze, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1982, p.12. 
4 'True Myth' ie genuine, historical Myth, concerning the gods, heroes and ancestors of a people, not a 
recent, artificial construction (however unwitting ) by authors or publicists. 
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Atlantic Campaign myths emerged from centuries of maritime and naval 
mythology colliding with late nineteenth century technological advance, at the 
end of an era of military, economic and material progress. New ideas and 
methods of making war spawned different views and reactions to experiences. 
"It takes thirty years for any technological revolution to be absorbed by society." 5 
1945 marked the acceptance and incorporation of the imagery and features of 
submarine and anti-submarine warfare into Western society and culture. 6 This 
conveniently coincided with VE-Day and the end of the Battle. 1939 had 
merely been the resumption of a competition interrupted 19 years before: the 
continuation of a technical and logistic seesaw which persevered beyond the 
Cold War, on drawing boards, in computers, and at sea. History and fiction 
defined perspectives of the event a decade after war's end. These portrayed 
the Battle the way its participants wanted. The powerful and pungent accounts 
of this era were not soon supplanted. 
By 1960, cinematic portrayal of sea warfare and the Battle had come full 
circle, returning to the didactic, uninspired, limited representations of Great 
War newsreel and interwar features. Cinema representation improved and 
evolved during the Second World War and briefly after. By 1955 this mass 
medium was driven by audience taste and commercialism.' Historical 
representations, with the inertia and force of tradition and continuity, changed 
slowly, and fiction moved from best-selling literary classics to commercial 
genre-pieces. No one needed the representations to change. They were 
merely added to. Technical histories contributed details and minutiae for 
participants and fans. Secondary works began to build upon the passionate 
works of the previous period. The myths of the Battle became the accepted 
historical view. The Battle was now told in all forms the way the participants 
desired. They possessed the forms and means of production of their stories. 
By 1975, the 30-Year Rule allowed new sources for versions of existing 
accounts. The accidental revelation of Ultra had several consequences. 
Technical history benefitted from new analysis. Manufacturing, logistics, 
s Cringely, R, Accidental Empires Viking, London, 1992, p.44. 
6 Though it is debatable how much anti-submarine warfare, unlike submarine warfare, was ever clearly 
incorporated. 
7 Audiences seemed to prefer action to drama, and actual events recreated to stories which made 
characters evolve. 
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weapons development and research began to receive more recognition. 
Historians embarked on a tangential path, a detour for two decades, not a new 
perspective. For the first time the Battle began to be reinterpreted in favour of 
a new group. Those at sea began to seem less vital than those in laboratories 
and factories. Documentary was so limited in presence its effect was minimal, 
and feature film even less so. Novelists yielded both the best-selling classic 
the subject had been waiting since 1955 to receive, and a controversy strong 
enough to shift it toward the limelight. Earlier controversies had been confined 
to participants and their relatives. The new controversy of content and 
presentation engendered by Buchheim's Das Boot was instead limited almost 
entirely to German-speakers. It was the only tangent in a ceaseless effort to 
comprehend the U-Boat. Its cinematic portrayal, and consequent media 
position and documentary production, took over the debate. 
By 1989, when a fledgling post-Ultra era was in evidence, change - 
began to gather pace. Anniversaries provided an opportunity for a higher 
profile, in addition to increasing coverage in general accounts of the Second 
World War. Academic history was now a considerable and growing area of 
activity. New subjects, such as the service of female personnel, homosexuals, . 
and ethnic minorities, appeared. New approaches and comparisons 
emerged. German U-Boat myth and the sociology of merchant seamen were 
examined. Scientific, statistical and rigorous narrative analysis gained 
credibility. For the first time new interpretations were posed. These were not 
usually contributed by participants, but were created by using their sources. 
These new representations were not critical or derogatory. They were 
intended to honour and support those who served. The long boom in repetitive 
formulaic fiction declined, as did that of under-narrated, over-detailed, 
technical histories. There is as yet no 'post-Buchheim' era in fiction, as there 
is a post-Ultra era in history. By 2000A0 the Internet had been added to 
media. New perspectives were visible, in how other wars were dealt with on-
line, and how other kinds of information and experiences were portrayed. 
Electronic presentation remained as stuck as discourse in other media. Battle 
websites were merely pamphlets or books online: outdated forms of 
presentation in a powerful new medium. There was only a hint of the 
convergence of fiction, history, documentary, cinema feature, and 
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communication the Net offered. Today at least the Battle can be found on the 
Net. 8 The peripheralisation of the Battle and the relative neglect of its 
participants came slowly to an end. Both the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle 
and of Walker's death have been promoted and commemorated by digital 
publications. 
The limitations and problems of conventional official commemoration 
were contrastingly expressed by an unofficial anniversary poem. Matt 
Simpson's poem of the Fiftieth Anniversary was mentioned in Chapter Six. His 
poetry worked on several levels, simultaneously presenting now and recalling 
then. 
The Common Touch 
On the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic 
On a day like this of rain and rattling helicopters, 
flags slap-slapping like smacked behinds, 
on a grey day like this obstinate as Tory decline, 
a time of soggy handshakes and grim smiles, 
when the stuff of war's brought out of mothballs and buffed up, 
and lachrymose old men march past with rows of dashing gongs 
to validate Monarchy and country yet again... 
The centre section of his poem attacked the late-May 1993 
commemoration of the Battle's Fiftieth anniversary, opposing the church 
services, exhibitions, and conferences which presented only the official, 
acceptable face of recognition. What specifically went wrong was that the 
Battle of then, and the largely-overlooked servicemen and seamen of half a 
century were misused as 'publicity fodder' the way they were once used as 
cannon fodder. 
I took you to the Albert Dock (where that phlegmatic pageant's underway now as I write) 
...dawdling over coffee by the Maritime Museum, 
watching kids with clipboards converting wonder into usefulness... 
...until the place's fakery and smarm became too much. 
8 In 1996 typing 'Battle of the Atlantic' into search engines yielded no hits. Today it yields between 60 
and 70. These are largely Canadian Government Veterans Affairs, or US Merchant Marine support and 
commemoration sites. The remainder are private relatives commemorative sites, or links to online book 
and video stores offering Atlantic Battle products. 
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Most prominent was the general use and specific misuse of the past 
that museums, memorials and commemorations can commit. The once 
bustling Albert Dock, the busiest port in the world, is now a Museum, with 
images, relics, and 'stories to tell', "converting wonder into usefulness": Simpson 
remembers its past, and the stories his family's workers told, and "the place's 
fakery and smarm become too much." Once again recreation and public history 
fail to capture the spirit or sense of the place. More significantly, the spirit and 
sense of the Atlantic Campaign was elsewhere: out on an anonymous, 
indifferent ocean. 
"What was this once?" you asked. Once? Creak of gantries winching bales, bawl of 
blockermen doling out day's work, those unlucky shambling off to pitch-and-toss somewhere 
against a jigger wall: 
This refers to the continuing industrial action on the Liverpool docks. 
The lines describe the pre-union 'first come, first served' work practices on the 
docks, and by implication the free-enterprise non-unionised system current 
management wishes to return to. These strikes began in 1992 and continue, 
long after similar disputes in Australia were resolved. 
Folk-memory spooks! Lashed to the quay in front of us a replica - reminding us how puny 
things once dared great deeds - Drake's Golden Hind.... 
Set between the fake museum and the commemoration is another 
warning: that replicas and reenactments merely, as Greg Dening pointed out, 
tend "to hallucinate the past as merely the present in fancy dress." 9 
...The Atlantic Battle rattles on. 
Today's wind is whipping up grey History to service po-faced ceremony, 
rain's rat-tatting on Drake's drum: Queen's reviewing her warriors, 
stiff old men with reawakened loyalties... 
Old men feel obligated to step forward to be recognised for the most 
important moments of their lives, for which they have not been lauded before, 
or will again. This is their only chance, and yet it is the regime and the 
government which is also supported and lauded, not for their sacrifice and 
service, their experiences and memories, but merely as their once-employer, 
for whom they may or may not have felt loyal to since 1945, or voted for, or 
supported. 
9  Dening, G, Mr.Bligh's Bad Language, Cambridge University Press, London, 1992, p.4. 
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The actual Atlantic was separate and excluded from awareness and 
attention. Success was mixed for remembrance and recompense of the 
neglected living. Books were effectively communicating their myths, 
ceremonies less so. Anniversaries highlighted for the public the type of 
ceremony, mutual memory and communication participants had been having 
for decades, via non-official associations, societies, dinners and pilgrimages to 
famous sites. This was not possible for former Atlantic servicemen. The late 
Carl Sagan wrote that 
"The real triumph of Gettysburg was not 1863 but 1913, when the surviving 
veterans of the Blue and the Grey.. .met in celebration and solemn 
memorial.. .When the time came to remember they fell, sobbing, into each 
other's arms. They could not help themselves. We need more than anniversary 
sentimentalism and holiday piety and patriotism.. .to confront and 
challenge.. .conventional wisdom." 1u 
The Battle of the Atlantic did not have a single such cathartic event. 
Opposing Navies became Allies soon after war's end, while their sailors forgot 
wartime differences, or were once again separate civilians. Seamen were 
excluded, or intermingled without ceremony. Government recognition of their 
service only grew as their numbers shrank and the urgency of their 
requirements grew. Commemoration depends, as Dasher and as the Vietnam 
experience proved, on who wants to remember. Things too mundane, too 
painful or controversial will be excluded by officialdom, to the detriment of 
those who served. The Second World War generated icons and strong civilian 
memories because the experience was no longer strictly among 'combatants' 
but spread throughout the population. These were separate from the Battle. 
"Those in convoy could think of nothing else, those outside it, couldn't imagine it." 11 
This contributed to their sense of abandonment by the public, and to their 
complaints. Representations had to form appropriate substitutes for the 
commemorations. Here the essence of the experience was expressed. Here 
too the opinions of the servicemen on their neglect were defined and 
enshrined. Here the representations paused for a long time. They were 
fulfilling their purpose. 
10 Sagan, C & Druyan, A,  Billions & Billions: Life & Death At the End of the Millennium, Headline, 
London, 1997, p.205. 
11 Winton 1983 op.cit p.110. The war made strong memories, but the Battle was only strong for those 
involved in it, not the majority of the population. 
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In addition to providing the essence of the experiences through 
mythology, representations needed to change. The world changed. Individual 
members of new generations grew up and wanted to comprehend and 
experience the events. The existing forms became inadequate. The 
academic and scholarly works of the Anniversary decade, and indeed the 
outstanding works of all eras, indicated the positive directions that the 
discourse could take. Progress can be made, in analysing the human-
technology interface, in analysing class relationships, in gender study, both 
through writing women more fully into it, and regarding the masculinity and 
maleness of seamen as a sociocultural construct, not a mere given. The 
relationship of bodies in space could serve as a basis for a poststructuralist 
examination. Such new interpretations could only come from academia: only 
they have the requisite background, skills, vocabulary and imagination. Many 
academics can see the myth, see over, through, past, and within it. Ships at 
sea, men in ships, aircraft and submarines are bodies in space. Both in reality 
and in the frame of a photograph or film they are suspended in space, in 
scene, in shot. There is space between ships, space between U-Boats and 
ships, between U-Boats and the surface, between aircraft and the sea. There 
is space between countries, culturally and geographically. The spaces 
between most countries in the Battle was ocean. There is space between men 
in ships - often not enough - but physically and psychologically. There is 
space between men and home, men and land. There is space also between 
men in the water, between men in boats and rafts, between loss and rescue, 
between life and death. 
General cinematic portrayals - and historical myth - seem evenly split 
between The Cruel Sea and Das Boot. The Allied experience is of too few, 
meagrely armed and equipped escorts and aircraft, vainly protecting old, over-
insured, under-maintained ships manned by the unrecognised and underpaid. 
The German experience is of empty ocean stripped by convoys and evasive 
routing, the constant risk of air and surface attack, forced to dive and pounded 
for hours by depthcharges, all enhancing the fearful foetid atmosphere of 
escort and U-Boat life. On one side, a corvette bridge-crew's faces lighting up 
from a ship aflame from a torpedo hit on the opposite side of the convoy, too 
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late to counterattack. On the other, Jurgen Prochnow dropping down the 
conning-tower ladder yelling "alaaaaaarrrrrrm!" in a splash of seawater. This is 
such a distinctive catchphrase it is even a chapter heading in Wolfoack, the 
British coffee-table photo-essay equivalent of U-BootKrieq: and a page 
heading in the near- "official" U-Boat website, run by a 28 year old in Iceland, 
Gudmundur Helgason. 12 
One principal difference between postwar German and Allied writings is 
that British, Canadian and American writers need not feel much responsibility 
for their war service. Nor do they need to feel - or escape - war guilt, fear, 
loathing, or the sense of being pawns, one of the more popular feelings among 
German ex-servicemen. For former Allied servicemen there is no Nazi past to 
deny, and they can be more clear-headed, or romantic, than German veterans. 
They do not have the same burdens from history and popular culture and 
memory. At the same time, however, there is less to debate, dispute, or gloss 
over and cover up. There may still be a need for inclusion, and the knowledge 
that writings that stray from orthodoxy, from genre and dogma lead at best to 
obscurity and anonymity. 13 At worst such innovation or straying means 
exclusion, condemnation from former comrades, defamation, libel. 14 Irving 
used this exclusion and condemnation to 'remake his network': to bond with an 
entirely different group, the hard-right wing in Germany and elsewhere. He 
was not, of course, an ex-serviceman, but he became close to a certain group 
of participants and their followers. His status as a leading, and very capable, 
historian gave and continues to give, them credibility. This path is not open to 
others unless they wish to be associated with such social and politico-historical 
forces. Few would merely to have their own opinions. 
One interesting aspect of Das Boot not touched on by Hadley was the 
separation between the controversies. The simple, mild controversy in the 
English speaking world revolved around the portrayal of Nazism, and of 
Germans as ordinary sailors. The virulent, complex and polarised controversy 
in Germany revolved around the portrayal of participants as sailors and their 
12 At www.uboat.net//index.html  
13 Becoming an "Einzelfahrer", independent farer" or "independent merchant vessel", in German 
parlance, meaning an iconoclastic ex-serviceman, 'going his own way'. Hadley 1995 op.cit. p.163. 
14 Ostracism and exclusion of "Einzelfarher's" is most apparent in Germany; ibid pp.143, 160, 163-4, 189. 
234 
MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 CONCLUSION 
duty and sacrifice as citizens. But there was very little connection between the 
two. Very little reference has been made by non-German writers to the 
German views, or vice versa. Writers such as Suid only explored the 
presentation of the war sans Nazism, or of Germans at war sans their regime. 
Controversies about the same work seem as unrelated as the types of works 
and perspectives as a whole. 
While the absence of a guilty Nazi past is something that doesn't plague 
western ex-servicemen, it also robs them and their work of political power, 
historical controversy and debate, and the force and depth - or at least 
polydimensionality - that ambiguity, concealment, revisionism, and a failure to 
properly resolve the past bring to German writings. German writings have 
tended to refrain from emotion, no matter how harrowing the experiences they 
are describing. They have tended toward monotone: justifying honour and 
duty, or expressing regret and loss, but never a balance between then in a 
given text. They can however be controversial, or at least struggling with 
themselves under the surface. Little of this occurs among Western writings, 
while they generally have more balanced feelings, and are more emotionally 
engaged with their subject, and thus able to involve the reader in a way few 
German writings can. Perhaps we must wait till all participants are dead 
before historical accounts can move beyond what they want to read or write, 
so our understanding does not aggravate and upset them. 15 This is not what 
Irving did, but any outsider stating 'this is not how it was' always gets at best a 
cool reception, and not without reason. We can however tell the stories 
realistically without belittling them and their experiences, or magnifying them 
beyond sense. Ways must be found to give them t1;eir share of fame and 
commemoration in the interim. Another distinction between the sides was that 
the German forces were [save secretarial staff] uniformly male and white, while 
women made up a substantial portion of Allied training and communications, 
and ethnic seamen from all over the world served in merchant navies. There 
was a disparity in the voices rarely alluded to in the representations. 
15 Or so that participants cannot condemn or criticise merely on the grounds that 'their' experience is 
being denigrated or misrepresented. 
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Little coherent meaning can be extracted from these works because 
little meanings was said or embedded in them. The participants who began 
the myths and perpetuated them assigned little meaning to the Battle. This is 
perhaps one reason, finally, for their relative obscurity as well as that of the 
campaign they describe. They had no message to captivate their audience 
with. Over the last thirty years new ideas, approaches, terminologies and 
conclusions have emerged only slowly. There has been no 'grand synthesis', 
no innovative coalescing of parts into more than their sum. There are now 
indications of where and how that synthesis can be achieved, in technical, 
gender, and ethnic history, in the 'digital convergence' of media offered by 
internet websites, and lastly a grand synthesis of all these advances. This text 
embodies a slow but growing recognition that the representations were 
intended to summarise and express the most dear and vital ideas and needs 
of a select group. Other audiences have been able to experience these events 
and feelings vicariously. The experiences and their significance were not 
forgotten, distorted, or trivialised. Their power and scale remained 
undiminished. The writers saw little meaning in their war. Their survival amid 
relative neglect and collective amnesia instead gave them purpose and 
strength. As Paul Fussell put it, "there was less coherent meaning in the events 
of wartime than we had hoped." 16 
16 Fussell 1989 op.cit, p.296. 
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1915: Liner Lusitania sunk, heralding commencement of unrestricted U-Boat warfare on 
shipping. 
1916-17 U-Boat warfare recommences after break; US enters war partly due to this; U-Boat 
becomes dominant German naval cultural icon, represented in books, novels, pamphlets, 
cinema, documentary, newsreels, memorabilia.' 
1919-: German memoirs such as von Spiegel's U-Boat-202 published in English. 
1921: Jutland British feature film with strong documentary content mythically and misleadingly 
illustrates largest Great War seabattle: miniatures, maps, RN ships & crew used. 
1924: Zebrugge British feature film concerned slightly with wartime U-Boat threat. 
1926: German feature films U-9, Sinking of UC-48, & U-Boat in Danger; 
Surface-fleet films The Scuttled Fleet, and Battle of Jutland all premiere. 
1927: The Battles of Coronel & the Falklands  last of interwar British naval features with heavy 
RN involvement and assistance. 
Moltenort U-Boat memorial begun near Kiel. 
1930: Mo!tenon U-Boat memorial opened near Kiel. 
1931: Hashagen's The Log of a U-Boat Commander among other German works published in 
English. 
1941: May: German cinema feature U-boats Westwards premieres. 
December: Strategic Victory, unseen, for belligerent UK & neutral US over Germany. 
1943: May: Battle Tactical Climax: aircover & technology added to shipbuilding & convoy-
escort strategy of VVW1 applied 1940-41 to counter German Tonnage-War strategy. 
Soviet - US/UK Cold War begins. 
1945: VE Day: limited actual damage to Ger from bombing; new U-Boat tech threats, 
uncovered. A-bomb tests & use: Nuclear weapons age begins. VJ day. End of rationing [US]. 
Lt.Cdr J.E. Taylor's little-known Northern Escort published; possible template or origin 
for MacLean's later HMS Ulysses. 
1946-8: US Withdrawal from Europe. 
Nurnberg WarCrimes trials: Raeder, DOnitz, U-Boat Operations staff, commanders 
imprisoned. 
1951: Monsarrat's The Cruel Sea published; instant bestseller & into film production. 
Paul Brickhill's The DamBusters published; "Britain's biggest-selling war book" by 1954. 
1952: The Cruel Sea feature film released. 
NBC broadcasts 25-episode Victory at Sea TV documentary series. 
1953: The Malta Story, docu-drama feature film, of the siege of Malta, released. 
End of Rationing of sugar confectionary, & citrus fruit in Britain. 
1954: The DamBusters feature film, from Paul Brickhill's 1951 book, released. Bomber 
Command's cultural penetration. 
The Goons episode "The Dreaded Batter-Pudding Hurler of Bexhill-on-Sea" [Ser.5 
episode 3, 12/10/54], containing parodies of & references to both Cruel Sea & Victory At Sea, 
broadcast. Also episode The Mystery of the Marie Celeste: Solved. 
1955: HMS Ulysses published. Sells out, instant classic, overnight sensation, household 
name, still in print: but is it original? 
For a full list of German works in German & English to 1995 see the Bibliography to Hadley op.cit 1995. 
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1956: The Battle of the River Plate film released. 
Reach for the Sky film released: the Battle of Britain's cultural penetration, via this 
Douglas Bader biopic. 
The War at Sea: the German Viewpoint by F.Ruge first general German history of 
WW2 naval operations. 
Suez Crisis: US browbeats former Allies & current NATO occupiers of Germany into 
humiliating backdown. 
1957: Roskill's War At Sea: RN Official History, vol.1, published. 
German cinema feature Sharks & Little Fishes, from novel, premieres. 
The Enemy Below classic US U-Boat vs destroyer psychological confrontation film 
released; ironically very-peripheral US BoA operation, based on novel of a British destroyer. 
The Bridge on the River Kwai UK\US film released, one of all-time classic war films. 
DOnitz released from Spandau Prison. 
Sputnik: space age begins; epitomises era of looking-forward accentuated by rise of 
Nuclear Weapons & turn away from concentration on war years. 
1958: The Silent Enemy UK Med.Sea midget-submarine feature film released. 
Run Silent Run Deep US Pacific Sub warfare feature film released. 
U-47--KptLt Prien German feature film released. 
1959: DOnitz publishes memoirs Ten Years & Twenty Days. 
1960: Sink the Bismarck! released, last of UK naval-war movies; tie-in history/novelisations 
by C.S. Forester [UK], Frank Brennan [US]. Critically derided as hopelessly dated but #1 UK 
box-office success. 
Under Ten Flags, US feature film of German raider, released. 
The Sea War UK TV documentary series broadcast, 1 episode scripted by Jackie 
Broome. 
1963: Roskill's War At Sea vol 3 parts 1 & 2 published, completing Official History of wartime 
Royal Navy. 
1967: British legislation changes release of military and government documents from 60 to 
30 years: enabling public access to wartime primary sources within a few years. 
1968: Irving's PQ-17 published. 
The Battle of Britain film released, a critical and commercial failure. 
1969: British '30-year-Rule' secret documents for 1939 made open; begins period of 
explosive growth in interest & publication of Second World War history & revisionism. 
Broome begins libel case against Irving's publishers, & wins [1971] £30,000 damages 
& withdrawal. RN, USN & MN antipathy smoulders, fuelled by lack of new information & 
hardening attitudes as participants & observers age. 
1971: Peter Yates' peripheral Merchant-seaman's film Murphy's War released. 
1972-3 The World At War UK TV documentary series broadcast, including "Wolfpack: U-Boats 
in the Atlantic, 1939-43." 
LG Buchheim's antiwar Das Boot published, abridged translated: controversial among 
U-Boat men. 
1974: The Ultra Secret 'blows the cover' on Bletchley Park's long-hidden wartime 
contribution to Allied cryptology, & to one of the keys of winning the Battle. Domination of 
WW2 historiography by Ultra commences, only slackening in middle 1990's. 
1975-- Explosion of U/tra-revisionist naval histories & biographies, especially concerning the 
Battle. 
1978: Jan: The Battle of the Atlantic UK technical-history TV documentary, broadcast. 
Nov: German Historical conference: 	Ultra enabled the Allied Battle victory: popular 
memory had already installed this as the reason. 
LG Buchheim publishes factual photoessay U-Boat War, first of several 
reconstructionist works. 
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1979: Thatcher Conservative Government elected in UK; RN run down by successive 
policies focussing on continental defence. 
1980: Irving's revised, "sanitised" PQ-17 published. 
Donitz dies on Xmas Eve. 
1981: Das Boot film, 2h10min, released. Dubbed English version has moderate international 
success; controversial in Germany & abroad from all sides due to accuracy, perspective, 
attitudes. 
Das Boot 300minTV miniseries broadcast, more controversy, but preferred by author. 
The Making of_Pas Boot TV documentary broadcast. 
1982: Argentine invasion of Falklands prompts outburst of Thatcherite support, nationalism, 
& military operation to retake the Islands. RN & MN contributions raise awareness of Atlantic 
Battle, WAC, MN service in VWV2: the road back. New sense of VWV2 reminiscence also. 
1985: Das Boot TV miniseries repeated in Germany. 
The Hunters & the Hunted mythological TV documentary, based on Brennecke's book, 
broadcast. 
Victoried to Death mythological TV documentary by L.G Buchheim broadcast. 
The Submariners companion photo-essay book by L.G Buchheim published. 
1987: Against England, controversial reconstructionist German TV documentary broadcast. 
1989: Fall of the Berlin Wall, beginning of the end of the Cold War. 50th Anniversary era of 
WW2 commemorations begins, with just-preceding rise in volume of commemorative literature 
& awareness. 
1990: Dunkirk & Blitz 50th Anniversary commemorations. 
The Grey Wolves counter-reconstructionist German TV doco broadcast. 
1991: Controversial media coverage of UN coalition driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
USSR disintegrates, end of Cold War. 
1993: 50th Anniversary Official Commemorations of the climax of the Battle of the Atlantic, 
Liverpool, Clyde, Portsmouth; 	History Conferences in London, Moskva, & Washington -DC. 
HMS Dasher memorial conceived, constructed, dedicated: commemorative book 
published 1994. 
Dambusters 50th Anniversary official commemorations. 
1994: Large-scale D-Day 50th Anniversary commemorations. 
Forgotten Heroes TV doco about Second World War seamen broadcast. 
"DOnitz: the Successor" episode of Hitler's Henchmen broadcast [ZDF/SBS]. 
US TV Proudly We Served documentary about USN black Atlantic crew broadcast. 
1995: VE-Day, VJ-Day 50th Anniversary commemorations. 
1996: BBC broadcasts ASW Battle documentary episode as part of Decisive Weapons 12- 
part series. 
1998: Das Boot Director's Cut, subtitled & enhanced, 3h20min, released. 
Preparations for 2000 AD 50th Anniversary commemorations of the Korean War begin. 
1999: Timothy Mulligan's Neither Sharks Nor Wolves indicates new scientific, analytical and 
countermythical directions in U-Boat and Battle research and narrative. 
2000: U-571, straight US war-action film loosely based on actual events, premieres. 
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YEAR: UK: US: German [Other]: Dom 
Fame 
InterN 
Fame 
Col: Notes: 
1940 Convoy 
For Freedom 
Neutral Port 
Long Voyage Home 
>- >- >- >- 
Z
Z
Z
Z
 
Z
Z
Z
Z
 
pre-HX-84 IJervis Bay action film. 
Doco-footage re-enactment of B.R.P. 
Stereotypical British maritime comedy. 
Play-based stories; well made & regarded. 
1941 Shr With Wings 
49 	Parallel 
Merchant Seamen 
U-Boats Westwards 
Z
>-Z
>- 
Z
> -Z
Z
 
Z
Z
Z
Z
 
Tedious Ark Royal aircrew & carrier story. 
Taut U-boat crew escape Canada story: 
Merchant Seaman's revenge tale: see W.App. 
Propaganda film; poor; better than 50s Ger.cin 
1942 In Which We Serve 
Coastal Command 
Find, Fix, & Strike 
Atlantic Convoy 
69 	(Soy) 
> -Z
Z
Z
Z
 
> -Z
Z
Z
Z
  
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
  
Effective famed Mountbatten & Kelly biopic. 
Target For Tonight-style RAF story: Crown FU. 
FAA ditto, Ealing studio. 
Early US Atlantic Battle short film. 
Soviets & Allies meet up 	 
1943 SanDemetrio: London 
Close Quarters 
We Sail @ Midnight 
Action in the 
North Atlantic 
Lifeboat 
Corvette K225 
>
- Z
 Z
  
>
- >- >- 
Z
Z
Z
 Z
>-Z
  
Z
Z
Z
  Z
Z
Z
  
taut eff. BoA tanker re-enactment-see Convoy. 
implaus. USN Atlantic submarine story. 
US equiv of Convoy & Western Approaches. 
Bogart meets Convoy on Kola Run 	 
Semi-taut Hitchcock allegory. 
Hawks: Cv meets Ub & A/C in Atl + romance. 
1944 Western Approaches Y N Y effective colour Brit BoA convoy story. 
1948 Whisky Galore Y Y N novel-based Ealing comedy, peripheral but effective, well regarded & 
famed. 
1952 The Gift Horse Y N N Conventional tale of ex-USN RN Destr in BoA. 
The Cruel Sea Y Y N v.successful, famous Brit BoA adapted novel. 
1955 Above Us The Waves Y N N re-enactment of X-craft vs Tirpitz operation. 
1956 Battleofthe River Plate Y Y Y realistic colour re-enactment of B.R.P. 
1957 The Enemy Below 
Sharks & Little Fish 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Taut but implausible U-Bt vs destroyer story. 
German adaptation of poor mythical memoir. 
1958 
The Key 
U-47--KpLt Prien Y 
V 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Left-wing German countermythical bio-pic. 
Poor confused novel adap. Tug-skippers BoA. 
1960 Sink The Bismarck! 
Under 10 Flags 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
stereotypical, stiff, archaic B&W reenactment. Muddled US Ger surface 
raider movie. 
1967 Submarine X-1 N N Y Recycled fictionalised Above Us the Waves. 
1971 Murphy's War N N Y minimal Venuez. O'Toole MN star vehicle. 
1981 Das Boot Y Y/N Y Solid modern Ger.adapted U-Boat novel. 
1997 Das Boot 
Director's Cut 
Y Y/N Y Extended, enhanced restored; firmer anti-war & less action-toned film. 
2000 U-571 Y Loosely based on British events about captured U-Boat and Enigma 
machine. 
Col = Colour. NB: Dom= Domestic Fame War success; Internat=International Fame &/or success; 
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APPENDIX II: ATLANTIC BATTLE-RELATED DOCUMENTARIES & DRAMA BY YEAR 
DOCUMENTARIES: 
Year Title Nat Epis Our Description 
1952 Victory at Sea US 7of 25 30min Famous music & narration; very widely remembered. 
1960 The Sea War UK ? ? ? Contained episode scripted by J.Broome of PQ-17/TCS. 
1973 "Wolfpack" worldaWar UK 1of 26 50min preU/tra; MN, RN, RCN, U-Boat, famous interviewees. 
1978 Battle of the Atlantic UK 1 of 6 49min Ultra-era weaponry, sensors, & Enigma technical doco. 
1985 Hunters & the Hunted Ger 54min Mythical pro-U-Boat from book by Brennecke. 
Victoried to Death Get 1h19 by Buchheim, more war experiences. Anti H&H. 
1987 Against England Ger 1h45 Balanced & nonmythical; but promotions mythical. 
1990 The Grey Wolves Get 54min Reactionary counter-Buchheim counter-L-Wng response. 
The Atlantic War US 50min Interviews & Archival footage from US participants view. 
1994 Forgotten Heroes UK  	50min Mythical traumatic multinational MN experiences. 
"Denitz":Hitler's H'men: Get 1 of 6 50min Biassed, ahistorical; misuses famous interviewees. 
Proudly We Served US  	58min Limited, mythical USN-backed black USN Service. 
Codebreakers US  	50min Purple & Ultra history & use; Kahn: postU/ba era. 
1995 The Black Pit Can 48min Story of Convoy SC-107 & negligence of RCN escort. 
1996 "Battle of the Atlantic" UK lot 12 26min BBC semi-mythical technical doco: vdVat. loop, others. 
1998 "Ultra" US lot 52 49min Massive US Commercial series Secrets of War repetitive. 
1998 "Battle of the Atlantic" US lot 52 49min 1 of follow-on intelligence/tech-history episodes to "Ultra". 
German documentaries except Hitler's Henchmen  have not been seen outside Germany; therefore their influence 
has been slight & penetration minimal, save within Germany's U-Boat debate. 
English-Language documentaries = 12 of 17 or 706%, so less penetration than overall numbers would suggest. 
DRAMA: 
I 1966 Convoy US 13 50mins "Uninteresting war series with chill wind of failure about it."' 	Only known TV 
drama series to involve the Battle of the Atlantic, from US escorts & merchant 
ship's points of view. Grim, depressing, and cancelled. 
1. Halliwell, L, Halliwell's Teleguide, 1 stEdn, Granada TV UK, 1979. 
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MEMORIALS FOR THE LIVING 	 APPENDIX III: MEMORIALS 
The Tower Hill Memorial, London lists 37,701 British merchant seamen of both world wars without known graves. 
The American Memorial, Cambridge. 
1,371 US Navy & 201 US Coast Guard men lost in the Battle are named on the right wall. 
Almost all US Merchant Marine seamen are without a specific memorial. 
Pages from Lloyds War Losses 
The dead of Inverlane and San Adolfo among other ships on the Tower Hill memorial. 
Notable beside San Adolfo is the far more famous San Dernettio, the subject of a wartime book and film. 
The crewmembers of Oakcrest lost at sea commemorated at Tower Hill. 
Merchant Navy graves among Royal Navy and Air Force at a small cemetery outside Portsmouth, 1941. 
The typ-VIIC U-995 at rest outside Laboe, near Kiel. Inset:: U-995 being lifted into position, 1970. 
Behind is the first brick tower memorial to U-Boat men killed in the Great War. 
The U-Boat crew memorial at MOItenort outside Kiel. 28,728 killed in action and 1,275 of other causes are named here. 
Australia's Merchant Navy dead. Until 1999 only entries on an alcove database, and general plaques commemorating 
seamen, war correspondents, nurses and munitions workers mentioned them. 
Today they have a deliberately separated 'Garden of Remembrance', 20% in error in overall numbers, outside the AWM's 
Roll of Honour building. Discrimination and inter-service rivalry are perpetuated. 
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The Tower Hill Memorial, London lists 37,701 British merchant seamen of both world wars without known graves. 
The American Memorial, Cambridge. 
1,371 US Navy & 201 US Coast Guard men lost in the Battle are named on the right wall. 
Almost all US Merchant Marine seamen are without a specific memorial. 
28 TONC.4 DECEMBER 1 339 
   
VOYAGE DATE VESSEL 	FLAG GROSS CARGO 
7500 tons 
coal. 
RI•ARKS  
Wreck dispersed. Tyne for Fort said. 
'POSITION  
4 'idles S.W. of Huisboro 
L.V. 
coal. Boness for london. 
BOW PERSONNEL 
N. 	1 lost. 
m. 	5 lost. i mile S. 'of N. Caistar 
Buoy. 
177o.G5o 
metric tons 
quartz. 
Malmo for Ronnskar. In the Kogrundsrannan, or 
betwecu Trelleborg and 
Falsterbo. 
Wreck broke up. 
s. 	51 lost. Narvik for -- 6C00 tons 
iron ore. 
-E rile 	of 
houuiuGsvai..gstadt, in 
lat. 62 
From Tyne -- 
M. 	1 survivor. -- 
Y• 	4 lost. Abadan for ]nvergordou. 1294 tons fuel oil. Beach near 
whit-
burn Steel; broken 
in two. Forepart 
refloated & towed 
Tyne, and Scapa. 
Later towed Longhope 
and beached. Refloated ma5i 20, 1944 prepared as blotkship and sunk in position May 30, 1944. 
12 MN:2, LOBLRT (m.v)sr 4535 
12 rAlTaCv READ Br 49 6 
12 TORO SW 3.467 
13 DEPTFORD Br 4101 
13 ROSA H- 1146 
13 WILLIAM HALLET Br 202 (s.tr1r) 
14 TNVERIAN7 Br 9141 
(m.tank) 
el 	., oi miles off Tyne Break- v. 	1 lost. 
water. w or 12 miles 
off N.F., coast U.K. Tyne area. 
555 r., 1 7 w. 
S. 	Crew saved. 5217 Albany (N.Y) for Cork. 	maize. 	51 N., 12 16 W. GERvATNE Gr 
15 H.C. FL.AJD No 
15 RAGNI No 
15 STRTTTAiIT r o 
15 -R3"S Sw 
1)07 null for Oslo. 	Coke. 	' Off Tyne. 
1264 Hull for malmo. 	coal. 	Off Tyne. 
321 vurvik for Lull. 	Ferro-chrome 	cff . Tyne. 
14.X) tdk.levalla for Rochester. Woodpulp. 	51 j5 N., 1 38 5 E. Creck lies in 51 53 1 N., 1 29 3 E. To be diererst.n. 
r , M. u missing. 
W. 	9 lost. 
Nr. 	9 lost. 
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The dead of Inverlane and San Adolfo among other ships on the Tower Hill memorial. 
Notable beside San Adolfo is the far more famous San Demetrio, the subject of a wartime book and film. 
DATE VESSEL FLAG 
TONS 
GROSS 
22 JUSTITIA Br 4562 
22 OAKCREST Br 5407 
22 PIKEPOOL Br 3683 
23 AMEN sw 5135 
23 BRUSE No 2205 
Liverpool for New 
York. 
Liverpool for South 
Africa. 
Glasgow for Barry. 
Nelson, N.B. for 
Ipswich. 
HOW PERSONNEL 
Crew 38 and 1 
gunner. 13 
crew lost. 
In ballast. In about 53 N., 17 W. S. Crew 40 and 1 
gunner. 	35 
lost. 
In ballast. 23 miles E.S.E. of Smalls. M. Crew-51 and 1 
gunner. 16 crew 
and gunner lost. 
In ballast. 56 57 N., 18 18 W. S. 32 crew saved, 
1 lost. 
1550 tons 
lumber. 
55 4 N., 12 15W. S. Crew 22, 16 
lost. 
5 9 
REMARKS 
Presumed sunk.Last seen 
November 23 at 12.5 a.m 
B.S.T. 
On November 25 in 57 15 N., 17 40 W., 
with heavy list. 
Presumed sunk. 
Forepart seen on Nov.24 
in 55 39 N. 11 31 V., & 
on Nov. 25 in 55 31 N., 
11 29 W., and was picked 
up by tug on Nov. 28 In 
55 45 N., 8 41 w., & 
arrived Clyde Nov. 30. 
Delivered to shipbrealeme 
at Troon in June, 1941. 
NOVEMBER 	1 940.     
VOYAGE 	 CARGO POSITION 
Savannah and Sydney N.S. 5161 tens 	In approx. 55 N., 13 10 W. S. 
for London. 	 lumber, 2248 
tons steel,• 
40 tons turps, 
300 tons 
sundries. 
23 BONAPARTE (tug) 	Br 	38 -- 	__ 	Near Northam Bridge, 
Southampton. 
23 BUSSUM Du 3636 Montreal for Belfast. 	About 5200 tons 55 39 N., 8 58 W. 
grain. 
A . 
S. 	29 survivors 
landGd. 
Later reported in 
55 37 N., 8 42 W. 
Sank November 24. 
23 EING IDWAL 5115 Liverpool for Baltimore. In ballast. 	56 44 N., 19 13 WAMaster) S. Crew 40, 12 
56 42 N., 19 14 W. 	 lost. 
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The crewmembers of Oakcrest lost at sea commemorated at Tower Hill. 
Merchant Navy graves among Royal Navy and Air Force at a small cemetery outside Portsmouth, 1941. 

The U-Boat crew memorial at MO'tenon outside Kiel. 28,728 killed in action and 1,275 of other causes are named 
here. 
The Longest Battle 
THE LAST TWO SHIPS OF THE WARTIME NAVY: In their permanent homes on the Toronto and Halifax 
waterfronts the heritage warships (following page) destroyer HMCS Haida and corvette HMCS SackuiIle 
with G-63 and K-181 their wartime pendant numbers on their hulls. As the last two warships left from the 
giant fleet of close to four hundred RCN ships at the war's end, they are open to visitors, reminding young 
and old of Canada's great achievement at sea half a century ago. The young who cannot remember are able 
to move through an actual warship that had fought in the longest battle. 
THE CATHEDRAL CHURCH OF ST. JAMES / TORONTO 
CONGREGATION FOUNDED IN 1797 
THEIR HONOURS GATHERED 
1943 
AND THEIR DUTY DONE 
1993 
COMMEMORATING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 
At this 50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Atlantic Church Parade, it is a privilege and solemn duty to 
thank God for our heritage of freedom and for the courage and determination, even unto death, of so 
many who were wounded or gave their lives in this terrible contest. We hold in reverent memory the 
following ships lost in World War II and their companies: 
HMCS Alberni 	 EMCS St. Croix 	 HMCS Levis 
HMCS Bras D'or HMCS Skeena HMCS Margaree 
HMCS Chedabucto 	 HMCS Trentonian 	 HMCS Otter 
HMCS Esquimault MACS Weyburn HMCS Regina 
kils1CS Guysborough 	 ILNICS Athabascan 	 HMCS Shawinigan 
HMCS Louisburg HMCS Charlottetown HN1CS Spikenard 
HMCS Ottawa 	 MACS Clayaquot 	 HMCS Valleyfield 
I-IMCS Raccoon HMCS Fraser HMCS Windflower 
HMC M.T.B.'s 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 466- Ships of the Merchant Navy. 
, 
: 
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